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The Marshall Mission, 1946

Dennis Joe Stewart
Fort Hays Kansas State College

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THE MARSHALL MISSION, 1946

being

A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty
of Fort Hays Kansas State College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

by

Dennis Joe Stewart, A. B.
Fort Hays Kansas State College

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Approved

Willa J. Smith
Major Professor

Ralph L. Cady
Chairman, Graduate Council
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the diplomacy of the mission of General George Catlett Marshall to China in 1946. By utilizing material gleaned chiefly from United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, the Congressional Record, and the New York Times, a step-by-step account of the Marshall Mission is attempted. Moreover, the effort is made to see the mission in its proper setting, against the backdrop of Oriental Communism and of antique Chinese Confucian authoritarianism. Thirdly, the narrative of the mission itself is coupled with news of developing public opinion in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, in an endeavor to determine the relationship and impact of the public temper on the mission, or visa versa. In brief, the salient purpose is to observe the power of the democratic practice of diplomacy when it is pitted against the anti-democratic force of ideology.

One fully positive correlation is yielded by the study: Marshall followed his directives to the letter. Indeed, his austere, military obedience was so straight and unwavering that the biographical chapter on him seems to have been included, in the last analysis, as a matter of scholarly convention. His directives, moreover, had written into them an element which largely pre-empted any "diplomatic" battle in China and made it rather one of opposing ideologies. The United States was irrevocably tied to support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist faction. Stage by stage, this persistent fact inexorably alienated the Chinese Communists from the negotiations and made them more amenable to support from, and collusion with, the Kremlin. When this potentiality
was early manifested, Chiang himself became minatory, finally settling upon a policy of force when he had seen that he could obviate Marshall's constraints with impunity and still count on an American sentiment that was growing more and more monomaniacally anti-Communist in temper. The result was that Chiang went the way of reaction, suppression, and cruelty, and the Chinese population, in the words of Dean G. Acheson, "moved out from under" his despotic leadership. Chinese Communism soon took over the China mainland, felling Nationalism in violent struggle which took place as if there had been no diplomatic intervention by the United States.

The determining factor seems to have been in an American foreign policy, which, from 1946 through 1949, as Archibald MacLeish notes, was a "mirror image" of Soviet foreign policy. It was a policy based on anti-Communist ideology, and one which thereby passed over many of the political social, military, and economic exigencies of postwar China—exigencies which needed to have been taken into consideration if diplomacy was to be given a chance to function.
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the diplomacy of the Marshall Mission against the historical backgrounds of international Communism and of antique Chinese Confucian authoritarianism. Moreover, the effort has been made to co-ordinate material gathered from government documents with that gleaned from issues of The New York Times in order that any possible correlation between the events of the Marshall Mission and the temper of public opinion in the United States, as well as in Russia and China, can be gauged in some rough fashion. The solution of the problem of exact relationships, however, have been left to matching Marshall's performance in diplomacy with the stipulations of his directives—an academic operation which so nearly yields full positive correlation that, in many respects, the biographical chapter on Marshall, seeming to assume the potential exercise of a personal impact, may well have been included as a matter of scholarly convention in the final analysis.

On November 27, 1945, General George Catlett Marshall was appointed as President Harry S. Truman's special envoy to China. His instructions charged him to work toward peace in the civil war in China, and toward the inauguration of stable government. Also, these operations were to be undertaken on the assumption that national leadership in China would continue to be wielded by China's "best asset for democracy," Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. If the policies of the Chinese Communists were not already predetermined by the inter-
national pretensions which Chinese leaders like Mao Tse-tung had been voicing since 1920, and by their willingness to pay deference to the Kremlin line and to be used by the Soviets for Russian purposes, the American policy of unwavering support for Chiang and the Kuomintang soon gave promise itself of determining those policies.

Marshall succeeded in the "nearly impossible," effecting a cease-fire on January 13, 1946. But the agreement seems in retrospect to have been signed purely for propaganda purposes. This was perhaps particularly true of the Communists, since the Political Consultative Conference, which was in session from January 14, 1946, to January 31, projected plans for the new government which posited the power of leadership in Chiang Kai-shek and gave the Kuomintang superior positions in the State Council and in the constitutional assembly.

The second step in Marshall's diplomacy, that of negotiating an agreement on military demobilization and reorganization, was the crucial one. The idea was to end civil strife permanently so that lasting political accord could be achieved. Both Nationalist and Communist forces were to be reduced and integrated into a new national "nonpolitical" army. The improbability of complete neutrality and the fatuousness of the hope to reduce politically-spirited armies into a unified and relatively docile policing force were shown by the very provisions of the agreement itself, which was promulgated on February 25, 1946. The Nationalists were to be given a five-to-one superiority in the integrated forces of every region; and in Manchuria, an area to
which the Communist armies currently had much better access than did the Nationalists, the Kuomintang armies were to enjoy a fourteen-to-one superiority. General Chou En-lai, the Communists’ field general and chief negotiator, consequently refused to comply with the agreement. From this point on, the breach continually widened. Sporadic skirmishes in north China between the two armies increased in scope and frequency. Communist propaganda, emanating from Moscow as well as Yenan, soon began to complain of the presence of American troops in China and of the fact that American aid had favored one faction only. Then, seemingly in riposte, Communist armies entered into Manchuria during the month of April when the Russians were evacuating. There they were armed and supplied with surrendered Japanese weapons and material; and the Nationalists found themselves unable to exercise the sovereignty they had been granted in Manchuria by the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945. Chances for reconciliation diminished almost to nothing. In June, Chiang announced his determination to wrest Changchun from the Communists, and Marshall, fully committed to full support of both internal peace and Chiang Kai-shek, could only request self-restraint from the Generalissimo. Communist faith in American mediation, an element which might have permitted the American mediator to use the Communist faction as insurance against Nationalist excesses, was now destroyed.

Nationalist armies soon besieged and occupied the Manchurian city of Changchun, and Chiang’s forces flared out toward Kirin and Harbin. Chiang, meanwhile, professed peaceful intent to Marshall, but simultaneously reduced the American mediator to the function of carrying his
demands—only occasionally mitigated by American emendation and paraphrasing—to the peace table.

In July, John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University at the time, was appointed at Marshall's behest to be the United States Ambassador to China. American mediation thereupon seemed too supine to be effective. The joint statement of Marshall and Stuart, issued on August 10, 1946, cited the economic deterioration of China and the continued warfare in the face of the popular desire for peace and prosperity. Truman simultaneously testified to the impotence of his negotiators by addressing his communiqué of August 10 not to Marshall or Stuart, but rather directly to Chiang, warning the Generalissimo that his present minatory behavior could only delay the extension of American economic aid to China, since such extension would continue to await the cessation of hostilities in China and the inauguration of stable government.

Chiang, however, continued his march into Manchuria and north China, and by October 10, the strategic city of Kalgan had fallen into Nationalist hands. This was the actual coup de grace of mediation. The American team now stepped aside as a Third Party Group made an abortive attempt at mediation in November. The Nationalists, however, demurred from the conference of November 4 on the grounds that the Communists had refused American mediation. Chiang then unilaterally convoked the constitutional assembly on November 12 and drafted a constitution which called for all the forms of democracy but largely vitiated
their substance by granting extraordinary powers to the person of Chiang Kai-shek and to the Nationalist members of the governing. Bodies. Marshall made several overtures to the Communists in order to try to persuade them to accept the new Constitution, but the Communists were final and adamant in refusal.

Marshall's personal diplomacy was characterized by unwavering and literal obedience to State Department directives which dictated a narrow "nonpolitical" and "neutral" path for American mediation. He was unable therefore to use the Communist faction as a threat against Nationalist excesses—or visa versa—or to use American troops stationed in China as a possible persuading force when an impasse was reached at the conference table. Strategic redeployment of American troops consistent with diplomacy and as suited American purposes was completely neglected. Instead, the presence of American troops was utilized by the Communists for propaganda material.

In the final analysis, the Marshall Mission, in most particulars, reflected the ideological temper of world politics following World War II and the disruption of the Grand Alliance. When the emphasis is on ideology, pragmatism is reserved only to cajole the national populations into agreement on national aims. No compromises were allowed in China. And the Chinese found the Chiang government ineffectual, with the result that they sought refuge and succor in the Communist movement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. PURPOSE OF THE MARSHALL MISSION AND DEFINITION OF THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM WHICH IT POSES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. CHINESE ANTIQUE HISTORY AND CULTURE AS IT BEARS UPON THE VIABILITY OF THE CHINESE TO WESTERN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEDIATOR, GENERAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE SETTING OF THE MARSHALL MISSION AND ITS DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The year 1946 may yet prove to have been the most crucial single year in modern world history. In December of that year, the failure of the mission of General George Catlett Marshall to mediate differences between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists not only signified a failure of democracy in one large region of the world, but it also immediately preceded an era in which pluralism in worldwide political philosophy was to give way to a simple bifurcation. The current Sino-Soviet split, the heightened truculence of Communist China toward the United States, and the present prospect of nuclear weapons for the Chinese People's Republic are all recent developments which make the Marshall Mission loom ever more importantly as an area for historical study. Marshall was sent to China as the harbinger—or perhaps even the prophet—of the Western democratic spirit. Yet, the entire story of the Marshall Mission is almost devoid of any element of democracy. It is rather a tale of uncompromising, militant Communism encountering an opposing force which increasingly found its raison d'être in anti-Communist intransigence rather than in the tenets of liberal democracy.

What was clearly evinced in 1946—even if an infinity of causal relations were left unknown—was that an unremitting, worldwide totalitarian movement undoubtedly had the capacity to pressure
democracy to the breaking point. The question of the survival of the democratic ideal—a question which seemingly has vexed man for centuries—became now the most paramount of questions. Did democracy, in order to maintain itself in the face of a dynamic foe, have to adopt authoritarian methods to such an extent that democracy itself was negated from within? Or was there a _modus operandi_ whereby democracy could continue to oppose both the Right and the Left, arrogating the enemy's methods to itself only superficially and on isolated and crucial occasion? Or thirdly, could democracy possibly survive through the simple application of its essence, and fight the good fight in a way that would be peculiarly and exclusively democratic? These were the questions which 1946 brought to Western man with redoubled impact.

While it would be the sheerest mad pretension to submit that this work answers questions so broad and sweeping as these, it has nevertheless been its purpose to examine the diplomacy of the Marshall Mission against the historical backgrounds of international Communism and antique Chinese Confucian authoritarianism—and to examine it, moreover, in relation to the ever-ossifying points of view which were becoming predominant in the two quarters which were steadily becoming anode and cathode of world opinion—Washington and Moscow, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The method of the paper is to try to measure in some rough way the power of the democratic practices of diplomacy as against that of the antidemocratic forces of
ideology, and to make conclusions which purport to any exactitude only with relation to the problem immediately at hand. Inferences and implications which may lead to broader conclusions, either correctly or erroneously, we elect to leave as scholarly heuristics that beg for no attention if they cannot command it.

Research on Oriental Communism and on the Marshall Mission itself was largely limited to the Department of State's publication, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, to the Congressional Record, to the series on Foreign Relations of the United States, and to The New York Times. Admittedly, there are notable gaps. Perhaps the prime deficit in this area is the lack of a scholarly biography of Marshall, a work which gives no promise of ever being written. Moreover, it might be mentioned that even the documents pertinent to this study, bordering as they do on questions of political ideology and belief, must be examined and utilized with careful critical process.

Acknowledgement is made to the members of my thesis committee, Professors Eugene R. Craine, Wilda M. Smith, Raymond L. Welty, and Roberta C. Stout, who have been longsuffering but reasonably cheerful through all the inconveniences to which they have been subjected; to Eugene Mullen of the Library staff, who bore with equanimity the extraordinary liberties that were taken with library materials; and to all my friends, whose predictions that the work would never be finished time and again sparked a renewed effort.
CHAPTER I

PURPOSE OF THE MARSHALL MISSION AND DEFINITION OF THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM WHICH IT POSES

The purpose of the Marshall Mission, as stated by President Harry S. Truman in his directive to General George Catlett Marshall on December 15, 1945, was:

... to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China, and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China.¹

General Marshall's task, in other words, was to bring about a cessation of hostilities in the civil conflict that was currently raging in China between the armies of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Nationalists, and to initiate a more stable and democratic government in which both factions would have a voice, but of which Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo of the Nationalist Army and President of the National Government, would be at least the nominal head.² According to the historian John King Fairbank, the final


²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1956), II, 68. The statement on "United States Policy Toward China," issued along with Marshall's directive on December 15, 1945, is quoted as saying that Chiang's Nationalist Government "is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China." Hereinafter cited as Truman, Memoirs.
settlement which was envisaged was a coalition government in which the Communists would assume a subordinate position akin to the position which Communist parties held in the coalition governments of Western Europe. Thus, the disasters which currently threatened China—economic and political anarchy on the one hand, and complete Communist takeover on the other—were to be averted through the interposition of American diplomacy.

If the Presidential letter of December 15, 1945, however, is used as the criterion of failure or success of the Marshall Mission, its diplomacy was most clearly a failure. As Herbert Feis writes, "The years have forced us to realize how grave and hard was the mission on which Marshall set off; how bleak the outcome, how ominous the sequence." Bad portents on the eve of Marshall's departure for China indeed had no answer. Marshall returned to the United States at Presidential behest on January 6, 1947. The Chinese civil war had resumed in a more vigorous fashion than ever, and both sides had given up any pretense at the compromise which might have eventuated in the permanent coalition government which the United States had desired.

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Moreover, by the time Marshall had returned to the United States, the dire fate of the Chinese Nationalists seems to have been somewhat hermetically sealed. Sino-Russian Communist collusion, the loose ends of which finally flogged the prospects for lasting peace to death during Marshall's tour of duty, began at this time to go to work on Chinese Nationalism. From Manchuria, where the Chinese agrarian armies (as they were called by such deluded people as the Foreign Service officers then on duty in China) had repaired almost en force to be armed with surrendered Japanese weapons by the evacuating Russians, the Communists began their drives which swept the Nationalists off the mainland and eventually culminated in the complete Communist control which was achieved on October 1, 1949. The illusion under which Marshall had labored—namely, that either Chinese Communist or Nationalist factions would be amenable to the lasting truce which would make possible permanent peace and coalition—seemed to have been quite fully dispelled by the time the Communists had achieved this control. Indeed, by the time of the early 'fifties, when the Chinese Communists sent troops to aid the puppet regime of North Korea in repelling United Nations forces in the Korean Conflict, the dynamic internationality of the Chinese Communist movement had become so clear that the Marshall Mission began to many observers to appear as more of a stupid blunder than a naive mistake on the part of American Far


Eastern policymakers. During the first session of the Eighty-Second Congress, for instance, Senators Styles Bridges, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, and Owen Brewster held hearings on Far Eastern policy wherein it was openly alleged, in the senatorial conclusions, that Marshall's six-months embargo on arms to the Nationalists during his mission had contributed crucially and substantially to the Communist triumph. It was by this time recognized that the Chinese Communist revolution was no less than "extremely dynamic" in nature; and the hearings called for a departure from the policies of Secretaries of State James F. Byrnes and Dean G. Acheson, which, according to these findings, were nothing short of "appeasement" of the international Communist conspiracy.8 Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the red-baiter from Wisconsin, went a step further at about this same time and labelled General Marshall as a "traitor to his country" who had a knowing hand in the conspiracy principally by virtue of resisting Chiang Kai-shek's effort to unify China by the force of Kuomintang military might.9

The validity of the extreme to which McCarthy went can most assuredly be doubted. Yet, it is certainly true that the Marshall Mission labored in obviation of certain ideological realities that were existent in China, and that its unsuccessful conclusion manifested a certain ignorance on the part of American policymakers of the tone

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of political philosophies which had long been in vogue in China. One has only to read the literal and philosophical works of Mao Tse-tung, for instance, current Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic who was in charge of political affairs at Yanan at the time of the Marshall Mission, to note clearly a dedicated and undying animosity toward the type of parliamentary government which Marshall was seeking to institute in China. As early as June of 1920, Mao had stated:

I recognize the existence of only two 'nations,' the 'nation' of the capitalists and the 'nation' of the workers. At present, the 'nation' of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the 'nation' of the capitalists.10

Further, as if to reinforce this earlier statement, Mao had gone on to note at the death of Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, late Premier of the Soviet Union, that "Russia remains the theoretical fountainhead of Communism and the model for China now as in the past . . . Sino-Russian friendship is unbreakable."11

Most of the belief that the Chinese Communists were not


11As quoted in Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), 546. Hereinafter cited as Buss, Far East. Things have changed with the premiership of Nikita Sergeyevich Krushchev, but Chinese leaders still assert their loyalty to Stalinist principles, and Mao has recently opined that the only mistake Stalin made was that he didn't kill Krushchev. See "A Gathering of Mummies," Newsweek (December 17, 1962), 30-33.
really Communists had sprung from what now appears to have been
a half-comical episode during the Ambassadorship of General Patrick
Hurley in China, just prior to the Marshall Mission. As Henry Wei
records it:

Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, and
General Patrick Hurley had a conversation with Soviet Foreign
Minister V. M. Molotov, wherein the Soviet diplomat told
them that the Chinese Communists were in no way related to
Communism, that they were in no way tied to the Soviet Govern-
ment, and that they were only reformers interested in improving
the economic conditions of China.12

Documents comprising the series, United States Relations with China,
however, reveal that in the conversation in question, Molotov care-
fully but shrewdly disavowed specifically only those "Chinese revol-
tutionary groups led by Chang Hsueh-liang and Wang Ching-wei which
included many Communists and which looked to the Soviet Union for
sympathy and aid . . ." This might well mean that the Chang and Wang
factions were to Moscow the opportunists they had long since been to
the main body of the Chinese Communists. Molotov then went on to refer
to the impoverished peoples in some parts of China, "Some of whom
call themselves Communists but were related to Communism in no way
at all." But never in this conversation does Molotov declare all
Communist factions anathema to the Kremlin, and it seems in fact
that he here refers to every section of China except the all-import-

12 Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, 1956), 170. Hereinafter cited as Wei, China and Russia.
ant factions of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{13}

When Hurley had his interview with Marshal Stalin, however, on April 15, 1945, he presented this eager analysis of the Molotov conversation:

\ldots that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all. Their objective is to obtain what they look upon as necessary and just reformations in China. The Soviet Union does not desire internal dissension or civil war in China. The Government of the Soviet Union wants closer and more harmonious relations in China \ldots \ldots \textsuperscript{14}

Hurley concludes with the terse sentence, "Molotov agreed to this analysis." But in the conversations, according to Hurley, came a concomitant expression on the part of the Soviets of intense interest "in what is happening in Sinkiang and other places and will insist that the Chinese Government will prevent discrimination against Soviet Nationals."\textsuperscript{15} In view of this and the international projections of Russian Communists—which included "closer and more harmonious relations in China"—it would have been a diplomatic faux pas for Molotov to have done anything other than agree to Hurley's fatuous analysis. Neither Stalin, nor Molotov, nor Mao, in reality, at that time separated national from international affairs in such


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 94-95.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 95.
a facile manner. The links are clearly seen in Mao’s statement on international aid:

"Victory is also possible without international aid"—this is an erroneous thought . . . . If the Soviet Union did not exist, if there were no victory of the anti-fascist Second World War and no defeat of Japanese imperialism . . . Could we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not.16

As Feis was later to write of the devious statement by Molotov:

"Hurley’s whole later treatment of the internal division in China was affected by hearing these words."17 Similarly, General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, then in charge of the China Theater of Operations, wrote:

Hurley, in 1944–45 . . . approached the problem of unifying China on the false supposition that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists under Moscow’s command but simply a Chinese faction that could be induced by diplomatic negotiations to come to terms with the Nationalist Government.18

At a much later date, however, President Truman was to deny that the Marshall Mission was undertaken upon such faulty premises.

"Neither Marshall nor I," he writes in his Memoirs, "was ever taken in by the talk about the Chinese Communists being just 'agrarian reformers.'" Yet, he continues that it was not until March of 1946,


when Marshall, then in the midst of his mission, confided to the President that:

Chou En-lai, the Communists' military commander and chief negotiator, had very frankly declared that, as a Communist he believed firmly in the teachings of Marx and Lenin and in the eventual victory of the proletariat. Marshall's messages from China show, also, that he fully assumed that the Chinese Communists would, in the end, be able to count on Russian support.19

Moreover, in seeming dissonance, it was in line with the Truman-formulated-and-directed "United States Policy Toward China" statement of December, 1945, which stated that "It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiations,"20 that the Marshall Mission found its official basis. The improbability and near-illogicalness is everywhere reflected in the post-mortems. John Leighton Stuart, who served part of his Ambassadorship in China during the Marshall Mission, concluded at the end of his service that, "In retrospect, with what we know of Communist intentions and methods, it seems clear that it had no chance."21

Marshall himself, in his final report of January 7, 1947, cited the

19Truman, Memoirs, II, 90-91.

20Ibid., II, 68.

21Stuart, Fifty Years, 180.
mutual suspicion in China that was based on Communist intransigence;22 and Senator William F. Knowland, speaking on the floor of the Senate on October 3, 1949, two days after the fall of Chinese Nationalism, spoke openly and clearly of Communist international aid to the Chinese insurgents.23 If the conspiratorial policy of the Soviet Union had hitherto been adumbrated by the earlier Stalinist policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and maintaining scrupulous relations with the Republic of China, it now became fully apparent to all as the Chinese Ambassador, in October of 1949, raised the cry of "Soviet Imperialism" before the General Assembly of the United Nations.24

The abysmal ignorance which resulted in the loss of China to the free world has penetrated even into historical literature, and has therein set in motion a movement which dwells upon the unfamiliarity of Chinese social patterns to Occidentals. Many recent writers on Chinese history, while expressly denying the concept of historical inevitability, nonetheless point to a simultaneous groping and rigid authoritarianism in Chinese development which has wrought certain ends which, it is contended, might easily have been foreseen. Fairbank, for instance, notes that American policy toward China since the entry into the Orient with the Treaty of Wanghsia in 1844 has

22Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 796.
23Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., 13741.
24Wei, China and Russia, 263-267.
been based upon a belief in the "exoticism" of the Orient, plus an illusory idealism, "punctuated by a recurrent mood of cynical disillusionment," and that Chinese history, consequently, has proceeded in its own merry direction in spite of over a century of economic subservience and military and political inferiority to the West. Such mysticism, in reality, seems only to underline a misunderstanding by the West of their own basic political and diplomatic techniques as they were put to use by other powers in the Orient. Emblematic of the effect is that, even as Ambassador Stuart was writing that the Communist ideologies were alien to basic Chinese social patterns, John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, and John Carter Vincent were noting with perspicacity that the Chinese Communists had wide popular support. Simultaneously came the other point of Chinese Communist power: the long-range policy of the Soviet Union favored

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26 Stuart, Fifty Years, 4.

27 Not only the "pinks" realized this. So did such respectable citizens as Kenneth S. Latourette and Fairbank. Dean G. Acheson, in his statement of January 12, 1950, said: "What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended," and that the Communists mounted on a revolutionary spirit which "moved out from under" Chiang. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: China (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), 112-113. Hereinafter cited as F. R.
them. Solidification of the Soviet position in Sinkiang, Manchuria, Mongolia, in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and even in Korea, made it only the short-range policy of the Soviet Union to cooperate with the nationalist aims of the Chinese revolution, for early Soviet gains were recorded in time with the internal machinations of the Communists endemic to China. The pattern of the policy itself, once revealed in its simplest forms, should in no wise have been new to the West. As pointed out by Joseph R. Levenson in an article entitled "Western Powers and Chinese Revolutions: the Pattern of Intervention," the West has always realized that the government of China, whatever the nuance of its political belief, always acquiesced more felicitously when it was under the pressure of what amounted to a Western-inspired rebellion. Consequently, China had to qualify for foreign aid from powers who seemed to be applying less pressure than the revolutionists. This method of dealing with China was, moreover, instigated in the heyday of nationalist idealism while the T'ai p'ing revolt flickered strong in China.

28 Lenin, like Mao, thought that the Chinese Revolution should pattern itself after the Russian "agrarian" Revolution of 1905.

29 Intimacy always has a great effect. "Sun Yat-sen ... urged his followers to guard the friendship between the two revolutions." Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, A Political Biography (New York: Vantage Press, 1960), 399.

British at this time realized that they could "by a relatively small expenditure in the form of suppression of Chinese independence . . . work their will in China."\(^{31}\) The system rests on a balance in imbalance, with two threats of destruction to the precarious medium:

... either the government eventually tries to dispense with the West and to right itself e.g., the Boxer movement, 1900, or it threatens to lose its balance completely and require more Western succor, lest it fall, than its services seem to its Western sponsors to warrant.\(^{32}\)

The United States, however, in 1941, "seemed to lack what Britain had held in leverage against Chiang Kai-shek in 1927--the priceless option to withhold the aid with which he could break the left."\(^{33}\) Thus Chiang could count on American support without caring for the corruption in his own government. Thus, neither the government nor its opposition remained docile enough to maintain the precarious balance of the imbalance in power. Chiang went the way of suppression and cruelty, arousing a hatred which exceeded that prescribed for the "sort of tame loyal opposition" and "steady but moderate resistance to the regime which the powers can easily and perpetually exploit."\(^{34}\) Consequently, the "rebels became the government," and "the Kuomintang, or the United States looming behind it, is the ominous threat which

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\(^{31}\)Ibid., 623.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., 624.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., 627

\(^{34}\)Ibid., 626
makes inevitable the Chinese payment of a *quid pro quo*—political submission, if nothing else—no longer to the West, but to Russia. 35

The growth of Chinese power within the Soviet bloc has recently put an end to such political submission. But in the Stalinist era, and particularly in the period, 1941-1949, Soviet diplomacy, for comparatively small expenditures of aid, and sometimes none at all, worked its will in China politically, at least as well and at least as effectively as did Western diplomacy. The Russians merely improved in practice upon the Western powers by creating an opposition that had to be by political belief both tame and loyal, supplying the essence of "steady but moderate" resistance to the regime.

Before and throughout the period in which the Marshall Mission is set, the Soviet Union was forging deep into the Eastern Orient with a furtive imperialism which recorded a series of amazingly quiet successes. Repeatedly, in accordance with the prescription later set down on paper by Levenson, Moscow had capitalized upon internal dissensions fomented by endemic Communist factions to get control of the national government itself. In Mongolia, Russia had taken advantage of the slow mull in Peking and among the Chinese Nationalists over the Karakhan Declarations and of incipient Communist activity in Shanghai, Hunan, and Paris, where Chou En-lai spearheaded the movement, to push the Mongol People's Party into power in November of 1921. Then, in 1924, even as they were promising to evacuate

35 Ibid., 627
Mongolia, Russia capitalized on the mild opposition and confusion being created by the Chinese Communists and "Christian" warlord General Feng Yu-hsiang to erect the Mongolian People's Republic. Russian troops met their obligation to evacuate under the Koo-Karakhan Treaty of 1924 only after Outer Mongolia had been "cut off from the rest of the world except at the pleasure of the Soviet Government."  

All this was seemingly accomplished, as the belated cry of Soviet imperialism would indicate, without the Chinese Nationalists becoming cognizant of the effective, two-pronged conspiracy. Dr. T. F. Tsiang, for instance, Director of the Department of Political Affairs in the Executive Yuan, communicated to John Carter Vincent, United States Foreign Service Officer, in 1942 that:

"China's historical attitude toward Outer Mongolia had been mistaken. The Mongolians were in no sense Chinese and there was no valid reason for denying them self-government (italics mine)."

Tsiang and the Nationalists, it seems, made the same error in judgment that many observers later made, that is, in assuming that the Russians intended to be allies of nationalism forever.

In Sinkiang, similarly, Moscow had capitalized upon the height-
ened Chinese Communist "resolve to fight" following the White Terror of 1927 to force a catering to the Soviets on the part of Chinese Governor Sheng Shih-tsai with the result that, "Sinkiang, an integral part of Kuomintang China, became a Soviet colony in all but name."

In Korea, the Kuriles, and Sakhalin, Soviet imperialism had been initially forestalled because of the strict controls, economic and administrative, wielded by the resolute Japanese. Still, it was in large part because of the weakness and exhaustion of China, largely owing to the negative character of the Communist effort in the United Front after 1939, that Russia, in grim finality, was to lay hold of Korea. China, by the time the Three Power conferences rolled around, was too weak to be considered by the Western powers as their foremost Asiatic ally against the Japanese. Instead, Russia, having grown stronger in the East as a result of sapping the strength from China both externally and internally, was hailed into the anti-Japanese alliance at the price of North Korea, as well as the later annexation of the Kuriles and northern Sakhalin.

Manchuria, the return of which to Chinese Nationalist sovereignty


40 Duss, Far East, 308. Wei, China and Russia, 155 ff.

was a focal point in determining the failure or success of the Marshall Mission, epitomizes the progress of Soviet imperialism in the East. After an early history of contending with both China and Japan for possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all post-dating the promise in the Karakhan Declarations to return it to China, Russia took advantage of China's weakness after the fall of Manchuria to sell the railway in 1935, over Chinese protests, to the puppet state of Manchukuo. However, as growing Communist strength and increasing Nationalist weakness before the Japanese invader forced the United Front after the Sian Incident of 1936, Russia made a nonaggression pact with Nationalist China. Mao Tsetung, moreover, made the switch with Moscow; and true to the long-term, two-fold strategy, simultaneously with his announcement of allegiance to "our dear comrades of the Kuomintang," he embarked upon a policy which admittedly included, "seventy per cent self-development, twenty per cent compromise, and ten per cent fighting the Japanese." When Japan began to put the heat on Outer Mongolia, however, Russia disclosed her "ultimate selfishness in Stalin's regard for either Nationalist or Communist China," concluding on April 13, 1941, a neutrality pact with the Japanese. But thus, by "giv-

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\(^{12}\)Wei, China and Russia, 110 ff.

\(^{13}\)Russ, Far East, 324. Wei, China and Russia, 97.

\(^{14}\)Wei, China and Russia, 137.
ing up" Manchuria, the way was paved for the eventual "redemption" of Manchuria. Over the prostrate form of a surrendered Japan and the bogey of a war-exhausted China, Russian forces were free to scramble into Manchuria at the end of World War II and to forestall takeover by a lethargic Chiang. Hurley and Chiang, in this context, worked frantically for a rapprochement between the dissident Chinese factions; and Marshall succeeded in effecting a temporary cease fire in January of 1946; but by April, Chinese Communist forces were in Manchuria and girding themselves for the drives which eventuated in their control of all China. Subsequently, even after July 7, 1947, when the Marshall Mission had repaired home and any pretense of Kuomintang-Communist unity was again dropped with all-out civil war, the Soviet Union declared as late as New Year's Day of 1948 that they "recognized only one government of China," the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.45 These protestations of loyalty, so filled with profitable vistas to a China starved of concrete economic assistance--its extension had been predicated upon the success of the Marshall Mission--or even the true sympathy of the Western Powers, forestalled both active opposition to the international policies of the Comintern and Cominform, or even their labelling, until after actual Communist control of the entire

45 Ibid., 222.
China mainland had been achieved.

As a result of this perniciously effective essay in the East, the Marshall Mission had to face a movement from the left in China which was extremely rigidified, and which manifested its strengths in various areas of economic and political importance. In its favor, it could list: a) the economic impoverishment and discontent of the Chinese populace, a factor with which American policy refused to deal until the Marshall Mission should be successfully completed, b) the long range plans of the Soviet Union which were creating the inevitabilities which they had "foreseen" in the Orient, and c) a propensity for rebellion, now amalgamated to high pitch by a civil conflict that had already achieved its impetus and engendered smoldering enmities. In the face of this, Marshall, on his arrival in China, seemed to have a lone asset: the often-cited "overwhelming desire" of the Chinese people for

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46 Western theorists on the question of historical inevitability have long polemicized against the concept, ignoring the fact that, in the Communist world, rigid political philosophies purge unbelievers from any exercise of personal volition in public affairs which effect human history. In competing with the Communists, also, anti-Communist nations have gone far in the direction of absolute policy, thus introducing the same phenomenon into their own affairs. For a good opposite view, see Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 6: "In describing human behavior it has always been artificial and over-austere to omit questions of the character, purposes, and motives of individuals."
peace. There was also the rather abstruse concept of popular sovereignty which was supposedly somewhere imbedded within the tradition of Chinese Confucian philosophy, but the question remains as to whether this seeming asset was merely "fool's gold."

The Chinese, from scholar to peasant, had always been an amazingly comprehending people, and it seems unlikely in retrospect that they would have accepted peace simply per se, especially in view of the violent polarities which were beginning to predominate.

Further, it is worth going into the historical culture of China, if only sciolistically, to note whether the democratic tradition in China might have been a real asset to Marshall, or whether it was more amenable to the type of governmental forms which the Communists on the one hand and the Nationalists on the other were aiming at. The important question to bear in mind during such an examination is whether the United States made the error, as Howard F. Cline states often happens in American diplomacy, of attributing the same democratic instincts to other peoples as Americans have ingrained into them by education and tradition. If so, did this mistake force Marshall into the whirling vortex of the extremist eschatology which opposed the Communist salient, yet veiled itself with watchwords which were more amenable to Western parliamentary democracy?

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Cline cites ethnic and traditional differences with regard to democratic impulses as being the determining factor in Woodrow Wilson's failure in dealing with the Mexican crisis of 1914-1915. Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 110.
CHAPTER II

CHINESE ANTIQUE HISTORY AND CULTURE AS IT BEARS UPON THE VIABILITY OF THE CHINESE TO WESTERN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

Isaiah Berlin, in his 1954 lecture at Oxford University on historical inevitability, notes that for philosophers who have spent their formative and educational years in authoritarian cultures, human uniformity and conformity quite completely overshadow any other historical factor. "Thus nations or civilizations," he writes:

for Fichte or Hegel and Spengler; (and one is inclined, though somewhat hesitantly, to add Professor Arnold Toynbee), are certainly not merely convenient collective terms for individuals possessing certain characteristics in common, but are more 'real' and more 'concrete' than the individuals who compose them.\(^1\)

China in 1946 and 1949 may well have been proof that, on societies not specifically based upon individualism, as ours purportedly is, Fichte, Hegel, and Spengler have made accurate commentaries. The mistake of "moral imperialists" in behalf of Christianity and democracy has eternally been in their underestimating this factor.

Thus, Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State at the time the Marshall Mission was reviewed, begins his narrative of that mission by citing the one part of the Chinese temper in late 1945 and 1946 which seemed salient to Western observers—a nearly-unan-

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imous desire for peace and for stable government. Yet what they ultimately got—and seemingly through their own efforts—was a prolongation and steady intensification of the civil war for some three years, and a stable government which, in the grim finale, was of a quite different character than that which the United States had envisioned.

The United States initially went to work with a mind to the political fragmentation which had occurred in China during the nationalist movements, and predicated their efforts for stable government on the assumption that the Chinese people looked at democracy as synonymous with peace. But even as educated Westerners as Professor Frank J. Goodnow, early in the twentieth century, and scholars of more recent vintage such as John King Fairbank and Kenneth S. Latourette have hammered away at the theme that democracy can never work in China. Latourette, for instance, in his Development of China, proclaims in one breath that "No other existing nation can look back over as long a past of continuous development as can China," and in the next records that the democratic temper has been excluded from the Chinese political development.

Moreover, Fairbank, in The United States and China, expounds,

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almost in spite of himself, the thesis that China's historical humanism is Confucian totalitarianism to the very heart, inveterately opposed to even that degree of libertarianism which we consider absolutely necessary for the existence of parliamentary government. Fairbank sees a hope for possible adherence to Western democratic reforms "within limits" in the traditional duty of the Confucian scholar to speak out against "misgovernment;"¹ but it is also to be remembered that the kind of "misgovernment" which was an abhorrence to the Confucian scholar, steeped as he was in the ideals of a pyramidal society, was that minimum of control which we have always considered an optimum.

Fairbank goes on to note that we could not have saved China from Communism "without an utterly different approach prior to 1944; not at all thereafter;"² but no diplomatic or political variable peculiar to 1944, save that the Communist movement was gaining strength and the right wing of the Kuomintang was fast proceeding toward reaction and decadence, is cited. Somewhat anomalously, then, Fairbank goes on to castigate the propensity of historians to interpret this as the outcome of "social trends and forces" as the kind of interpolation which is annoying to men of action "who are conscious of the

²Ibid., 263.
random elements of chance and personality on history." Yet, even while he records the achievements of the Marshall Mission as "breath-taking" and a "personal tribute to General Marshall," he asserts that the mission had no chance of success, coming as it did after 1944.

The main problem, as Fairbank sees it, was in getting the party dictatorship of the Kuomintang to "pursue democratic reforms" and an equal animadversion on the part of the Communists against entering into the constitutional coalition. Thus, both major factions in the China of 1944 are committed to single-minded and somewhat authoritarian policies, throwbacks to the days of warlord culture as it usurped with despotism the more gentle brand imposed by the scholar hierarchy of old. Both totalitarian philosophies, in addition, were seemingly exclusive of the other in their philosophical inceptions.

Latourette, in a second publication entitled The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951, puts forth much the same thesis. Basic to "the frustration of the United States," he says of the failure in China, "was the fact that China was not ready for the kind of

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6Ibid., 266.

democracy which Americans knew, and in which they believed."

About the Marshall Mission in particular, Latourette sets forth an equally pessimistic view:

Some observers believed from the very outset that General Marshall had an impossible assignment, and that his mission was foredoomed. Certainly the odds were heavily against him. The distrust of the Kuomintang and the Communists for each other was so great, the personal enmities between the leadership so marked, and the basic political and economic theories so far apart that continuing peaceful cooperation in one government was highly unlikely.

Thirdly, Latourette alludes to the impossibility of the United States winning support for democracy by backing the faction they did.

"A major reason for the Nationalist defeat," he writes:

was that the Kuomintang, the national government run by it and Chiang Kai-shek had completely lost the confidence of the people. Rightly or wrongly, public opinion held the Nationalists responsible for the disasters which had overtaken China. In the days of the Confucian empire a dynasty was said to have ‘lost the mandate of heaven’ when it had proved incapable of averting a series of disasters, whether man-made or natural. It then collapsed before the blows of another aspirant for the throne; and the latter, if successful, was regarded as having received the mandate of Heaven until his house, in turn, proved to be chronically incompetent. Although it was now nearly forty years since the empire had gone, something of the same attitude survived. The popular mind, without perhaps using these precise words, regarded the Nationalists as having forfeited the mandate of Heaven.

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9 Ibid., 201.

10 Ibid., 224.
Latourette fourthly sees the "weakening of Confucianism," but not into any political philosophy which includes democracy as more than a transitional stage in the progress toward either economic democracy or the oligarchy of rightist reaction. Confucianism, according to Latourette, weakens into Communism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, both of which in the twentieth century begin to expound the differences which make the one irreconcilable with the other. This, in fact, begins to resemble the Christianity of Chiang Kai-shek and the right Kuomintang on the one hand and the Communism of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung on the other.\(^\text{11}\)

It is admittedly with some seeming implacability that Chinese history has been rich in aristocracy and autarchy. The age of the Chou rulers, 1122-256 B.C., in which most of Chinese culture gropes backward to its roots, was not only the age of warring feudal lords giving rise to the professions of soldiery and statesmanship, but it was also, quite significantly, the "golden age of Chinese philosophy."\(^\text{13}\)

It was hardnosed Confucianism in this age of strife and imperious rule which found most popular currency and the most incorporation into social institutions. Taoism and Mencianism remained for the most part


\(^{12}\)Ibid.

the philosophies subservient to the substratum which Confucianism provided, as did the Buddhism later imported from Japan. Chinese Confucian philosophy was more intellectual than religious, and by that fact negated the gnostic individual mysticism which is at the basis of individualist democracy.14 This negation of individualism is further reflected in the Confucian social organization, an organization based on obligation rather than right and composed of a squirearchy of the educated and learned rather than a stratification based on earnings or entails.15 Thus, as Latourette has intimated, Chinese history has consisted of a series of "mandates"—a series of autarchies. The Ch'in Dynasty, 221-207, abolished the old feudal aristocracy, but it initiated a new kind of totalitarianism with a centralized bureaucracy, and undertook a "burning of the books" to facilitate a singleminded, conventional temper in social, cultural, and political matters. Even when, under the Han Dynasty, Wang Mang, 8-23 A. D., instituted China's first reform by nationalizing and redistributing the land, monopolizing salt, iron, coinage, wines, and mines, and having the state put a floor under agricultural prices by surplus purchase—all the reforming was done under the iron tutelage of a benevolent despot, who, moreover, died an early death, most probably at the hands of contemporaries who spoke out against this


15Duss, Far East, 31.
progressive kind of "misgovernment."

The succeeding T'ang Dynasty illustrated the ease with which Confucian squirearchy is usurped by oligarchy rather than by the fragmentation embryonic to democracy. In glamor and culture, the T'ang Dynasty exceeded all its European contemporaries; but the top-heavy structure of the dynasty only veiled an underlying military weakness, an ensuant political discontent and economic poverty which was to plague China as long as her government remained in the hands of a few. A second "New Deal" was initiated under the ensuing Sung Dynasty, but here again, it represented only "a tendency of the conservative Chinese to experiment in statecraft and economics."16 Hence, dissatisfaction gained momentum, and during the Yuan or Mongol Dynasty, it found combination and outlet with a suppressed abstraction—nationalism. This combination overthrew the foreign dynasty in 1368, cooperating with a conservatism that supplied the leadership, as always, to the authoritarian-minded Chinese people. But conservatism, nationalism, and economic depression gradually gained momentum throughout the Ming and Manchu dynasties and were stimulated particularly by the cooperation with the Powers by the latter government. A new leadership championed the overthrow of the old dynasty in the name of nationalism in 1912,17 and did it

16 Ibid., 28 ff.

in the name of China as a means of capitalizing upon the long
pent-up resentment over the unequal treaties habitually imposed
by the Powers. An antithesis of imperialism and nationalism came
to dominate the mind of an underdeveloped China, in congruence with
the three major circumstances which Latourette lists as forming the
public mind in the China of the twentieth century: a) a nationalism incited by over a century of foreign domination, b) an extreme
defensiveness provoked by a combination of foreign invasion and
exhausting civil strife, and c), as an ancillary to the other two,
a burning desire for independence.18

At this time, the mind and spirit of China became viable to
the type of history writing which sustained itself throughout World
War II and which featured nationalism in the face of Japanese imperial-
ism as the deepest desire of the people. Owen Lattimore's brief
history of China is exemplary of this kind of encomium to Chinese
nationalism. Lattimore's reputation as a historical and political
writer later went into eclipse when he was accused of being a Commun-
ist; but at the time of his writing this work, at least, he is convinced
of Chiang Kai-shek's rectitude in accordance with what he cites as
China's age-old source of strength--that which "really did lie in the
people, not in individuals."19 Lattimore, here taking the posture of

18Latourette, American Record, 91-93.

19Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, The Making of Modern China, A Short
a thoroughgoing Chinese nationalist (He was Chiang's political advisor at the time of writing), regrets even that incursion of foreign power which Chiang Kai-shek inadvertently wrought in 1927 as a result of his purges. The events of March 26, 1927, when Chiang broke with the Communists in the Kuomintang and with Russia, put China, according to Lattimore, in the hands of Western Powers who "had the ability to act," yet refused because they were:

in some instances badly frightened by the idea that the defense of their vested interests against the Japanese might cost them more than their interests were worth, in other instances, by the idea that China might 'lapse into chaos.'

The label of "Communist" for Lattimore is likely attached as shakily as it is borne. Nevertheless, it is only a short step from championing a long-suppressed nationalism in a conservative nation to the binding of that nationalism to the other inevitable off-shoot of extreme conservatism, the economic depression of the lower classes. An example of the kind of Chinese historian who makes such a connection is the Maoist, Hu Sheng, who, in his *Imperialism and Chinese Politics*, corrects even those historians who have seen the T'ai ping rebellion as the beginning of the imperialist technique of causing "danger from without" to coincide with "trouble from within."

These "bourgeois" historians, he asserts, have erred in failing to understand that "the Tai ping (sic) Uprising was, in its nature, a

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\[\text{20}\text{Ibid., 152. This, in fact, did happen. China fought Japan with "magnetic warfare," exhausted herself, and Russia reaped Sakhalin, Korea, and the Kuriles for her strength, China having "lapsed into chaos."}\]
revolutionary peasant war." The application of the term "revolutionary" by Hu Sheng is, of course, mistaken, particularly in the Communist sense of the term. While it is probably true that the main body of the T'ai p'ing rebellion signified a need of the people that surged forth from antiquity—a need later translated into People's Livelihood by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, into Economic Democracy by Dr. Sun Fo and Mao—the rebellion as a whole cannot be termed revolutionary and agrarian in the same sense as even the "bourgeois, nationalist" rebellion became after 1922. The former lacks the true professional revolutionary leadership of the latter, and is more truly a revolt than a revolution in the historically materialistic sense of the latter term.

Hu's ensuing and focal correction of "bourgeois history," however, points to a correctness in his train of thought even in spite of its embellishment in erroneous minutiae. The Manchu Dynasty, he claims, was not at all the helpless victim of imperialism, but rather its cohort and helper. Outside the context of Communist ideology, however, "helpless victim" is precisely the term for the Manchus;


22 The Three People's Principles are usually translated as Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood. Sun Fo, who is Sun Yat-sen's son, was wont to reiterate the alternate rendering of National Democracy, Political Democracy, and Economic Democracy.
often they had no other choice but to follow the dictates of the Powers. But the veracity of the overall picture which Hu is trying to depict is difficult to refute. The oppressed millions of China had long been cognizant of a divorcement of the policies of their rulers from their own needs and well-being, and, most of all, from their intense sense of nationalism as it began overtly to develop in this century. Thus, Communism in the 'forties, being both politically nationalistic and economically revolutionary, was in a position to command large popular support.

It is the United States, finally, which is indicted by Hu as being the chief imperialist depredator throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and the ensuing twentieth century. While this is wrong in a very literal sense, it is with some truth that the United States is chosen as symbolic of the ignoring of China's millions by the West. No other nation assumed with such inveterate blindness that even the most oppressive and corrupt regimes were representative of the Chinese people and of Chinese nationalism.23

Consequently, in view of the quintessential essay in the history of China—a nationalism borne out of a decadent Confucian

23Paul Myron Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), 15 ff., gives little space to the analogy between warlordism and the militarism of the Kuomintang.
totalitarianism and centuries of economic depression and suppression— it is less surprising now than it would have seemed in December of 1945 that Mao Tse-tung should soon be writing, "What Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted to do in the forty years he devoted to the national revolution but failed to accomplish, the peasants have accomplished in a few months;" and that he should extoll those same peasants with the lines: "They accept most willingly the leadership of the Communist Party." 

In 1946, there was consequently a tactile assumption that it was Communist singlemindedness alone which was pre-empting the hopes of liberal democracy in China. In obviation of the historical background which made China not only susceptible to this kind of authoritarianism of the left, but also reinforced other kinds of authoritarian movements, Marshall was commissioned to introduce democracy by attaching his diplomacy to one of the Chinese factions—which itself could only have been born of the Chinese tradition. The pertinent question raised by a study of historical issues is whether support of one faction did not contribute to the intensification of authoritarianism rather than its hindrance and replacement with democracy.

Yet what the historians who are dedicated to the dialectic


25Ibid., 31.
of inevitability might do well to remember in the case of post-war China is that the country of Confucius, dedicated to monolithic practices from an antiquity which far antedates the Western classical period, perhaps finds its political history more subject to the workings of historical inevitability than most other countries, and thus, the power of the United States to act here should have entertained few of the impediments of Chinese political paralysis at this time.

But the intercession, in the case of civil embroilment, must, at the same time, be vigorous and almost revolutionary in deportment in order to be capable of infusing the democratic temper into the favored—and the unfavored—factions. If it is in the form of merely supplying a mediator, he must somehow come close to fitting the description which Sidney Hook gives of what he calls the hero, the event-making man, in history, "whose actions are the consequences of outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character, rather than of accidents of position."26

When dealing with a political situation such as existed in China after World War II, and to a lesser but increasing degree in his own United States, where a sharp division of political thought was emerging, the mediator would moreover be wise to divorce himself from such a bifurcation, retain personal freedom of action so that his character might have impact, and to act upon his own in ways that

are adjusted to the situation at hand.  

In the light of these requisites, it behooves us, before going into the actual diplomacy of the Marshall Mission, to examine the qualifications of the mediator himself to deal with a situation which involved, as we have concluded from Chapter I, an international conspiracy on the one-hand and its equally-determined opposite on the other, when both groups were reinforced by a propensity for authoritarianism in Chinese antique history.

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27 In the case that the mediator should prove subservient and obedient in character, it is clear that the quality of his mission will hinge upon the quality and frequency of his directives, their flexibility, and the information which reaches the directive-writers.
CHAPTER III

THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEDIATOR,
GENERAL GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL

This chapter must be prefaced by the admission that there is a paucity of materials on the life and character of General George C. Marshall. There is no biography of him that is in general circulation, and, save the biased report of Senator McCarthy, no work that is wholly devoted to him as a subject. Yet, even the superficial information that is available on Marshall makes it very clear that at the close of World War II he was, historically speaking, a very anomalous, if not dubious, personality. Walter Trohan calls him the most powerful military figure in the world at this time because he was presiding officer over the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces, which in turn controlled the greatest fighting force in the world. Nevertheless, Marshall had not been a field general and had spent nearly the entire duration of the war in Washington in an administrative--a directing and presiding--capacity. Earlier, following his graduation from Virginia Military Institute in 1901, he had served as a Second Lieutenant in the Philippines; but, thereafter, during World War I, his service was largely restricted to administrative duty on the staff of General John J. Pershing in France.1 Although he did this kind of work with distinction, the fact remains that it was a sedentary

and inactive kind of work—the kind of activity which seems more apt to produce a Hamlet than a Macbeth. Marshall’s closest call to combat duty was as a Lieutenant Colonel in command of the Fifteenth United States Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China, from 1924 to 1927.

Even in spite of the performance of administrative duty with excellence, Marshall’s chances of promotion from Brigadier General at the beginning of World War II were small precisely because he had had too little experience in the field. It was only after Congress had passed an act which temporarily permitted the by-passing of seniority lists, and at the intercession of General Pershing, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted Marshall over thirty-four other field officers to the rank of General and appointed him as Chief of Staff for the Army.2

After his tour of duty in Washington during the war, Marshall planned to retire, and took steps to initiate this plan by going with his wife to his country home near Leesburg, Virginia.3 There is, in fact, some evidence pointing to the conclusion that Marshall, particularly at this time in his life, was a retiring type of individual. His personality is described, by those who knew him, as mild

2Ibid.

and compromising, if not inconspicuous and subservient. His chief virtue was in performing his assigned tasks with supreme obedience and confidence, even if without the greatest élan. It was along the line of conforming with directives, moreover, that Marshall seems on one occasion to have shown a rare high-spiritedness. General Wedemeyer writes that when Marshall arrived in China, he (Wedemeyer) calmly undertook to inform the General that his mission was impossible in the face of the Marxist-Leninist aspirations of the Chinese Communists and the sentiment for demobilization in the United States. In a rare mood of personal vindictiveness, Marshall angrily retorted to Wedemeyer, "I am going to accomplish this mission, and you are going to help me."4

But the episode is isolated in the annals of history, and certainly Marshall had in no degree the aggressiveness and drive of a man like Wedemeyer, though, of course, he was not handicapped with Wedemeyer's extreme prejudices, either. Wedemeyer, in fact, has gone so far as to suggest that Marshall was perhaps prejudiced against the Kuomintang because he had read the Stilwell reports, written by General George Stilwell, who served in China from 1942 to 1944, represented Chiang as the inept source of all that was wrong with China, and was consequently finally relieved of his command partly because Chiang had applied the pressure which led up to General

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Hurley's request for a new commander in the China Theater.\textsuperscript{5}

The truth of the charge is doubtful. All reports of Marshall in China show him always striving to obey his directives, which, if they gave any edge, almost unfailingly gave it to the Nationalist Government.

Paradoxically, Marshall's greatest strength, his great popularity with the American people, may have been at the same time his greatest liability for dealing with the Chinese situation. John Leighton Stuart writes that, at the time Marshall secured his appointment as the United States Ambassador to China, Marshall "could have had from the American people whatever he wanted;"\textsuperscript{6} and in putting forth Marshall's name to succeed James F. Byrnes as the American Secretary of State, Senator Claude A. Pepper of Florida proclaimed him as the man "than whom no American today is more greatly honored nor more highly esteemed." Such popular currency, as Hook notes, can be a misleading factor in studies which deal with history, politics, and diplomacy. "There is no reliable

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., 370.

\textsuperscript{6}Stuart, Fifty Years, 166.

\textsuperscript{7}Congressional Record, 80 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), XLI, 368.
"between historical significance, measured by the effect of action on events, and historical fame, measured by acclaim or volume of eulogy. That is why the judgment of the scientific historian, who investigates specific causal connection, on the historical work of individuals, is always to be preferred to results of polls, comparative space allotments in standard works, and frequency of citation. The latter show enormous variation influenced by fashion, picturesqueness, parti pris, and very little by scientific findings. Particularly today, any 'front' man can be built up into a 'hero.' From 1916 to 1933, Hindenburg was undoubtedly the most popular figure in Germany, but one could mention half a dozen individuals who had greater influence on German history, including military history, during the period.\(^8\)

Moreover, such popularity would prove a handicap to Marshall if he should not be able to rise above the current strains of popular political sentiment. His aptitudes, however, point in another direction. Marshall had risen to his high office on the crest of a fashion which was in the embryonic stages of progressing toward monolithic efficiency of the type which put the premium upon unquestioning conformity.\(^9\) This conformity, indeed, seemed to be Marshall's forte. Truman writes of the selection of Marshall for the mediation task that Marshall, in his belief, was the right man for the job,


\(^9\)Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, for instance, was getting his wish for a bipartisanship in foreign policy which found the sole basis for agreement in the anti-Communist stand which most Americans felt must be increasingly adamant. See A. H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 351-352.
because:

... he was deeply steeped in democracy and sincerely believed in letting the people determine their own fate. He was a firm believer in the principle of civilian supremacy over the military as a principle that not only applied in the United States but was essential to the welfare of any nation.\(^{10}\)

Those who would have forced unity on China, like Hurley or Wedemeyer, by "ramming it down their throats," were the wrong men in Truman's estimation.\(^11\) It would take a more docile make of man for what Truman seemingly had in mind: "To achieve a proper and fair appraisal of Marshall's mission," Truman continues,

it is necessary to bear in mind that even before he left for China there already existed a formal agreement in writing between the Central Government and the Communists to work toward national unity ... My sole purpose in sending him was to help carry out a program willingly subscribed to by the Chinese leaders. In no sense was it our intention to impose our will upon the Chinese people.\(^{12}\)

If Truman meant to let the Chinese have their way, there can be little question that Marshall was the right man for the job. Yet the question remains as to whether the increasingly anti-Communist mold of the federal government, as reflected in the conformist mind of General Marshall, as well as in the intention to hinge the economic aid which would have gone furthest toward democratization, did not


\(^{11}\)Ibid.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., 92.
prefix into the mediating apparatus a principle which negated personal effort. Certainly, Marshall, picked because he believed in what the administration was trying to do, was faced with the prospect of tailoring his actions to a pre-formulation of policy which militated against any kind of momentary contrivance to suit the needs of that moment.
CHAPTER IV

THE SETTING OF THE MARSHALL MISSION
AND ITS DIPLOMACY

A. Political, Military, and Economic
Situation of Postwar China

The political situation in China following World War II was much as has been pointed up by the introductory chapters of this paper: the Communists and Nationalists faced each other from positions that were poles apart, and the third parties either found themselves temporarily allied to the Communists in opposition to Kuomintang reaction, or else they suffered some degree of ineffectualness. The Chinese Communists, moreover, in spite of their reported minority rating, had insisted on political equality, at least for the time being, and hence had disobeyed the General Order Number 1 of August 14, 1945, delivered by General Douglas MacArthur, then in command of the Pacific Theater of Operations, that only Nationalist troops were to accept the surrender of the Japanese.¹ The Communists had continued to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, seize their matériel, and occupy surrendered territory. The result was a series of skirmishes with Government troops which were in the process of spreading, with the result that chances for internal peace seemed dim.

¹Perhaps portentous of the events which were to follow, it was General Marshall who advised MacArthur to issue the order. See Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 197.
Political opposition was thus so mutually adamant that it soon became military opposition. The key to the military situation in the minds of both factions and their sponsors was the control of Manchuria. General Wedemeyer, then in charge of the China Theater in 1946, reported to Washington on November 14, 1945, that the National Government was completely unprepared to take over Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition. His subsequent report of November 20, 1945, read:

I have recommended to the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in north China and upon the prompt execution of political and official reforms designed to remove the practices of corruption by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes.

Wedemeyer, in also recommending the utilization of foreign executives and technicians, at least during the period of transition, also claimed that "Logistical support for National Government forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff;" and thus that the Communist guerillas and saboteurs could restrict the Nationalist army to south China if they so desired. Wedemeyer believed that Chiang could stabilize the situation in south China, provided he accept "the assistance of foreign administrators and tech-

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3Ibid., 131.

4Ibid.
nicians and engage in political, economic, and social reforms through honest civilian officials." There was the additional possibility that the situation in north China could also be stabilized, "provided a satisfactory agreement with the Chinese Communists is achieved" and reforms made. The occupation of Manchuria, however, Wedemeyer deemed to hinge upon satisfactory settlements with both Russia and China, whose potentialities for mutual collusion he readily realized. But at the same time he concluded that, "It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between the Chinese Communists and the National Government." Wedemeyer's final suggestion was that a trusteeship by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia should be established over Manchuria until such time as the National Government could rehabilitate itself, cleanse itself of corruption, and assume control of the area. Noting that abuses by the Nationalists in the areas they took over from Japan had already done much to alienate support from the Nationalists, Wedemeyer recommended the trusteeship as a means of avoiding embarrassment.

Meanwhile, the prospective battle lines were already being drawn. "The Communists," writes Herbert Feis,

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 132.

through guerilla and local units and regular forces as well, were securely established in the area east and north of Peiping, in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar border region around Kalgan, and at various points in Shantung and other land approaches to Manchuria. They dominated some sections of the railroad north from Peiping.8

Simultaneously, American planes were redeploying Nationalist troops in areas which would give them possible access to north China and Manchuria. Fifty thousand American marines were landed in the autumn of 1945, and planes redeployed from 400,000 to 500,000 Chinese Government troops in areas around "Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, and other critical sectors along the North China coast."9 Antedating possible attempts at mediation as these movements did, they involved the United States in a quandary which would be open to Communist exploitation, if, as Wedemeyer and others were beginning to assert, the Communists entertained more than short-range plans.

Even as Molotov stressed that the Soviet Union would bear "no responsibility for internal affairs or developments within China," the Chinese Communist Field Marshal, Chu Teh, lodged on October 5, 1945, a protest with the American Embassy in Chungking against "American


interference in China's internal affairs." Meanwhile, the Communist factions were attempting to keep their record outwardly clean. On November 25, Chinese Communist spokesmen professed that they were on "very friendly" terms with Chiang; and on November 28, Chu Teh told several American correspondents that the Communists had no objection to Nationalist troop movements, but the point at issue was their conveyance by American forces through areas which had been "liberated" by the Communist Eight Route Army. At about this same time, the Yenan Emancipation Daily opined:

The problem of whether the sending of troops to North China and Manchuria is still necessary and whether American help shall be needed for this purpose should first be submitted to the Political Consultative Conference for discussion. Otherwise the movement would be contravening President Truman's statement that the United States support will not be extended to United States military intervention to influence the course of Chinese internal strife.12

Meanwhile, the economic situation in China was sorely depressed and was contributing, along with the repressive policies of the Kuomintang, to dissatisfaction which stimulated political ferment. In some cases there had been large-scale popular defections to the cause of Communist economic democracy. Herbert Feis summarizes the situation succinctly by noting that China had no foreign trade, that ninety per cent of the railways were out of operation, and that, more-

10 Ibid., 204.
11 Ibid., 212.
12 As quoted in ibid., 213.
over, the standstill in commerce was manifesting itself by skyrocketing inflation.\(^{13}\) The productive potential of agriculture, mining, and industry in the areas which had been taken from the Japanese, however, remained potentially high. But here again, much of the hope for postwar prosperity was contingent upon dislodging the Communists from crucial areas, principally Manchuria. As Dean Acheson noted in retrospect, "The expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and Formosa promised to increase several-fold the national industrial plant and to contribute to the achievement of a national self-sufficiency in food."\(^{14}\) The critical part which economic factors were to play during the attempts to re-establish civil peace is obvious in the reports which were later to circulate from China during the mediation attempts. Gunther Stein, for instance, reported in 1945 that the hills along the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border, where the Communists were entrenched, were "sprinkled with green fields on the side of the Border region," while they were "barren and empty on the Kuomintang side."\(^{15}\) Such a situation enabled Mao Tse-tung and his companions to make their most effective political pitches to the Chinese populace. By the "new Three Principles of the People," Mao

\(^{13}\)Feis, The China Tangle, 355.

\(^{14}\)In Dept. of State, Relations with China, 127.

is quoted by Stein as saying late in 1945, "the government is to belong to the people and must not be monopolized by the few;"¹⁶ and no doubt many Chinese at the time were imagining that prosperity was being monopolized by the few. The effect was so overwhelming, Stein reports, that even the best men in the headquarters of the Kuomintang were hiding a tendency to realize "the superiority of Yanan’s methods over those of Chungking."¹⁷

The Communists, by retaining a lien upon Manchuria, had gained access to the great industrial equipment and potential which the Japanese had built and an agricultural area that was capable of producing an appreciable export surplus for China. Manchuria had only one-ninth of the population of China proper and one-fourth of the area; and it now had an industrial potential four times as great as China, an electric generating capacity three times as large, and a rail density four times as great.¹⁸

Such economic depression and the poor prospect of regaining Manchuria more than overbalanced China’s favorable position on the foreign exchange, which largely consisted of large reserves of gold and American dollar exchange, estimated to total over 900 million dollars on December 31, 1945.¹⁹ Everything depended upon the re-est-

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¹⁶Ibid., 457.
¹⁷Ibid.
¹⁸Dept. of State, Relations with China, 128.
¹⁹Ibid., 129.
establishment of normal internal trade, and the subsequent resumption of large-scale imports of food and industrial raw materials. In transportation, the war damage had been crucial, and had placed an obstacle to Chinese domestic and foreign trade which the retaking of Manchuria could begin to alleviate.

The victorious allies, at the close of the war, had tried several measures to help the Chinese with economic reconstruction. Such scattered activities as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Lend-lease, Economic Cooperation Administration, loans and assorted credits were tried with no appreciable effect. As is noted in United States Relations with China, "the ultimate soundness of the international financial position depended . . . on the speed with which export industries and remittances from Chinese overseas regained their prewar levels;"20 and George Moorad sings the inglorious epitaph on the scattered aid which was extended immediately after the war:

So much trick bookkeeping is involved, so much question about funds earmarked but never released, that it is almost meaningless to discuss American aid in terms of dollars. By the most generous estimates, the sum was but a drop in the sea of China's troubles, and that little was mishandled.21

Moreover, economic disruption and weakness can clearly be seen in relation to internal and international machinations which were then

20 Ibid., 130.

being carried out. Wedemeyer, in ruminating on his own suggestion for Chiang to regain control over north China, recalled the stipulation in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945, which required Russia "to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be given to the Nationalist Government as the recognized Government of China." 22 Yet, the Russian policy had been to keep China "weak and disunited." 23 "I now for the first time realized the economic implications of my recommendations," Wedemeyer writes at this time, "but in all honesty I had not given this factor any thought when I made them originally." 24

Thus, as the Marshall Mission began, the political, military, and economic situations were all interrelated with the common base in the problem of national unification; and national unification, it seemed from the outset, would be achieved under the hegemony of that power which could control Manchuria. In this sense, the mission, concurrent with the Yalta Agreement and postdating the Sino-Soviet accord of August, 1945, took economic factors more explicitly into consideration than had the Hurley Mission. The success of the Marshall Mission depended upon unification under the leadership of Chiang; and this admittedly depended, in turn, largely upon the

23 Ibid., 353.
24 Ibid., 355.
return of Manchuria to "Chinese sovereignty"--or to the control of the Nationalist Government. Hurley's Five-Point Draft Program of November 10, 1945, on the other hand, looked chiefly to political settlement as the practical thing, providing for: 1) Nationalist-Communist cooperation for unification and reconstruction, 2) a democratic coalition government of all anti-Japanese parties, 3) support of the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a Bill of Rights, 4) coordination of all military activities by a United National Military Council, and 5) the recognition of all anti-Japanese parties. The Counter-Proposal promptly made by the Nationalists, however, set down the essence of policy which the United States was largely to follow throughout the Marshall Mission. Its clear import was the supremacy of the Kuomintang, as it called for: 1) incorporation of Communist troops into the Nationalist Army, 2) Nationalist control of all troops and control of the National Military Council, and 3) a pledge to "carry out" the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

B. The Diplomacy of the Marshall Mission

The resignation of General Hurley as special presidential envoy to China came as a surprise to President Truman and to Secretary of State Byrnes; and no successor to Hurley had been contem---

25Dept. of State, Relations with China, 74.

26Ibid., 75.
During the cabinet meeting which took place to choose Hurley's successor, Truman in fact remarked that he had been considering the quiet, soft-spoken Marshall for the more demure position as chairman of the American Red Cross. On the suggestion that Marshall could take up the task as mediator on a temporary basis, however, Truman agreed to the appointment, and on November 27, 1945, upon the acceptance of Hurley's resignation, Truman simultaneously announced the appointment of Marshall as his special representative in China, with the personal rank of Ambassador.

Marshall himself did not participate in the conferences which culminated in the drawing-up of the policy statement of December 15, since he was busy testifying before the Congressional Pearl Harbor inquiry. This accident may perhaps account for the narrowness of the path which policy gave Marshall to walk in calling for a "strong, united, and democratic China," and yet withholding economic aid until such time as that hope should be made a fact.


28 There are two versions of the casting of the policy statement. Acheson asserts that Marshall wrote his own directives because he disapproved of Byrnes's. This is unlikely, however, in view of Marshall's presence at the Pearl Harbor hearings. See U. S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East, 82 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1951), 1848. Hereinafter cited as U. S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East.
Moreover, as the State Department was later to note, "This obviously meant modification of the Kuomintang's system of 'political tutelage' and the broadening of the base of government." A further disadvantage under which the mission sought to accomplish its task was that, since the mediator was an American and the United States policy statement had cited the interest of the United States and the United Nations in pacifying and unifying China, the mission appeared to be foreign meddling in Chinese internal affairs. This was excused on the grounds that political ferment should cease before the crucial economic aid was extended. As Latourette writes:

A direct participation in China's internal affairs was excused by the reasoning that a China torn by civil strife was not a proper place for American economic assistance in the form of credits or technical skills or military aid.

Marshall, upon arriving in China on January 4, 1946, spent the initial days of his mission talking to American observers. In particular, he talked to General Wedemeyer; and it was at this time that Wedemeyer made the remark about the impossibility of the mission which aroused Marshall's anger.

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29Dept. of State, Relations with China, 133.


31U. S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East, 2305.
The following day, however, Marshall flew to Nanjing and began his talks with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer's pronouncement on this initial session—that he "began to feel confident that these two men would cooperate in the task that lay before them"—was perhaps the tipoff to the way the mediation would be received by the Communists in the end, especially in view of Wedemeyer's appointment as Ambassador being rejected a short time later at the objection of the Chinese Communists. Certainly, the initial visitation to Chiang before any pilgrimage to Ienan, together with the recent American activity in the redeployment of Nationalist troops quickly gave rise to a school of thought which contended that the strength of Chiang was primarily "the strength of Americans who supported him."33

1. The cease-fire of January 13, 1946: momentary peace in the face of mutual, and not entirely dormant, truculence.

The first stage of Marshall's mission was a signal success, resulting in the effecting of a cease-fire which many had called "impossible." In retrospect, however, it seems that the truce of January, 1946, was more of a follow-through on the agreement of November 11, 1945—34—which both Nationalists and Communists seem to

32Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, 366-367.


34See pages 12-13 of this paper.
have signed for propaganda purposes—than it was a decision
made upon the momentary suasion of Marshall. In order to win
popular suffrage in the face of a desire for peace, both sides
agreed to the truce. The Communists, almost as if they knew by
premonition what good capital the Marshall Mission would eventually
make for anti-Nationalist and anti-American propaganda, swallowed
American and Nationalist proposals wholesale at the negotiations
table. Finally, given this raison d'être, the truce was an uneasy
one, with both sides trying to push the other into an incident
which would re-trigger the civil war.

Even as Marshall had first arrived in China on the fourth
of January, it was obvious that mutual animosities were going to
continue to loom hard on the Chinese horizon. On the first, Govern-
ment forces had announced their intention to take Jehol Province.
The Communists, of course, countered this with a resolve to resist
the move.35 It was surprising—and yet not surprising—then, that
when Marshall, in his initial meeting with the Commander of the
Chinese Communist armies, Chou En-lai, announced that American trans-
port planes would move Nationalist troops into North China, Chou
agreed to the movements in spite of Chu Teh's earlier protests.36

In the face of the continuing enmity mixed with ostensible
willingness to negotiate, Marshall attempted to restrict his activities

2, 1946, Sec. 1, 3.

36Dept. of State, Relations with China, 130.
to the most inobtrusive kind of diplomacy. According to the
State Department, he:

acted both as an intermediary between Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek and the representatives of the Chinese Communist
Party and as an adviser to, or member of, certain bodies
or committees which were established in the effort to reach
agreement on China's problems. He also exercised initiative
in giving each side impartially and confidentially the bene-
fit of his analysis of the situation as it developed, and
in drafting various statements and agreements which he thought
might move the negotiations forward.37

This role was somewhat at variance with the more active
one which Secretary Byrnes had imagined. Byrnes, according to Her-
bert Feis, had wanted a strong, unified China precisely so that Russia
would not be able to retain control of Manchuria and maintain any
influence in north China. He had thought that "the central idea of
the program was to put enough weapons in Marshall's hand to induce
the Government and the Communists to get together."38 But Truman,
quite to the contrary, had disavowed any thought of imposing the will
of the United States upon China by force;39 and thus, "Marshall," as
Feis writes, "was still perplexed as to how he was expected to use

37Ibid., 134.

38Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China
from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton
Tangle.

39Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company,
these weapons. The withdrawal of American marines was postponed and the China Theater was continued. Neither of these facts, however, were put to positive use by Marshall, in spite of his authorization to do so by the State Department directive to Wedemeyer. With the reluctance of Marshall to bring strategic military pressure to bear upon influencing the course of negotiations, Molotov early gave indications that it would be the Communists who would capitalize, for propaganda purposes, upon the presence of American troops in China. Almost simultaneously with General Chou's agreeing to the American transport of Government troops, Molotov was asserting from Moscow that American troops were no longer necessary and was demanding their withdrawal.

On January 6, after Marshall had met with Chiang, the Nationalist Government proposed the assembling of a three-man committee to discuss the terms of a truce. On January 7, this committee held its first meeting, with General Marshall serving in the capacity of chairman, General Chang Chun representing the Nationalists, and

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41Ibid., 420. Troops could be used in consistency with the negotiations, as Marshall determined, or when Marshall should determine that the negotiations had failed. It is probably fair to note, however, that it was Wedemeyer, and not Marshall, who was Theater Commander.

42Ibid., 425.
General Chou En-lai the Communists; and on January 8, the Political Consultative Conference, formed during the Hurley mission, met to discuss its agenda, even as the Communists were announcing the capture of Chihfeng.\(^4\)

The specter of armed strife never relented. Immediately, Marshall encountered mutual suspicions in the meetings of the Committee of Three. The Nationalists were aroused over Communist designs on Manchuria, while the Communists were of a mind that the Kuomintang was bent on the complete destruction of the Chinese Communist Party. Chou En-lai, consequently, announced at this time that continued Communist participation in the negotiations depended upon the Kuomintang's manifesting a desire for democratic reform.\(^4\)

Still, the Committee of Three agreed on a cease fire on January 10. All troop movements were to cease immediately, except for Government movements to the North; and an Executive Headquarters was to effect and police the truce by means of three-man truce teams made up of Nationalist, Communist, and American representatives who would issue orders "in the name of the President of the Republic


of China. The truce, effective on January 13, was supposedly a nonpolitical truce. According to General Claire L. Chennault, the famed "Flying Tiger," "Some fifty truce teams ... were dispatched to trouble spots all over China. Each was headed by an elderly American colonel specially picked for his white hair to impress the Chinese." Thus, even such aspects as hair color and physiognomy were supposed to carry more weight than political alignment. Moreover, as George Moorad writes:

The officers of General George C. Marshall's truce teams in China, who stood in the front lines of this great ideological conflict, were required to sign a pledge that they would not discuss political issues.

The terms of the truce itself, however, in providing for an exemption for northward Nationalist troop movements, reflected the coinciding wishes of both the United States and the Kuomintang that Nationalist sovereignty over Manchuria be secured; and it is with some symptoms of wearing the blinkers that were then becoming conventional that President Truman lauded Marshall's keeping out

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45 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 609.
46 U. S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East, 1851.
48 Moorad, Lost Peace, 102.
of political affairs at this juncture. By January 14, spokesmen for both factions were reporting that fighting had either ended or subsided everywhere in China; and a demonstration of Chinese students in Shanghai was urging United States troops to return home. But on January 16, both sides issued mutual charges of military attack; and on the twentieth, in a preview of what the genetic dualism in China might eventually portend, four American fliers were detained by Soviet troops stationed at Chihfeng.

Friction, moreover, was reflected in the continuing negotiations, as was the tacit pro-Kuomintang bias of the very bases of those negotiations. The Political Consultative Conference remained in session from January 14 to January 31, deliberating on the problems of government organization, reconstruction, military reorganization, the composition of the proposed National Assembly, and the status of the 1936 draft constitution, ratification of which had been postponed by the occurrence of World War II. During the extended session, both the United States and the Nationalists, while willing to recognize the legality of all anti-Japanese parties, nevertheless insisted upon the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the recognition of that leadership by these parties as a quid pro quo for the retention

49 Truman, Memoirs, II, 68.

of legal status.\textsuperscript{51}

Members of the proposed supreme government organ, the State Council, moreover, were to be appointed by the "President of the National Government," Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{52} Also, the constituency of the National Assembly, which was to amend and ratify the 1936 draft constitution, was to be determined by an electoral law which kept the Kuomintang delegates decidedly in the plurality.

Of 2,050 total delegates, 1,200 were to be retained from geographical apportionments which favored Kuomintang-held areas; 150 delegates were, somewhat inappreciably, to be allotted to the Northeast Provinces and Taiwan; and 700 more were to be proportioned among "various parties and social leaders," presumably by the unilateral fiat of the elements who were controlling the negotiations.\textsuperscript{53} These proposals naturally aroused the opposition of the leftist Democratic League as well as that of the Communists. On January 17, both dissident groups went on record as favoring open general elections for the National Assembly. Outside the negotiations, this balkiness aroused reactionary fervor in the right wing of the Kuomintang. On January 25, the house of one of the members of the Democratic League was sacked by the Kuomintang Secret Police, a maneuver which prompted the League to threaten a complete boycott of the future meetings of

\textsuperscript{51}Dept. of State, \textit{Relations with China}, 610.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 619.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid.
the Political Consultative Conference (P. C. C.). Nevertheless, the final resolutions of the P. C. C., delivered on January 31, reflected the predominant position of the Nationalists: the National Assembly was to convene on May 5, 1946, to adopt the constitution, revising the 1936 draft constitution along the line of the principles agreed upon by the P. C. C., and its constituency was to be determined according to the Nationalist proposal; the organic law was to be revised to make the 40-man State Council the supreme organ of the national government, its membership was to be appointed by Chiang with some consideration to apportionment of the non-Kuomintang minority to be reserved to future sessions; and the President was to have a veto over the Council with a three-fifths vote required to override it, although a mere majority vote was to be enough for a change in administrative policy.

While Marshall purportedly steered clear of political matters at this point, did not act as mediator during the January session of the P. C. C., and thus, by default, contributed to an early Nationalist edge in the negotiations, his efforts in behalf of permanent peace were unflagging. "To lend the strength of his influence to the cease-fire agreement between the two Chinese armies," Truman writes,


55 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 139-140.
Marshall undertook a three-thousand mile flight through northern China all the way to the borders of Inner Mongolia. He talked to all the principal commanders in the field and reported to me that he had been able to promote a general understanding throughout the region of the purposes of the cease-fire and of the machinery that had been set up to enforce it.56

While in Yanan, Marshall talked with the Communist political leader, Mao Tse-tung, who seemed appreciative of Marshall's role as peace mediator and waxed eloquent on the prospects of democratic government in China.57

The truce, of course, was never effected to perfection. As early as February 5, there were reports of Communist attacks upon three villages in the border region of North China; and in reprisal a new resurgence of reaction started five days later and continued throughout the rest of the month.58 Yet Marshall retained confidence in the idea that once a military settlement had been effected, political discussions could ensue in refinement from military pressure. This confidence is evidenced in his request to President Truman early in February to terminate the China Theater of Operations. Even as he had written the President on February 9 that continued Russian presence in Manchuria was developing into a "festering situation,"

56Truman, Memoirs, II, 74. "His correct view of his mission was that he was to bring the fighting to an end, if possible, and he took pains to avoid matters that were wholly political in nature."

57Ibid., 78.

which piqued the Nationalist Army,\footnote{Truman, Memoirs, II, 74.} Marshall, on the twelfth, for the purpose of avoiding "the inevitable Russian recriminations similar to those today regarding the British troops in Greece,"\footnote{Ibid., 77.} recommended termination of the China Theater and simultaneous evacuation of American marines, leaving only the military advisory group and a marine detachment for "reconnaissance and transportation and some housekeeping and local guard units."\footnote{Ibid.}

Truman replied that plans for the movement of Chinese armies to Manchuria could not be completed before September 1, 1946, and that logistical support for these armies would have to be extended until October 31, 1946; but at the same time he expressed a sympathetic anxiety to get American forces out of China as quickly as possible.\footnote{Ibid.} Evidently, any plan of using American forces to apply occasional pressures consistent with the negotiations was completely dropped in favor of winning the favor of world acquittal from the allegations of the Soviet Union.

2. The Accord on Military Demobilization and Re-organization: the mediating party is carried along with one faction as a result of nonpolitical policy.

The second major development of the Marshall Mission was the

\footnote{Ibid., 74.}
accord on military reorganization, reached on February 25, 1946. This was the crucial step in an attempt to insure that the truce would develop into a lasting peace by providing for the reduction of both Communist and Kuomintang forces and their integration into a national army which, ideally, would be nonpolitical in character. But at this critical point, the Communists, who felt they were getting the worst of negotiations and that, while they could accept temporary submission, they could not accept it permanently, balked. Thereupon, Marshall, as the straight-line mediator in behalf of a mediating policy which had originally leaned with near-imperceptibility toward one faction, was now carried along with that faction in an equally imperceptible manner almost precisely because of the "non-political" import his mission was presently supposed to carry. The Communists had been the first to violate openly the resolutions by failing to present a list of their troops to Executive Headquarters. Hence, Marshall, ostensibly quite nonpolitically, began to find himself lining up with the Nationalists.

From February 14, 1946, to February 25, the three-man committee on military affairs, with Marshall sitting in an advisory capacity, Chou En-lai representing the Communists, and General Chih-chung the National Government, deliberated on the policy of reduction and integration. Agreement was reached on the twenty-fifth and promulgated in

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63 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 140.
a document entitled, "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army." The stated purpose of the agreement was to:

facilitate the economic rehabilitation of China and at the same time to furnish a basis for the development of an effective military force capable of safeguarding the security of the nation, including provisions to safeguard the rights of the people from lawless military interference. 64

To many observers, particularly those propinquous to the left, however, the title of the agreement—"Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army"—seemed to give the lie to its supposedly "nonpolitical" intent. "On the strong advice of General Marshall," Kenneth Latourette tell us, the army was to be strictly nonpolitical in character and alignment. 65 The final provisions, however, left the Communist armies in a projected five-to-one minority in each region: within eighteen months, armed forces were to be reduced to fifty Nationalist divisions and ten Communist divisions, each division to be limited to 14,000 men and receive twelve weeks of basic training. 66

A further directive of the military subcommittee, signed on March 16, 1946, designated the Executive Headquarters as the organ to implement this plan. A subgroup was to be formed within the headquarters, to be made up of Nationalist, Communist and American

64Ibid., 141.
65Latourette, American Record, 215.
66F. R., 427.
personnel, to supervise execution of the plan. Chinese puppet
groups of Japan were to be disbanded within three months, a
twelve-week training program was to be outlined, and it was rec-
ommended that a Demobilized Manpower Commission be established to
coordinate activities with the Government, the Communists, civilian
agencies, relief organizations, and the central military headquarters.67

3. The truce is broken: Marshall does not use American
troops, and so the Communists do—for propaganda purposes.

The success of the military plan, designed to bring a halt
to fighting so that "negotiations for political settlement could be
carried on in an aura of peace," was hardly complete.68 Even as Gen-
eral Marshall was stating that this agreement represented the "great
hope of China," the New York Times was reporting on February 27 that
Moscow radio was beginning a new virulence against the presence of
American troops in China and Manchuria. Fighting again broke out in
Jehol Province,69 and a new flurry of rightist attacks occurred in
Western port cities.70

67Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secre-
tary General, February 26, 1946-July 10, 1947 (Washington: U. S. Gov-

68David Nelson Rowe, China Among the Powers (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and Company, 1946), 211.

69"Moscow Radio Inveighs Against U. S. Troops in China, U.S.S.R.,
Manchuria," The New York Times, February 27, 1946, Sec. 16, 2; "Fighting
in Jehol," ibid., March 5, 1946, Sec. 15, 1.

70"Rightist Attacks," ibid., March 15, 1946, Sec. 7, 1.
It was at this inconvenient time that Marshall left China and returned to Washington to make a report to President Truman. Departing China on March 12, Marshall left behind him "smoldering animosities" which, "immediately upon his departure ... broke out afresh."\textsuperscript{71}

Just before leaving China, Marshall had obtained the consent of Chiang Kai-shek for the entry of cease-fire teams into Manchuria, a proposition which the Nationalist Generalissimo had previously refused. "In fact," writes President Truman, "it was this event which had led Marshall to believe he could be spared in China."\textsuperscript{72} After Marshall left, however, Chiang "put such severe restrictions on the powers of the cease-fire teams that were to go into Manchuria that they were unable to function."\textsuperscript{73} In the interim State Council, meanwhile, the Kuomintang had arrogated to itself twenty of the forty seats, and thus had put themselves pretty well in the driver's seat. Kuomintang determination for ascendency involved, moreover, some duplicity in public affairs: as the rightist terror spread unabated through mid-March, for instance, the Generalissimo was pledging that the right wing within the party was being suppressed and was attributing the new conflagration to internal acts of spying and sabotage


\textsuperscript{72}Truman, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 78.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 78-79.
being perpetrated by agents of the Soviet Union. 74 Chou en-lai, in turn, reiterated a sally against the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang and subsequently refused to file a list of Communist armies, their strengths, positions, and weapons with the Executive Headquarters on March 26, 1946, as the agreement of February 25 had stipulated as the first step in carrying out military reorganization. 75 He cited as an excuse the "justified complaint" 76 that the Commander of the Nationalist forces at Canton had refused to recognize the authority of the Executive Headquarters in his area, and that Nationalist armies at Nanking had failed to report movements to the Executive Headquarters at Peiping. Sixty thousand Communist troops in the north Hubei-south Honan area, moreover, were cut off from food supplies by an encircling cordon of Government troops. 77

The Chinese Communist Party in riposte was meanwhile steadily consolidating its position in Manchuria. Russian withdrawal, originally scheduled for December 3, 1945, had been postponed until February 1, 1946, by the Sino-Russian agreement signed under Western


75 Ibid., 194.

76 As the State Department calls it. Dept. of State, Relations with China, 146.

77 Ibid., 147.
supervision in August of 1945. After a Government request in early March for some move toward withdrawal, the Soviets agreed to a progressive evacuation, beginning on April 6 and ending on April 29. Consequent Nationalist takeover, however, was handicapped by extension of their lines of communication and lack of sufficient rolling stock. Government forces were further impeded by Russian refusal to allow the port of Dairen to be used as a means of entry and in continued and staggered hesitancy in Russian withdrawal. Unit-scale fighting soon broke out in numerous areas of Manchuria, as no effective Executive Headquarters could be established there; and as the Nationalists tried to gain control of the lines of communication, hostilities spread southward. American forces, furthermore, became involved in the fighting; and on March 25, United States authorities reported two marines killed by Communist forces in Jehol. On April 6, General Gillen, Marshall's deputy, reported that Government authorities were detaining Communist cease-fire team members at Mukden and had arrested others in Peiping. Chinese Air Force planes had also "buzzed" the Communist center of Yanan.

79Dept. of State, Relations with China, 148.
81Truman, Memoirs, II, 79.
But in Manchuria, the picture became increasingly bright for the Communists. On April 15, 1946, the day after Russian troops had withdrawn from Changchun, the Communist forces, in what amounted to a "flagrant violation" of the January cease-fire, attacked the city and by April 18 had occupied it.\(^\text{82}\) This tore a breach in the negotiations which was never mended. It at once made the Communist generals overconfident and less agreeable to compromise and strengthened the ultra-reactionary groups in the Kuomintang. And Marshall returned from Washington to find himself powerless in the chasm between two determined foes.

Marshall returns and can only solicit Kuomintang support for his mediation: the United States becomes involved in the polarization to the extent that its mediating team can only militate to the Nationalist Government.

Marshall returned to China on April 18, 1946, to find the situation in this impasse.\(^\text{83}\) The only hope for respite, it appeared, was in the Communists' repeatedly-expressed willingness to submit military and political reorganization to negotiations if the fighting were terminated. The National Government, however, declined such compromises, insisting on its right to complete sovereignty over Manchuria. Since this was also a basic principle of American policy, Marshall could only repair to Nationalist headquarters at Nanking—which seemed the more truculent at the moment—to try to induce acceptance of some compromise measure. This offended the Communists

\(^{82}\)Dept. of State, Relations with China, 11:9.

\(^{83}\)Ibid.
who felt that Marshall should have contacted Chou En-lai first, or at least, should have arranged for a simultaneous meeting with the leaders of both factions.\textsuperscript{84} The seriousness of the turmoil, moreover, was reflected in the fact that it had already meant the indefinite postponement of the May 5 constitutional assembly--something which the Communists, in view of their portended inferior position there, no doubt wanted--and had heightened factionalism and mutual distrust to the extent that it appeared that the Constitution (which was ultimately promulgated on November 12) was foredoomed to rejection by the Communists and their allies.\textsuperscript{85}

Marshall now, in cognizance of the undeniably imperious hold of the Communists in Manchuria, and in accordance with the American policy of ensuring military peace before political settlement, momentarily retreated from the position implied by the January 10 cease-fire order--that Manchuria was the sole property of Nationalist China--and recommended the entry of Executive Headquarters teams into Manchuria. This was first obstructed by the Nationalist Commander in Manchuria, then by the Nationalist members of the teams themselves who would claim no authority for themselves in the embattled area.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} "Reds Irked at Marshall's Delay in Meeting Chou," \textit{The New York Times}, April 21, 1946, Sec. 26, 3.

\textsuperscript{85} As it finally was. See p. 83 of this paper.

\textsuperscript{86} In spite of this a few teams were active in Manchuria as early as April 8. F. R., 417.
Marshall began to abide by the Nationalists' decisions, instead of the Nationalists abiding by his.

As the Communists realized that Marshall could not prevent Chiang from having his way, their propaganda attacks began to single out the American mediator for criticism. The Nationalists parried this with their own criticisms of Marshall and of the United States; and both factions tried to present the face of readiness to compromise to the general public while both, in fact, began to cling the more tenaciously to extremist positions. Chiang, for instance, while announcing his intent to capture Changchun, and while resisting Marshall's efforts to woo him away from this revanchist position, was simultaneously agreeing to get rid of the rightists in the Kuomintang. As a feint in this direction, he announced his intention, on April 29, 1946, to relieve the extreme right-wing militarist, General Yeng-chin, of his command. Somewhat anomalously, it had been Yeng-chin's statements on Manchuria, asserting that it was a problem which could be solved by force alone, which had presaged Chiang's own. Yeng-chin was subsequently offered the position of

87 "Kuomintang Agrees to Get Rid of Rightists," The New York Times, March 17, 1946, Sec. 29, 1, 3.

88 Ernest Klein, Sovietized China (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1951), 57. General Yeng-chin is reported as saying as early as October, 1945, "There is no chance for agreement in China. The Chinese Communist movement represents a foul excrescence of the Chinese Nationalist revolution which must be done away with by force."
Chief of Staff to get him out of field command. Yeng-chin, however, declined the offer and announced his retirement on May 13, 1946, serving as a badly-needed whipping boy for a policy that was clearly in the ascendant. 89

5. The breach widens: both factions express distrust of the United States, and Marshall is "despitefully used" by the Kuomintang.

The Communists were now becoming stronger in their charges that the Marshall Mission was merely a Nationalist-American intrigue against them. 90 The Nationalists disclaimed this, citing the betrayal at Yalta as the prime manifestation of American non-partiality toward Nationalist China. 91 Throughout April and May, the exchange of propaganda took place with such frequency and increasing acrimony that by May 30, Marshall was reduced to a meek explanation in a press conference of America's role in China. Singularly un inventive, Marshall echoed the old line which had come to be regarded by the Communists as mere cant: that the United States was not interested in forcing its will upon China, but rather wished only to promote concord in accordance with the desire for peace that the two factions had expressed in the agreement of November, 1945. 92 Recalcitrance continued to grow.


91 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, 351.

Nationalist China increased its agitation for control of Manchuria. The Communists demanded a revision of the military reorganization plan so that they might have five divisions in Manchuria to the Nationalists' fourteen, instead of the one division as planned.

This war hysteria had the effect of forcing the desk general out of action. Reminding the National Government that it would be a violation of the truce to attack Changchun, Marshall withdrew as mediator, though he continued to hold separate conferences with representatives of both sides and carry communications between the two sides. Marshall also proposed a "compromise" looking to the gratification of Kuomintang desires, but by a gradual and peaceful, instead of an immediate and warlike, process. This plan suggested Communist withdrawal from Changchun, the establishment of an Executive Headquarters there, and complete Nationalist occupation of the city at the end of a six-month interval. The Communists naturally objected to this plan, saying that the giving up of Changchun would also put in doubt the status of other Manchurian cities, such as Kirin and Harbin, upon which the Nationalists had further designs. Chou also repeated at this time the Communist demand for five divisions in Manchuria.93

Marshall's actions at this juncture are graphically demonstrative of the "nonpolitical, neutral" policy which he was forced to follow in the absence of any military, economic, or moral suasion.

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93 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 152-154.
In this instance, as Kuomintang militarism gathered steam, Marshall's diplomacy was forced to attach itself to that faction which had the more momentum, as the content of the "compromise" suggestion indicates. Furthermore, when the Communists had taken Changchun, even the new mediation could only request Chiang to exercise control over his party's revanchist emotions. But once influence and emotion have combined within the Kuomintang to make the drive on Changchun somewhat of an inevitability, Marshall can only devise a plan which would provide for eventual Nationalist accession to the city, but by peaceful means.

Chiang knew that behind this rather shallow kind of entreating diplomacy there lay no sanction that a bit of deviousness could not evade. Consequently, on May 22, when Marshall felt that he was coming close to arriving at a basis for agreement on Changchun, Chiang notified the mediator that he had not heard from his troops for three days, and so, with assurances of peaceful intent, he left on May 23 for Mukden. En route to Mukden, however, he transmitted to Marshall three demands which for the time being disrupted any chance for agreement on the Manchurian crisis. Seemingly possessed of a premonition of his armies' successes in the field, Chiang demanded: 1) that the Communists facilitate the re-establishment of communications in north China and Manchuria, 2) that they make immediate plans for military demobilization and reorganization, and 3) that on all field teams or
high staff teams, the American member be allowed the deciding vote.\textsuperscript{94} With this set of demands, Chiang at once aroused Communist suspicion against the United States with an all-too-obvious trust in the American voting record, and put the entire American mission at his mercy. Marshall could no longer find great trust with the Communists, and, without that lever, he could no longer have any assurance that Chiang would in any way heed his advice. In a word, Chiang had spitefully used Marshall.

Nor was this all. On May 23, as Changchun fell to the Nationalists, Chiang was, by some happy coincidence, there to enjoy the triumph. His forces thence flared out to make menacing motions in the direction of Harbin and Kirin; and Chiang, quick to realize that he had Marshall in his grip, fired a message to him asking for his "guarantee" that the Communists would carry out the three demands.\textsuperscript{95}

To Marshall's reply that these actions were making it difficult for him to continue as mediator; Chiang confidently answered that he was cognizant of that fact and re-avowed his peaceful intent, though only backing it with the evidence that he was now in favor of having Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria. But this was rather weak evidence in view of the trammels which the Nationalists had previously

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., 154-155.

\textsuperscript{95}Which, as Chiang explained, would consist in General Marshall's setting time limits for the putting into effect of all agreements which General Marshall had signed and in his assuming responsibility for supervision over the strict observance of agreements by the Communists. Ibid., 157.
imposed on the Headquarters teams.

Chiang returned to Nanking on June 3, issued orders for the establishment of Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria, and halted the advance. By June 6, a 15-day truce had been agreed upon. But the courtly attitude of Chiang toward American mediating personnel had wrought its ends. Communist propaganda reached a shrill crescendo in anti-Americanism. On the same day that the truce was agreed upon, the Communist press attacked the continued presence of American troops in China and asserted that Marshall's peace efforts were futile unless the United States withdrew its forces. The following day, Comrade Mao expressed the traditional Communist tautology, strikingly international in style and scope, that the Communists wanted peace while the United States had always been, was now, and ever would be, an imperialist power. The Yenan press on June 8 charged that Japanese troops were being utilized by the Nationalists and by the United States to fight Communist troops.

But Marshall had not been intentionally partial, and these attacks now aroused him to the diplomatic error of openly taking


sides against one of the factions. One June 13, as acerbity grew and Marshall found himself helpless in the face of rapidly-moving field developments, he committed the irreparable faux pas of publicly accusing the Communists of blocking the truce. Armed now with what seemed the virtual certitude of impunity, the reactionary fervor shot toward its pinnacle within the Kuomintang. On June 17, Chiang presented demands which, if answered, would have ipso facto given him complete control of all north China and Manchuria. Anti-American demonstrations of a rightist tinge were carried on in Nanking and Shanghai; and quite significantly, even as the Kuomintang was vehemently denying the rightist tag, General Yeng-chin was placed back in his command on June 29. The Shanghai Nationalist press now began to call for all-out war against the Communists.

In the face of this dual extremism, Marshall undertook to


99 The plan demanded Communist withdrawal from Jehol, Chahar, Shantung localities occupied after noon on June 7, and from Harbin, Antung, Tunghwa, Mudankiang, and Paicheng in Manchuria. Dept. of State, Relations with China.

100 "Yeng-chin Again in Command; Shanghai Press Wants War Against the Communists," The New York Times, June 30, 1946, Sec. 15, 1.
present his draft agreement on the army reorganization plan. It maintained the 5 to 1 ratio in troops, but provided for six months instead of the previous twelve for assignment of troops to specific areas. The Executive Headquarters was to determine areas of occupation, and the Government garrison in Harbin was explicitly restricted to 5,000 troops. Government troops, moreover, were not immediately to move into the areas which the Communists had evacuated in China proper, and local governments and a Peace Preservation Corps were to oversee this. Chiang promptly dissented from the restrictions placed on the Government garrison in Harbin and the stricture against the quick moving of Government troops into north China. Chou En-lai, on the other hand, objected to the proposed Communist withdrawal from Kiangsu.101

The truce was renewed on July 1, but it had little chance in the face of increased Nationalist agitation for all-out action and heightened Communist obsession with the presence of American troops. The situation so nearly approached cataclysm that Truman records that now, "For the first time, Marshall sounded a discouraging note." 102 Saying in a cable to Truman that success now depended more upon happenings in the field than on the "problems of negotiation," Marshall appended a rather dire note: "I am working against time."

101 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 166.

102 Truman, Memoirs, II, 79.
Disagreement at this time became indeed so violent that it began to permeate the United States itself and produce its own antipodes there. Groups led by such spokesmen as the Marine Corps Commandant, General A. A. Vandegriff were urging that the marines remain in China "as long as United States policy demands it;"103 while the New York Committee to Win the Peace and Brigadier General E. F. Carlson were urging rapid withdrawal, together with some recognition of the fact that the Chinese Communists were beginning to express the wishes of more than a slim minority of the Chinese populace.104 In all quarters throughout the world, chauvinism was sharpening. Moscow radio began to compare the Kuomintang with the German National Socialist Party of 1933, and indeed cited direct Nazi influence as a holdover from the early German military advisorship to the Kuomintang.

Increased field activity was the natural outcome. The Honan-Hupeh area soon became again a hotbed of innumerable small conflicts;105


105 "Nazi Influence in Kuomintang," ibid., June 28, 1946, Sec. 12, 5; "Honan and Hupeh Activity," ibid., July 11, 1946, Sec. 1, 2.
and Communist forces began to mass near Peiping and Tientsin after a preliminary assault on Lincheng. On July 29, there occurred an ambush of American marines by Communist forces in which three marines were killed and twelve wounded. Seven marines were also kidnapped in East Hopei by the Communists and held under duress for several days before their release.106

Chiang Kai-shek, meanwhile, departed Nanking on July 14 for Kuling, seriously handicapping negotiations. Marshall's hands had always been tied by the popular vogues which were prevalent in the United States, but never so noticeably as now, when violent opinion swept all the way to the shores of the Potomac. Truman, in his Memoirs, notes a good example of the way in which violently formed public opinion can paralyze the efforts of the individual diplomat:

At this point Marshall was seriously handicapped by various proposals that had been introduced in the Congress and appeared related for passage—proposals that would have extended Lend-lease and other aid to the government of Chiang Kai-shek without laying down a condition that he work with General Marshall. This was heart-breaking and contributed greatly to General Marshall's troubles. . . As was to happen again and again in later years, the Chinese government sought to gain advantages from our government by applying pressures from other directions. . . the 'die-hards' in China gained new confidence and sabotaged Marshall's efforts to bring about peace.107

106 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 172.

107 Truman, Memoirs, II, 80.
5. The appointment of John Leighton Stuart as Ambassador: mediation is reduced to analysis and introduction of artifices.

John Leighton Stuart, meanwhile, was appointed United States Ambassador to China, upon the recommendation of General Marshall, on July 16, 1946. Dr. Stuart was an educator and a missionary who had been acting as President of Yenching University in Peiping prior to his appointment as Ambassador. His idea of the cure for China's ills was to educate the Chinese to adjust themselves to China's new, "modern international environment." But at the time of his appointment, propensities seem to have traveled quite far in the other direction. Stuart and Marshall, as a result, were reduced to wasting away at the rather artificial tasks of reporting to China that its economic situation was deteriorating and of instituting the 5-man council, in most ways a needless repetition of the old 3-man committees.

At this point, there was no middle ground left. In a press conference held on August 3, 1946, Chu Teh and two other Communist Generals saw a resumption of full-scale, all-out civil war as inevitable. In the United States, meanwhile, Senators Ellender and Butler were calling for the withdrawal of the United States mission in China, stating that the situation was by now a "hopeless imbroglio," and Senator Owen Brewster was recommending that, while peace negotiations should probably be discontinued, American marines should nevertheless hold their ground in China as the guardians of the Western world against

108 Stuart, Fifty Years, 166.

109 Ibid., 163.

possible Russian incursion. 111

The joint statement issued by Stuart and Marshall on August 10, 1946, was itself anything but optimistic in import. It cited the deteriorating economic situation and continued strife in the face of what Stuart, Marshall, and other American observers had often termed the unanimous desire for peace and prosperity. The character of the dispute, as this statement pointed out, now began to center its focus on the character of local governments after troop reassignment and displacement. The Communists, looking to a withdrawal from north China which was imminent if agreement were to be reached at the negotiating table, demanded insurance that local civil administrations would be left inviolate when the Nationalist military forces entered. Chiang, on the other hand, had often repeated the opinion that Kuomintang forces could not "surrender administrative responsibilities" in the localities and provinces which they occupied. 112

At this point, with the Communists ostensibly demanding civilian control and the Nationalists pointing toward military control, the argument that reaction had swept the Kuomintang was, prima facie, convincing to all quarters. Yet no respite was offered the Communists even as a stratagem to bring the Nationalists into line. Instead,


112 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 173 ff.
President Truman, tacitly testifying to the impotency of his mediating team in China, sent a direct message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on August 10, 1946, in which he informed the Generalissimo of his grave concern. Expressly citing that school of thought which blamed militant reactionary forces in China with suppressing liberalism both within and outside the Kuomintang, Truman re-asseverated the intention of the United States to withhold economic aid for rehabilitating industry and agriculture until such time as the civil conflict ended. Chiang's reply of August 28 seemed to assume the same ingenuity on the part of the President that he had been free to assume on the part of Marshall, and it shifted the blame to the Communists in the most obtuse manner, blaming them as the faction which in reality wished to usurp civil government with the military. Truman remained steadfast, however, and replied on August 31 to repeat his warning that only the end of civil war would make feasible the extension of economic aid.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{6. August, 1946: the traces of complete alignments of the Chinese factions with the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, begin to appear.}

During August of 1946, the drift toward all-out strife gathered a momentum that was almost irrevocable; and the two polarizations in China showed more certain prospects of attaching themselves to the Uni-

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., 179-180.
ted States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. Several speakers on the floor of the United States House of Representatives voiced desires for firmer action against the Soviet Union. Marine-Communist clashes were repeated throughout the month, and on August 18, Yenan ordered mobilization of all Communist troops. An American intelligence report of August 30 found that the Soviet Union had troops stationed at Chinese Communist bases.\[^{114}\]

Stuart, as part of a move to alleviate Communist intransigence through a somewhat strained device, organized a five-man committee to deal with the problems of negotiation concurrently with the three-man committee. By September 3, both factions had named their delegates to this committee, over which Dr. Stuart was to preside as Chairman. It was Chiang, however, who attached himself to this committee because of its advertised American hegemony, and he refused to participate in any further committee of Three meetings until the five-man council was convened.\[^{115}\]

The split was also reflected in the projected constituency of the State Council. The selections of the Generalissimo-President


\[^{115}\]Dept. of State, Relations with China, 175.
had restricted Communist and third-party delegates to a rather slim minority. They, in return, demanded control of fourteen seats in the council of forty, enough for a veto. Marshall finally got Chiang to agree to the usual compromise—which in effect gave Chiang everything that he wanted. The Communists and their friendly allies such as the Democratic League and "no-party" fellow travelers like Kuo Mo-jo were to be allowed thirteen seats in the State Council—one short of a veto.116

In prompt accordance with this hiatus in agreement, the National Government forces pressed into Communist territory and began advancing toward the strategic city of Kalgan. Marshall, believing that the attack would be unnecessarily destructive, asked to be relieved as mediator. Chiang, in reply, agreed to a truce, while the Communists demanded complete cessation of attack. Marshall warned Chiang that further advances northward at this point might well cause the Soviet Union to extend direct assistance to the Chinese Communists. The admonition was lost on Chiang, however, who was bent on unifying China, and thus preparing it for American aid, in his own way. When the Communists at length officially rejected the truce, requesting that there be no time limit to it and that troops move back to the positions they held in China proper as of January 13 and in Manchuria as of June 7, Chiang unleashed the full onslaught of his attack. On October 10, 1946, both Kalgan and Chihfeng, the

116Stuart, Fifty Years, 170.
last Communist stronghold in Jehol Province, fell, as did towns formerly held by the Communists in northern Kiangsu. 117

7. The breach complete: American mediation wrecked on the walls of Kalgan.

With this Nationalist triumph, negotiations, even though Marshall lingered on in China until his recall on January 6, 1947, were administered the actual coup de grace. All through the month of September, both sides and the powers which were emerging as their sponsors—the United States and the Soviet Union—exhibited an ever-heightening adamancy. A resolution of the United States House of Representatives on September 5 again urged a stiffer policy against Communism in China. On September 6, Moscow radio announced that withdrawal of American troops afforded the only possible prospect for agreement. Henry A. Wallace, formerly Vice-President of the United States and Secretary of Commerce, made a speech in Boston on September 12, pleading for retention of international feeling over the China crisis, and was heckled by an unruly mob of Russophobes; Chou En-lai, on September 8, in pleading for a reconvening of the military commission in the face of the imminent beleaguement of Kalgan, denied any connections with the Soviet Union. Marshall, nevertheless, rejected the plea on September 13, apparently giving up any hope that American mediation could restore permanent peace or even a temporary truce. 118

Consequently, on September 20, the Communists threatened to publish the proceedings of the peace parleys unless the Marshall military committee was reconvened.

By September 30, certain small progressive groups in the United States were getting on the bandwagon for withdrawal of American troops, and the Russian United Nations representative, K. V. Kisselev, on October 2, claimed that the presence of United States troops in China constituted a violation of the United Nations Charter.

With the fall of Kalgan, finally, hard and fast lines were unremittingly drawn. As Dr. Stuart recalls the event:

By a coincidence this was almost exactly one month before the opening of the National Assembly and it was required that a formal summons to all delegates should be issued one month in advance. The emotional reaction of the highly emotional Chou En-lai and of his companions was the more intense because these two events were thus synchronized.

As this crucial series of events is related by Dr. Sun Fo, Chou was still planning to go to Nanking to continue negotiations even after the fall of Kalgan. Stuart records that Marshall at this point


120 Stuart, Fifty Years, 170.
"went to the extreme" of flying to Shanghai to urge Chou to return to Nanking. But when the October 11 mandate announcing the convocation of the National Assembly arrived, Chou abruptly changed his plans. The third parties also denounced this convocation as unilateral and dictatorial on the part of the Kuomintang.

Veiling the opening attacks on Antung and Chefoo, Chiang on October 16 issued a statement of basis for negotiations which harkened back to a joint statement by Stuart and Marshall made on September 27, which called for: 1) simultaneous meetings of the Committee of Three and the five-man council, 2) continued negotiations on military demobilization and reorganization, and 3) resolution of questions of local government by the Kuomintang-dominated State Council. To this Chiang appended a proposal positing the exclusion of Manchuria from the proposal providing for the settlement of the question of local government by the State Council. The September 27th proposals were in themselves overwhelming enough, the Communists felt, without Chiang's addition and the continued Nationalist offensive. Chou En-lai, together with the third party group, returned to Nanking to discuss the proposal, but on October 24, Chou informed Ambassador Stuart that he could not accept it.

Government forces, meanwhile, occupied the last stations on

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121 Ibid.
122 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 197.
123 Ibid., 198-199.
on the Tainan-Tsingtao Railway and moved along the Peiping-Hankow Railway in southern Hopei. The Communists withdrew their personnel from the Executive Headquarters and from all field teams in the Government-occupied areas with the result that practically all branches were inoperative.\(^{124}\)

With all other vistas having been exhausted by the now-imperious intransigence of the two major Chinese factions, Marshall and Stuart, as a last desperate measure, suggested mediation by a Third Party Group which included the liberal parties and the youth leagues. On November 1, this group recommended informal conferences be held. Chiang Kai-shek agreed, but now holding military supremacy, he insisted that his proposal of October 16 constitute the agenda. Chou En-lai reluctantly agreed, and the meeting was set for November 4. Before the conference convened, the Nationalists were insistent that no cessation of hostilities could be effected until the Communists submitted a list of their delegates to the National Assembly. Confused by this intrusion of political matter into what purported to be an attempt at military settlement, the Third Party Group turned to Marshall and Stuart; but the latter declined to take the lead in negotiations, saying that a Chinese neutral group should act in mediation, at least on political questions.\(^{125}\)

The Conference never materialized, however, as on November 4, only the Communist delegates arrived to hear Chou En-lai present

\(^{124}\)Ibid., 200-201.

\(^{125}\)Ibid., 202-203.
the Communist case. Nationalist delegates, now playing the United States for all that it was worth, suddenly refused to attend on the grounds that the Communists had refused American mediation.\textsuperscript{126}

Chiang, however, still professed to Marshall and Stuart that he favored a cessation of hostilities. To this end, he prepared a statement on November 8 which the two American mediators found equivocal in tone and difficult to understand. To the queries of Marshall and Stuart following their perusal of the document, Chiang replied that in preparing the draft he had had to take into consideration that, while there had formerly been a divided opinion in the Government regarding the proper course to be followed, there was now a complete unanimity of opinion in the Government that a policy of force was the only course to follow.\textsuperscript{127}

A cease-fire followed, but it was unilaterally undertaken by the Generalissimo for the purpose of convoking the National Assembly, also by unilateral fiat, during the interregnum of peace.\textsuperscript{128} The Communists, hence, as well as a considerable portion of the liberal delegates, did not take part in the adoption of the constitution. This constitution delivered on paper everything which the Kuomintang had protestingly promised to the United States and to their rival factions in China. Marshall was to write in his final statement of

\textsuperscript{126} F. R., 649.

\textsuperscript{127} Dept. of State, \textit{Relations with China}, 205.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 206-207.
January 7, 1947:

It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly, since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted.\footnote{Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., XLIII, 368.}

As regards the establishment of institutions that were democratic in form, the statement is irrefutably correct: the basis of government was broadened with a State Council in which the Communists, the Democratic Socialists, the Young China Party, and the independents were to hold seats along with members of the Kuo-mintang. The political program of the National Government of China called for "political democratization" and "nationalization of the armed forces." The Executive Yuan was to execute the will of the State Council, thus conforming to the principle of "authority and responsibility." Provinces were to separate military and civil authority, and all parties were to be allowed to participate in provincial government. And "strict guarantees" were to be accorded to "the people's freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom of publication, and freedom of assembly."\footnote{Dept. of State, Relations with China, 740.}

Literally, the new constitution was thus sufficiently broad and democratic. In like manner, Chiang's speech to the closing session of the P. C. C. on January 31, 1946, had carried a message of honest intent to reform. "I wish to declare first on behalf of the Government," he intoned:
that they [the P. C. C. resolutions] will be fully res-
pected and carried out as soon as the prescribed procedures
have been completed. I pledge at the same time that I will
uphold this program faithfully and will also see to it that
all the military and civil subordinates follow it strictly.
From now on, I will, whether in the Government or out of it,
faithfully and resolutely observe, as a citizen should, all
the decisions of this Conference.131

Chiang, however, could make the promise rather glibly, since he
never intended to be out of the Government. The collected wartime
speeches of the Generalissimo are rife with an imperious tone of his
own personal leadership; and in China's "March Towards Democracy,"
it was the Kuomintang under Chiang's mentorship which was scheduled
to "bring the ship safely to port."132 Moreover, in spite of the
fact that, as Lawrence K. Rosinger and others had noted in 1944,
Chiang's militarism actually amounted to an imposition of warlord
power upon the vanguard of the nationalist movement, Chiang was vir-
tually assured of American support.133 American mediation certainly
did much to corroborate this belief. The constitution of 1946, praised
by both Chiang and Marshall, negated in essence its democratic form
by assuring a seating arrangement whereby the minority parties and
the Communists would have no chance of overriding Presidential veto,
and a very slim one of overriding the Kuomintang majority. American
diplomacy, inasmuch as it repeatedly found itself on one side of the
fence during the China crisis of 1946, had the final effect of accent-
uating, rather than mitigating, the polar dualisms that were emerging

131Ibid., 138.

132Chiang, Kai-shek, The Collected Wartime Speeches of Generalissimo

133Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1945 (Prince-
with such vertical force in China.

Marshall remained in China throughout December of 1946, only to be appalled by the Communists' repeated rejections of his overtures and their repeated refusals to join in the constitutional government. Finally, saying that he would neither be used by either side nor serve as an umpire on the battlefield, Marshall expressed his opinion that all avenues had been exhausted. Consequently, he was recalled by the President on January 6, 1947, and departed China on January 8.135

Chiang Kai-shek continued on his sortie into Communist territory, enjoying great success for a time and even capturing Yenan in February of 1947. But, in the words of Dean G. Acheson, the "almost inexhaustible patience" of the Chinese people in their misery ended; the nationalist fervor "moved out from under" Chiang, and in large part defected to the foe.136 The United States Chamber of Commerce estimated in March of 1949 that there had been a twenty or more fold increase from 1946 through 1949 in the Communist forces by way of "voluntary turnover of Nationalist troops."137 The Nationalist Government lost its backing, became ineffectual and decadent,

134 Dept. of State, Relations with China, 217.

135 Ibid.

136 F. R., 112-113

and so fell. Rather wistfully, Marshall stated on January 7, 1947, that:

The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them.138
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Debate over China Policy

After the unsuccessful termination of the Marshall Mission, and particularly since the takeover of the Chinese mainland by the Communists and their subsequent academic, political, and ideological vituperation of the United States, Western writers have been forced into a hard line against Oriental Communism, and have been wont to put the brunt of responsibility for the disruption of the negotiations upon the Communist faction. Indeed, the idea that "you can't deal with the Communists" had been an article in the creed for a period for some time antedating the mission itself. Implementation of the coalition government which the United States proposed, however, loaded the Communists with the responsibility of assuming an inferior posture under Nationalist leadership. It was true that as both Chiang and Marshall pressed the Communists to thus make possible the institution of the new nonpolitical army and the State Council (by accepting a minority in both), the Nationalist forces and areas were decidedly in the plurality; and further, the Kuomintang was showing forth its might, pressing forward on a drive which felled the major strongholds of Communism.

But the situation was less unequal than either the military situation or the proposed Kuomintang-heavy government would have

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1 Marshall is usually incriminated only as the inadvertent aider of the Communist cause.
indicated. The Communists were still in control of most of the crucial area of Manchuria; and, as General Chou En-lai had asserted in October of 1946, while they had lost cities, they had not lost armies, and were determined to fight to the finish.

Furthermore, Marshall seemed to ignore in his dealing in political affairs the warning he had given to Chiang in relation to military affairs—that the proposed drive into Manchuria might well give the Russians excuse to tender aid and support to the Chinese Communists, and that, furthermore, the operation was ultimately impossible in the face of the consolidated opposition which the Communist faction could, in the last analysis, offer. Similarly, the Chinese Communists assuredly had enough in area and political control to sabotage the proposed new government in its operation; and thus their demand for a veto—a scant veto, at that—in the new State Council may not have been without its justification in the actual situation.

But the empirics seem to have been ignored in favor of careful notations on ideology. Vigorous anti-Communists could point to the many speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and maintain that he at least aired his intentions for the ultimate broadening of the government and the extension of democratic suffrage to the Chinese people.

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3As see Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 195. Chiang repeatedly went on record as favoring government "of the people, by the people, for the people."
The dialectic of the Kuomintang itself, while just as rigid as that of the Chinese Communist Party, called for the eventual doing away with the stage of "political tutelage," seemingly the iron rule and lack of ruth which the Generalissimo was currently evincing, and its replacement with democratic government. On the other hand, the Communist dialectic was precisely the reverse, preferring to go through a stage of "bourgeois" democracy only as a prelude to that type of total party rule which the Communists have long called by the name of "economic democracy."

Yet the pattern which was in evidence throughout the duration of the Marshall Mission fooled many. The right Kuomintang found itself in influential positions, dictated a policy which meant a subversion of democratic processes, and arrogated the little financial support which China received to the interested. A repressive policy in the provinces, moreover, alienated popular support. On the other hand, as we have noted, such American correspondents as Gunther Stein, while convinced that the Kuomintang was really vilifying the

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4 Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, The Making of Modern China, A Short History (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1949), 182. "The Chinese one-party system is preparatory to a future democratic government. In this fact it differs from fascist one-party systems, which are ideologically anti-democratic."

principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in practice, were writing that the policies of the Chinese Communist Party had grown less and less radical since the achievement of the United Front against Japan in 1937, and were quoting Mao as saying that local elections were the key to returning the government of China to popular sovereignty.6

Central to the solution of the Chinese civil conflict and to the inauguration of stable government was the plan for reduction and integration of the respective armies into an army which would be nonpolitical in character and which would maintain order and thus clear the air for political negotiations. Ideally, this was calculated to make the coalition efficacious in spite of the extreme ideological differences between the two principle factions. Here again, ostensibly, it was the Communists who sabotaged the plan, refusing to hand in a list of their units on March 26, and subsequently pressing for revision of the ratios, particularly with regard to Manchuria. Still, the Communists insisted that their actions were in riposte to the Nationalists' ignoring of truce teams; and so the question must remain as to whether within the chain of command of an army, it is possible to ignore politics completely. It seems rather fatuous at this point, in view of the decidedly and

6Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 83. "Sun Yat-sen's theory of tutelage, reinforced as it had been by Borodin's recognition of the Kuomintang, had made that party quite immune to notions of political democracy or of the multiparty system. The fact that power within this party had gravitated into the hands of military men . . . simply reinforced its undemocratic nature."
inherently political nature of the armies involved, to believe that a national gendarmarie could have been instituted into which no political interests intruded themselves.7 This is particularly true when it seemed to have been the assumption of American Far Eastern policymakers that a national government which legalized political parties only insofar as they recognized the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was as close to "nonpolitical" as it was possible to get.

The predication of American policy upon ideological considerations, however, clearly ignored diplomatic realities. As the Chamber of Commerce report of March 16, 1949, finally revealed, Chiang had been a bad risk.8 Argument on this point had raged interminably ever since Henry A. Wallace had returned from his mission to report to President Roosevelt:

Chiang, a man with an Oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts, and neither of which he can control by military commands ... Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.9

Wallace's prediction came all too true; and, according to Werner Levi, the Nationalists, after having been run off the mainland by the successful revolution, "admitted frankly that their inefficiency,

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7See p. 97 of this paper.

corruption, and neglect of the people's welfare contributed to the disaster on the mainland.\textsuperscript{10}

On the other hand, by the time Marshall was assigned to China, it had become clear that the United States could not risk offering any kind of permanent support to the Chinese Communists. Even the minds of most of the Foreign Service officers, who early had extolled the methods and aspirations of Yenan, had since been changed. John Paton Davies, for instance, had written on June 24, 1943:

Foreign observers, including Americans, who have recently visited the Communist area agree that the Communist regime in present policy is far removed from orthodox Communism; that it is administratively remarkably honest; that popular elections are held; that individual freedom is relatively uncurbed; that the regime appears to have strong popular support and that it is described less accurately as Communist than as agrarian democratic.\textsuperscript{11}

By late 1945, however, Davies was agreeing that the Chinese Communists were quite orthodox Marxist-Leninists who had accepted the "inevitability of gradualness."\textsuperscript{12} Thus, by the time policy had been formulated during the Truman administration, it had resorted to some rather tricky manœuvres: the Kuomintang was so corrupt and reactionary that further substantial economic aid, it was concluded, must await its reform. Yet, the Kuomintang was supposed to reform and simultaneously exert "democratic" leadership over the Communists, who really


\textsuperscript{11}"After Nineteen Years: New Light on Why China was Lost," \textit{U. S. News and World Report} (April 2, 1962), 54-86.

were Communists, in the estimation of the administration, bent on the ultimate destruction of bourgeois forms of government. "What I hoped to see," wrote Truman in succinct summary, "was China made into a country in which Communism would lose its appeal to the masses because the needs of the people and the voice of the people would have been answered." Thus, the most prominent ancillary essay of the Marshall Mission was to ask Communists to join in an effort to defeat Communism.

Marshall, accordingly, was sent into China to follow a rather rigid but pragmatically tenuous line which included external democratization, the formation of a nonpolitical army, and, most primarily, the backing of China's presumably best asset for democracy, Chiang Kai-shek. Marshall had no authority for any kind of deflection from this path, and, being the kind of diplomat he was, molded by military training into austere obedience and singleminded ratiocination, by personal character into a certain timorousness and capacity for pause, he followed the path set down by the administration to the very letter. Dynamic personal diplomacy of the type which seems to have been needed to contravene the two "inevitabilities" which Marshall had to deal with was not the promise. Some leeway, it seems, for a machiavelianism to deal with foes who were not exactly antimachiavels themselves, should have been allowed. Assuredly, there should have been momentary shifts from left to right, as besuited the given sit-

uation. As it was, however, Marshall, as we have noted, found himself finally paralyzed and almost completely at the mercy of a Kuomintang which ignored him, and then "despitefully used" him.\textsuperscript{14}

Certainly, in dealing with two such inveterately opposed factions, one must play both ends against the middle. In the face of the "real" abstractions of social belief posited by Hegel, Fichte, and Spengler, this is the only tack for the democratic, event-making man of action.

Secondly, the movements of American troops then in China should have reinforced these momentary feints to right and left. Balkiness and intransigence from either side should have been met with a strategic deployment of troops consistent with the diplomatic maneuvers. The State and War Departments, at the time of the beginning of the Marshall Mission, had instructed General Wedemeyer that:

Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China ports may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops into North China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States and the maintenance of international peace.\textsuperscript{15}

Security of the long-term interests of the United States, it seems,

\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{See} pp. 75 ff. of this paper.

\textsuperscript{15}Truman, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 72.
would have dictated this leeway for using troops only as they benefited the negotiations. As it was, the marines were admitting as early as August of 1946 that they were being used in the aid of one faction in China—the Chinese Nationalists. Truman had early demolished the thought of full-scale military occupation on two grounds: 1) the popular demand for demobilization and return of American troops home, and 2) the tremendous effort, expenditure, and risk of life that it would have taken to occupy a large country like China. But what Western policy from 1860 to 1941, and Soviet policy from 1941 to 1949, proved, was that relatively small expenditures in men, equipment, and aid are enough to wield a balance of power when a near stalemate in full-scale conflict is in effect, as it was in China in 1946. It would not have required full military occupation to have worked our will in China at this time; but it certainly did require more than an entirely passive attempt at mediation.

B. Panaceas in retrospect: examination of the post-mortems.

From the early debate over China policy which Herbert Feis records as raging between General Patrick Hurley\(^\text{17}\) and the Foreign Service officers, the former vesting confidence in Chiang Kai-shek

\(^{16}\) As see "Marines Admit Aid One Faction," *The New York Times*, August 20, 1946, Sec. 2, 2.

\(^{17}\) In spite of his early belief that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists, Hurley soon changed his mind in 1945. Don Lobbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1956), 280.
and the latter recommending everything from "rapid and thorough" reform of the Kuomintang to all-out support of the Communists, the lines of thinking have largely developed into the hardnosed anti-Communist line and the "liberal," or "soft-on-Communism" line.

The Hurley school develops historically into the contention that we should have rendered unmitigated and unqualified support to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Latourette's conclusion that China was not ready for the kind of democracy which Americans know destroys to the satisfaction of this line of thought the Foreign Service officers' recommendation for rapid reform of the Kuomintang. These critics claim it would have done no good; Kuomintang suppression was necessary because of the historical tradition of China and because it opposed a worse suppression in the form of Communism. As Senator McCarthy asserted, we should have rendered full military aid to Chiang, forcibly inducted Communist troops into the Kuomintang armies, and, in particular, should have encouraged and backed the attack on Kalgan. Materialization of this victory could have, according to McCarthy's estimates of Nationalist strength at the time, culminated in the unification of China under Kuomintang rule.18 It is Truman, however, who gives a particular argument against this:

In 1945 and 1946, of all years, thoughts of full-scale military operations in China would have been rejected by the American people before they were even expressed. That was the time when congressmen in Washington joined in the call to 'get the boys back home,' and our influence throughout the world, as well as in China, waned as the millions of American soldiers were processed through the discharge centers. 19

The opposing recommendation, that which John Carter Vincent had posed in 1942 of going all the way to the left, was completely discredited when it became apparent in 1945 that "Russia might decide to support the Yenan regime in a postwar struggle for political power within China." 20 Still, tactical sorties to the left might have been allowed for by the clouded prospects which both Moscow and Yenan had in 1945. As Stephen D. Kertész writes:

"Stalin had little confidence in the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership in the 1930s, and thought no more highly of them in 1945 at the time of the post-Yalta treaty with Chiang Kai-shek." 21

Thirdly, those who pick at the personal diplomacy of Marshall as faulty or inefficient are largely mistaken. Marshall followed his directives well, and with great competence. As we have noted, he flew three thousand miles to put into effect the initial truce, and

19Truman, Memoirs, II, 91.


flew to Communist headquarters at least twice to make overtures
to the Communist leaders to come to the negotiating table. He
kept the President fully informed of all his actions, and never
consciously aided one side or the other—and in fact even seemed
to work in naive innocence of the fact that his directives leaned
slightly in the direction of one faction. It was along the line
of intended impartiality that Marshall made his one error, which
in view of the circumstances, was a humanly understandable one.
In the dark days of June, when Marshall was finding the "neutral"
policy singularly frustrating and, moreover, was being lambasted by
the Communists for that very policy, he turned on Chou in outraged
self-defense and accused him of blocking the truce.22 Certainly
Marshall had been unfairly attacked. His own personal behavior
in China is a legend in impartiality. Perhaps it shouldn't have
been, however, for the only fault with the personal diplomacy of the
Marshall Mission was that it wasn't eventful, inventive, or bold,
and, most of all, that it wasn't epic-making.

Marshall, indeed, had been picked for that very reason—for
a promise of conformity which was then coming into vogue in Washington
and which found its base in a temper of anti-Communism that was nearly
as absolute as the pernicious movement which it opposed.

22See p. 60 of this paper.
As Archibald MacLeish writes:

... in the four years from 1946 through 1949 American foreign policy was a mirror image of Russian foreign policy: whatever the Russians did, we did in reverse. American domestic politics were conducted under a kind of upside-down Russian veto: no man could be elected to public office unless he was on record as detesting the Russians, and no proposal could be enacted, from a peace plan at one end to a military budget on the other, unless it could be demonstrated that the Russians wouldn't like it. American political controversy was controversy sung to the Russian tune.23

Henry A. Wallace, moreover, who was Secretary of Commerce at the time Truman acceded to the Presidency, notes that after the departure of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson from the Cabinet, it "became more and more heavily loaded on the side of the Russia-haters," and that "many big businessmen who had co-operated with the Army and Navy during the war were looking ahead to the probability, if not the inevitability, of war with Russia."24 It was indeed this attitude which created certain inevitabilities. It was out of this singleminded abhorrence for Communism and a resolute intention to avoid it at every pass which resulted in a refusal to toy with Communism even in an effort to defeat it—a ruse which would have been particularly appropriate to the China situation in 1946, and completely in accord with the tenets of parliamentary democracy. Instead, we attempted to demand that Chinese Communism enter into


a movement which would mean its final elimination. They refused, and we, in a sense, joined them. As MacLeish writes:

We had persuaded ourselves that this labor of resistance and containment must take precedence over everything else, and that purely American objectives and purposes, including the great traditional objectives of American life, must not only be subordinated to the accomplishment of the task of containment, but even, in certain cases, sacrificed to it.25

Certainly in China, in 1946, democracy suffered a tremendous sacrifice in the wide abyss which yawned between a Communism and an anti-Communist drive which had agreed to become poles apart, and to vanquish almost everything in between. Certain provisions within the creed of democratic nationalism were for the time being adumbrated by a temper which seemed to sweep the world and which centered its focus on ideology. The United States required that economic and political development be upheld until the military settlement became perfect. Their foes made economic and political settlements within their own bailiwicks while looking to a violent protraction of the military struggle.

25 MacLeish, "Conquest," 22.
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