The Dull Knife Raid of 1878: A Study of the Frontier

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THE DULL KNIFE RAID OF 1878:

A STUDY OF THE FRONTIER

being

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays Kansas State College in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts

by

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Date August 1, 1963
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ABSTRACT

The Dull Knife outbreak of 1878 was one of the last Indian raids in the United States. It was part of the general conflict which plagued frontier America from its very genesis to the latter part of the nineteenth century. The frontiersman-Indian conflict can only be explained through a study of the actual confrontation of the Indians and the whites.

The Indian and the frontiersman differed in their conception of land use. In the Northern Cheyenne's relationship with the United States government, that difference was manifested in the treaty which forced the northern tribe to the southern agency, and the attempt of the agency to "civilize" the Cheyenne.

The conditions in Indian Territory were unbearable for the Northern Cheyenne who had been forced there by an illegal treaty. The annuities and rations guaranteed these Indians were not supplied in full measure showing the infidelity of the government in its role as benefactor of the red man. The outbreak from Darlington Agency, the raids in southwest Kansas, and the Sappa creek and Beaver creek massacres were defiant acts of revenge against the whites who were taking over their country.

Indian ingenuity and military failure characterize this outbreak. Serious problems plagued the United States Army in protecting the frontier and the public was unwilling to either give support to the army in suppressing the Indians or leave the red man to determine his own future in his own way. The settler
demanded the services of the state and federal government to protect him in his exploitation of the earth's resources. The might of a new industrial nation was on his side and he won.
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Indian-frontiersman relations are as familiar to Americans today as any other factor in their country's history. This conflict is continually rehearsed on the television and movie screens, and newspaper articles and books are produced in large volume for the lucrative "western" market.

This study is an examination of the Indian-white conflict in the light of one particular episode in the history of that conflict. To facilitate research an episode in area history, the Dull Knife Raid of 1878, was chosen. Through the use of numerous sources which have been overlooked by previous writers on this subject, this study attempts to present this episode in Indian history in the light of the greater movements then taking place in American society.

Research has included taped interviews, personal reminiscences, popular histories of the west, novels, etc. Senate Report No. 708, the Report of the Secretary of War, and the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, are major government sources used in this study. Other essential sources are the Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society, Chronicles of Oklahoma, and the Nebraska History magazine.

Acknowledgement must be made to those who made this study possible. I extend my thanks for help and encouragement during my graduate career to Gordon Davidson, my thesis advisor, also
to the history faculty at Fort Hays Kansas State College for their patience through this ordeal. I am indebted to the late George B. Nellans of Oberlin, Kansas, who had gathered some of the materials which made my task much easier. Mrs. Lawrence Claar, curator of the Oberlin Museum, was of great help in aiding my research. The staff at the Kansas State Historical Library must be given credit for helping locate many materials not available at Hays or Oberlin. A special thanks to Edward M. Beougher, Grinnell, Kansas, for some of the Fort Wallace materials, and for lending me a book which was unavailable elsewhere.

The pressure of writing a master's thesis has been hard on me and those around me and without encouragement and help from my wife, Eva Powers, this thesis would never have been written.
INTRODUCTION

The American West has long been the subject of critical study by historians in an effort to determine the effect of the frontier on American life and character. The most renowned scholar of the frontier was Frederick Jackson Turner who rejected the traditional concept that the American character was a reflection of its European progenitor. He insisted that the character of American civilization could be ascribed to the continuous "evolution and adaptation of organs in response to changed environment." "The existence of an area of free land," he wrote, "its continuous recession and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development."¹

But, the "frontier hypothesis" with its emphasis on free land forced Turner to place the highest social values in the relatively primitive society just within the agricultural frontier. However, his insistence upon a theory of social stages placed the highest values in the urban industrial society which was in full development during Turner's life. The great historian wavered between two views. Henry Nash Smith states that: "The First World War had shaken Turner's agrarian code of values. ..."²

as an area of free land but also as nature. Rebirth was the result of this "magic fountain of youth in which America continually bathed and was rejuvenated."\(^3\) This transcendental optimism in American ideals founded in the forest and free land has proven inadequate for our new industrial age. Also Turner's insistence on the democratic influence of the frontier has resulted in a peculiar understanding of the conflict between the pioneer and the aborigines. In his famous paper presented to the American Historical Association in 1893, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," he states that the Indian frontier was an important consolidating agent in American History.\(^4\) Relating particularly to the Great Plains Turner states that following the organization of Kansas and Nebraska in 1854, Indian hostility continued because "the savage lords of the boundless prairie instinctively felt the significance of the entrance of the farmer into their empire."\(^5\)

If the frontier was "the meeting point between savagery and civilization,"\(^6\) as Turner maintains, then the democracy which evolved at these outer limits of civilization might be more adequately explained through analyzing the Indian-frontiersman

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 297.


\(^5\) Ibid., p. 144.

conflict and the reasons for the eventual elimination of the
Indian control of the New World. This is the purpose for this
study of one particular episode in frontier history, the Dull
Knife outbreak of 1878.

The Great Plains was the last frontier for settlement
though many trails traversed it and traders and hunters long
had exploited its resources. But, it was not until the farmer
had adapted himself to the new environment through mechanical
invention and technology that the Great Plains could be conquer-
ed and made productive for the rapidly industrializing nation.
Railroads provided transportation; barbed wire was made available
for fencing; deep-drilled wells and windmills supplied water; dry
farming and irrigation partially solved the problem of inadequate
rainfall. With the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, the
Government gave its support to western settlement although it was
more than a decade before the new technology opened up the Great
Plains frontier.

Before the Plains could be completely safe for settlement
the Indian population had to be shifted to areas less desirable
to the white agriculturalists. This process of displacement and
the resulting Indian uprisings were not unique to the Middle West.

7 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York and
Dunlap, 1931), passim.
From the very genesis of America the Indian lands were subject to appropriation by the civilized technicians of the new agrarianism. William T. Hagan states that the role of the central government in the Indian-frontiersman conflict assumed a definite character even before the Revolution. It was basically paternal in treating Indian problems, but "officials of the central government soon learned that when a conflict existed between the interests of the Indian and those of the frontiersmen, that the Indian had to be sacrificed."  

The Indians' predicament was succinctly assessed by Alexis de Tocqueville who states in *Democracy in America* that "The American government does not indeed now rob them [the Indians] of their lands, but it allows perpetual encroachments on them ... and as the limits of the earth will at last fail them their only refuge is the grave."  

Our forefathers early employed the rationalization used extensively to justify white aggression: "God and reason both condemn the monopoly of land by those unprepared to cultivate it."  

This interpretation of Indian-white relations was first recognized by Secretary of War Henry Knox, one of the first public officials "to emphasize private property as an instrument of civilization."  

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11 Ibid., p. 43.
ownership in fee simple were introduced among the Indians they would acquire the desire to follow the white man's techniques. But even Knox realized that the pioneers' invasion of the Indians' hunting ground and killing the game upon which he depended was the only way to insure a complete break from aboriginal life. The enfranchised frontiersmen had priority and "the reaction of a frontiersman to the sight of arable land in the possession of an Indian were as easy to predict as the reflex of Pavlov's dog."\textsuperscript{12}

President Washington advised the tribesmen to adopt the farming and stock-raising techniques of the white man. Beginning in 1793 Congress authorized a yearly appropriation of $20,000 for purchase of domestic animals and farming implements for the Indian nations. This expenditure was not always used for such projects, often being used by agents to purchase gifts to influence tribal leaders.\textsuperscript{13}

Professor William T. Hagan states that the character of Indian-American relations changed following the War of 1812. The decreasing threat of British intervention allowed the United States government to be much less conciliatory to the Indian nation, but there was official concern over Indians visiting Canadian posts as late as the 1840's. The preemptory

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 45.
demands made by the settlers on Indian lands reflected the weakened position of the tribes. By 1850 the tribes had relinquished the bulk of their holdings east of the Mississippi.

In 1822 the government withdrew partially from Indian affairs by leaving Indian trade to free enterprise. The Bureau of Indian Affairs was created in 1824 as a subsidiary of the War Department, but it was not until 1832 that a Commissioner of Indian Affairs was formally designated. Two years later, in 1834, Congress passed two important laws dealing with Indians. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act redefined the Indian's territory and it strengthened the government's hand in dealing with intruders. The Indian Reorganization Act was designed to take care of the complaints of "expensive, inefficient, and irresponsible" administration of Indian affairs.

The House committee which recommended an Indian appropriation in 1819, exemplified the government's position in dealing with the Indians. Its program was to "Put into the hands of their children the primer and the hoe, and they will naturally, in time, take hold of the plough . . . and they will grow up in habits of morality and industry. . . ." The extinction of the tribal system of communal ownership of land would follow.

The failure of the government's policy was that it had to overcome the resistance of tribesmen, and also the government's

14 Ibid., p. 66.
15 Ibid., p. 67.
16 Ibid., p. 88.
operation of farms and mills which aimed at civilizing the
Indians was handled by white men and seemed to profit them
rather than the Indians. It was almost essential that the
elements that provided the tribesmen with a living would have
to be destroyed before he would accept a new way of life. This
was accomplished by forcing the tribes onto the plains and
later the slaughter of buffalo herds. Ray Allen Billington
states that "Once the buffalo vanished the Indian's livelihood
was gone and he had no choice but to accept federal bounty."
The slaughter of the two giant herds which grazed the central
plains was begun in 1867 and was nearly completed by 1883.

When the cultural values of the Indians and Whites conflicted,"the superiority of the Bible, the primer, and the plow were
never questioned by the whites and no attempt was made to compro-
mise with Indian tradition," states Hagan. Pushed into an
agrarian way of life which they neither understood nor desired,
the Indians resisted but to no avail.

When an outbreak occurred, the Army accused the Indian
Department officials of coddling the Indians and arming them
with better weapons than the troops used. The army partisans in
Congress denounced the "mawkish sentimentality" of humanitarians,

17 Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of

18 Hagan, American Indians, p. 91.
and frontiersmen displayed Indian skulls inscribed with, "I am on the reservation at Last" or "Let Harpers Tell of My Virtues."

The northern plains lured pioneers with hopes of mineral wealth and despite the treaties which forbade intrusion on Indian land the prospectors invaded the area in the 1870's. A Wyoming newspaper expressed the frontiersmen's attitude in these words: "The same inscrutable Arbiter that decreed the downfall of Rome, has pronounced the doom of extinction upon the red men of America. To attempt to defer this result by mawkish sentimentalism ... is unworthy of the age." And an army captain turned frontiersman states: "Some will say they [the Indians] are human beings, and [we] must treat them as such. My answer to this is they appear to be only human in form ... they will not be satisfied unless ... killing the white race ... and it will never be got out of them until they are made to cease to breathe."

The Indian wars closed the final chapter on one phase of American history. Professor William T. Hagan, states that the "Wars and rumors of wars had contributed much to the determination of western personality and political and social organization. What unity there was on the frontier, together with the tendency to look to federal authority, was due in large part to the Indian problem."

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19 Ibid., p. 109.
20 Ibid., p. 117.
21 Captain S. S. Van Sickel, A Story of Real Life on the Plains ... (n.d.: no pub.), pp. 31.
22 Ibid.
Many careers were made on the Indian frontier, and many lives lost. But the Indian wars were an economic boon to the frontier. An estimate in 1870 places the cost for each Indian killed at $1,000,000 in government expenditure.

The Northern Cheyenne tribesmen had been relocated in Indian Territory where their numbers were soon decimated by malarial fever. A shortage of medicine was combined with a meat ration which had been described by their agent, John D. Miles, as "not grossly bad."

After a year on the southern reservation a small band of the tribesmen decided to leave and their escape summoned thousands of troops from Fort Elliot, Texas, to Fort Meade, Dakota Territory, to capture them and preserve peace on the frontier. The small band of less than three hundred Cheyenne was piloted by Dull Knife and Little Wolf across eight hundred miles of barren prairie. This band of Northern Cheyenne and their flight for freedom represent the dilemma of the American Indian.

This study will attempt to analyze, in the context of the Cheyenne outbreak of 1878, the developing frontier.

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23 Ibid.

24 Senate Report No. 708, p. 76.
I. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

"We are not living up to our obligations with the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, and we should give them clearly to know by our future dealings with them that we will do them full and liberal justice. . . ." This was the conclusion that a Senate investigating committee arrived at after extensive testimony and study of the Cheyenne outbreak from their agency in Indian Territory. In a study of the Cheyenne outbreak it is essential first to present a background of the relations between the Cheyenne and the government.

The Cheyenne Indians are of the Algonquian family and formerly lived either on the shores of the Great Lakes or the upper Mississippi river and its tributaries. They lived in villages and cultivated the soil, but by 1803 they had moved west and southwest, to the edge of the Great Plains. Here they acquired the horse and moved beyond the Missouri river to the North Platte river. They were a typical tribe of buffalo hunters, "... possessing energy and courage, and taking rank as one of the most hardy and forceful tribes of the great central plains."

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2 George Bird Grinnell, The Cheyenne Indians: Their History and Ways of Life (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1924), I, 1.
One of the first accounts of white men coming in contact with the Cheyenne Indians is in the Lewis and Clark Journals; they found the Cheyenne established in two places in 1804. They traded with the Spanish and the French and also procured British and American goods at the Arikars and Mandan villages on the Missouri. It was about 1830 that the Cheyenne split into two bands, a northern and a southern group.

The first treaty between the Cheyenne and the United States government was in 1825. The place of signing was the mouth of the Teton River; tribal recognition and provisions for trade were established, but no reservation was designated. When the tribe split into the northern and southern branches, the southern group formed a confederacy with the Arapahoe along the Arkansas River. In 1851, the Fort Laramie Treaty was signed by the Sioux, Assiniboin, Arikara, Grosventre, Crow, Arapahoe, Shoshone, and Cheyenne plains tribes. Congress was to pay annuities to several of the tribes and they, in turn, were to allow the government to build military posts and roads through their country. Each tribe accepted a particular defined area for its roaming. The Cheyenne and Arapahoe were to occupy the area east of the Rocky Mountains and between the North Platte and the Arkansas Rivers. Undoubtedly the Commissioners, D. D. Mitchell and Thomas Fitzpatrick, who negotiated the treaty for the government did not realize that the Cheyenne were divided, and the

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Ibid. p. 40.
Northern Cheyenne were to remain in the north though they maintained contact with their kindred in the south. The 1851 Treaty would have given the Indians $50,000 annually for fifty years from the government, but the U. S. Senate substituted "ten years" for "fifty years" and authorized the president to continue payments for five years longer. All the Indian tribes did not give their approval to the change.

Between 1851 and 1861 the white men discovered gold and silver in Colorado, and a stream of miners headed for the rich mountains in central Colorado where forts were built and trails led across the lands of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians. The Treaty of 1851 had guaranteed this land to them, but the whites were forcing them down upon the headwaters of the Arkansas River. This was in direct violation of the government's promise to enforce the treaty provisions.

To rectify the changes taking place on the Plains, the government signed another treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians on February 18, 1861, at Fort Wise, Kansas. This treaty would give the Indians a smaller district "beginning at the mouth of the Purgatory River to the northern boundary of the Territory of New Mexico; thence along said west boundary to the Sandy Fork to the place of the beginning." The Indians' reservation

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was to include both sides of the Arkansas River, and the territory around Fort Lyon, Colorado. The U. S. government was to pay each tribe $30,000 per year for fifteen years and houses were to be built, lands broken up and fenced, and stock animals and agricultural tools furnished.

Many of the chiefs and warriors withheld their consent of the new treaty and chided those who had accepted the white man's terms. War parties began to pillage settlements and kill settlers. The Overland Mail route was suspended and immigrant trains were plundered. In the midst of the Civil War the federal government could give little aid to the frontier defenses. Consequently, on June 24, 1864, Governor Evans of Colorado ordered the friendly Arapahoe and Cheyenne on the Arkansas River to go to Fort Lyon for enrollment and protection and those who refused were to be hunted down and destroyed. Most of the roving bands refused, and the summer of 1864 saw the plains completely desolate by the Indians. Then the Governor called upon all citizens to "go in pursuit" of the Indians and "to kill and destroy them." Under Colonel Chivington, the Third Colorado Cavalry, and part of the First, (900 to 1,000 men), attacked the Cheyenne camp of Black Kettle on Sand Creek on November 29, 1864. Chivington wired Governor Evans that he "killed 500 Indians; destroyed 130 lodges; took 650 mules and ponies..." George Bird Grinnell states that

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"The soldiers scalped the dead, cut up and mutilated the bodies and took back to Denver over a hundred scalps, which were exhibited in triumph between the acts of the theatrical performance one evening."

The Sand Creek Massacre touched off one of the most bitter Indian wars in the West.

The government tried to fight back, but this time the odds were not in their favor. The Indian warrior knew the terrain and had been trained from boyhood in the skill of horsemanship. And, of course, the Indian traders had equipped the Indians with equal or better arms than the army provided its recruits. The situation was overcome by the army by resorting to winter campaigns. The Indians were at a disadvantage during that season as they were unable to move without leaving a trail.

The federal government tried to appease the Indian when, in 1865, they sent William S. Harney and John B. Sanborn to the mouth of the Arkansas river to conclude a treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne. The terms provided for a new reservation to be partly in Kansas and partly in Indian Territory, but the tribes could continue to hunt on the former range as long as the game lasted. But this treaty was never signed by the U.S. Senate and the Indians continued to occupy the central plains.

The winter campaign became the major strategy of the army and with the arrival of Lt.-General George A. Custer in the West

the Indians were in for some serious reversals. The Washita Massacre in Indian Territory in 1868 was such a campaign. Custer completely destroyed the Cheyenne village of the old chief Black Kettle. The captured Indians were taken to Camp Supply and fighting between the Southern Cheyenne and whites ceased until 1874.

The hide hunters encroached upon the Indian's lands south of the Arkansas River, and in 1874 the Southern Cheyenne joined the Comanche, Kiowas, and Apaches in the Fight at Adobe Walls in the Texas panhandle. Defeated by a handful of whites the Indians then raided as far north as the Smoky Hill River.

In September, 1874, Colonel R. S. Mackenzie and seven troops of the Fourth Cavalry captured the Kiowas, Commanche, and Southern Cheyenne villages near the Red River of Texas. The tribes were placed on the Darlington Reservation in Indian Territory. They were placed in the charge of Agent John D. Miles, who had been appointed agent there in 1872. Here they lived peacefully with rations issued to them by the government.

The Northern Cheyenne were in perpetual warfare during the 1860's and the 1870's. Their villages were filled with plunder from raiding the stage lines and settlements along the Platte in 1865. This led to the Powder River Expedition of 1865, initiated by General Grenville M. Dodge to protect the frontier from Indian

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Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, pp. 319-327.
depredations. The expedition was not successful, and the follow-
ing year the Indian menace was increased by the Fetterman Massacre
and the army withdrawal from the Powder River country.

General Hancock took a command into the field in the summer
of 1867, but in his four months of active campaigning killed only
four Indians. The Indians, however, were more successful, massac-
ing Lieutenant Kidder with ten soldiers on the plains north of
Fort Wallace.

The Year 1867 brought a peace commission to the Great Plains.
After the Medicine Lodge Treaty was signed by the Kiowas, Command-
es, Arapahoes, Apaches, and Southern Cheyenne, the Commission went
north to make a treaty with the Brule and Ogalalla Sioux, the
Northern Cheyenne, and the Crow. But, as Grinnell states, "The
giving of a few presents and the signing of treaties by a few chiefs
would not appease the Indians, whose livelihood, the buffalo, was
being destroyed or driven away."

The Fort Laramie and Medicine Lodge treaties cleared the
central Plains of Indians, and the white men surrendered the
Powder River Road, and abandoned the three forts guarding that
highway. The Fort Laramie Treaty, signed April 29, 1868, gave the
Sioux a permanent reservation in Dakota Territory west of the
Missouri River. They were allowed to use their old hunting ground
until the government should need this land. Also the country just
east of the Big Horn mountains was recognized as Indian Territory.

Ibid., p. 276.
On May 10, 1868, the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe Indians concluded a treaty with the United States government which was ratified on July 25, 1868. The Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians were to tie themselves permanently to the Medicine Lodge Creek agency, the agency near Fort Randall, or the Crow Agency near Otter Creek, on the Yellowstone. It also provided that any individual who was head of a family, and who wanted to start farming should be given land not exceeding 320 acres which "shall cease to be held in common, but the same may be occupied and held in the exclusive possession of the person selecting it."

Since a reservation was never assigned to them the Northern Cheyenne lived with the Brule Sioux during the succeeding years. For six years the two tribes lived in peace together, but in 1874 the Black Hills explorations of Lieutenant-General George Custer brought in a horde of gold seekers. As frictions developed between the whites and the Indians, the Cheyenne moved out of the Black Hills into the valleys of Montana, which they considered theirs by treaty right. The country was well watered, timbered, and stocked with buffalo, and for the next two years the entire group of northern Cheyenne lived well, moving from the Powder River to the Big Horn mountains during their big hunt.

In 1873 delegates of both the Northern and Southern Cheyenne
met in Washington to induce the Northern branch to accept the cordial invitation of the latter group to settle in Indian Territory, but the Northern tribe refused.

The Indian appropriations approved June 22, 1874, contained a clause that prohibited the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe from receiving supplies "until they should join the rest of their tribe in the south." But before the terms for their removal could be agreed upon, hostilities broke out in Indian Territory. The Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe were then asked to enter into an agreement to move to the Indian Territory, "whenever the government should see fit," before receiving any supplies or annuities. This agreement is dated November 12, 1874, and was from the Red Cloud Agency in Nebraska.

In the next appropriation act, approved March 3, 1875, the restrictive clause of the former act was altered to provide instead that "said Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoes shall, if required by the Secretary of Interior, remove to their reservation in the Indian Territory before the delivery of said supplies appropriated for the foregoing clauses." The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1875, states that "Such removal and division would tend greatly to good discipline, and enable the

13 Ibid., p. 236.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
enforcement of compulsory labor by the Indians."

The hostilities in Indian Territory ended in April, 1875, but the government feared that removal of the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians would thwart the efforts of the Commission negotiating with the Sioux for cession of the Black Hills.

The Indian office requested on October 16, 1875, that an order be issued directing the removal of the Cheyenne and requested the Secretary of War to enforce the removal in case the Indians refused to obey the orders of the department.

On November 18, 1875, the Secretary of War stated that the matter "has been referred to the military authorities for information, and that it is the opinion of General Sheridan the change should not be made at this time."

During this period the Sioux were leaving their reservation in Dakota and taking refuge with the Northern Cheyenne. Finally, in December, 1875, an order came from the government that all Indians not living on reservations—and this included all of the Northern Cheyenne—should be at their agencies by January 31, 1876, or the military would come after them. Because of the

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16 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
17 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
20 Ibid.
severity of winter it was impossible for the Indians to comply even if they had wanted to; however, it seems none of them desired to leave their homes in the protected valleys.
In a three-pronged attack planned by General Terry, commanding the Department of Dakota, to capture the "hostile" Indians, General Crook with fifteen troops of cavalry and five companies of infantry moved on a camp of Sioux and Cheyenne, June 17, 1876. The ill-fated Custer command had moved to a Sioux camp on the Little Big Horn.

The Sioux War of 1876 found a portion of the still wild Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe taking an active part. It culminated in the destruction of Dull Knife's village by General Mackenzie on November 26, 1876. This peaceful village hidden on the Crazy Woman Creek in the Bighorn Mountains was found by Arapahoe scouts from the Red Cloud Agency. The surprise attack forced the Cheyenne out of their village but their retreat was successful and they were not captured. Captain Luther North and his Pawnee scouts, sent to burn the lodges and camp gear, found many articles which had belonged to members of the Seventh Cavalry. Dull Knife's band wintered with the Sioux under Crazy Horse. The war continued until spring when the main body of Cheyenne surrendered at Red Cloud Agency to United States troops.

The Indian appropriation act of August 15, 1876, again had made delivery of supplies to the Northern Cheyenne contingent on their removal south.
The Act of August 15, 1876, which resulted in the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory has been the center of considerable controversy. As passed by the Forty-fourth Congress February 28, 1887, it was "An Act to ratify an agreement with certain bands of the Sioux Nations of Indian, and also with the Northern Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians." The agreement was concluded by George W. Manypenny, Henry B. Whipple, Jared W. Daniels, Albert C. Boone, Henry C. Bulis, Newton Edmunds, and Augustine Gaylord, commissioners on the part of the United States. The controversial portion of the agreement was Article 4, which states:

The government of the United States and the said Indians, being mutually desirous that the latter shall be located in a country where they may actually become self-supporting and acquire the arts of civilized life, it is therefore agreed that the said Indians shall select a delegation of five or more chiefs and principal men from each band, who shall, without delay, visit the Indian Territory under the guidance and protection of suitable persons, to be appointed for that purpose by the Department of the Interior, with a view to selecting therein a permanent home for the said Indians. If such delegation shall make a selection which shall be satisfactory to themselves, the people whom they represent, and to the United States, then the said Indians agree that they will remove to the country so selected within one year from this date. And the said Indians do further agree in all things to submit themselves to such beneficial plans

21 Ibid.
as the Government may provide for them in the selection of a country suitable for a permanent home, where they may live like white men. 22

Of the seven tribes that signed the treaty at the seven different agencies, five of the Sioux tribes placed a reservation on article 4, but "in all other respects the said article [Article 4] remaining in full force and effect." 23 But, those tribes that signed the treaty without reservations were the Ogalalal Sioux, the Northern Arapahoe and Cheyenne who signed the treaty at Red Cloud Agency, Nebraska, September 26, 1876, and the Brule Sioux at Spotted Tail Agency, Nebraska, September 23, 1876. But when the treaty was printed in the appendix of Senate Report No. 708, the transcript of the investigation of Cheyenne removal, there is inserted a note that there was no record of Cheyenne signature of the treaty. 25

The following Northern Cheyenne, however, did sign the treaty with the Sioux Commission: Living Bear, Spotted Elk, Black Bear, Turkey Legs, and Calfskin Shirt. There is no

23 Ibid., 171
24 Ibid.
record that other leading chiefs of the Northern Cheyenne even knew of the negotiations taking place in the fall of 1876.

At the meeting between the Sioux Commission and the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe, September, 1876, at Red Cloud Agency, these two tribes requested that they be incorporated into the Sioux Nations. Manypenny states that the Commission had no specific instructions to incorporate the tribes, but "it was apparent that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe had a right to a home on the Sioux reservation (among others), guaranteed to them by the Treaty of May 10, 1868."

The fourth article of the agreement of 1876, stated that a delegation of Indians from each band would visit Indian Territory "with a view of selecting therein a permanent home for the said Indians." The delegation from Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies and the delegates of the Cheyenne were selected and visited Indian Territory, and were generally pleased with it. These were the only bands which agreed to send delegates to the southern country, and upon their return they were not permitted to report to the Indians they represented according to George W. Manypenny. Officers of the army were acting as Indian agents at the northern agencies, and General Sheridan and General McKenzie, in command at Fort Robinson, were opposed to sending delegates south, or the removal of the Indians to Indian Territory.

28 Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, p. 169.
29 Manypenny, Our Indian Wards, p. 325.
30 Ibid.
The agreement was ratified by Congress in February, 1887, by striking out the fourth article and part of the sixth article, which prohibited the removal of any portion of the Sioux Indians to Indian Territory "until the same shall be authorized by an act of Congress." No mention is made of the Northern Cheyenne or Arapahoe regarding removal and the latter tribe was allowed to remain in the north and the former was removed south.

Thus the Sioux Indians and the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe were bound to receive their subsistence and supplies on their northern reservations. The third article of the agreement states as follows:

The said Indians also agree that they will hereafter receive all annuities provided by the said treaty of 1868, and all subsistence and supplies which may be provided for them under the present or any future act of Congress, at such points and placed on the said reservation, and in the vicinity of the Missouri River, as the President of the United States shall designate.

The removal of the Cheyenne to Indian Territory did not relieve the government of the obligation to provide these Indians with supplies. But, in the Indian appropriation of March 3, 1887, which provided annuities and subsistence for the Indian tribes for the year ending June 30, 1878, there was no appropriation for the Northern Cheyenne as was guaranteed by the agreement of September 20, 1876. The Treaty of 1876 was to "provide all necessary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of civilization;" and "to furnish them schools and instruction

31 Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, I, 169.
32 Ibid.
in mechanical and agricultural arts." Also, the condition and morals and industrious habits of the Indians were to be improved by having an agent, trader, farmer, carpenter, blacksmith, and other artisans, living on the reservation.

The provision in the agreement which stipulated the amount of weekly rations to be supplied was as follows:

Also to provide the said Indians with subsistence consisting of a ration for each individual of a pound and a half of beef, (or in lieu thereof, one half pound of bacon,) one-half pound of flour, and one-half pound of corn; and for every one hundred rations, four pounds of coffee, eight pounds of sugar, and three pounds of beans, or in lieu of said articles the equivalent thereof, in the discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Such rations or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be continued until the Indians are able to support themselves.

The question of treaty obligations relative to the amount of rations to be supplied was a major issue in the Senate investigation of 1879-1880. This problem will be treated at length in the following chapter. Suffice it to say that though the government did not provide for the Northern Cheyenne as a separate tribe for the year of 1887-1878, the Northern Cheyenne did receive rations on the Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation in Indian Territory.

The plan of removing the northern Indian tribes to Indian Territory was due to the demand of the frontiersmen (who would

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
have been pleased to eliminate the Indian altogether) and also to the Eastern Christian and benevolent groups which meddled in Indian welfare work. The removal of the Cheyenne and, if possible, of the Sioux was the scheme of the eastern members of the Sioux Commission according to George F. Hyde. He states that the members of the commission "agreed among themselves on a new wildcat scheme for saving the Sioux (and incidentally the government) from the very troublous situation they were in, by removing the tribes to Indian Territory."

The Sioux tribes which signed the treaty without reservations on article four were the Ogallala Sioux at Red Cloud agency, and the Brule Sioux at Spotted Tail agency. The Indians were treated roughly and the chiefs who were insolent were deposed by the army and cooperative chiefs were placed in their stead. George Hyde states that when the Ogallalas showed little eagerness to sign away their lands and freedom, Assistant Attorney General Gaylord, a member of the Black Hills Commission, "... spoke to them with a curt and almost brutal frankness which shocked them into a full comprehension of the fact that if they refused to sign the agreement they would find themselves in extremely serious trouble."


They were even told that if they resisted the government would starve them and their women and children, and might also "set the troops on them."

The Sioux Commission treated each of the tribes separately, depriving them of solidarity of numbers. It also took advantage of the fact that the hostile elements taking part in the Sioux War were still away from the agencies and could not create confusion. Some of the Indians later claimed that the government used whiskey, bribes, threats of loss of all rations and false interpretation of the terms of the treaty as methods of getting the Indians to sign the treaty. The treaty had provided that a specific proportion of signature was needed to validate all future treaties. The 1876 treaty, however, contained the signature of only forty Indians at Red Cloud Agency, when it was later estimated that 2,267 signatures were needed.

James Warren Covington states that the negotiations of the Sioux Commission of 1876, indicated that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe wished to be incorporated into the Sioux Nation, rather than removed to Indian Territory or live on the Crow Reservation. They finally agreed to send a delegation to visit Indian Territory and look for a suitable location. Two delegations were pleased with what they saw in the south, "but Congress eliminated the article

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38 Ibid.

permitting the Cheyennes to go south when it ratified the agreements made by the Sioux Commission.

Covington further states that after Dull Knife had been defeated in 1876, Generals McKenzie and Crook took them into council and Crook told them that they had three choices: "to go south, go to the agency at Fort Washaki, or stay at Fort Robinson for a year." If they choose the latter, the government officials would determine where the Indians were to go at the end of the year's time. The Cheyenne, in choosing Standing Elk to speak for them, found themselves accepting the removal south which none of them wanted.

George Bird Grinnell is the originator of the foregoing version of the story, and he states that the decision of Standing Elk pleased the military and they urged the Indians to start south at once, "and so by mingling threats and persuasions the Cheyennes were half forced and half persuaded to leave their country." They started South on May 1, states Grinnell.

Mari Sandoz states, in her work Cheyenne Autumn, that the Northern Cheyenne surrendered in 1877 with the promise of "food and shelter and an agency in their hunting region... But almost before the children were warmed on both sides, they were told they must go to Indian Territory, the far south country many already knew and hated." She states that the two Old Man Chiefs listened to the command in silent refusal, but some lesser men

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42 Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 400.
shouted agreement, and these Indians were given horses, fine blue blankets, meat, coffee, and tobacco "for a big feast that would build their power and following in the tribe."\textsuperscript{114}

Quoting the chiefs, she states, "It is a trick of the spider . . . . The web [white man] has long spun his web for the feet of those who have gins but are too foolish to fly."\textsuperscript{115} Even after the feasting the Indians refused to go, so the Indian agent announced that he would issue no more rations to the Cheyenne. "While the Sioux women moved in their long line, holding their blankets out to receive their goods, the Cheyennes were kept off on a little knoll, their ragged blankets empty in the wind, the children silent and big-eyed, watching."\textsuperscript{116} Finally through the coaxing interpreter's plea that officials wanted them to "Just go down to see. If you don't like it you can come back . . . .\textsuperscript{117} Dull Knife and Little Wolf agreed. The chiefs did so because of the starving condition of their tribe.

Mr. C. E. Campbell, an employee at Darlington Agency, Indian Territory, states that an order was issued, presumably by the Indian Office, to move the Indians south. It fell to the commanding officer of the department to execute the order. The Indians were taken into council and the "orders from Washington" were,
according to the army account, fully explained to them.

Protests were in vain as the Indians were told that they must prepare to live thereafter in Indian Territory. The Indian version was that "the commanding general assured them they were first to go down to that southern country, simply as visitors. . ." and if they did not like the country they could return north.

Mr. Campbell suggests that the two accounts might be due to the fear of the interpreter that a literal rendition would cause trouble with the Indians, and he conveyed a version not intended by the army officers.

John D. Miles, agent for the Indians of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, Indian Territory, said in a letter to the Indian Office, dated November 1, 1878:

Not one of the chiefs who left the agency September 9, 1878, signed the treaty of September 26, 1876, and on more than one occasion one of the chiefs who left informed me in substance that they had never made a treaty, and had only come south on trial and under great pressure, and have continually talked of returning, and threatened to return when matters did not go to suit them.

On May 17, 1877 the Indian Office received a copy of a dispatch of May 15 from General Sheridan to General Sherman, which stated that 1,400 Northern Cheyenne desired to go to

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49 Ibid.

50 Senate Report No. 708, p. 160.
Indian Territory, and he strongly urged their removal. The Indian Office telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the Army, May 18, giving its approval of the removal, and on May 29, a telegram was received from Lieutenant H. W. Lawton that he was enroute with 972 Cheyenne to Indian Territory as directed.

During the first day of their march from the Red Cloud Agency to Indian Territory, the Cheyenne were escorted by troops under Lieutenant Lawton. The Indians moving south were described by a writer who had met them as travelling "quietly and mournfully, for events had forced them to this choice, and they had left home with the choice of the emigrant. The bucks were mostly mounted. Many of the squaws, however, carried their papooses on their backs, and led ponies that hauled the travois."

The Cheyenne arrived at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, August 5, 1877, and the commander of Reno, Major Mizner, delivered them to Agent John D. Miles of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency located at Darlington, Indian Territory. Nine hundred and thirty-seven Northern Cheyenne and four Northern Arapahoe were counted. Thirty-five Indians had disappeared enroute from Nebraska.

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51 Ibid., p. 237.
52 Manypenny, Our Indian Wards, p. 335.
53 Senate Report No. 708, p. 237. Covington states that nine hundred thirty-three Indians were taken to Indian Territory but he fails to give the source of the number.
II. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE IN INDIAN TERRITORY

"We were sickly and dying here, and no one will speak our names when we are gone. We will go north at all hazards, and if we die in battle our names will be remembered and cherished by all our people." This was an oft heard complaint of the Northern Cheyenne as reported by Agent John D. Miles.¹

The treatment of the Northern Cheyenne in Indian Territory has been as much a point of controversy as the question of the treaty which forced them to the southern country. The acceptance of the northern tribe by the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe, fulfillment of treaty obligations concerning supplies, medicine and education of the Indians in agriculture were two of the main problems of the reservation. The conflicts at the agency were first brought out in the Senate investigation into the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory. It is the report of that investigation which will serve as the basis of this chapter.

First, the manner in which the Southern Cheyenne accepted the Northern Cheyenne to live among them is a matter of debate. The testimony of a Southern Cheyenne states that they received their northern relatives with warm greeting and were glad that they had come to live among them.² But the Northern Cheyenne chief, Wild Hog, declared that they were called Sioux (because of the inter-marriage of many with Sioux) by the Southern Cheyenne and "no

¹Senate Report No. 708, p. 278.
²Ibid., p. 35.
attempt at friendship was made." 3 In testimony before the Senate committee, Agent Miles stated that upon the arrival of the Northern Cheyenne at the agency,

We let them divide right up among their friends—their relatives among the southern people here. At the first council I had with the southern Indians I encouraged them to feel, and urged them to act as if they felt, that these northern Indians were their friends, their relatives, a part of the same tribe, and to try and make them feel at home down here, and to realize that they were to have an equal show with the balance of the Indians, and were the brothers and sisters of those who were here before. I tried to show them how necessary it was that they should affiliate and live peaceably with each other. I think this advice of mine was pretty generally followed by the southern Indians, and was met in a similar friendly spirit by those who had come from the north; some of them became acquainted and seemed to feel at home here almost right away, others more gradually, until finally about six hundred of them became affiliated and thoroughly identified with the southern Indians. On the other hand, there was Dull Knife and Hog, and a few others, who separated themselves from the southern Indians, and from the Northern Cheyennes who had affiliated with the Southern Cheyennes, and camped by themselves, four or five miles right northwest from the agency here. Being separated, they became like two tribes—two distinct elements, I should say, the southern and northern—and then our Southern Cheyennes called those who had separated from them the Sioux Cheyennes. These Northern Cheyennes—those of them that I have mentioned—separated themselves from the rest and seemed to be pretty generally dissatisfied with the country. 4

The predisposition of the Northern Cheyenne under Dull Knife and Little Wolf to become dissatisfied with the Indian Territory has been described by Dennis Collins, a rancher in southwest Kansas, as follows: "The fact of the matter is that he Dull Knife was only a very short time at the Darlington agency before he began formenting

4 Senate Report No. 708, pp. 55-56.
With a touch of humor the author continues: "He was not there very long until he discovered that the whole scheme of creation seemed to be out of harmony with his needs and comfort." A contractor and employee at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, Mr. John H. Seger noted the same intransigent attitude of Dull Knife and his band. He states that the Northern Cheyenne were of the understanding that if they did not like it in the South they could return North. Seger continues: "But when they reached there instead of falling in with the agent's ideas of farming and raising corn, they began to give dances and sing war songs and tell of their exploits and battles, and soon had their southern brethren very unsettled and dissatisfied." When the Southern Cheyenne put their children in school and allowed the young boys to be whipped by a white man the Northern Cheyenne made fun of and ridiculed the Southern Cheyenne parents. "Will you let the white wolves whip your boys?" they chided, and the large boys, when they returned to camp, were called squaws and cowards for wearing short hair like the Negro.

Another employee of the agency, C. E. Campbell expresses the same opinion of Dull Knife and his band of Northern Cheyenne when he states that: "They commenced even at this early period to demand

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6 Ibid., pp. 232-233.
8 Ibid.
permission to return north, where the water was purer, the heat not so oppressive, the game plentiful and life worth living."9

The testimony of the Senate investigating committee was directed not only at the Dull Knife outbreak, but also at the removal of some Northern Cheyenne under Little Chief. In his testimony Little Chief stated that he and his band did not get along very pleasantly with the Southern Cheyenne, and there had been bad words between his band and the southern tribe.10

A problem which became an issue of contention between the Northern Cheyenne and the Agent was the method of distributing rations. It had become a status symbol for the chiefs and young men to distribute the rations. They wanted the rations turned over to them in bulk and they would pour them out on the prairie and let the leading men do the distributing. Agent Miles complained that this method of distribution allowed the leading war element to take the lion's share of the rations.11

The Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency had adopted a family ration check, upon which rations could be issued once a week. When the Northern Cheyenne first arrived at the agency, the young men gathered all the family ration tickets and presented them in bulk to the clerk. Agent Miles was absent at the time and to prevent trouble, the rations were

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10Senate Report No. 708, p. x.

11Ibid., pp. 55-57.
issued on the checks presented. Miles returned before the rationing was completed and the clerk brought his attention to the matter. A protest was made by the Agent, but the issuing of rations was almost completed and it was allowed on that occasion. The leaders of the Northern Cheyenne stated that they "were going to do as they did up north." The articles were dumped on the plaza and the chiefs helped themselves and distributed the remaining portion to the rest of the tribe.

Agent Miles, immediately called the chiefs into his office and through his interpreter, George Bent, told them that rations were to be issued to the heads of families. The women were usually presented the family ticket, or ticket for a lodge, and the rations were issued to them for that family or lodge. Miles said that the government issued rations for the benefit of the poor as well as the rich, and his duty was to see to it that the rations were equally distributed. In reply the Indians said that their chiefs had to have something to do and some favor to grant which would distinguish them from the ordinary Indians. The chiefs said: "If you are going to do all that, what is there left for us to do? There is no object or advantage in being chief." The method of issuing rations to families had been an instruction of the Indian department. Miles informed the chiefs that there was no

\[12\text{Ibid., p. 58.}
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\[13\text{Ibid.}
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use talking about the matter, that the rations would never be given to them in bulk to divide. He would obey the orders of the government. The chiefs held councils about the situation, but the Southern Cheyenne told the adament chiefs they should submit. This ended one particular incident between the Northern Cheyenne and the Agent. But the resentment over being forced to remove to this southern country was certainly increased by this latest demand of their benefactor, the United States government.

Complaints about the food issued at the agency resulted in an order by Colonel R. S. Mackenzie for Lieutenant H. W. Lawton to proceed to Fort Reno, Indian Territory "to inspect the condition of the Cheyenne Indians, and report to Headquarters at Fort Sill, I.T." This inspection was begun September 30, 1877, which was less than two months after the arrival of the Northern Cheyenne at the agency. Lieutenant Lawton found that sugar and coffee seemingly were weighed in fairness, but the flour was issued by guess and since the amount for each individual was small, a slight discrepancy which would not greatly affect the bulk of the issue, would make considerable difference to the individual. The sugar was of inferior quality, and was dark and very wet when received at the agency. Lawton stated that it was an issue "that would not have been received and issued to troops without the action of a board of survey." The Indians told Lt. Lawton that the rations were much better at this particular rationing than they had been for some

14 Ibid., p. 268.
15 Ibid., p. 269.
time previous, and on that particular day they were getting more rations than at any time previously.

The major complaint at the rationing observed by Lieutenant Lawton concerned the beef. Upon his visit to the beef pen the Lieutenant found the beef to be of inferior quality. The animals were not weighed at the time of issuing, but rather, the issuing was based upon the weight of the animals when received from the contractor. The beef was irregular in size and age, rough and of poor quality, and there were some bulls among them. Lieutenant Lawton was informed that the animals issued weighed on the average of seven hundred and fifty pounds, but he was convinced that the average would be from fifty to seventy-five pounds-per-head less. Each issue of beef was made to a small band which was large enough to take one animal or more. Since the beef was not weighed, a band might receive a small animal weighing a hundred pounds or more, less than their entitled average, and another band might receive a large beef weighing more than the average which they should receive. Since the bands did not contain an even number of individuals, and no allowance was made for that difference, a band of thirty-three could get one beef and so might a band of fifty.16

Proof of the deficiency in this particular rationing is the ration tickets which were checked against the amounts actually received:

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16 Ibid.
Plenty Bear's ticket: 5 people, 7 days, 35 rations. Sugar and coffee, 3 pounds; deficient 1 3/8 pounds. Flour, 16 pounds; deficient 1 3/2 pounds.

Goes in the Willow's ticket: 2 people, 7 days, 14 rations. Sugar and coffee, 1 pound; deficient 3/4 pound. Flour, 5 pounds; deficient 2 pounds.

Walking Woman: 4 people, 7 days, 28 rations. Sugar and coffee, 2 pounds; deficient 1 ½ pounds. Flour, 8 ½ pounds; deficient 5 ½ pounds.

Wild Hog, Northern Cheyenne chief, had been the spokesman in relating the problems to Lieutenant Lawton. The chief stated that the flour was black and would not rise, and that there was no issue of corn, hard bread, hominy, rice, beans, or salt, and only infrequent issues of soap and yeast powder. The sugar, coffee, and beef ration for the seven days was consumed in three days.18

Having finished his investigation, Lieutenant Lawton concluded: "I observed this issue with a great deal of care, noting the number of men in each band, and the number and size of the beeves given them, and found it to be, in my opinion, decidedly unsatisfactory and irregular."19

He also reported "there is strong feeling among them [the Indians] of injury and injustice; that there are few who are evil-disposed and troublesome; and that no serious trouble need to be anticipated unless the Indians are driven to it as the alternative of starvation."20

17 Ibid., p. 271.
18 Ibid., p. 276.
19 Ibid., p. 273.
20 Ibid., p. 276.
When Agent John D. Miles testified before the Senate investigating committee, he disclosed that the supply of rations for the year 1877-78 were three quarters of the amount guaranteed by treaty.\footnote{Ibid., p. xvi.} The treaty of 1876 which was the basis for the Cheyenne removal to Indian Territory stated:

\begin{quote}
... to provide the said Indians with subsistence consisting of a ration for each individual of a pound and a half of beef, (or in lieu thereof, one half pound of bacon,) one-half pound of flour, and one-half pound of corn; and for every hundred rations, four pounds of coffee, eight pounds sugar, and three pounds of beans, or in lieu of said articles the equivalent thereof, in the discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.\footnote{Charles J. Kappler, (ed.), Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), I, 169.}
\end{quote}

When questioned about the rationing Miles stated that the Northern Cheyenne received the same rations as did the Southern Cheyenne. He said that his instructions from the department specified so many pounds of such and such articles—"if the supplies were on hand," but if there was only one month's rations for two months, then half rations would be issued and the deficiency was to be made up in an extra issue of beef.\footnote{Senate Report No. 708, p. 59.}

There had always been complaints that the beef ration was insufficient, the Agent stated, but the established ration was three pounds gross, or a pound and a half net, and only on occasion did the Commissioner of Indian Affairs increase the rations to four pounds. This was done in early 1877.

When asked specifically if the full rations for the year were
ever supplied by the government, Miles replied, "No, sir." He had understood that the rations were not supplied due to a lack of funds. The shortage amounted to as much as three months per year on the average, and it was only because the Indians were absent for three to five months on the annual hunt that the deficiency could be overcome. Also, the sale of robes and hides helped bridge the deficiency.

There was no difficulty in procuring supplies of meat, flour, corn, bacon, etc., when funds were available. The problem was that the Agency did not purchase the supplies as these were supplied by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Reliance could no longer be placed on the buffalo hunt as a means of food for the Indians. In the three years previous to 1879, the Indians returned from the hunt in worse condition than they left, because of loss of camp equipment, ponies, and wear and tear on lodges.

When Miles was asked if the Indians ever "received more than nine months rations out of the twelve?" he replied, "I think not." But when asked more directly if full rations were issued in 1878, he replied that full rations of beef had been issued but a shortage occurred in flour, coffee, etc.

The acting-Secretary of Indian Affairs, William M. Leeds, testifying before the Senate committee January 24, 1880, presented the

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
26 Ibid., p. 64.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 97.
correspondence of the Indian Office relative to rations dealt to the Indians at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency. Commissioner Hayt, in a letter of November 16, 1878, transmitting to Secretary of Interior Schurz the letter of Agent John D. Miles, of November 1, 1878, admitted that a deficiency of supplies existed and the Northern Cheyenne were not dealt all the supplies they needed. The Commissioner stated that the amount of beef due for the year ending July 1, 1878 to be 914,256 pounds, and the amount given was 1,151,088 pounds, but only one-half was merchantable beef.29

The report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that the Indians had due them by treaty 1,420,589 pounds of subsistence supplies and there was dealt to them 1,475,320 pounds, or a surplus of 54,731 pounds.30

The report states that the amount of beef due the Indians was 1,026,840 pounds and 1,242,208 pounds was dealt them. This is, according to Mr. Leeds, a miscalculation because there is no deduction of fifty per cent tare, which represents hides, horns, entrails, refuse, etc. Then the net weight of merchantable beef includes bones, gristle, and tendons. The president of a beef canning company, a hotel proprietor, and a family butcher and dealer, confirmed Mr. Leeds' report that Texas steers will give only fifty percent merchantable beef and but twenty-five percent of food.31

29Ibid., p. 160.


31Senate Report No. 708, p. 164.
Thus the figures of the Commissioner's report should be adjusted to be beef, merchantable, 513,420 pounds, entitled by treaty and of this 256,710 pounds was consumable. Assuming this, then 621,104 pounds of merchantable beef was provided of which 310,552 was consumable. With this consideration the true picture of the supplies issued during the 398 days the Northern Cheyenne were in Indian Territory emerges. The Indians were short 106,795 pounds without allowance for shrinkage, etc. This is revealed in the chart on page 44.32

Mr. Leeds stated that he wrote portions of the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and regarding the beef statement:

I made up that statement in the Commissioner's report, so many pounds of beef, and put the pounds down net beef—net merchantable beef; that showed a deficit, that the Indians had not received the amount promised them by the treaty. It was discovered that by calling it gross beef, and doubling the figures, the doubling increased one side a great many more pounds than it did the other side—as you will see by comparing the table of supplies which the Commissioner fixed up and had inserted in his report (and which I have already read to you), with the correct statement which I furnished you (Hear the beginning of the testimony), in order that you might compare it with that fixed up by the Commissioner. When the Commissioner saw that by making it beef gross he could make it appear that these Indians had received their full supply, he directed that it should be made gross in that account; and it was made gross, and showed a surplus. But that surplus was in reality a surplus of hides, horns, and refuse. In this evasive way he furnishes a basis for his assertion that 'this statement disposes of all the clamor that has been current during the year that these Indians did not receive rations to the amount to which they were entitled under the treaty.'33

32 Ibid., pp. 163-164.
## NORTHERN CHEYENNE FOOD ESTIMATES

### Commissioner of Indian Affairs' Calculations:

"They were entitled to the following quantities of supplies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>1,026,840 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>171,140 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>171,140 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>13,725 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>27,450 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>10,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,420,589</strong> &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"There was dealt out to them during the time mentioned the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>1,242,208 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon and lard</td>
<td>20,016 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>157,060 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>18,190 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>10,425 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>20,950 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>2,272 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>2,297 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hominy</td>
<td>14 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>994 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baking Powder</td>
<td>894 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,475,320</strong> &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mr. Leed's Calculations:

"They were entitled to the following quantities of supplies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef, merchantable</td>
<td>513,420 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that is-- Beef consumable</td>
<td>256,710 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>171,140 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>171,140 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>13,725 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>27,450 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>10,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>650,459</strong> &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"There was dealt out to them the following quantities of supplies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef, merchantable</td>
<td>621,104 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that is-- Beef consumable</td>
<td>310,552 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon and lard</td>
<td>20,016 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>157,060 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>18,190 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>10,425 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>20,950 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>2,272 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>2,297 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hominy</td>
<td>14 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>994 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baking Powder</td>
<td>894 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>543,664</strong> &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Senate Report No. 708, p. 163.*

**Ibid., p. 164.**
Also, for the period from July 1, 1878 to September 7, 1878, there must have been a deficit of food to a money value of $352. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. Hayt, stated:

... in this connection it would be fair to state that the rations for the year ending July 1, 1878, were nearly $3,000 greater in money value than the Indians were entitled to by the treaty; and the small deficiency represented by the $352 was owing to the fact that the Indian appropriation bill was not passed by Congress until the 27th day of May, and the opening of bids for supplies for the new fiscal year took place on the 18th of June, and it was not absolutely impossible to make the purchase of supplies and transport them to the agency in season to be available as soon as the supplies were actually needed. Nevertheless the deficiency in amount was so slight that it was impossible to say that these Indians left the reservation for the want of sufficient food.34

Mr. Leeds suggested that the small deficiency of $352 would have paid for seven thousand pounds of flour, and the outbreak of three hundred Indians during this period could have been averted by this flour.35

In a report of Major J. K. Mizner, dated from Fort Reno, Indian Territory, September 30, 1878, which was contained in the report of Agent Miles to the Indian Office, he stated that,

During the latter part of the winter and the early part of the spring the beef was very poor, and was much complained of by all the Indians on all occasions, and it was really very bad. From the 1st of July to the 1st of September, the issue of rations was very unequal. The regular ration of flour was issued but twice, while beef was issued constantly; there was but little flour, and sometimes no coffee or sugar.36

At the issue of August 5, there was no flour issued, and nothing in lieu of it. The weekly issue of August 12, found 27,400 pounds of

34 Ibid., p. 161
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 162.
beef (gross), and 4,522 pounds of corn issued in lieu of 35,000 pounds of flour and corn which was specified; no flour was issued. The 27,400 pounds of additional beef was in reality 6,850 pounds of meat; and as the meat ration was sufficient, the additional 6,850 pounds of lean Texas beef was probably of less value than the same weight of flour. Thus, 4,522 pounds of corn and 6,850 pounds of beef, a total of 11,372 pounds, were issued in lieu of 35,000 pounds of corn and flour provided for by the treaty. An actual deficit of more than 23,628 pounds, or about four and three-fourths pounds per Indian, was included in the August 12th issue. The 133,501 pounds of gross weight of beef was good for but 33,375 pounds of meat and the 4,522 pounds of corn, which was to supply 5,004 Indians at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency for the one week. The 37,897 pounds was only seventeen ounces daily per Indian.37

Neither corn nor flour were dealt at the August 19th issue, and the beef ration was not increased. With the usual scant rationing of coffee and sugar, the per diem of one and one-half pounds of merchantable beef (or three-fourths pound of meat) was issued for the week from August 19th to August 26th.38

Again on the 26th of August, no flour or corn was issued, and only scant rations of sugar and coffee and 10,007 pounds of merchantable beef. This was only fourteen and one-fourths ounces of beef per

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
diem, which would provide only seven ounces of meat. 39

September 2, 1878, saw the receiving of a full ration of beef, no corn, and the flour ration less than three-fourths. In the week preceding the outbreak the Indians received eighteen ounces per diem of food against twenty-eight ounces guaranteed by treaty. 40

It would be beneficial to this study to record the Indian's anxiety over the food shortage, but, except for those sources previously mentioned, there are none which are dependable. The sentimental Mari Sandoz relates the embarrassment of the great chiefs to eat from the kettles of the hungry. 41

Annuity goods like the rations were guaranteed the Northern Cheyenne by treaty. They were issued to the families, and were consigned to the agency by the Indian Department, under the supervision of the Board of Indian Commissioners. These consignments were made on the estimates of the agent.

In issuing the annuity goods, the commander at Fort Reno furnished men to help, and each separate article, such as blankets, shoes, pants, hats, etc., had a man distributing them and checking the item off the rationing card for annuities. A surplus in goods for 1878 was issued in partial payment for those who worked. The agency was authorized

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Mari Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn (New York: The Hastings House, 1953), pp. 7-8. This source is completely unreliable as a historical work. Her mention of Yellow Swallow as Custer's son by a Cheyenne woman, has been completely disproven. This information came from Edward Beougher, Grinnell, Kansas, who confronted Miss Sandoz about Custer's son and she was unable to answer his question. Also her mention of John Miles, one of Grant's Quaker agents, offering his daughter to Little Wolf, the Cheyenne chief, is completely ridiculous.
to increase annuity rations to those who worked, not to exceed double the ordinary rations in amount.

For the year 1878, Agent John D. Miles' requisition for annuities was $47,194, and the Congressional appropriation was $14,500. Also a $20,000 beneficiary fund could be used for annuity goods, which meant that $34,500 was available for those purposes. The agent was forced to make the $34,500 do the work of $47,000.42

In particular, the issuing of annuities to the Northern Cheyenne was under a separate account until June 30, 1878, and Agent Miles stated that any complaints on their part could not be attributed to annuity goods.43 The deficient annuities were issued in October, 1878, after the Northern Cheyenne had escaped.

But, when asked if he issued the complete particulars of the treaty of 1868 which guaranteed the Indians a good suit of clothing, the Agent replied, "I do not believe I have."44 When asked the reason for not issuing articles guaranteed by treaty, the Agent stated that the government had not sent him such articles.

The Agent was also asked if the Northern Cheyenne had been provided, "in addition to the clothing previously named, the sum of $10, to each Indian roaming, and to each Indian engaged in agriculture in the purchase of such articles as, from time to time, the condition and necessities of the Indians may indicate to be proper," and for their

42Senate Report No. 708, p. 73.
43Ibid., pp. 73-74.
44Ibid., p. 77.
personal benefit. Miles replied that if it had been expended it was done in a way unknown to him; possibly in the purchase of subsistence.45

When asked if any Northern Cheyenne had been given a good cow and one well-broken pair of American oxen for removing to the reservation and starting to farm, Agent Miles said that the department had never advised him to do so.46

Finally, Miles was asked if the issue of larger amounts of annuity goods (the treaty requirements including twenty dollars each if they started farming and an ox and cow) could have mitigated the discontent. The Agent replied: "It might, to some extent; but they are exceedingly dissatisfied with the country and affairs here, and I would not venture the statement that it would have mitigated it much.47 But when asked if full annuities and rations would have made them content, Miles stated that if furnished enough food and clothing he could keep the Indians peaceful and quiet all the time.48

The question of medicine for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency was complicated from the beginning. The Northern Cheyenne arrived in August, 1877, during the malarial season. There was but one physician at the agency and a constant shortage of medicine. The agent felt that the Northern Cheyenne suffered more sickness than the other Indians, "Their sickness was more severe and a greater number of them

45Ibid., p. 78.
46Ibid., p. 79.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
died.\footnote{49} L. A. E. Hodge, physician at the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, stated that the greatest shortage of medicine occurred during the fiscal year from July 1, 1878, to January 17, 1879, when drugs were received which should have been received on July 1, 1878.\footnote{50}

The contract for medicine was opened June 18, 1878, and it was not until August 24, that a contract was signed with a Mr. Jadwino. The delivery was finally made January 17, 1879, seven months after the opening of the contract. On August 10, the Indian Office had authorized Mr. Kingsley to buy fifty ounces of quinine for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe. On August 14, the Indian Office ordered Mr. Nicholson, superintendent of Indian Affairs at Lawrence, Kansas, by telegraph to purchase ten ounces of quinine for the Cheyenne.\footnote{51}

Agent John D. Miles acknowledged receipt of ten ounces of medicine on August 2, which he stated would last only a week. Miles wrote the Indian Office, August 16, that he had no antimalarial remedies during that quarter, and he had borrowed all that Fort Reno could supply him. On October 10, Agent Miles sent a letter from the agency physician which stated the need for medicines. Finally, on October 12, Miles was authorized to purchase two hundred dollars' worth of medicines.\footnote{52}

The contract medicines were shipped from New York on November 29, 1878. On December 10th, C. E. Campbell, chief clerk at the agency,
telegraphed the Indian Office of the urgent need for medicine. The Indian Office telegraphed Agent Miles on December 14th, that the medicine would be at Wichita, but, if not, he was authorized to purchase a hundred dollars' worth. On December 19th, Miles telegraphed the office that the medicines were not at Wichita and that he had purchased the authorized amount.53

It was uncovered in the Senate investigation that the authorization of August 10, for the purchase of fifty ounces of medicine was to be split with the Quapaw Agency. When the chief clerk of the Indian Bureau, Edwin J. Brooks, was asked if the original contract stated that the medicine was to be shipped within thirty days, he conceded the fact.54

Tracers were issued by the Indian Bureau to speed up delivery of the medicine. Mr. Brooks expressed the opinion that red tape was one of the causes of delay because the contract had to be approved by the Board of Indian Commissioners, the Secretary of Interior, and the Comptroller of the Currency.55

In August, 1878, the sanitary condition of the Indians was described by Agent Miles in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:

The intense heat of the present summer has had the effect to increase the mortality, and it is no exaggerated estimate when the number of sick people on the reservation is placed at 2,000. Many deaths have occurred which might have been obviated had there been

53Ibid.
54Ibid., pp. 191-194.
55Ibid., p. 198.
a proper supply of anti-malarial remedies on hand. Ninety-five ounces of quinine were received in advance of the annual supply and was consumed in less than ten days.56

Agency physician Dr. L. A. E. Hodge stated that five thousand people provided more work than one physician could handle. When he had remedies he was always busy, and it was not uncommon for him to dispense medicine for a hundred cases in a day. The doctor did not attribute the discontent among the Indians to lack of medicine, however, but said that it might have had something to do with it.57

In particular the Northern Cheyenne must have suffered greatly from the southern diseases. They were not familiar with ague, and the heat was intolerable to people used to the cool mountain valley climate. One of the Indians testified to the Senate committee that he calculated fifty-eight Northern Cheyenne had died in the south.58

Another Indian source states that the Northern Cheyenne were stricken with fever and ague soon after they arrived at the agency. Of the nearly one thousand in the Cheyenne camp, about two-thirds became sick within two months after arrival. Forty-one died of sickness during the winter.59

The failure of the agency to get medicine even forced the agency doctor to leave the agency as he was unable to help those who came to

56 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1878, pp. 56-57.
58 Ibid., p. 10.
him. Many who were refused treatment resorted to native medicine and "perpetuation of their superstitious rites."\textsuperscript{60}

The desire of the government to civilize the Northern Cheyenne was early expressed in the 1868 treaty with the tribe. It specified the desirability of education, and the need for the Indians to begin cultivating the soil. The head of a family could select land, and show his intention of farming, and would receive one hundred dollars the first year for seed. Instruction was to be provided in farming techniques.\textsuperscript{61}

The treaty of 1876 stated that "the United States does agree to provide all necessary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of civilization; to furnish to them schools and instruction in mechanical and agricultural arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868."\textsuperscript{62}

At the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency during the year of 1878-79 there were between 140 and 150 children attending school. The school was contracted to Mr. John H. Seger at three dollars and a half per month per child. The contract was for ten months, and the supplies were furnished by the government.

The treaty of 1868 specified that for every thirty students there was to be one teacher, but the Agency school had only two teachers which did not include Mr. Seger who did no teaching.

\textsuperscript{60}Bernice Norman Crockett, "Health Conditions in the Indian Territory from the Civil War to 1890," \textit{The Chronicles of Oklahoma}, XXXVI (Spring, 1958), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{61}Kappler, \textit{Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties}, II, 1013.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., p. 169.
The benefit of the school as viewed by Agent John D. Miles, was to teach the children good habits. He states, "they are taught habits of industry, and that is the principal thing that needs to be inculcated into the Indians." The Indian must change his manner of living by adopting that of the white man. Properly guided and instructed they would be able to provide for themselves and not be dependent on the government.

When Agent Miles was asked if there was a need for less learning and more labor, he replied that the best advantage to the government would be the use of three and a half dollars to put a couple of Indian boys on the rolls of the contractor "and give them a day or two each week in the school, and have them spend the balance of their time in the shops." Agent Miles expressed himself more explicitly on the subject in his 1877 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: "Eight years of experience in operating Indian schools has convinced me that a mere literary education, without the more important element of industry, is but time poorly spent."

The Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency at Darlington, Indian Territory, had one instructor in farming. The Indians showed little interest in farming, many regarded it as a woman's job. Mr. J. A. Covington,

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63 Senate Report No. 708, p. 90.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 91.
66 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1877, p. 84.
agency farmer, felt that the Indians would be much more able as herders than as farmers. To the Indian who was raised herding his father's ponies, it was natural. The herding of cattle would be less work than ordinary farming, and less strain on the body.67

Considering the agricultural potential of Indian Territory, the raising of corn and other farm products was precarious in that climate, while herding would be more certain.

Major Mizner, at Fort Reno, also felt that stock-raising was much more natural for the Indians whose efforts at farming was the cultivation of small patches of corn, insufficient for sustaining a family more than thirty days. He said that, "By giving stock to certain Indians known to the agent as being provident and painstaking their success might induce other Indians to follow their example."68 The problem of getting the Indians to develop separate interests in a herd, would require discriminating between individual Indians.

The failure of the government to provide the annuities of twenty dollars and an American cow and oxen helped defeat the government's plan to civilize the red man.

The Northern Cheyenne chief, Wild Hog, stated that they received no agricultural implements when they arrived at the agency. The treaty of 1876 stated that the government was to supply such articles as the Indians required to become farmers. Wild Hog states that his

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67 Senate Report No. 708, p. 104.
68 Ibid., p. 119.
tribe would have been willing to start farming at their old reservation in the north.  

Little Chief, the Northern Cheyenne chief whose tribe was brought to Indian Territory after Dull Knife's Raid, wanted to return home. However, three or four families of his band had begun farming upon arrival in the south and they did not want to return home.

Although the question of becoming farmers was not a factor in the Northern Cheyenne's demand to return north, the withholding of certain rations when they refused to work caused dissatisfaction. Under direction of Circular No. 10, of the Indian Office dated March 1, 1878, entitled "Diminishing the rations of Indians who refuse to Work," Agent Miles withheld sugar, coffee, and tobacco from the Indians. It seemed to have little effect and was soon withdrawn.  

It is significant that the Circular contained the following:

Indians should also be informed that the issuance of regular rations of flour and beef cannot long be continued by the government, and should have impressed upon them the necessity of engaging at once in some civilized occupation by which they may become independent of government support.

The Circular was used to withhold rations around the first of May, 1878, and a weekly labor and ration check was made.

Almost all the Northern Cheyenne had their rations withheld and the Agent offered them agricultural implements. A number of Northern

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69 Ibid., p. 7.
70 Ibid., p. 301.
71 Ibid.
Cheyenne subdivided a field and put in small patches of corn. Agent Miles felt that arbitrary enforcement of labor regulations was unwise. Ill wind and discontent arose and the enforcement of work was abandoned.\textsuperscript{72}

When the Northern Cheyenne surrendered in the north, and before their removal to Indian Territory, there was an attempt to disarm them for the trip south. Government sources state that this attempt to disarm and dismount the Indians, was made by General Pope, commanding the Department of the Missouri, "but it was found this could not be done without violation of the conditions of their surrender, so they were permitted to retain their arms and ponies."\textsuperscript{73} Agent John D. Miles, in testimony before the Senate committee, stated that he was of the understanding that the Indians had been disarmed in the north, "but we soon afterward saw arms in their possession, which naturally led us to suppose they had not been thoroughly disarmed." A portion of the horses were taken from them by General Mackenzie, who went to Fort Reno in person, and the horses were taken to Fort Sill and sold and cattle were purchased for the Indians.\textsuperscript{74}

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report of 1878, states:

They should have been disarmed before leaving the north, and dismounted upon their arrival at the agency, while still in the hands of the military. To the neglect which permitted them to retain the Springfield carbines captured by them in the Custer

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., pp. 81-83.

\textsuperscript{73}Record of Engagement with Hostile Indians, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{74}Senate Report, No. 708, pp. 54-55.
fight may be attributed the horrible atrocities perpetrated by the Northern Cheyennes. The trail of blood which they left behind them in Kansas could not have been made and the outrages could not have perpetrated but for the possession of these arms which not only enable them to defend themselves from attack, but to carry carnage and destruction among the settlers of Kansas.75

A portion of the Cheyenne nation found itself in an alien country. The government's attempt at civilizing the Cheyenne was frustrated by its lack of resources; and the adamant stand of the two chiefs Little Wolf and Dull Knife was a constant threat to peace at the reservation. The split between the tribes caused resentment with such Indians as Standing Elk receiving extra supplies while such commodities as sugar, tobacco, and coffee were withheld from those who would not cooperate. Without the resources they once had in fighting the army and other tribes, the Northern Cheyenne were forced to steal horses, trade for weapons and try an escape across the flat prairie of the Great Plains, past six army posts.

Their plight was typical of other Indian tribes, and their outbreak was one of the last flickers of light in an epic drawing to a close. The background of this outbreak was a treaty unsigned by the head chiefs, and life on an agency which found itself given the job of civilizing the Indians but at a minimum expense. The army, which would often compete with the Indian Office in exacting justice on the aborigines, was caught in the same conflict of limited funds for a job of protecting thousands of miles of frontier. Then there was the

75 Report of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1878, p. xxxiv.
settler whose ingenuity had made the barren prairie produce for the expanding markets of the East. With the westward push, the Indian Office and War Department were to protect him from the red man who once roamed the vast prairie as its complete lord and master.

To ask "What was the cause of the Dull Knife outbreak?" is perhaps to beg the question. The problem of rations, annuities, medicine, and treaty rights have been fully analyzed, but there still remains the fact that the Northern Cheyenne, at least a portion of them, were never integrated into agency life. Perhaps they intended from the beginning to return north.

The fact is that they did return north and the mitigating causes at the agency are of importance not as individual instances of human frustration, but as contributory acts which sustained the righteous determination of the Indian to express his right to seek out his own fortune and future. Lacking free choice, his resistance was a reactionary protest brought on by the haphazard efforts of Industrial civilization to seek new resources in the West. The Pioneer was the tool of this effort of civilization to fulfill itself, but it was an incomplete civilization and this internal contradiction brought chaos in its wake.
III. THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE ESCAPE NORTH

The Northern Cheyenne were brought to Indian Territory August 15, 1877, and left September 9, 1878. It is impossible to attribute the discontent in Indian Territory of the Northern Cheyenne to an exact cause, and equally difficult to determine when the decision to leave was made. It was only a few days before they left that Agent John D. Miles received any information about their intentions. On September 5th, the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe complained to the agent that their best horses were being stolen by the Northern Cheyenne and then hidden five or six miles out. Also, Mr. Campbell, agency clerk, informed the agent and the commander at Fort Reno that a group of the Indians were trying to draw two weeks ration, instead of one, and they asked permission to remove to the Cimarron River, and they failed to put their children in school.¹

Agent Miles called Dull Knife, Wild Hog, Old Crow, and Little Wolf into conference and asked them if any of their young men were absent from the agency or if any planned to leave. The chiefs said that none had left and that it was a "Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe lie" that they had stolen any of their horses. But the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe continued to lose horses and they explained that only the Northern Cheyenne would take pains to steal the best mounts, whereas white rustlers would round up a bunch and

¹Senate Report No. 708, p. 112.
run them off. They also told the agent that the young men who were missing were keeping the horses in a camp somewhere on the Cimarron.²

The Northern Cheyenne chiefs were again asked if any of their young men had left, and they again denied it. To insure that the chiefs were telling the truth an enrollment of all the male adults was ordered. The Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe complied immediately, but the Northern Cheyenne made excuses until they finally escaped.

In his testimony to the Senate investigating committee, Agent Miles stated that the chiefs left his office with the idea of getting the young men to come in and have a count, but that the young soldier element refused to go along. "The older ones actually commenced, on one occasion, to tear down their lodges, preparatory to coming in and being counted, but the young men utterly refused."³

Miles had a conference with the chiefs on September 7, and it was at this meeting that the Indians complained they were too ill to move their camp, so Miles sent the doctor and Mr. Covington, the agency farmer, up to the Northern Cheyenne camp on September 7, 1878. Mr. Covington and the doctor returned to say that a number of the tribe were sick, but all were well enough to come in for enrollment. The Indians were very excited over the whole matter. Mr. C. E. Cambell states that he accompanied the physician to the camp on September 8th, and they found an air of distrust and suspicion plainly

²Ibid., pp. 60-61.
³Ibid., p. 61.
apparent among the Indians. The agency clerk and physician were not allowed to roam about the camp as the Indians seemed to be concealing something. The Indians had camped on a small level piece of bottom land which was encircled on three sides by sand hills, from one to two hundred feet high. On a subsequent trip to the camp, it was found that the Indians had dug rifle pits on the sides of the sand hills which commanded every inch of the ground any troops sent against them would have to use. The strategic value of the position was enhanced by a draw which afforded protection for the stock.  

September 8th (Sunday) was ration day and the Northern Cheyenne were informed that they would not be issued rations unless they complied with the agent's orders.

On the evening of September 5th, the post at Fort Reno had been informed that some of the Northern Cheyenne had left the reservation. They had been camped on the north fork of the Canadian River, and were under the leadership of Dull Knife and Little Wolf. Within an hour a command of twenty pack mules for transportation and a force of eighty-seven enlisted men, companies G and H, 4th Cavalry and four commissioned officers, under the command of Captain Joseph Rendlebrock, started in pursuit. The command travelled only a short

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2Senate Report No. 708, p. 112.

distance that night, and the next morning they marched on and found the Cheyenne camp which was located about ten or twelve miles from Fort Reno. The command was then ordered to watch the movements of the Indians, and the troops went into camp about three or four miles from the Indian camp. The movements of the Cheyenne were observed by the scouts.

It was learned that the Indians had fortified themselves in some sand hills on the north banks of the Canadian, and Lieutenant W. E. Wilder was sent to the post to notify the commanding officer of the situation. Captain Rendlebrock requested artillery as the Indians would have to be shelled out. Lt. Wilder returned on the evening of the 8th of September without the artillery. Many of the Northern Cheyenne went into the soldier's camp and all of them were well armed.7

In the last interview on the evening of September 9th (Monday) the agent asked the Northern Cheyenne to come in and be counted and promised that the troops would then be withdrawn. In the interview Old Crow, Wild Hog, and Little Wolf still insisted that sickness prevented them from moving down to be enrolled.

7Senate Report No. 708, pp. 147-148. Comparing this source with the sentimental view of Mari Sandoz, we can better judge the unreliability of the latter source. Sandoz expresses pity over the agent who called for troops which took with them a howitzer and found the Indian "men trying to snare rabbits and gophers, and women digging roots." The howitzer was set on the Indian camp and a "red" faced captain road down into the lodge circle. And on the 8th of September, the agency doctor went to the village, and his comment as recorded by Miss Sandoz was: "This is a pest camp, a graveyard." Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 10-11.
Major Mizner was there on this occasion and he stated, "If you don't come up to be counted, I will see that you do."  

The interpreter on this occasion as well as at the earlier meetings was Edmond Guerrier. He recorded another story of the Indians leaving the agency. When the agent called in the chiefs he told them that he wanted ten young Cheyenne men for hostages "to hold as prisoners until I get back three that have gone off." The troops would be sent out to bring in the renegade warriors and then the ten men would be set free.  

Little Wolf refused to provide the hostages, and told the agent that the army officers would not be able to find the three Cheyenne men. At this, the agent threatened to cut off rations until the hostages were provided, "I will give you nothing to eat until I get them. You shall starve until they are given to me."  

Little Wolf answered:  

My friends, I am now going to my camp. I do not wish the ground about this agency to be made bloody, but now listen to what I say to you. I am going to leave here; I am going north to my own country. I do not want to see blood spilt about this agency. If you are going to send your soldiers after me, I wish that you would first let me get a little distance away from this agency. Then if you want to fight, I will fight you, and we can make the ground bloody at that place.  

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8 Senate Report No. 708, pp. 62, 112.  
10 Ibid., p. 403.  
11 Ibid.
The Indians returned to their camp on the Canadian River about twenty miles above the agency. Agent Miles then sent the interpreter Ed Guerrier to the Indian camp. He advised them not to go, but Little Wolf again announced their intentions of going north. Guerrier's friends in the Indian camp advised him not to interpret for the Indians, as their temper was high and they might try to kill him.\(^{12}\)

Dennis Collins states that the two Northern Cheyenne Chiefs, Dull Knife and Wild Hog, made no secret of their attempts to procure arms. They were willing to trade anything to the cowboys and soldiers for arms or ammunition. A couple of ponies were traded for an old rusty six-shooter. James Smith, a teamster for the government, met Dull Knife on one of his hauling trips and the chief proposed a swap of his new government overcoat for ten cartridges, and the deal was made. Collins states that the old chief made a nuisance of himself in his continual proposals to make trades.\(^{13}\)

This episode lends some credibility to the story by C. E. Campbell concerning an incident which occurred earlier in the year of 1878. Permission had been given by the Indian Office upon discretion of the agent, for a buffalo hunt that summer. The Northern Cheyenne upon hearing of this, proposed to leave on the hunt immediately without considering the conditions for such a hunt. Mr. Campbell was temporarily in charge of the agency and it was his decision whether to allow the Indians to leave immediately, postpone

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 404.

\(^{13}\)Dennis Collins, The Indians Last Fight, or the Dull Knife Raid (Girard, Kansas: The Appeal to Reason Press, c1915), p. 239.
the hunt or discontinue it. Through the Indian police it was learned that the Northern Cheyenne were going to take advantage of the extra two weeks issue which was given the Indians leaving on the hunt, and then slip away to the north. Since there were practically no buffalo within the limits allowed for the hunt it was postponed.  

The acting-agent was visited by a delegation of Northern Cheyenne who were incensed by his refusal to issue the extra subsistence and provide the military escort for the hunt. The request was again denied. At this moment Little Wolf spoke as follows:

Look at me, I am Little Wolf. The whole of the Sioux nation open their ears when I speak, and I want you to open yours. We are going on this hunt, whether you have us rations and soldier escort or not. If you give us the subsistence we shall be glad but if you love the food and will not give us any, we will go just the same. Now we are going over to the soldier home and tell the soldier chief what we are going to do.  

The commanding officer at Fort Reno visited the agency and was excited over this visit by the Northern Cheyenne. He suggested that the Indians be allowed to go on the hunt because the command was not strong enough to protect the fort in case of an outbreak. But, Campbell was confident in the support of the Southern Cheyenne and Arapahoe and he insisted that no hunt would take place without reports of sufficient numbers of buffalo to warrant it. Referring to this attempt of the Northern Cheyenne to leave the agency during the annual hunt of the winter of 1877-78, Major Mizner, commander

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15Ibid.
16Ibid., p. 676.
of Fort Reno, stated: "So much was that a part of the purpose of these Indians then, that Old Crow lingered after the return of the majority of the Cheyenne, and I saw that it was his intention to go north."\(^17\)

Prior to the outbreak, the following episode occurred which, if true, probably means that the Northern Cheyenne chiefs gave Miles warning that their band was leaving the reservation.

The Indian boys at the agency school were giving Mr. John Seger trouble and he decided to go and see Agent Miles. He found the agent suffering from an attack of neuralgia, and barely able to talk and completely unable to advise him on the situation. Miles told Seger:

I can't advise you. The Indians are on the point of breaking out already. The Northern Cheyennes have worked our Indians up to a state of dangerous excitement and I don't know what to do. The military stands ready to take charge of them should they break out again, and in all probability the agency will be abolished. Under the circumstances I can give no advice. The Indians have probably instigated this insurrection of the large boys to afford an excuse for going on the warpath again, and the troops we have are not sufficient to protect us from attack. I can't offer any suggestions or give any instructions in regard to what you are to do in this matter; use your own judgment.\(^18\)

Agent Miles stated in his testimony to the Senate investigation committee that the next information he received about the Northern Cheyenne came at three o'clock a. m. September 10 (Tuesday) when he was awakened by American Horse (a Northern Cheyenne member of the agency police) and another Indian. They said that the Northern Cheyennes...

\(^17\)Senate Report No. 708, p. 112.

Cheyenne had torn down their lodges and left a little before midnight (between ten and twelve o'clock). American Horse said that he had been trying to get away from the camp for two or three days, but he was not permitted to leave. When the camp moved out he left the rest of the band and came back to the Southern Cheyenne camp. Miles then wrote a note to Major Mizner, and sent Mr. Darlington, an employee at the agency, to deliver it. The note left the agent's house just after three o'clock in the morning.\(^{19}\)

Major Mizner reported that at about half past three September 10, a messenger had come from the agent telling him that the Indians had left, and that he had sent this message to the command under Captain Rendlebrock, two companies of 4th Cavalry, which had been sent to watch these Indians. He immediately ordered the troops in pursuit and his specific instructions were to try to induce the Indians to come back without resort to force. Mizner told the Senate investigating committee: "I wish to draw especial attention to this point—that he [Captain Rendlebrock] was particularly instructed to induce the Indians to come back without resorting to force, if he could possibly do so."\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\)Senate Report No. 708, p. 62. Dennis Collins states that Agent Miles summoned Johnny Murphy, who had been General Sheridan's confidential ambulance driver during the campaign of the Washita to take the message of Dull Knife's departure to the Commander at Fort Reno. The commander at the fort asked Mr. Murphy to take the message up the river to the troops, who were found asleep while the "object of their tender care was on his way to the hunting grounds in the North." Collins, The Indians Last Fight, p. 240.

\(^{20}\)Senate Report No. 708, p. 112.
It was at 6:00 on September 10th, when Captain Rendelbrock started the command in pursuit of the Indians. After a march of thirty miles it was discovered that they were heading northwest toward the Dodge road, and a courier was sent to Camp Supply, Indian Territory, to inform the commander of the direction of the Indians' movement. The command marched fifty-four miles the first day out.

On September 11th, the command followed a winding trail and progressed about forty-four miles before camping. The next day, September 12th, the command marched forty-two miles. Finally on the 13th, after marching thirteen miles, the Indians were seen about three miles in front of the command. The troops had been travelling through the brakes of the Kingfisher, a very rough country. Then they had crossed the prairie to the Cimarron. It was in a wooded area on the north side of the Cimarron, a place called Turkey Springs, that the Indians were found.

As an interesting sidelight, Dennis Collins related the following story: "The first evening of the march Major Ronderbrook [sic] made the startling discovery that, in the haste and bustle of preparation consequent upon the order to pursue the fleeing Indians, they had forgotten to pack up his feather bed, his davenport, also his writing stand and wall tent. He felt that he could not make a successful journey without these necessary accessories to his personal comfort, and therefore, he detailed Peter F. Weasel, a member of the 16th Infantry ... to return to the fort." Collins, The Indians Last Fight, p. 244.

Nellans, "Dragoon."

Ibid. Grinnell states that the first battle took place on the Little Medicine Lodge Creek. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 404. Collins states that it was in the Antelope Hills north of the Cimarron River. Collins, The Indians Last Fight, p. 243. One of the command testifying before the Senate committee states that the battle was on Turkey Creek. Senate Report No. 708, p. 128. But the other, Captain Gunther, referred to Turkey Springs.
The command moved to within 800 hundred yards of the Indians, and the cavalry column advanced to within 400 hundred yards of the Indians, where they dismounted and formed skirmish order. As they were doing this the Indians rode back and forth in front of the command and some to within 200 yards of the soldiers.

It was 9:00 o'clock that morning when Captain Rendlebrock sent the two Arapahoe scouts to see if the Indians would surrender. The Captain ordered the scouts to urge the Indians to surrender and return peacefully to the reservation. The Indians refused to return to the agency; they would rather fight than return.

The troops were given the order to fire and G company, 4th Cavalry, commenced. It was soon apparent that the Indians has prepared for the battle as the troops found themselves nearly surrounded. In the numerous assaults on the command's position, the Indians were unable to secure the advantage. Private Slader of H company was killed and an Arapahoe scout wounded. Corporal Lynch of G company was killed and Privates Burrows and Leonard of the same company were wounded.

The Indians had set the prairie afire on all sides of the command, and as it was a warm day and they had no water the Indians were at a decided advantage. As it grew dark the command made an attempt to get water, but the Indians repulsed it. There was no medical officer and the wounded were forced to suffer unaided.

24 Nellans, "Dragoon."
25 Ibid.
On the following day a reconnaissance confirmed the fact that the command was completely surrounded. Water was so low that the troopers were forced to drink the urine of the horses. To aggravate the situation, the ammunition was running low. Finally, the command began to retreat towards the Cimarron River. One man was killed in this retreat, but water was reached at 9:00 o'clock the morning of the 14th. 26

The command fell back five miles and fixed drags for the three wounded and on the 15th they started for Camp Supply which was reached at noon September 16.

On the 17th, a detachment of forty men under Lieutenant Wood was sent out from Camp Supply to find Company I, 4th Cavalry, under Captain Hemphill which had been sent out on September 15 to intercept the Indians. This company could not be found, and the following day the balance of Captain Rendlebrock's command was ordered to move up the Dodge road. The command which had been sent out the previous day was reached at the Cimarron River. They reported that they were unable to locate the still missing company. 27 This detachment under Lieutenant Wood had marched some seventeen miles east in search of the Indians, but were unable to locate them.

Captain Rendlebrock started his command toward Dodge when two couriers sent by Colonel Lewis, commander at Fort Dodge, arrived with word that the Indians were at the head of Sand Creek. The

26 Ibid.
27 Senate Report No. 708, p. 149.
command went into camp and the next morning headed across country in a southerwesterly direction.

The missing company under Captain Hemphill out of Camp Supply, had trailed the Indians through the southern part of Clark County. At the Driskill ranch they met with ten or twelve cowboys and followed the Indians northwest and then west to the site of the present town of Ashland. There they were met by six more men with guns and ammunition. Heading west again they came upon the Indians in the hills east of Sand Creek. In a short battle some of the troop's horses were killed and several soldiers were wounded. Captain Hemphill, feeling that his command was insufficient for fighting three hundred Indians, rode with his men to Fort Dodge for reinforcements.28

At Fort Dodge Hemphill's company was joined by a company of the 16th Infantry from Fort Riley under Captain Morse. This command together with about fifty cowboys and ranch owners with horses, mules, wagons, and supplies formed a stock train and made ready to proceed to Cimarron, on the Sante Fe Railroad west of Dodge City then south to Sand Creek where the Indians were recently seen. This command moved down to the head of Crooked Creek, then to the Big Timbers in present day Mead county, on Sand Creek, where they camped.29

It was here that Captain Rendle Brock's men found them and at about 4:30 in the afternoon five or six cowboys began to scout

29Ibid.
around to locate the Indians. Shortly after the cowboys had left shots were heard; the Indians had been discovered. The cowboys were being driven from the field, so the military immediately moved in to support the civilians and drove the Indians into a ravine. This skirmish occurred on September 21st. At sundown the troops withdrew to the camp and remained there until the next morning when they took a circuit of about eight miles and again fought the Indians. That night a courier was sent to Fort Dodge for supplies and ammunition and during the night some forty citizens from Dodge arrived to reinforce the command. These civilians were fired on by mistake when they camped near the army.

The battle of Sand Creek occurred on September 22, as the command moved upon the heavily fortified position of the Indians. The Indians had moved into a canyon in which they had driven a number of cattle and sheep and their own horses. Around the ridges of the canyon they had dug holes and piled up rocks and rifle pits commanded the front sides of the canyon. They were prepared to fight. The army command fired on the Indians and the battle lasted from nine o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon, at which time the Indians had been driven into their main position within the canyon. At four, Lieutenant Widler was sent with ten men and forty citizens

30 Senate Report No. 708, p. 129.
31 Nellans, "Dragoon."
32 Ibid.
to complete a circuit of the Indian's position, and lost two horses in the process.

To the disgust of the citizens, Captain Rendlebrock ordered the soldiers to retire. One of the party of cowboys, J. W. McNeal, stated that his party "returned to Barber county, thoroughly disgusted with the management of this campaign." J. W. Berryman states that the troops were within 300 to 400 yards of the Indians and anxious to charge into them and "endeavor to capture them," but the ranking captain forbid it, refused to put out guards and withdrew all the forces about a mile, where they went into camp.

The Indians evacuated during the night. Captain Rendlebrock kept his men in camp as he had made arrangements for supplies and ammunition to be brought to that point. Many of the men also lacked horses having had their mounts shot during the fighting.

On the 24th the command moved up the trail to Crooked Creek, where a citizen had been killed the previous day. On the 25th they reached the Arkansas River seven miles west of Cimarron Station, and telegraphed Fort Dodge of their arrival. By this time nearly all the citizens who had joined the command had returned to Dodge City. That evening Colonel W. H. Lewis, commander of Fort Dodge, took command, with one company of the 19th Infantry under Captain Bradford and two


companies of Fourth Cavalry from Fort Elliot, Texas. Captain Rendlebrock was relieved of his command. The company of the Sixteenth Infantry was sent back to its post.

Robert Wright, one of the men who reported to Colonel Lewis on the Battle of Sand Creek, later wrote that Colonel Lewis was extremely disgusted with the cowardly officers who had allowed the Indians to escape. He said, "Wright, I am going to take the field myself and at once, and on my return, you will hear a different story."35 The Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, states that all operations along the Arkansas were placed under the direction of Colonel Lewis, and on the 25th "Colonel Lewis in command of all the detachments of troops in the immediate neighborhood, started in pursuit."36

As the military was attempting to catch up with the Indians and force them back to the reservation, the Indians began to plunder the countryside. There was fear that the news of an Indian uprising would halt immigration, which would hurt business and cut down traffic on the railroad. Some citizens even sent letters and telegrams East stating that there was no truth in the rumors of hostile Indians.37

At first, one of the Dodge City newspapers declared the news of the


36 Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians within the Military Division of the Missouri from 1858 to 1882, Lieutenant-General Ph. Sheridan, Commanding. (Chicago: Headquarters of the Missouri, 1882), p. 91.

outbreak a hoax. But as the Indians continued their migration, terror and stories spread. They killed Reuben Bristow and Fred Clark on the high divide between the Cimarron and Salt Fork watersheds. Four arrows were pulled out of Bristow's heart and three or four out of Clark's body. In Commanche County, Kansas, a young child was shot in the breast, another party was shot across the back of the head, but neither fatally. Fearing for their lives the people of Medicine Lodge and Barber County formed a volunteer group for protection, and solicited aid from the governor. From Hutchinson, Kansas, was sent the following telegram from C. G. Coutant, dated September 21, 1878:

Geo. T. Anthony, Charles Chambers has just returned from Sun City and Medicine Lodge. He reports settlers being murdered by small squads of Indians. He saw a young man who was shot in the leg, and one wounded in the neck; a child shot in the breast; one camp on Salt Fork where three men were killed. Armed squads of settlers were going round through the country gathering up women and children, and bringing them to Sun City. Mr. Chambers says the settlers are badly armed or not at all. The Indians are going around in squads of six and eight, getting such arms as they can from the homes of the settlers.

38Dodge City Times, September 14, 1878.

39Charles F. Colcord, "Address," Chronicles of Oklahoma XII (March, 1934), pp. 1-10. Bristow and Clark were Colcord's nephews. He recorded their deaths as September 12.


And the following telegram, dated September 21, 1878, was sent from Kingsley, Kansas, by J. E. McArthur, County Attorney of Edwards county.

Gov. Anthony: J. D. Crank and Jard Spencer have just returned from their cattle camps, forty miles south of Kinsley. They report that the Indians have been there and destroyed their camps, took all their ponies, and killed and stampeded their cattle. The Indians are on their way southwest. Will you commission J. W. Fuller, Sheriff Edwards county, to raise a company here with my assistance? Four men from Kinsley are known to have been killed. Please answer immediately.\textsuperscript{42}

The Kinsley Graphic, September 21, 1878, was most emphatic:

As we write, the blood thirsty fiends are roaming at will, almost in sight of Kinsley, butchering the honest, unsuspecting pioneer, whose wrecking scalp is thonged to the belt of those satanic fiends who are armed today better than any army in Europe.\textsuperscript{43}

Also from Springvale, Post Office, Pratt County, September 25, 1878, Mr. A. J. Johnson telegraphed:

Mr. Anthony, Dear Sir: I received a letter from you this morning handed to me by our friend Mr. Nelson. Was pleased to see the interest you take in our Indian scare, which is much smaller than reported. Mr. Nelson and myself went to Sun City and found out all particulars in regard to Indian troubles. Mr. Nelson has the names of killed and wounded except two men. I consider no further trouble from Indians.\textsuperscript{44}

The following notation was written in pencil on the back of the letter:

"Killed at Salt Fork, Reuben Brinston, Frank Dow, Fred Clark, on Big Mile Creek, Mr. Evans."\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{43}Kinsley Graphic, September 21, 1878.
\textsuperscript{44}Eighteenth Biennial Report, pp. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 25.
J. W. Berryman states that the Indians entered Kansas in Commanche County, southeast of Protection, travelling west in the southern part of Clark County, where they killed one man and shot another.\(^\text{16}\)

The Indians seemed prone to commit other acts of deviltry also, as they rounded up some sheep belonging to a Mr. Williams and drove them into a water hole where six hundred of them drowned. While in the Sand Hills the Indians came upon a man named Leforce who was employed at one of the local ranches. His remains were found some time later after the Indians had killed him and left him to the coyotes.\(^\text{17}\)

George Simmonds, a Negro cook of the cattle camp of Chapman and Tuttle, "lost his life through his fidelity to his master's interests." Left at the camp with a team of mules he finally hitched up the team and headed for Dodge. The Indians intercepted him, shot and scalped Simmonds, and took the mules.\(^\text{18}\)

At Belle Meade (Meade, Kansas), the Indians brought their entire camp to the edge of the small town. The chiefs, presumably Dull Knife or Little Wolf, met Captain A. J. French and asked for food. The settlers gave them two quarters of beef, a sack of flour, coffee, and some other provisions. After eating they raided a larder, took guns and other articles and left, except for a rear guard of fifteen Indians who overtook the wagon of Washington O'Conner, a mail carrier.

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\(^{16}\) Berryman, "Early Settlement of Southwest Kansas," Collections, p. 568.

\(^{17}\) Collins, The Indians Last Fight, pp. 248-249.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 249-253.
resident in the village, who was returning from Dodge City. As the settlers watched, the Indians killed O’Conner, cut his throat, and took his mules.\(^4\) 9

The following list of "Civilian Injuries and Losses Sustained South of Arkansas River" is given by Stanley Vestal in his work on Dodge City:\(^5\)

**Killed 10**

- 2 young men, nephews of Mr. Colcord, Sept. 12, 1878
- Dow, cattle herder for Mr. Kinsley
- John Evans, herder for Mr. Sheedy, Sept. 12, 1878
- Warren Richardson, Sept. 13, 1878
- George Simmonds, cook for Chapman and Tuttle, Sept. 18, 1878
- Con-Red, herder for W. C. Quinlan, Sept. 21, 1878
- Thomas Murray, from Quinlan’s Camp, Sept. 21, 1878
- Samuel Leforce, from Quinlan’s Camp, Sept. 21, 1878
- O’Conner, mail carrier, Sept. 24, 1878

**Wounded 5**

- Walter Payne, leg broken and thumb shot off, Sept. 13, 1878
- Charles Payne, 3 yrs. old, shot in body, Sept. 13, 1878
- Nora Payne, 1 yr. old, shot through breast, breaking top of left shoulder
- 2 men, strangers, Sept. 13, 1878

**Stock Stolen or Destroyed 640**

- 400 sheep
- 126 horses
- 114 cattle

The Dodge City Times first recorded information about the Indian raid in an extra edition on September 14, 1878 which was reprinted in

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\(^4\) Vestal, *Dodge City: Queen of Cowtowns*, p. 133.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 136. The Eighteenth Biennial Report lists the following six names of those killed in southwest Kansas: Reuben Briston, Fred Clark, Frank T. Dow, John Evans, all of Salt Fork, Comanche county. George Simmonds (colored), Barber or Comanche county. Washington O’Connor, Meade county. (pp. 30-31).
News was received at this station this morning announcing that a majority of the Northern Cheyenne Indians, probably numbering a thousand, had broken away from Fort Reno, or Cheyenne Agency. Their first object is to get North to join the hostile Sioux. The Indians are being pursued by two companies of cavalry from Fort Reno and one company from Camp Supply. It is stated that the Indians may pass either east or west of the Post. The commander of Fort Dodge, Col. Lewis, has received orders to watch the south side of the Arkansas river. Troops at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Hays and other posts have received marching orders.

It is presumed that the Indians were within one hundred miles of Dodge City.51

Though the editor of the paper was not yet certain of the validity of the rumours on the 14th, the regular edition of the following week contained an article on the Cheyenne with such sub-captions as: "The Red Devils," "The Wild and Hungry Cheyennes," "Commit Murder and Arson," "Several Herders Murdered," "Straggling Bands of Indians Raiding Everywhere," "Immigrant Trains Robbed," etc.52

The paper went on to record: "There has been great excitement all week over news brought in almost hourly of murder and depredations by the straggling bands of Northern Cheyenne Indians."53

Bat Masterson was sheriff of Ford County at the time of the raid, but he had gone to Hot Springs, Arkansas, for rest and medical treatment and returned in October long after the Indians had passed the city. Another of Dodge City's famous citizens, Wyatt Earp, participated in the raid. When the Indians were raiding the Chapman and Tuttle Ranch

51 Item reprinted in the regular edition of the Dodge City Times, September 14, 1878.

52 Dodge City Times, September 21, 1878.

53 Ibid.
on Mulberry creek about eighteen miles from Dodge, Earp headed a force of civilian volunteers to reinforce the cavalry. Upon his return to Dodge on September 24, he had a few Indian prisoners who were placed in the custody of the military authority.54

Demand for security from the Indians was made upon the Governor, as the citizens were reluctant to place their complete trust in the military. The following telegrams express the demand of the frontiersmen that they be armed for their protection:

Dodge City, Kansas. Sept. 18, 1878

Geo. T. Anthony, Gov.; Leavenworth, Kan.: Three hundred Indians are driving off stock and killing herders. They are now within six miles of our city. We are without arms, having equipped members who have gone south. Can you send us arms and ammunition. Situation alarming. We are powerless without arms and ammunition.

James Kelley, Mayor
C. W. Willett
H. E. Gryden
D. Sheedy.55

This telegram was forwarded to General Pope and the answer from his Leavenworth headquarters is as follows:

Gov. Anthony: Gen. Pope in town. Telegram just received from commanding officer, Fort Dodge, who has for a week had his orders about these Indians, makes no mention of their being in the vicinity.56

Upon receiving the foregoing information from the governor the citizens of Dodge City responded with the following:

56Ibid.
Dodge City, Kan., Sept. 18, 1878


James H. Kelley, Mayor. 57

Dodge City, Kan., Sept. 18, 1878

Gov. Anthony: Indians are murdering, and burning houses within three miles of town. All the arms we had have been sent. Can you send us arms and ammunition immediately?

H. Shinn
R. W. Evans
C. W. Willett
T. L. McCarty
James C. Conner. 58

The governor answered by sending P. S. Noble, the Adjutant General, to Dodge City with two hundred stand of arms and ammunition on the train September 19, 1878. He was instructed to issue arms only upon receipt from the officers of the county or city and in the presence of five responsible citizens. The Adjutant General sent the following message to the Governor on September 20, 1878:

Gov. Geo. T. Anthony: Have issued one hundred stand of arms and seven thousand rounds of ammunition to Mayor of Dodge; forty stand and two thousand ammunition to citizens of Cimarron; sixty stand and ammunition to Capt. Friedly, upon urgent request. All quiet at Dodge now, and citizens feel confident that they can meet any emergency. Rumors that Indians are near Lakin, the United States troops concentrating at other points. Shall return, as nothing further can be accomplished staying.

P. S. Noble, Adjutant General. 59

57 Ibid., p. 23.
58 Ibid.
The Indians crossed the Sante Fe Railroad west of Dodge City near Pierceville. Near this spot they left the body of an old squaw wrapped in blankets and covered with a buffalo robe. This trail was found by the military on September 24 and on the morning of the 25th Colonel Lewis started in pursuit with five companies of cavalry and one company of infantry. At Dodge the command had recruited the services of seven scouts, Amos Chatman (Chapman), Ben Jackson, Bill Combs, Levi Ritchison (Richardson), Ed Cooley, a man called "Kokomo," and George W. Brown.

The first day the command marched about forty miles and made camp. The next day, September 27, they marched about ten miles to Beaver creek where they found signs of a recent Indian camp. Continuing down the creek the command halted about four o'clock in the afternoon to wait for the baggage wagon to catch up, and as the troops were relaxing the Indians fired on them from entrenched positions on the hilltops along Famished Woman's fork of the creek. This is present day Scott County near Scott county state lake. After momentary confusion, Colonel Lewis formed the command into a skirmish line and the troops ascended the bluffs and forced the Indians back into their defensive fortifications, which were rifle pits that commanded the entire creek bed and also the surrounding bluffs. In driving the Indians from the hill to their entrenchments Colonel Lewis was shot

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60 Vestal, Dodge City: Queen of Cowtowns, p. 134.

through the thigh, cutting the main artery. Also two men, one from G company and one from F company 4th Cavalry, were wounded.62

There are many stories of the gallantry of Colonel Lewis in attacking the Indians, but the fact is that the Indians surprised the troops and if we can believe the scout George W. Brown, Colonel Lewis failed to put out flankers in the move down Beaver Creek. When the scout warned the Colonel of Indians in the vicinity, he only said that he believed the Indians had gone.63 From the reports of the dragoons in the command it appears that the Colonel needlessly exposed himself and was over anxious in attacking the Indians' position. Also, he fell before any real decisive action took place. Most popular accounts picture the Colonel pushing his troops up the side of the canyon and upon exposing himself he was finally hit and taken from the field which left the command in disorder without his guiding hand.64

That night the troops were withdrawn and at dawn they found that the Indians had again escaped. Fifty ponies belonging to the Indians had been captured the previous day and Captain Clarence Mauck, who was now in command, ordered them shot. They also had captured a great deal of the Indian's food in the form of dried beef.65 One Indian was found killed; his body was out of reach of his friends.

64 These sources include Robert Wright's Dodge City, also Edgar Beecher Bronson's Reminiscences of a Ranchman. Even the Indian sentimentalist Mari Sandoz, in Cheyenne Autumn, states: "The man close to the soldier chief motioned him down too, but he just kept pointing toward the Indian position."
65 Senate Report No. 708, p. 130.
At 7 o'clock the command moved out and the wounded Col. Lewis and the two privates were sent to Fort Wallace in the ambulance. The scout George Brown was sent along with the ambulance, as were a detail of twenty-five men under Lt. Cornelius Gardner. They arrived at Fort Wallace about eleven or twelve o'clock on that same night, but the Colonel had died about an hour earlier.66

At Fort Wallace, Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Van Voast, of the 16th Infantry, Commanding, had been informed of the renegade Cheyenne on September 12, 1878, and he sent Captain W. E. Wedemeyer with thirty mounted men to Sheridan where Indians were reported to have attacked an immigrant train. This report turned out to be false, but Van Voast continued to send out scouting parties to seek out the Indians and warn settlers.67

On the morning of September 28, the senior surviving officer of Colonel Lewis' command, Captain C. Mauck, 4th Cavalry, moved in pursuit of the Indians. A march of forty miles was made that day and on the following day at about noon they reached the Kansas Pacific Railroad at Carlyle Station. The Indians had crossed the track in the same vicinity the previous night.68

66Brown, "Kansas Indian Wars," Collections, p. 137.


68Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 91.
On the 30th, the command marched thirty-five miles until they reached the Old Sheridan Cavalry Post Office on the Leatherman ranch, located about two and a half miles east of the present day town of Selden and south of the north fork of the Solomon. Here the Indians had pillaged the ranch and post office and scattered effects across the prairie. They had also shot at two immigrant boys. Both the boys managed to escape, the injured one reached Prairie Dog Creek; the uninjured one reached Oberlin early the morning of September 30 in search of a doctor, and he warned of the coming Indians but people refused to believe him.

The Indians then moved up the Ogallala cattle trail, destroying property as they went. By October 1, the troops were closing in, but their horses were worn out, having had no forage in the previous twenty days, and the Indians had stolen at least two remounts.

On September 30, the Northern Cheyenne arrived at Sappa Creek in Decatur county, seven and one-half miles southwest of Oberlin, approaching the creek from the south. Presenting a friendly appearance, they would ride out to meet the settlers working in the fields, usually to ask for tobacco, then one of the Indians would ride up behind the white man and shoot him in the back.

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69 Nellans, "Dragoon."
70 Ibid.
72 "Decatur County now and then," (Oberlin, Kansas: Pamphlet unpublished by the Oberlin Diamond Jubilee Inc., 1960). See also the Ellis County Star, October 10, 1878.
One source states that the Indians appeared on the hill south of Oberlin, but when they saw large groups of men preparing to travel to Buffalo Park to meet their families to bring them to their newly claimed homesteads, they turned west.73

From a camp about nine miles southwest of Oberlin, small groups of braves attacked the scattered and unsuspecting settlers. About 9 o'clock the morning of September 30, thirteen year old Harry Keefer saw the Indians shoot to death two men, James Smith and John Hudson. The young boy fled home to tell of the horrible scene; when his mother returned to check his story she saw the Indians ride up to the wagon carrying William Liang and his son William and two girls, Eve and Lou Van Cleave, enroute to Norton. The Indians killed Liang and his son and the two girls were ravished and released naked on the prairie.74

The Indians then attacked the Keefer home, but with the aid of a cattleman named Pat Lynch and his helper, Jimmy Kelly, Mrs. Keefer and five children were kept safe in the dugout. One Indian was shot while trying to gain entrance into the house. It was estimated that there were around three hundred Indians on the Keefer property when this occurred.75

73Ibid.


75Ibid. This figure is highly doubtful, but it is possible that the entire camp came up at the same time. Most of the estimates of this kind are exaggerated, as were many other things about the frontier.
Moving west, the Indians killed Moses F. Abernathy, Marcellus Felt, George F. Walters, a Mr. Lull, Ferdinand Westphalen and his son, John Irwin, John Young, and E. O. Humphrey, and wounded John Humphrey in the shoulder, the latter dying a month later. All these murders occurred within a distance of two miles.

The evening of September 30, the Indians crossed to the north fork of the Sappa and killed William Liang, Jr., and his brother John, the sons of William Liang who had been killed earlier in the day on the south fork of the Sappa. The Liang homestead was ransacked and Mrs. Liang and her two daughters were mistreated. The two girls were put in a bed of straw which was to be set afire, when an old chief interfered and took the mother and girls outside and told them to go. They travelled all night to reach shelter at the Keefer ranch nine miles southwest of their homestead.76

A monument was erected in 1911 as a memorial to those who lost their lives in the Indian raid near Oberlin; the following names appear on it:

E. O. Humphrey (father)
John Humphrey (son)
John C. Hutson
Geo. F. Walters (correct name Fred K. Waltzer, according to Fred Bliss who helped to bury the dead)
Moses F. Abernathy
Mr. Lull
Ferdinand Westphalen and son
Marcellus Felt

76Glen Rogers, "An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas," pp. 25-26. This episode is also related by Henry M. Anthony, in his "Early Northwest Kansas Reminiscenses," who refers to the chief interfering in behalf of the whites as Dull Knife.
Many attribute the great loss of life in the massacre on the Sappa Creek to revenge on the buffalo hunters destroying the village of the Cheyenne chief Bull Hump, three years previous, April 23, 1875. In that fight a company of soldiers under Lieutenant A. Henely, and some buffalo hunters led by Hank Campbell surrounded Bull Hump's village camped on the Sappa Creek. Twenty-two Indians were killed in the fight and only two soldiers were counted dead. Many writers attempt to show that the number killed by the Northern Cheyenne in 1878 was equal to the Cheyenne killed in 1875. The question then arises, whether the chiefs sanctioned the killings and raiding. Grinnell states that all the killing that took place was against the order of chief Little Wolf. And the chief Wild Hog stated in his testimony to the Senate committee that: "I don't know what young men killed the settlers; all the fighting young men I knew of were killed."

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79 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 104.

80 Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 413.

81 Senate Report No. 708, p. 21.
At the Keefer ranch the settlers organized a company, elected Sol Rees captain and Lew Caley (or Kaley) lieutenant, and started after the Indians. They headed for the north fork of the Sappa and in a draw they discovered a dead cowboy, Ed Miskelly, who had been herding cattle.

An another draw of the north Sappa, the settlers ran across three Indians, a warrior, squaw and young buck. The warrior was killed and the others set loose. This small civilian group split when the more adventurous joined two companies of U. S. Cavalry sent out from Fort Wallace to reinforce the captain, and the rest headed back to Oberlin. On their return they met a "company of cavalry proceeding very leisurely after the Indians." 83

In Rawlins County, west of Decatur County, the Indians trapped and killed a herd of cattle in a draw near Ludell, between Oberlin and Atwood. This place has since been known as "Hundred Head Canyon," and the ranch on which this occurred is called "Dead Man's Ranch," because one of the herders, Alex Foster, was killed by the Indians, and Charley George and Gus Cook barely escaped alive. Gus Cook started down the Sappa for help and finding a lone woman and baby on the trail, helped them to safety. He then met Captain Mauck and the soldiers from Camp


Supply, Indian Territory, "but did not think they were looking TOO hard for the Indians." 84

Also on the Beaver in Rawlins County, the Indians killed Pete Janousek, Ignac Janousek, and a Mr. Springer. They stayed in the Paul Janousek house for three days. 85 One of the troopers who testified at the Senate investigation of the Removal of the Cheyenne told the following of this incident:

In one place, in Kansas, I saw the bodies of three men about a hundred yards from the house which they had evidently occupied; the men were lying on the ground with their brains knocked out; two had apparently been running from the house when they received these blows from the Indians. The house, inside, was all torn to pieces; the feather beds were strewn all over the yard; the dogs, cats, geese, ducks, every living thing belonging there had been killed, and was lying there dead. Five or six hundred yards further I found four children, the oldest twelve years old, the youngest a mere babe, the children of Bohemian settlers—the men who had been killed. These children were in a very destitute condition. That was all I saw; but I heard of a great deal more. 86

An immigrant girl was later found naked and alone on the prairie after the command had left the Beaver and headed over the divide north. 87

Also on the Beaver, the Indians killed Frederick Hamper. A Mr. Stiner and his son were killed on their homestead, Mrs. Stiner was abused,
as were most of the captured women, and has never been heard of since. At the Abbott homestead, a son was killed and seven beeves were slaughtered but the horses were left alone.\textsuperscript{88}

The Eighteenth Biennial Report of the Kansas State Historical Society lists the following as killed in Rawlins county:


For the next two weeks the settlers rode over the prairie looking for the dead. The bodies of G. F. Walters and John Wright were found after much searching.

The same plea for arms and ammunition that came from southwest Kansas when the Indians were raiding in that section of the state, now came from the settlers of western and northwestern Kansas. Most of the demands from the west were dated after the massacre at Sappa Creek and the demand for arms was based on fear that the Indians might return south.

From Ellis, Kansas, Dave Rathbone sent a telegram, October 2, 1878, to Governor Anthony stating that "Reliable information has been received that eighteen white men were killed this morning by Indians, near Buffalo. Please send immediately one hundred guns and ammunition to Ellis."\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{88}Decatur County now and then.

\textsuperscript{89}Eighteenth Biennial Report, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., p. 25.
From Buffalo (Buffalo Park), Kansas, came a telegram to the governor from J. C. Henry, which told of the "seventeen men known to be killed on Sappa,"; also sent October 2nd. 91

In answer to the two telegrams, Governor Anthony sent the following reply: "Had interview with General Pope, who says: No hostile Indians in Kansas; no Cheyennes within a hundred miles of Buffalo today. Have you confirmation of dispatches sent me? answer." 92

A confirming telegram was sent by J. C. Henry and the Governor sent P. S. Noble again to the frontier with arms and ammunition with the command to "Issue arms only to good bond." 93

That little bit of humor incident even upon such occasions as an Indian raid is seen in the following telegram of October 3, 1878, from J. F. Keeney, Wakeeney, Kansas, which states, "Three Indians seen this morning eleven miles north of here by Clarke, whose word is as good as General Pope's." 94

Jonathan Edwards wrote the governor a number of lengthy letters in the following tone: "Governor, this is a terrible thing, a small force of Indians leisurely making their way for nearly twenty days across the country, and the troops as leisurely following, and not even capturing or killing an Indian, and yet, as you are told by the

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
general commanding, not a hostile or Cheyenne Indian within a hundred miles." 95

In a letter of October 3, he wrote, "I very much regret that this great commonwealth which you have the honor to govern could not have the power to protect its citizens from these hordes of savage murderers that have marched through western Kansas with perfect impunity." 96 Also, "I am very sorry to say you're censured very much throughout the west as it is not known whether you manifest any interest in behalf of the frontier." 97

The Indians continued to move; the troops camped two miles from the Beaver on October 1, and the 2nd they moved down to view the remains of the three murdered Bohemians and pushed on to camp on the Republican River, across from the Circle ranch owned by the Wilson Bros. of Denver, Colorado. The Indians' camp fire was judged to be at about two or three miles distance from the troops. 98

The Indians had stolen about forty horses in the area, while the cavalry mounts were fast giving out. Thirty horses were abandoned by the cavalry, and the wagons were filled with dismounted troopers. The next day, the command saw the Indians about ten miles in front of them on Frenchman Creek, and picked up an old Indian left on the trail.

96 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
97 Ibid., p. 29.
98 Nellans, "Dragoon."
On the morning of the 4th, they came upon fifty abandoned horses and their packs. The trail was covered with articles stolen in the recent raids. That night, after marching fifty-two miles, the command reached the South Platte opposite Ogallala. Crossing the Union Pacific Railroad on the 5th they continued to the North Platte. When it had been learned that the Cheyenne were heading north from Indian territory, troops were put in readiness under the command of Major Thornburgh, and the 5th Cavalry under General Wesley P. Merritt was ordered to Fort Laramie, and Colonel Carlton, with the 3rd Cavalry was ordered to Fort Robinson.99

Despite precautions, the Northern Cheyenne crossed the Union Pacific tracks, October 4, at Alkali Station, east of Sidney, Nebraska. Major Thornburgh with about one hundred forty men, three companies of 4th Infantry, and one company of 5th, and one of 7th Cavalry, followed the Indians.

The command from Fort Reno followed Thornburgh's command until they were ordered to Sidney Barracks, Nebraska, by General George Crook. One of the dragoons expressed himself as follows:

We arrived there on the 10th, completely worn out, not a man having had a chance to change clothes, or if he had he had non [sic] to change since [sic] leaving Reno, having often but one meal a day, having lost 40 horses and five engagements with the enemy and marched 850 miles in 30 days, without forage, through Indian Territory, Kansas and Nebraska. We were glad of a brief respite.100

99 Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 92.

100 Nellans, "Dragoon."
Thornburgh and his command trailed the Indians through very difficult country; the wagons had to be abandoned, thus from October 6 to October 10 the command was without rations. Finally, they joined with a column of troops of the 3rd Cavalry under Major Carlton, near the Niobrara River, and the commands marched to Camp Sheridan, Nebraska, having found pursuit through the sand hills impossible.

After the Cheyenne crossed the South Platte some of them felt safe enough to stop and rest while others insisted on continuing the journey to Wyoming. In the Niobrara Hills the tribe split; those who desired to stop stayed with the old chief, Dull Knife, and the others under the young chief, Little Wolf, went on.

George Bird Grinnell related the story of this division as told to him by Little Wolf. Dull Knife had stated that "This is our own country. Nothing bad ever happened to us here. Let us rest. The soldiers will leave us alone, for lo, we are in our own land."101 But Little Wolf responded, "You can go that way if you wish, but I intend to work my way up into the Powder River Country. I think it would be better for us all if the party were not divided."102

During the night the band which supported Dull Knife moved a few yards away from Little Wolf's camp. Some say that Little Wolf's band left gifts before the tent of the old chief Dull Knife before they left. But, none of the sources record the date or exact place of the departure.

102 Ibid.
On October 15, the commanding officer at Fort Robinson reported that Indians had been running off stock in the vicinity, and the 3rd Cavalry under Carlton was sent to check the report. Also, the commanding officer at Fort Sidney stated that two Cheyenne were captured in their attempt to join the Indians at Fort Keogh (Montana), where, if permitted to stay, the Cheyenne would surrender, but, if not, they would join Sitting Bull in Canada. Through Ben Clark, the interpreter, the prisoners also said that fifteen had been killed since leaving Indian Territory.\footnote{Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, pp. 92-93.}

To the forces of the Departments of the Missouri and the Platte were added the troops of the Department of Dakota; October 17th Major Tilford and nine troops of 7th Cavalry, and four companies of infantry (430 enlisted men) reached Camp Sheridan, from Bear Buttes (Fort Meade), Dakota.\footnote{Ibid., p. 93.}

The acting Indian Agent Tibbetts at Red Cloud Agency reported that a party of the fugitive Cheyenne had been captured by the Sioux. On October 21st Major Carlton reported that Agency Indians knew where a portion of the Cheyenne Indians were and wanted to capture them for their arms and horses. Carlton detached Captain J. B. Johnson, commanding troops B and D of the 3rd Cavalry, and on October 23rd they captured one hundred and forty-nine of the Northern Cheyenne and one hundred and forty head of stock. Dull Knife, Old Crow, and Wild Hog
were the chiefs taken, "but the prisoners said they would die, rather than be taken back to Indian Territory." When told that they would be sent to Fort Robinson as a step toward removal again to Indian Territory, the Indians began to dig rifle pits and construct breastworks. Army reinforcements and artillery arrived and the officers were successful in getting the Indians to go to Fort Robinson without a fight. Their remaining arms were taken from them and they were confined to an empty set of barracks.

The remaining portion of the Northern Cheyenne under the leadership of Little Wolf succeeded in escaping into the sand hills of western Nebraska. They intended to return to the Powder River country, but on March 25, 1879, near Box Elder Creek, in the Department of Dakota, Lieutenant W. P. Clark from Fort Keogh with the 2nd Cavalry persuaded Little Wolf to surrender. There were thirty-five lodges, two hundred fifty ponies, and "The band numbered thirty-three men, forty-three squaws, and thirty-eight children."  

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
IV. AFTERMATH, THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE IN THE NORTH

A study of the Dull Knife Raid of 1878 can not end with the capture of the two Cheyenne bands of Dull Knife and Little Wolf. To complete the picture we must view its result.

At Fort Robinson the Northern Cheyenne band under Dull Knife was confined in the log barracks at the southeast angle of the parade-ground. The doors had not been locked nor the windows barred, but a small guard patrolled this barracks-prison.

George Bird Grinnell states that a conference was held at Fort Robinson the day following the surrender of the Northern Cheyenne. As there was no Cheyenne interpreter at Fort Robinson, a Sioux named Tangle Hair, who spoke Cheyenne and Sioux, translated to an interpreter who translated from Sioux to English for the commanding officer, Captain Carlton.\(^1\)

In this fashion the commanding officer told Dull Knife:

Now, the fighting is over. We are friendly with one another. You must stay here for three months before the government will decide whether to send you south or to send you to the Sioux. While you are here, nothing bad will happen to you, but you must stay for three months. You will have the freedom of the post and may even go off into the mountains, but each night at supper time you must be here. If one man of you deserts or runs away, you will not be treated like this any longer. You will all be held responsible for him.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)Ibid.
Dull Knife then spoke and told his people to do as they were commanded. "We are back on our own ground, and have stopped fighting. We have found the place we started to come to."³

Thus the Northern Cheyenne came to enjoy the freedom of hunting and roaming in the near-by mountains. Dances were held in the barracks and some of the soldiers bought food to be distributed at the dances and gave small amounts of money to the Indian girls they danced with for the purchase of ornaments and small gifts. This lasted about two months, until Bull Hump left for Pine Ridge Agency to join his wife who had escaped when the Cheyenne were captured. When the commanding officer found that he had gone, his absence not immediately reported by the cook, the Indians were confined to the barracks, their liberties taken away. Bull Hump returned to find his companions locked in the building with sentries posted.⁴

The states of Kansas and Nebraska were each demanding custody of the Indians for the purpose of identification, prosecution, and punishment of the individual members for the killings during the raids through their territory.

Governor Anthony of Kansas, in a letter to the War Department dated November 11, 1878, demanded the surrender of the Cheyenne chiefs to his state:

On mature reflection, and with reference to the demands of law and justice, I feel it an imperative duty to call upon you for a surrender to the proper officers of the civil court of

³Tbid.
⁴Tbid., p. 418.
Kansas, for trial and punishment under its laws, the principal chiefs, 'Dull Knife,' 'Old Crow,' 'Hog,' 'Little Wolf,' and others, whose identity can be established as participants in the crimes of murder and woman ravishing. I believe there is a precedent for this demand, in the surrender to the civil courts of Texas of 'Satanta,' and one other chief, in the year 1872. But if there is no precedent, public necessity and simple justice would, I believe, be ample justification for this demand.\(^5\)

In a letter from Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz to the Secretary of War, dated November 22, 1878, it is disclosed:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, transmitting a copy of a telegram, dated Chicago, Nov. 8, 1878, from General Sheridan, urging that some disposition be made of the Cheyennes, prisoners at Camp Robinson: and I would respectfully state that the matter was duly referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an expression of his opinion, and the officer in reply hereto, under date of 16th instant, recommends that all of the Cheyennes in the custody of the military, who were engaged in the recent hostilities, be taken to Fort Wallace, or some other military post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as committed outrages in said state, and their delivery to the proper civil authorities for trial; and that the remainder of said Indians be returned to their agency in the Indian Territory.

The recommendation of the Commissioner has the approval of this Department.\(^6\)

The federal government decided to return the Northern Cheyenne to the reservation from which they had left in September. This was revealed in a memoranda dated November or December, 1878, from the Secretary of War, and signed W. T. S. (William Tecumseh Sherman):


Governor Anthony of Kansas in person asks for more troops to increase the security and property in south and western Kansas. Governor Anthony says that squads of Indians from Indian Territory come into Kansas and make the settlers feel insecure. The military authorities make no reports to this effect, and I believe the Indian Bureau contends that all the Indians are kept on their reservation. The Northern Cheyennes who escaped from the reservation at Reno last summer, and were captured on the Upper Niobrara, are now prisoners and can be held if necessary. Existing orders are to surrender the murderers of the settlers on Sappa creek to the civil authorities and the remainder to Reno.7

General Phillip Sheridan, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, stated his opinion regarding the Cheyenne prisoners: "... unless they are sent back to where they came from, the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability."8

The commanding officer at Fort Robinson, Captain H. W. Wessells, brought the Sioux chiefs, Red Cloud, American Horse, and No Flesh, from their agency to help convince the Northern Cheyenne to abide by government policy.

Red Cloud, the principal Sioux speaker, said the white man now filled the earth and was all powerful, the Sioux begged them to allow the Cheyenne to stay in the north, but whatever the white man directed "you must do." The Sioux could not aid any resistance.9

Dull Knife then rose to address the Sioux chiefs:

7Tbid.
We know you for our friends, whose words we may believe. We thank you for asking us to share your lands. We hope the Great Father will let us come to you. All we ask is to be allowed to live, and to live in peace. I seek no war with any one. An old man, my fighting days are done. We bowed to the will of the Great Father and went far into the south where he told us to go. There we found a Cheyenne cannot live. Sickness came among us that made mourning in every lodge. Then the treaty promises were broken, and our rations were short. Those not worn by disease were wasted by hunger. To stay there meant that all of us would die. Our petitions to the Great Father were unheeded. We thought it better to die fighting to regain our old homes than to perish of sickness. Then our march began. The rest you know.\textsuperscript{10}

Then he turned to Captain Wessells and his officers:

Tell the Great Father Dull Knife and his people ask only to end their days here in the north where they were born. Tell him we want no more war. We cannot live in the south; there is no game. Here when rations are short, we can hunt. Tell him if he lets us stay here Dull Knife's people will hurt no one. Tell him if he tries to send us back we will butcher each other with our own knives. I have spoken.\textsuperscript{11}

These are the words recorded by Edgar Beecher Bronson, who was present at the council. He states that all the Cheyenne sat silent throughout the council except Buffalo Hump, a son of Dull Knife, who paced from one end of the barrack to the other. Bronson expected him to leap on some member of the party "and try to rend him with his hands."\textsuperscript{12} Nothing came of the council as the War Department and Interior Department agreed that it would not be wise to merge the Cheyenne with the restless Sioux, and it had been decided to march them back to Fort Reno.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 168-169.
\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 169-170.
Through James Rowland, who became interpreter for the Cheyenne at this time, the officers began to persuade the Indians to go south. Dull Knife, speaking for his people, again refused, saying: "We will not go there to live. That is not a healthful country, and if we should stay there, we would all die." He continued to resist: "No, I am here on my own ground, and I will never go back. You may kill me here; but you cannot make me go back."Mari Sandoz states that the Cheyenne were informed on the 3rd of January that they must prepare to go south. Wessells was ordered to start the Indians regardless of weather conditions, but he was to provide the best supplies possible for their comfort. In reply, he stated the Indians were resolved to die rather than to go. The following day General Crook telegraphed Washington for an agent of the Indian Bureau to superintend the move. "He was unwilling to let this responsibility rest on the military." But, on January 5th, 1879, Captain Wessells received orders from the War Department to start south immediately with Dull Knife's band. This was the decision of the Indian Bureau and it was requested that the Secretary of War enforce it immediately.

Captain Wessells brought Dull Knife, Old Crow, and Wild Hog to his headquarters to inform them of the order. Dull Knife replied that

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13 Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 418.
14 Ibid.
15 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 192-193.
he wished that they could do as the Great Father ordered for he knew that they were helpless in his hands, but they would not march to Indian Territory in such weather, for they would die on the way and fall victim to the fever again. "They would not return to the south, and they would not leave their barrack-prison."

Dull Knife's long speech concluded: "You are now the many and we are the few, but we know that it is better to die fighting on the way to our old home than to perish of the sickness . . .."  

Captain Wessells had no choice; he told the interpreter to explain to Dull Knife that the Indians must obey the order. If they refused, then their food and fuel would be cut off until they would agree to go south peacefully. The commander next sent the interpreter to the barracks asking that the children be removed and fed, but the Indians refused. 

Grinnell states that food, water, and fuel were cut off; some of the Indians stated that for eight days they had neither food nor water, others said that they had no food for five days, and no water for three days.  

Snow was scraped from the window sill for water. The

17Ibid., p. 172.

18Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, pp. 191-192. Mari Sandoz states that this is the conference in which the Sioux chief Red Cloud tells the Cheyenne "It is foolish to think of resisting." She states that Rowland was the interpreter, and a newspaper man was present. 

19Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 419. Last food and fuel, Saturday, January 4, 1879; last water, January 8, Captain Wessells told Board of Proceedings. Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 194.
starvation caused some of the Indians to act as drunken people, and a
young man was reported to have said, "I want to jump out now and be
killed." The interpreter was warned not to come inside with the
Indians, and not to let anyone else in or they would be killed.

According to Edgar Beecher Bronson, the barracks rang with death
chants for five days and nights. On the morning of January 9, which
was the fifth day without food Captain Wessells again summoned Dull
Knife, Old Crow, and Wild Hog to a council. The latter two went, and
refusing to surrender the tribe, they were ordered seized and put in
chains. Wild Hog was able to seriously wound Private Ferguson of
Troop A, and let out a war-cry to alarm his people. The Indians
immediately began barricading the windows and doors, the floors of
the barracks were torn up and rifle-pits dug beneath it. There were
twenty-odd rifles and pistols among the Cheyenne which had been smug-
gled into the barracks at the time of capture by concealing them
beneath the squaws' skirts and beneath the blankets. One version

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20Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 419.
21Bronson, Reminiscences of a Ranchman, pp. 174-175. Grinnell
states that five guns were hidden under the floor, and that they had
eleven pistols with some ammunition.

In a letter to E. A. Brininstool, Wessells explained: "I went
to Camp Robinson, where Col. Carlton was in command, and the Cheyenne
prisoners in an empty barracks building. In a few days, Col. Carlton
left, and turned the post over to me. I assumed that when those Indians
were captured they had been disarmed, but it was not so. They had hid-
den their weapons, or some of them. An order came to send them to the
Indian Territory. I told them of it, and said I would do all I could to
make their journey comfortable. But they said that the country where
they were was their home, and they would die before they would leave it.
They then barricaded the building from inside. To prevent their escape
I increased the guard around the building; but that night they broke out,
using their rifles in doing so. Their fuel and food were not cut off until they refused to surrender. All the fight was on their side.
E. A. Brininstool, Fighting Indian Warriors (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:
is that many of the small arms were disassembled and the parts were distributed among the children as ornaments, and when they were shut in the barracks the arms were put together and hidden in the floor.\textsuperscript{22}

The command immediately expected an outbreak, however only seventeen men formed the guard that night when the break came. Recording the episode, the Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, states: "At 10 o'clock on Jan. 10, 1879, the Cheyennes tried their desperate escape from the barracks at Fort Robinson."\textsuperscript{23} The ten o'clock "all's well" was just being passed by the sentries when a shot was fired through the window of the barrack killing a soldier and an Indian sprang out of the window to relieve the dead man of his arms. The fight was on. A group of Indians rushed through the front door, shooting two more soldiers. All the Indians poured out through windows and doors, forming a line in front of the barracks and firing on the troopers as they rushed to the scene. The women and children were sent ahead of the rest of the band.

The Indians escaped across the saw-mill crossing of White River, which was only a few hundred yards from the barracks, heading southwest toward the ranches in the area to find horses. Five to six inches of snow and a full moon made the escapees easy targets for the soldiers. Most of the fighting men of the Cheyenne were killed in the first half mile of flight. In the confusion the soldiers could not

\textsuperscript{22}Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyenne, p. 420.

\textsuperscript{23}Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 95. Both Bronson and Grinnell record the date of the Robinson outbreak as January 9th.
distinguish between men and women, a Lieutenant Cummings found himself attacked by two Indians armed with knives and after he had shot them he discovered they were squaws.\textsuperscript{24}

Grinnell relates the following story, told to him by an Indian squaw:

Some people who were ahead of me got to the top of the hill, but I got out of breath and stopped by a big tree with some other women. One of these was the wife of White Antelope. She was already wounded, and White Antelope was carrying the baby. When the soldiers got up close, White Antelope rushed back on them with his knife and fought for a little while and was killed. When the soldiers had come up close, I was shot in the back and in the side of the head and knocked senseless, and knew nothing after that. Two other women were killed there.\textsuperscript{25}

Four troops of 3rd Cavalry under Captain P. D. Vroon, at Camp Canby, one mile east of Fort Robinson,\textsuperscript{26} upon hearing the shooting formed a skirmish line across the valley to prevent escape east. Vroon took one troop to the aid of the fort. He was the first to engage the fleeing Cheyenne, who had selected a high bluff two miles west of the post as their avenue of escape. The inaccessible cliff commanded by the Indians forced the troops to withdraw until daylight.

In the morning a detail of soldiers was sent out to bring in the dead Indians. About forty frozen corpses were found and stacked like cord wood against the sawmill where they were later buried in a common

\textsuperscript{24}\textsuperscript{24}Bronson, \textit{Reminiscences of a Ranchman}, pp. 181-182.

\textsuperscript{25}\textsuperscript{25}Grinnell, \textit{The Fighting Cheyenne}, p. 422.

\textsuperscript{26}\textsuperscript{26}These troops had been sent to reinforce Fort Robinson. Bronson, \textit{Reminiscences of a Ranchman}, p. 170.
trench. The civilians had begun to scavenger among the dead and rob them of trinkets, etc.

Four troops of 3rd Cavalry under Captain Wessells started out after the Indians who had escaped the night before. The Indians had followed the high divide between the White River and Soldier Creek west of the fort. Their trail through the snow led down the narrow valley of Soldier Creek, and they had entrenched themselves on a high steep hill covered with fallen timber, which commanded the trail. The Cheyenne opened fire on a column of soldiers led by Vroon, but the command moved back, reassembled and soon surrounded the Indians stronghold which was impregnable to a charge attack. The command having brought no packs or rations, Captain Wessells ordered decoy camp fires built around the Indians position and marched his men back to the garrison.

When Captain Wessells returned with his command on the 12th, he found the Cheyenne occupying a strong position in the thick timber along Soldier Creek at the foot of the hill on which they had been entrenched the day before. The troops and the Indians engaged in a battle of long-range firing. The Cheyenne were fortunate to kill a trooper's horse, and when the command marched back to the garrison that night, the Indians ate their first food in seven days. The next

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27 Ibid., p. 184.
28 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 209.
day the Indians remained there eating and resting without the threat of troops. On the 14th the soldiers returned and found the Indians six miles further west entrenched on the Hat Creek Bluffs, and here the command was ambushed and two troopers wounded. The Captain and lieutenants Crawford and Hardie (Hardy) and the interpreter crawled near the Indians rifle-pits and called for the Cheyenne to allow the women and children to come out. But the only answer was a rifle volley. The command had brought along a twelve-pound Napoleon gun and forty rounds of shells were thrown in the Indians position without dislodging them.31

That night the command surrounded the Indians in hope of keeping them from food and water. But the next morning it was discovered that the Indians had slipped through the picket lines, and headed southwest along the high bluffs lining Hat Creek Basin.32

The Indians continued to elude the troops. For the next six days the command would force a running fight, the Indians would secure themselves in a strong defensive position, and with nightfall would slip away without notice.33

Bronson states that Captain Wessell's command was joined by Lieutenant Dodd and a band of Sioux scouts on January 20, and on Tuesday the 21st the final battle took place.34 The government

31 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
32 Ibid., p. 194.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
records state that on January 20, Major Evans with Troops B and D of 3rd Cavalry intercepted the Cheyenne on some cliffs but they escaped. Captain Wessels with troops A, E, F, and H of 3rd Cavalry overtook the Indians on January 22nd "near the telegraph line from Fort Robinson to Hat Creek, where they were entrenched in a gully." The Cheyenne were found in a washout about fifty feet long, twelve feet wide, and five feet deep near the edge of the bluffs. After an interpreter summoned them to surrender and they refused, a skirmish line was formed and the troops charged to the edge of the pit emptied their carbines into it, sprang back to reload, and fired again. Captain Wessells and two men were wounded and three enlisted men were killed. Twenty-three Cheyenne were killed and nine captured of whom three were wounded.

The night of the outbreak from the barracks the soldiers killed thirty-two Cheyenne and seventy-one were captured, most of them being wounded. Dull Knife and his wife, his son and his son's wife and child, evaded capture by hiding in the hills for ten days, and then they travelled to Pine Ridge Agency where they confided in the interpreter William Rowland about their plight. Grinnell states that of the nearly 150 Cheyenne confined at Fort Robinson, 64 were killed in the outbreak, about 58 were sent to Pine Ridge Agency, about 20 were sent to trial and south, and 8 or 10 were never heard of again.

35Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians, p. 96.
36Ibid.
38Ibid.
Eleven soldiers were killed and ten wounded along with the Sioux scout Woman's Dress. In the medical history of the Fort Robinson Post, Surgeon E. B. Mosely wrote:

During this whole period the fighting was of the most desperate character being from a hand to hand struggle up to a range almost always inside of fifty yards. The great proportion of fatal wounds is remarkable and their concentration on the trunk of the body shows a deliberation and skill in handling the improved breech-loading arms with which they were liberally supplied, a fact which explains why this particular tribe enjoyed the reputation of being the best warriors on the plains. The conduct of the white troops is worthy of the greatest praise. Taken by surprise the first night, they rallied in the most prompt manner and followed the flying enemy even bare-footed in the deep snow with thermometer at 10°F. until ordered back by their officers.

In the final charge the men advanced under a heavy and fatal fire to the edge of the hole in which the enemy were hidden and in a few minutes of short work finished the affair.

By an unfortunate fatality a large number of the killed were of the very best and most respected men of the command.39

Although the affair seemed finished there were repercussions; a Deadwood dispatch to the New York Tribune stated, "Intense indignation is manifested throughout the whole country, even among the advocates of extermination, over the barbarous treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson near here, previous to the recent outbreak and slaughter."40

And the Telegraph of Sidney, Nebraska, on January 25, 1879, stated that the Indians surrendered in the fall claimed that they were assured


40Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 226.
they would not be taken back to Indian Territory. The editor had received his information on a visit to Fort Robinson. After the Cheyenne had been at the Fort for two months, "it was agreed upon by the war and interior departments that the Indians should be returned south, to the end that such of them as committed the murder and other atrocities in Kansas might be identified, and put on trial."

When the Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz was asked to express his opinion about the treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson and the outbreak, the Secretary replied that the Interior Department had no control over the Indians at that time. He stated that his opinion coincided with General Sheridan's that "unless they are sent back the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability." It was still necessary to return the Indians to the reservation.

General George Crook backed the commander of Fort Robinson:

"... having tried every means in his power and failed, and there being no change in the orders from Washington, Captain Wessells, the officer in charge, had no alternative but a resort to harsh measures. He made overtures to the chiefs and head men to let the women and children come out from the building, so that they might not suffer in any conflict that might arise; but the Indians defiantly rejected every attempt at compromise, saying, 'We'll all die here together sooner than be sent south.'"

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42 Senate Report No. 708, p. 251.
43 Ibid., p. 242.
The General stated further that, although Captain Wessells had no other alternative, "I have never known a band of Indians to make peace with our government and then break it, or leave their reservation, without some ground of complaint; but until their complaints are explained and adjusted, they will constantly give annoyance and trouble." To Crook it seemed that there had been an unnecessary exercise of power in Washington to force this particular band of Cheyenne back to Indian Territory, while fragments of the band, which surrendered to troops on the Yellowstone, had escaped to the Pine Ridge and Spotted Tail Reservations and had been allowed to remain in the north.

The Omaha, Nebraska, Daily Herald, January 17, 1879, editorially reviewed the situation at Fort Robinson:

These Cheyennes were surrounded in the sand hills of North West Nebraska in a severe snowstorm on the 20 October last by three companies of the 3rd Cav. under Capt. Johnson. Their number was then officially given as 114. Then they said they would remain peaceably at Camp Robinson or live with Red Cloud's people (on the Sioux reservation in the north) but would die before they would return to their reservation in Indian Territory, where they had been starved. The commissioner did nothing in the case until Dec. 19, when he ordered their removal to Kansas. Temperature at Camp Robinson indicated 30° below that day. The commissioner must have known this. It was one of the items of news, current in all the journals of the country. The squaws and children hadn't a blanket that wasn't in rags. They did leave their reservation in the same clothing they now wear, but they left in August, and it is now January; besides, clothing often wears out in Nebraska as well as in Washington. The man who opened that telegram was a fool or a cold-blooded scoundrel. Dec. 20, 1878, the commissioner was informed by wire that before these Indians could be moved, they must have clothing. He never answered that telegram until January 11, the very day of the outbreak.

\[114\] Ibid., pp. 242-243.

\[45\] Ibid.
The whole Cheyenne business is in keeping with the rest of the Indian Bureau management. It is a disgrace to the U. S. A. From Mr. Hayt we are prepared to hear anything. He displayed his incompetency so fully in his dealing with the Sioux as a 'diplomatist' that we beg leave to suggest to him that as a private citizen he might be more of a success than as the head of a bureau. 46

In the proceedings of the Board of Officers investigating the Cheyenne outbreak at Fort Robinson there appeared two main questions: "Could not identification of the guilty have been tried at Robinson as well as elsewhere, and did the dignity of the government require removal of the Indians back to Indian Territory without full investigation into the merits of their complaints?" 47

A few weeks after the massacre of the Northern Cheyenne at Hat Creek, wagons carrying about twenty Cheyenne as prisoners headed for Sidney where a special railroad car would take them to Leavenworth, Kansas. Among them were Wild Hog, still suffering from self-inflicted wounds, Tangle Hair, Left Hand, Old Crow, Porcupine, Blacksmith, and Noisy Walker with their relatives.

Bevert Major General Jonathan Pope had informed Governor Anthony, of Kansas, on December 31, 1878, that the War Department had informed him that he was to turn over to the civil authorities in Kansas "such of the Cheyenne prisoners en route to this place as can be identified as the criminals who committed murders or other crimes during the raid of the Indians through Kansas in September last." 48

47 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 243.
On January 15, 1879, Ford County Attorney M. W. Sutton, sent a letter to the newly elected governor John P. St. John in which he enclosed warrants for the arrest of Dull Knife and other Cheyenne Indians, and it is possibly because of this early request that the trial of the Indians was held in Dodge City. On February 6, 1879, the governor sent word to Sutton that "All that is left of Cheyenne raiders will be at Leavenworth soon--What can be done from your section of the state to aid in Identifying them?" The county attorney sent Bat Masterson, sheriff of Fort County, with four witnesses to Leavenworth to identify the Indians and bring them to Dodge City for trial. The witnesses were Deputy Sheriff C. E. Bassett, James Masterson, Capt. A. J. French, and Kokomo Sullivan.

The identification and transfer to civil authorities took place at Fort Leavenworth. The Leavenworth Times of February 16, 1879 reported:

DUSKY DEMONS
The Cheyenne Robbers and Murderers Fall at Last into the hands of the Civil Authorities
That they will Never Again Ravish Women and Kill Children is a Certainty.
They Were Taken Away Yesterday to be Lodged in the Ford County Jail for Trial

Yesterday morning there gathered a throng of people about the Union Depot whose faces were a study; they had heard much of the atrocities committed by the renegade Cheyennes in Meade, Ford and other counties, and many of them being old frontiersmen said little. Their eyes betokened curiosity to see the devils who had desolated so many homes, and the firm set lips of the 'old timers', when their names were mentioned, indicated anything but a friendly feeling.

50 Dodge City Times, February 15, 1879.
And the Ford County Globe, February 17, 1879 reported the arrival of the Indians in Dodge City.

The seven Cheyenne Indian prisoners arrived from Fort Leavenworth last Monday morning, in custody of W. B. Masterson, Sheriff of Ford County... The Indians were placed in the jail, where they still remain, their hands and feet closely shackled. They sit in a row upon the damp floor in the dim dungeon with sorrow and despair deeply engraven upon their manly countenances. All hope of future happiness in this wicked world has forsaken their breasts. Death in any form would be welcomed by them as a healing balm to their bleeding hearts. In this desperate state of mind they would commit suicide if the least opportunity presented itself.52

The Dodge City Times, February 22, 1879, states:

The names of these red gentlemen, who some months ago paid the environs of Dodge City a visit, and who threw the city and country into such a tremor of excitement, are given in English as follows: Crow, Wild Hog, Tall Man, Old Man, Run Fast, Young Man and Frizzle Head. They are fine specimens of the genus Indian—stalwart braves—apparently comfortable under their distressing circumstances.53... The preliminary trial of these prisoners will take place as soon as witnesses reach here. The examination will be conducted by County Attorney M. W. Sutton, whose recent successful prosecutions have been the admiration of a law-abiding people and a terror to evil-doers.54

The trial at Dodge City was convened June 24, 1879, with Judge Samuel R. Peters, 9th Kansas Judicial District, presiding. Michael W. Sutton was prosecuting attorney, assisted by H. B. Johnson. H. E. Gryden, of Dodge City, was attorney for the defense, assisted by J. G. Mohler of Salina.54


53 Dodge City Times, February 22, 1879.

54 "Indian Pamphlets," 1855-1885, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, Champion, June 29, 1879.
A change of venue was granted the defense and the prisoners were taken to Lawrence, Kansas, where they were examined by a Senate investigating committee on August 12, 1879. On February 12, 1879, Senator Allison had submitted a resolution to the United States Senate for appointing a select committee to examine the circumstances connected with the removal of the Cheyenne Indians from the Sioux reservation to the Indian Territory. The committee was composed of S. J. Kirkwood, Jno. T. Morgan, H. L. Dawes, J. E. Bailey, and P. B. Plumb. The Indians, including their leading man, Wild Hog, were brought to the committee room accompanied by their attorney. Major Ben. Clarke, of Fort Reno, Indian Territory, was sworn in as interpreter. The particulars of the investigation were not made public at the time.

The Lawrence Standard, October 16, 1879, stated that the Cheyenne were liberated, the case of State of Kansas vs. Wild Hog et al., was called and disposed of for want of evidence and absence of witnesses.56

The Atchison, Kansas, Champion, stated that Old Crow was discharged from custody when the county attorney of Ford county entered a nolle prosequi in his case. He had served the Union Army during the Civil War and claimed that he had been forced to go on the raid.57

In a letter from Dodge City the explanation of the technicalities involved in trying the six remaining Indians is explained:

57"Indian Pamphlets," 1855-1885, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, Champion, June 29, 1879.
As the case of the Cheyenne prisoners now stands Wild Hog, Old Man, Left Hand, Frizzly Head, Porcupine, Blacksmith will be tried at Lawrence, Kansas, in October, 1879, or sooner, if ordered, for the high crime and misdemeanor of murdering citizens of Kansas in Sept. and October 1878. The trick is one I think but little understood [sic] by the generality of the citizens of Kansas. The general understanding of the people of the country at large was, I think, that the trial of the Cheyenne Indian prisoners was for all the crimes, murders, etc. committed in the whole state in the late raid. It now appears that each Judicial District, through the county attorney of each county in said Judicial District takes cognizance at law for the crimes committed in the several counties of each said Judicial District. This mode of judicial procedure in the case of the Cheyenne Indian murderers is equivalent to a positive acquittal of the prisoners.58

Judge N. T. Stephens, of Douglas County, refused to continue the case and the Indians were turned over to Indian Agent John D. Miles, who conducted them back to the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency in Indian Territory.59

The Ford County incarceration had an influence on the November election for sheriff.60 It seems likely that pressure from the government after the testimony in August, 1879, led to the dismissal of the court case against the Northern Cheyenne chiefs.

In his inaugural speech before a joint session of the Kansas House and Senate, January 16, 1879, the incoming Governor John P. St. John gave special attention to the recent Indian raid through the state. He stated that the Indians moved:

58 "Indian Pamphlets," 1855-1885, I, clipping from Atchison, Kansas, Champion, June 29, 1879.


... in their line of march northward along the western border of the frontier settlements, making incursions into sparsely-settled districts, where the people were wholly unable to protect themselves, killing as they did about forty citizens, destroying and carrying away large amounts of property, and committing outrages upon defenseless women and children, so brutal, heinous, and revolting in their nature as to never to be forgiven or forgotten. In declining to discuss the question touching the effort made by our State and National authorities to protect the settlers against the outrages committed by this lawless band of savages, I do not wish to be understood as casting any unjust reflection upon any one. 61

To insure that such outrages would never occur again in the dominion which the governor ruled, the State would have to act to protect the lives and property of the citizens "against every invasion by predatory bands of lawless savages." 62 It was much more essential since the "doors of Kansas have been thrown open wide, and a cordial invitation extended to the industrious, law-abiding people of all portions of the civilized world to come among us and build for themselves homes." 63

By the then existing statutes the commander-in-chief had no power to act except in case of insurrection, invasion, or threatened invasion, and no money could be spent without the expenses having been incurred. The governor recommended that an appropriation be made for a military contingent fund sufficient to uniform, mount, equip, and pay a number of men "whose duty it shall be, at such times and places as may be deemed advisable, to act as a patrol on the frontier, and promptly give warning

62 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
63 Ibid., p. 18.
of every approach of danger; and thus the citizen, having due notice, and promptly aided in his defense by the State, could be made secure in the enjoyment of his life and property."64

Governor St. John also recommended that a committee be appointed to investigate the extent of damages sustained by citizens from the Indian raid.65 And by Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, "relating to losses sustained by citizens of Kansas by the invasion of Indians during the year 1878," a committee of three men appointed by the governor would hold meetings in Dodge City, Hays City, and Norton, to hear claims by those citizens who suffered losses in the raid and "audit and allow all or so much of said claims as they may deem just and right, and shall make report to the governor."66 These claims were to be audited and transferred to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, with a demand for the payment of damages by the federal government.67

The governor appointed R. E. Stevenson, A. W. Mann, and W. R. Adams to the commission with Stevenson elected chairman, and James Clayton, selected as clerk. The Commission examined 116 claims which

64Ibid., p. 19.
65Ibid., p. 20.
67Ibid., p. 218.
totaied $182,646.13, and allowed $101,766.83. Twenty-six claims were rejected or disallowed for lack of evidence. The total expenses of the commission had been $1,197,80.68.

The counties which were raided were Barber, Commanche, Clark, Decatur, Ford, Foote (now Gary), Gove, Hodgeman, Meade, Rawlins, and Sheridan counties. The property loss to the individual claimants was greatest in Ford and Gove counties, with the three highest claims being allowed to Evans, Hunter and Evans of Ford County, $17,760; to Smith and Savage, Gove County, $111,019; and to J. L. Driskill and Sons, Ford County, $13,700.69

Some people remarked that: "Evan at a fancy five dollars a head for them Texas longhorns, the Indians oughta been fat as badgers--around three hundred Indians eatin' better'n ten thousand head in less'n a month."70 In 1882, the government ordered $9,870.10 to be paid from the treaty funds of the Northern Cheyenne to claimants for damages in their flight through Kansas.

John P. St. John had been elected governor in the election of November, 1878, and the appropriation which he recommended in his first message, January 16, 1879, was promptly voted by the legislature. In his second biennial message to the legislature, in 1881, he stated:


69 Eighteenth Bienniai Report, p. 31.

70 Sandoz, Cheyenne Autumn, p. 270.
Under the act of March 12, 1879, $20,000 was appropriated to be used for the purpose of protecting settlers on the frontier against Indian depredations. In April, 1879, by virtue of this act I organized and thoroughly equipped a patrol guard of about forty men, and kept them on the south-western border, patrolling a line from Barber county west about 100 miles ... thus rendering it impossible for any considerable number of hostile Indians to invade the state without notice thereof being promptly conveyed to not only the settlers exposed to such a danger, but to both state and national authorities, so that a sufficient additional force might be quickly added to the patrol guard to successfully resist any such invasion, and furnish ample protection to the lives and property of the citizens. This guard was kept on the frontier until the 15th of November, when the men were relieved from duty and paid off. 71

Governor St. John went on to state that a small appropriation of $1,000 a year for the next two years would secure the services of an efficient and reliable detective "to remain in the territory among the Indians to give warning of any indication of danger from that direction." 72 C. M. Scott, an experienced scout, was employed during the year of 1881-1882 "to spend his time on the plains watching the Indians." 73

In recording the accomplishments of the St. John administration, I. O. Pickering, a former law partner, states that there was no further loss of life or property due to the thoroughness and efficiency of the measures recommended by the governor, and that the peace and security of settlers of western Kansas was insured. They were now permitted "to go forward in the prosecution of their business and the development


72Ibid., pp. 390-391.

73Ibid.
of their country, not as formerly, with fear and trembling, but with confidence and hope." 74

The migrations to western Kansas were just beginning in the 1870's, and the Indian raid of 1878 had temporarily halted immigration. Large caravans bound for western Kansas stopped, and fear of the Indians caused many families to decide to return home. 75 In October, 1878, N. J. Gesmon led sixty families into Gove and Sheridan counties, and they settled near Grinnell and Grainfield, but the news of the Indian raid forced them to flee, although most returned shortly. 76 The settlers around Palco fled to Stockton, 77 and the small settlement on the Prairie Dog, east of Oberlin, evacuated to Almena and points east. 78

The Senate committee established to investigate the removal of the Northern Cheyenne, after its hearings in Lawrence, Kansas, moved to the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency, Indian Territory, where on August 20, 1879, they examined John D. Miles, Agent at the time of the Cheyenne outbreak. Also examined were the agency physician, Dr. Hodge, and Major Mizner, commander at Fort Reno. J. A. Covington, head farmer at the Agency, and H. W. Lawton, from Fort Reno, were examined at the same time. Lieutenant Wilder, Thomas B. Chase, and Sebastian Gunther

74 [Ibid., p. 391.]

75 [Roderick Cameron, Pioneer Days in Kansas (Belleville, Kansas: Cameron Book Company, c 1951), pp. 23-24.]


78 [Cameron, Pioneer Days in Kansas, p. 24.]
were also examined while the committee was at the agency and Fort Reno. 79

William M. Leeds, acting Secretary of Indian Affairs, was examined January 24, 1880, at Washington, D. C., and Ezra A. Hayt, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was examined January 28, 1880. The Secretary of Interior, Carl Schurz, went before the Senate committee May 15, 1880. Also examined were General Nelson A. Miles, and General George Crook, on April 26, 1880. 80

Senate Report No. 708, of the Forty-Sixty Congress, 1879-1880, is a 312 page document containing over two hundred pages of testimony, in addition to correspondence, reports, charts, treaties, etc., relating to the removal of the Northern Cheyenne Indians to Indian Territory. The recommendations of the committee which conducted the investigation were presented to the Senate June 8, 1880, by Senator S. J. Kirkwood and were as follows: "Recommends that Little Chief's band be returned to Fort Keogh; that a reservation be established for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe tribes of Indians; that a cattle-herd be established for the tribes, or a separate herd for the bands, and an annual money investment by Government to increase or preserve the herds; that Indians be employed as herdsmen, and Indian police with white officers be employed as guards; that additional farmers be employed


80 Ibid.
to remain with the Indians; that in allotting lands in severalty attention be given to water privileges.\textsuperscript{81}

When Wild Hog was acquitted in the courts of Kansas, he and the other chiefs and their families were again transported to Indian Territory. But the other members of the band, including Dull Knife, who had survived the Fort Robinson outbreak were allowed to go to the Sioux reservation at Pine Ridge. In 1880, the Agent at Pine Ridge, Major V. T. McGillycuddy, reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: "Up to the middle of last November, a group of Northern Cheyenne under Dull Knife were here. These people were a constant source of trouble as they were mourning continually for their relatives who were killed—and being of a more war-like nature than our Sioux—I was only too glad to accede to a request of General Miles and by authority of the Honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs to transfer the party to Fort Keogh where they have since remained under the control of the military."\textsuperscript{82}

The bands of Little Wolf which had surrendered to Lieutenant W. P. Clark, and those under Two Moons which had remained at Fort Keogh after the surrenderings in 1876-1877 and consented to become scouts for General Miles during the Nez Perces outbreak, and the


\textsuperscript{82}Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1880, p.
Miles made provision for the growing band at Fort Keogh.

It is not known exactly when the Cheyenne began slipping away from Keogh and returning to the Rosebud River, their native country, but a small band soon formed on the little creek called the Muddy of the Rosebud, about fifteen miles southwest of the present townsit e of Lame Deer, Montana. One of the first to go there must have been the chief Little Wolf, who went into self-imposed exile during the winter of 1880 after killing Starving Elk who had been too attentive to Little Wolf's wives and daughter. 83

This small migration of Cheyenne back to the Rosebud satisfied General Miles because it solved the problem of overcrowding at Fort Keogh. But others were not pleased as is noted in the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of 1883, which states: "... allegations have been made by cattlemen that they are killing stock. ... Special Agent Milburn was instructed to visit them and ascertain the conditions and the truth of the complaints. ... but he found that the complaints of the cattlemen were not well founded." 84 The report also stated that the military authorities at Fort Keogh felt that these Indians were deserving of assistance and should be allowed to remain where they were. In conclusion, he recommended "that a special agent be appointed to take charge of the Indians temporarily and distribute

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84Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1883, p. 35.
to them such supplies as they are entitled to receive. ... Some of
the Indians in the vicinity of Tongue River were held for a time under
the surveillance of the military at Fort Keogh and during that time
they were considered prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{85}

By an Executive Order dated November 26, 1884, a tract of country
east of the Crow Reservation was set up for the Northern Cheyenne
"parties captured by the military in 1877 and 'hostiles' from the Pine
Ridge Agency who have been permitted to settle in the vicinity of the
Tongue and Rosebud rivers.\textsuperscript{86} The annual report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs of 1885 noted that "the creation of the new reserve
created much excitement and opposition among the settlers.\textsuperscript{87}

A special agent was sent to the newly created reservation to in-
estigate whether the Northern Cheyenne were living on the lands pro-
vided by Executive Order. It was found that the Indians occupied lands
on the Tongue River which was not on the reservation, and settlers
within the areas were living on the reservation because of rights ex-
sting prior to the date of the order. In his report, the agent
recommended that the Executive Order be revoked and negotiations opened
with the Crow Indians for purchase of the northwest corner of their
reservation for the Northern Cheyenne. This recommendation was not
followed. This was the situation when R. L. Upshaw became agent for
the Northern Cheyenne in 1886. He also found the local press hostile

\textsuperscript{85}Dusenberry, "The Northern Cheyenne," p. 31.

\textsuperscript{86}Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1885, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 41.
and the land office at Miles City uncooperative. He was unable to change the situation and, in 1889, wrote General Miles:

For the past three and a half years I have been in charge of the Northern Cheyenne at this place. A strong effort is being made by a large portion of people of this (Custer) county to have these Indians removed to some other place. The quality of land suitable for agricultural purposes on the reservation is small and it may be that a move may in the end be advantageous to them. But I am preparing a report on the subject and desire to have all the information in regard to them that is possible to obtain, especially as to how they came to be here and what promises were made them as to their tenure.

Two Moons, White Bull and others refer to you on every occasion and say that you put them on the Rosebud and Tongue rivers and told them that they were to stay here permanently.

General Miles' answer gives an insight into his attitude toward the Northern Cheyenne:

... in regard to the proposed removal of the Indians I would say that, in my judgement, there is no good reason or justice in doing so.

These Indians surrendered in good faith in the spring of 1877. . . During the last twelve years they, Two Moon's band, have been killed while employed by the Government. They have been a good part of the time self-sustaining; the Government has allowed them a little corner of territory upon which to live, and justice, humanity, and every other commendable reason demands that they should be allowed to live in peace in the vicinity in which they were born.

The congregating of great masses of Indians, as has been done in the Indian Territory and on the Great Sioux Reservation, is not only a blot upon our civilization, but also a black mark upon the map of the United States, and I trust the Government will extend to those people the protecting hand which a peaceably disposed people are entitled to.

They were told that if they remained at peace and did what they were directed to do the Government would treat them fairly and justly. They have fulfilled their part of the compact and it would


89 Ibid., p. 33.
be but justice for the Government to allow them to remain where it has placed them during the past years. What is more, Indians who surrender their tribal relations, are, under the law of Congress, entitled to take up land for homes on the public domain, and in this instance, they have undoubted right, legally and morally, to remain where they are now located.90

Another problem with which the Agent had to contend was the desire of a group of Northern Cheyenne under Little Chief to return to the Tongue River reservation and join their kinsmen. This group of 250 Indians had been sent to Indian Territory from Fort Keogh at the time of the Dull Knife outbreak from Indian Territory in 1878. The Senate committee which investigated the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory recommended that this band under Little Chief be allowed to return "to the vicinity of Fort Keogh and be put on a reservation with the Northern Cheyennes in that vicinity."91 They were given permission to return in 1881 and Captain W. A. Thompson of the 4th Cavalry escorted the band to Pine Ridge Agency. Agent Miles of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Agency in Indian Territory said of this band: "Little Chief, although very unhappy, has always behaved himself well, and held his people under good control at this agency."92 But the Agent at Pine Ridge, T. V. McGillycuddy, wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1881, "I do not look with anticipation that the Cheyenne Indians will add to the peace and prosperity which this agency has enjoyed in the past three years."93 This agent "fresh from the

90Ibid.
91Senate Report No. 708, p. xvi.
scenes of fighting with the Cheyennes near Camp Robinson, Nebraska, had been placed over the Red Cloud Sioux by Secretary Schurz at the insistence of the military.94

In the summer and autumn of 1882, McGillycuddy was engaged in a quarrel with Red Cloud and his people, the agent having a strong dislike for these Northern Cheyenne and especially for their holding Red Cloud in such high esteem.

Little Chief's band wanted to camp with Red Cloud, but McGillycuddy forced them to camp elsewhere and used police to keep them away from Red Cloud's camp. They then moved their camp to the Nebraska border, and the agent retaliated by cutting off rations. The hungry Cheyenne returned to the agency with 150 armed warriors "demanding full rations for their families at once."95 McGillycuddy met them with fifty armed police and forced the Indians to back down.

On September 23, 1882, two hundred Cheyenne led by Chief Black Wolf slipped away determined to return to the Tongue River Reservation in Montana. Agent McGillycuddy issued arms and ammunition to his police and started after the fugitives when he received telegraphed orders from the Indian Office to desist. In his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs he states:

The transfer of the Northern Cheyenne to this agency . . . has in no way assisted our people toward civilization or progress. They are an insubordinate, uncontrollable and migratory

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95 Ibid., p. 93.
lot of aborigines. They spend most of their time finding fault, loafing and dancing. . . . The more discontented of the party, some two hundred, under the sub-chief, Black Wolf, left this agency on the 23rd of September without a pass or authority, for Fort Keogh, Montana, and contrary to the wishes and authority of the department. As your office instructed me to use no force to restrain them they were allowed to depart in peace. 96

In his next annual report McGillycuddy again lamented:

These Bedouins of the Desert have remained in their normal condition of general worthlessness under their officially recognized chief, Little Chief; some have gone north to the Big Horn country, some have returned, none have engaged in freighting, but have passed their time in dancing, wandering around the country, and occasionally making a raid on the agent's office to inform him that they are guileless children of nature, etc., etc. 97

In 1884, the last remnant of the Northern Cheyenne which had been transferred to Indian Territory in 1877 was returned north. This new influx of five hundred Cheyenne was described by McGillcuddy as "a floating population" which was "here today and off for the Yellowstone tomorrow where, after a while, tiring of the precarious living to be picked up hunting or stealing cattle, they will return for a time to their Great Father's storehouses at the agency." 98

The following year the agent was still displeased with his new charges, but he did admit that about one hundred fifty of them under Standing Elk had split off and started building houses and farming and doing a little freighting. But the other, under Little Chief and Wild Hog, "Not one of them will live in a house, dress in civilian garb, engage in freighting or farming . . . in fact, do nothing but sit

96 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1882, p. 35.
97 Ibid., 1883, p. 34.
98 Ibid., 1884, pp. 36-37.
around in their picturesque canvas village waiting for the Indian millenium, i.e. the return of the buffalo, a new agent, and the supremacy of the chiefs. 99

In 1887, about two hundred Northern Cheyenne ran away from Pine Ridge Agency to the Tongue and Rosebud country, but Agent Upshaw at Tongue River Agency, knowing that he was unable to provide for them there, called on the army which escorted the Indians back to Pine Ridge. "They made great complaints of their treatment at the hands of the Sioux and expressed a determination to live and die with their kinfolks here," Upshaw wrote the Commissioner. 100 The following year, the new Agent at the Pine Ridge Agency, H. D. Gallagher, wrote the Commissioner that "so long as they are separated they will do nothing but travel back and forth between the agencies visiting each other . . . this occupies all their time and keeps them poor, preventing them from raising anything." 101

Even some of the Northern Cheyenne on the Tongue River agency, expressed doubt whether their Pine Ridge relatives should join them. One of the Indians stated that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had told him that the Cheyenne had made a treaty for the land at Pine Ridge fifteen years earlier, and that chiefs Dull Knife, Little Wolf, Turkey Legs, Spotted Elk, Calf Shirt, Big Wolf, and Short Hair had signed the treaty. 102 But this advise did not keep the Cheyenne

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99 Ibid., 1885, pp. 33-34.
100 Ibid., 1887, p. 149.
101 Ibid., 1888, p. 47.
from their visits which had become such a problem for their Pine Ridge Agent.

In 1890, the Messiah craze swept across the Indian reservations, and the Sioux at the Pine Ridge Agency embraced the new belief. With Gallagher’s resignation a new agent was appointed, D. F. Royer, who was unable to control the Indians. To prevent the outbreak of new hostilities, the remaining Northern Cheyenne at Pine Ridge were given a pass to Fort Keogh, and under Little Chief, they began the four-hundred mile trek in mid-winter. General Miles assumed command in the Sioux country during the Messiah craze, and it is likely that he was responsible for granting the long disregarded desire of the Cheyenne.103

After two months travel, Little Chief and his band of about 275 people reached Fort Keogh. Theirs was the last band of Cheyenne to return to Montana from exile. But the efforts at union were again frustrated when it was discovered that the passes for these Cheyenne read “Fort Keogh” and it was interpreted that they might have to stay there and receive lands on the military reservation. The new agent at Tongue River came to their support as his Indians were constantly going to visit Fort Keogh.

In July, 1891, Little Chief and his band went to Tongue River Agency, with some passes for only twenty days and most with no passes at all, and the agent fearing that they would be forced to live off the other Indians at Tongue River, asked permission for them to form

103 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
a permanent settlement. Finally, on October 5, 1891, Agent Tully was able to write to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the "Pine Ridge Cheyenne Indians in number 276 were received from Capt. Ewers, Special Agent at Fort Keogh, on the 3rd of October. They have located on different parts of the reservation and many of them are ready to build houses."\textsuperscript{104}

The few Northern Cheyenne who remained of the once great and powerful tribe, looking back in time, believed, in their primitive fashion, that their misfortune had been preordained by the capture of their medicine arrows by the Pawnee in 1830, and by the desecration of the buffalo hat through the removal of one of the hat's horns.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{104}Old Letter File, Northern Cheyenne Agency, Lame Deer, Montana, cited in \textit{ibid.}, p. 40.

V. CONCLUSION

Professor William T. Hagan states that: "If a society's treatment of its minorities is an index of its character, Indian-United States relations are a gold mine for the social historian." This thesis, a study of the Dull Knife Raid of 1878 as it relates to the frontier, does not claim to have interpreted the American character in an adequate fashion, but it has attempted to show how frontiersmen-Indian relations were distinctly representative of certain general characteristics of nineteenth-century America.

The rising tide of immigration of the seventies and eighties, necessitated guarding the immigrant trails and the advancing railroads, and protecting the new settlements which sprang into existence with each passing day. The cattleman, railroad builder, and farmer, demanded the services of the army (both regular and volunteer) which was completely disorganized and ill-fitted for the task. In a study of the Army during this period, Richard Marcus states that: "From 1866 to 1897 the United States Army almost died of neglect. The public, war weary after four years of fratricidal conflict, had forgotten it; and Congress, after reducing it to a minimum strength of 25,000 men, remembered it only to ignore its requests, and further slash the already inadequate appropriations."


The troops were too few and scattered along the frontier which marked the outer limits of civilization. The status of the enlisted man was appalling; the base pay for a private in the United States Army was thirteen dollars a month, and a first sergeant received only twenty-two dollars.

The year of the Dull Knife outbreak, 1878, legislation was presented to eliminate ten regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, two of artillery, and thus reduce the enlisted men from 25,000 to 20,000 and muster out 835 officers. Those who followed the Northern Cheyenne felt the pressure of insufficient supplies and men. When Captain Rendlebrock was ordered in pursuit of the Indians he took two companies, the only mounted troops available for fighting. In the first two fights the troops were out-numbered by the Indians, with no more than fifty soldiers available for combat. Most of the fighting was done on foot and the cavalry had to dismount in order to engage in fighting and a large detail of men were required to hold the horses for the command.

In his report to the division commander, on October 7, 1878, General Pope stated that "The absence of cavalry in the department is severly felt, and may make it impracticable to intercept those

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3Ibid., pp. 43-44.


5Senate Report No. 708, p. 133. Lt. Wilder states that the smallest force available for fighting purposes was twenty five and the maximum available for fighting was 150 men.

6Ibid.
The troops had better horses than the Indians but the latter engaged in plundering the countryside for new mounts when their's tired. The Cheyenne were well supplied with arms and ammunition; they had Springfield rifles, Sharps carbines, and one gun, probably a buffalo rifle or hunting gun, which "carried a very large ball, as indicated by the sound, and had a very long range." One of the scouts, Thomas Donald stated that: "Take the Indians as these were and they had a great deal the advantage of the white soldier. They were better armed; they had the advantage of the ground; and they were lying for the troops." Under these circumstances the troops felt that they should have greatly outnumbered the Indians. They felt that extermination was necessary if the Indian threat was to be eliminated.

Many of the army personal sympathized with the Indians but professionally they were the clean-up corps which preceded the settlements. The Secretary of War, General William Tecumseh Sherman, assured the incoming white man of his support. The Indians were shoved aside, some to the north, some to the south, and some "into the ground." The settlers, Sherman said, "built up

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8 Senate Report No. 708, p. 133.
9 Ibid., p. 138.
10 Ibid., p. 136.
here what the Indians could not have done in ten thousand years. You have corn growing where the Indians never made corn grow; you have made wheat grow where wheat never grew before. If the Indian had remained here to the end of time he would never have accomplished this."

General Nelson A. Miles, however, was one of the ardent supporters of the Cheyenne cause. He had opposed sending them to Indian Territory; "Those of the same tribe that remained north have for more than two years supported themselves, without receiving any aid from the government except for what they earned." He felt if the Indians had to come in contact with the roughest elements on the frontier, they would regard this as the natural condition of the white man, and oppose assimilation. But if they were allowed to come in contact with the civilized communities and see the advantages of education and civilization, they would not be so resistant to change.

While in Indian Territory the Northern Cheyenne were not in a situation to acquire the civilized habits which could eventually make them self-supporting. The country which they were sent to was not fertile and had little good timber. It was suited for grazing rather than agriculture, but the entire efforts of the agency was to make farmers of the Indians rather than herders to which they would be more easily adapted. To

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12 Senate Report No. 708, p. xii.
13 Ibid., p. 212.
make the Indian Territory productive for agricultural purposes, extensive irrigation would have been necessary. This would have been expensive and would have required skills which the Indians did not possess. To induce the Indians to greater industry, it was suggested that the numerous bands be separated and each given a grazing territory under its control, so that each family could own cattle as separate property.

One of the basic conflicts between the Federal government and the Cheyenne was the question of land ownership and use. "It was admitted by most Whites that the Indian was the rightful occupant of the land and was entitled to possession of as much as was necessary for his use. But the difference in land use between the Indian and the White was such that one or the other had to go."

The philosophy of the frontiersmen is best expressed by Adolph Roenigh, who states: "The farmer must always have right of way against the hunter; and the trader against the pilferer. In the end, by whatever route, the Indian must have given up his hunting grounds and contented himself with progress into civilized life. The route was not one which he would have determined for himself; the stronger race had to determine for him." The beautiful country could not have been left to a people knowing

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14 Ibid., p. xxiv.
nothing of agriculture, manufacture, or trade "having no conception of private ownership of land, possessing social ideals and standards of life based on the chase, could not and should have remained un- altered at the expense of a higher form of life." To the pioneer the process of extinguishing the Indians was the simple working of evolution.

In the various treaties between the United States and the Northern Cheyenne there was evident the desire of the government to initiate private ownership of property among the individuals of the tribe. The treaty of 1868 stated that "If any individual belonging to said tribes of Indians, or legally incorporated with them, being the head of a family, shall desire to commence farming, he shall have the privilege to select . . . a tract of land within said reservation not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres in extent . . . and it shall cease to be held in common, but the same may be occupied and held in the exclusive possession of the person selecting it, and of his family, so long as he or they may continue to cultivate it." And the treaty of 1876 which led to the removal of the Cheyenne to Indian Territory contained the following: "Whenever the head of a family shall, in good faith, select an allotment of said land upon such reservation and engage in the cultivation thereof, the Government shall, with his aid, erect a comfortable house on such allotment."

17 Ibid., p. 357.
19 Ibid., I, 170.
The treaties between the government and the Cheyenne and other Indian tribes were means of opening western resources to the white man and making the Indians "live like white men."

This was accomplished by confining the tribes on reservations in Indian Territory and educating them in the virtue of private ownership of property and the techniques of the agrarian way. But in order to accomplish this the Indians should have been integrated into white communities and not isolated on reservations. This was recognized by the Senate committee investigating the removal of the Cheyenne which felt that "... the time is near at hand when they [the Cheyenne] must become members of the same communities with the white people," but their recommendations did not lead to assimilation; but only to an increased effort to impose the white man's system on the Indians.

The treaties provided the Cheyenne with rations, annuities, and other goods for the purpose of becoming civilized, in return for the lands taken from them, but the rations were poor and treaty obligations disregarded. But, most incongruous, the government subsidy granted the Indians was considered as temporary and the distributing of goods was used to coerce the Indians into adopting the white man's way.

The outbreak of the Northern Cheyenne from Indian Territory in September, 1878, the massacre on the Sappa Creek, and the

20 Ibid.

21 Senate Report No. 708, p. xxi.
subsequent outbreak from Fort Robinson were expressions of defiance against the reality of nineteenth-century America.

And the internal conflicts within the United States government made subduing these Indians a difficult task.

The free land of the frontier was taken from the Indians by the government, sometimes through legal treaties and sometimes by illegal methods, or both, as in the case of the Northern Cheyenne. The government, thus, became the agent of the frontiersman in opening the vast prairie to homesteaders. The Indian was considered as an inferior race and subject to the rights of the people who knew the proper use of the land.

If democracy originated on the frontier then it must be considered as "white agriculturalist" democracy.
VI. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The source material for a study of the Dull Knife Raid of 1878 includes historical studies, government and state documents, personal reminiscences, publications of the state historical societies, popular histories of the Indian wars, and novels. The classic work on the Cheyenne Indians, The Cheyenne Indians: Their History and Ways of Life, was written by George Bird Grinnell in 1924, in two volumes. It is primarily an anthropological study of the Cheyenne and is a standard work for the study of Indian culture. Grinnell had written an earlier historical study of the Cheyenne in 1915 entitled The Fighting Cheyenne. This sympathetic account used primarily Indian sources, as the author spent many years among the Plains Indians and gained the confidence of the chiefs and warriors of the several tribes he studied. The Dull Knife Raid is treated in one chapter of the latter book, and the author cites Senate Report No. 708, in his tribute to the Indian courage in defying the U. S. Army.

Also written in 1915 was The Indians' Last Fight, or the Dull Knife Raid, by Dennis Collins. The reminiscences of a frontiersman living in southern Meade county, Kansas, at the time of the raid, his account presents an excellent view of the frontier attitude towards the Indians. Collins frequently uses the term savages to denote Indians, but he realizes the peculiarity of the cultural conflict that doomed the Indian civilization. This work is a major source which has been frequently overlooked by researchers —
of the Dull Knife episode.

Equally penetrating in his analysis of the Indian-frontiersman conflict was Edgar Beecher Bronson in his *Reminiscences of a Ranchman* written in 1908 and revised in 1910 to include a chapter on the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. As a rancher near Fort Robinson he had first hand experience of the Indian raids in the area and the Dull Knife outbreak from Fort Robinson. His account expresses compassion for the Indian's plight, but the author is also extremely realistic in his approach to the Indian problem.

A general work on the Indian problem written soon after the Dull Knife Raid, was George W. Manypenny's *Our Indian Wards* (1880). Manypenny, an ex-Commissioner of Indian Affairs and member of the Sioux Commission of 1876, presents an extremely sympathetic account of the Cheyenne removal to Indian Territory, yet at the same time a good analysis of the cultural conflict involved in the Indian problem. This account is similar to another work written during the same period, Helen Hunt Jackson's *Century of Dishonour* (1881).

Historians of the Indian Wars have varied little in their view of the Indian problem. Sympathetic and sentimental, they condemn the white intruders as the true savages. One of the more popular is Paul Wellman's *Death on the Prairies*, which was written in 1934. Novelistic in his writing about the Dull Knife Raid, his enthusiasm leads him to blandly distort fact. But the introduction of Wellman's work, which analyzes the cause of Indian defeat before the superior industrial might of the white man, is excellent.
Wellman used Grinnell as one of his major sources, but lacked the deep understanding of the Indians that Grinnell had.

Western historian Stanley Vestal (pseud. for W. S. Campbell) also presents a typically sympathetic account in his history of the Indian wars on the Plains. *Warpath and Council Fire* was written in 1948, and, though out of print, is a major source for the cursory view of the Indian wars. His treatment of the Dull Knife Raid is good and well documented.

Two other contemporary historians of the American West, are Martin F. Schmitt and Dee Brown, and their *Fighting Indians of the West* is an excellent pictorial history of the Indian wars. One chapter is devoted to the Dull Knife Raid of 1878, and contains numerous pictures of the chiefs involved, and also drawings from magazines that appeared at the time. Their account is very sympathetic, and probably based on Schmitt's work on the autobiography of General George Crook, which was edited by him in 1946.

B. W. Allred, Ranch Planning Specialist in the Washington office of the Soil Conservation Service, has contributed the chapter on "Massacre of the Dull Knife Band" in the work *Great Western Indian Fights*, which he also helped to edit. Using the aforementioned works by Stanley Vestal, Dennis Collins, George Bird Grinnell, and M. F. Schmitt and Dee Brown, and also Mari Sandoz's *Cheyenne Autumn*, which will be discussed later, Mr. Allred has produced a short account which deals primarily with the plight of Dull Knife at Fort Robinson. One significant error in this
work is the quote from Grinnell which he had taken from the Senate investigation committee, and Allred attributes the quote to Little Wolf when it should be Little Chief.

Earl Alonzo Brininstool has written one of the better works on the Indian wars in his *Fighting Indian Warriors* (1953). The Indians relations with the government is analyzed and one chapter discusses the removal of the Indians from the Black Hills region. The Cheyenne removal to Indian Territory is also treated. The documentation of this work is adequate but limited.

The University of Oklahoma published one of its "The Civilization of the American Indian Series" volumes in 1934, which dealt with the Cheyenne and their problems at the Darlington Agency, Indian Territory. Written by a contractor at the agency, John Homer Seger, a jack-of-all-trades, his *Early Experiences Among the Cheyenne and Arapahoe* is an excellent account of the problems involved in civilizing the Indians. His account of Dull Knife's presence at the agency is sketchy, and he presents a sympathetic view of Agent John D. Miles and his work with the Cheyenne.

Using John H. Seger's work as her main source, Flora Seymour, in her *Indian Agents on the Old Frontier*, presents a chapter on John D. Miles. She also used the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1878*, and is sympathetic in her estimate of Agent Miles and his predicament in being caught between the Indian Department and the Indians whom he was earnestly trying to civilize. Seymour has made an error in giving the date of the Indian outbreak as September, 1879, instead of 1878, but it most likely a misprint.
The only complete historical account which deals exclusively with the Dull Knife Raid of 1878, is Mari Sandoz's *Cheyenne Autumn*, written in 1955. Raised on the Upper Niobrara River in western Nebraska, Mari Sandoz has written a vivid account from interviews with remaining Northern Cheyenne, and accounts related to her by her frontiersman father, Jules Sandoz. Her sympathy for the oppressed Indians is sentimental and her narrative is the dialogue of the Indians on their trek north and during their confinement in the north. The account ends rather abruptly with short sketches of the later lives of the chiefs involved, but nothing on what happened to the Northern Cheyenne. Through the use of "Reports from Agent John D. Miles to Commissioner of Indian Affairs," *Records*, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. National Archives; The Records of Darlington Agency; the author presents her story, but her main source is "Old Cheyenne Woman and others" and the failure to use the Senate Report No. 708, has limited the value of the work and leaves the topic open for further research. Miss Sandoz has also failed to make use of many sources which would have enhanced her insight into the character of the greater conflict in which the Cheyenne outbreak was but one small episode.

The one source which makes extensive use of the Senate investigations into the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory is James Warren Covington's article, "Causes of the Dull Knife Raid of 1878," which was published in the *Chronicles of Oklahoma* in 1948. This study was done while the author was doing graduate work at the University of Oklahoma. Now a professor at Miami College, his article made full use of Senate Report No. 708, almost to the exclusion of other sources. His conclusions are
those of the senate investigating committee's without a complete insight into the committee's purpose and motives.

Mention should be made of two works on Dodge City which contain a chapter on the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. Robert Wright, a citizen of Dodge City and well acquainted with Colonel Lewis at Fort Dodge, wrote his *Dodge City: The Cowboy Capital and the Great Southwest* in 1913. Mr. Wright expresses the typical frontier attitude of contempt towards the Indians, and his story of the fight at Famished Woman's Fork is interesting. The author places the date of the raid at 1868. The best work on the raid in southwest Kansas is Stanley Vestal's *Dodge City, Queen of Cowtowns*. The author includes considerable quoted material from letters to the governor, and Dodge City Times. Most valuable is the list of persons killed and wounded south of the Arkansas.

The only history of a fort which contains an extensive treatment of the Dull Knife Raid is the excellent study *Fort Wallace and its Relation to the Frontier*, by Mrs. Frank Montgomery. First appearing as an article in the *Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society*, (1926-1928), then published in an abridged edition by the Fort Wallace Memorial Assn., the work is well documented. The author lived at Hays, Kansas at the time of the raid.

The extensive amount of personal reminiscences which have been published over the years is fertile ground for the western historian. The accounts previously mentioned are all included in full length works and are invaluable in any study of the Dull Knife Raid. Of less value but still important are those personal accounts
which have appeared in historical magazines, county histories, studies of Indian raids or as parts of a longer account of frontier life on the Plains. These accounts express the contempt that the frontiersman had for the Indian, and also the conflict which arose over the failure of the army to capture the fugitive Indians and of the state to provide arms for the frontiersman to defend himself.

Three such accounts appeared in the 1926-1928 edition of the Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society, Vol. XVI, written by men who were involved with the Indian raid in Indian Territory or southwest Kansas. Mr. C. E. Campbell's article, "Down among the Red Man," is the best in reflecting the Indian-white conflict. The author was employed by the government at Darlington Agency and his assessments of the attempt to civilize the Indians are cogent. Mr. Campbell's account verifies the observations of Dennis Collins regarding the character of Cull Knife and his antagonism toward the efforts of the Agent to give the Northern Cheyenne work and civilize them. This conclusion is also verified by the Senate investigating committee's testimony. The reference to "savage" Indians throughout his narrative diminishes its critical value.

In a short article on "Kansas Indian wars," a settler on Crooked Creek in Southwest Kansas, George S. Brown, describes his activity during the raid. Mr. Brown became a scout for the command of Colonel Lewis out of Fort Dodge and his account contains the most descriptive view of the fight at Famished Woman's Creek in Scott County. He led the ambulance train which carried the dying Col. Lewis to Fort Wallace, and also two companies of soldiers across country to the
Sappa Creek to view the results of the massacre.

J. E. George, of Clark County, Kansas, was one of the participants in the Raid of 1878, and his account is particularly descriptive of the fight between the Indians and soldiers south of Dodge City. The failure of the military to continue the fight caused the cowboys and ranch owners, who had joined the soldiers in their pursuit of the Indians, to withdraw their support and condemn the cowardly army officers. In describing happenings which occurred later, the account is vague and distorted.

Personal accounts of settlers involved in the Sappa Creek massacre in northwest Kansas are numerous and detailed. The best compilation of these accounts were taken as interviews by Glen Rogers for his master's thesis, "An Early History of Decatur County, Kansas," which was presented at Fort Hays Kansas State College in 1931. The interviews of F. F. Bliss, L. J. Hamper, John Love, and Billy O'Toole are highly detailed, and express the typical frontier attitude of contempt for the Indians. These accounts express the hysteria that existed in the Oberlin community at the time of the raid. A more recent thesis written at Fort Hays Kansas State College which treats the raids in northwest Kansas and particularly Oberlin is Winston L. Crown's "A Study of Indian Raids in Northwest Kansas, 1864-1878," (1950). Mr. Crown makes extensive use of the state documents relating to the raid and the "Indian Pamphlets" at the Kansas State Historical Society.

Also dealing with the massacre in Decatur County is the account of Mr. Henry M. Anthony, collected by Raymond L. Stacey for a folklore
class at Fort Hays Kansas State College, in 1958. The story is completely distorted when the author discusses happenings which are not first-hand, and therefore of little value.

The least valuable sources of information about the Oberlin raid are the taped interviews of the five remaining settlers, Henry F. Steffan, Charles Stiner, D. G. Addleman, and Charles Rohan, all of whom were young children at the time of the raid and still living at the time when Ed Mason of XXXX Radio at Colby, Kansas, interviewed them. The radio program completely distorted the interviews with a quote from Paul Harvey which eulogized the pioneer spirit of settlers, without knowledge of the particulars of this episode, or even a faint understanding of the settlement of the West.

The raid in Norton County is related by Amy Lathrop in her Tales of Western Kansas, written in 1948, in which she describes the experience of Gus Cook, and she also describes the hysteria that existed in this frontier community. This account and Mrs. Joe Janousek's "Happenings along the Beaver in Rawlins County, Kansas, during the Cheyenne Indian Raid of 1878," concern the same vicinity. Mrs. Janousek wrote her account from Stratton, Nebraska, in 1955. This poorly written account adds only details.

Many of the foregoing materials dealing with northwest Kansas, were obtained from the Decatur County Historical Society Museum which attracts tourists as the place of the last Indian Raid in Kansas. A recent publication of the Society is a pamphlet entitled "Kansas' Last Indian Raid," which is the story of the Cheyenne chief Wild Hog. It relates the Cheyenne's plight in being forced to Indian
Territory with some exaggeration.

Of the local sources relating to the Indian Raid in northwest Kansas, a pamphlet published by the Oberlin Diamond Jubilee Inc., Oberlin Kansas, entitled, "Decatur County now and then," is superior to any previously mentioned and the anonymous author is the late Judge Nellens whose insight into the Indian-frontiersman conflict is very penetrating.

Two recent reminiscences of life in northwest Kansas have briefly treated the Dull Knife Raid of 1878. They are Roderick Cameron's Pioneer Days in Kansas, written in 1951, and Myrtle D. Fesler's Pioneers of Western Kansas. Both deal with the effect rumors had on the frontier family.

There have been two novels written about this particular episode of frontier history. The one-time Communist Howard Fast wrote his only western novel, The Last Frontier, about the courageous Cheyenne flight for freedom. His use of documents enhances the narrative, and the final chapter includes newspaper articles from that period. However, this account must be viewed with suspicion, because Fast's statement that no whites were killed on the trek through Kansas, is distorting fact. The author's chief sources were government documents, but he also spent some time among the Cheyenne in Oklahoma and used sources at the University of Oklahoma.

The other novel written about the Dull Knife outbreak is Clay Fisher's The Brass Command, written in 1955 and reissued as a paperback in 1956. The author of numerous novels about the west, Fisher wrote this novel from the Tongue River Agency, Lame Deer, Montana, the Northern Cheyenne Agency. He treats the incompetence of the
frontier army officers and the gallantry of the Cheyenne under chief Dull Knife.

There is one significant piece of material compiled by the Kansas Historical Society which deals with the Dull Knife Raid as it related to the state of Kansas. This is "Marking an Epoch--The Last Indian Raid and Massacre," in the Eighteenth Biennial Report of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1913, which contains the correspondence between the settlers on the frontier and the governor of Kansas. This correspondence is excellent material for understanding the problems of supplying protection to the frontier and the frontier attitude toward the military and toward a lethargic state government. The editor of these letters presents a typical frontier attitude toward the Indians, whom he refers to as savages.

In addition to this material there is a compilation of newspaper clippings contained in a scrap-book type of work called "Indian Pamphlets," Vol. II, gathered by the staff of the Kansas State Historical Society. Bound in this volume is the report of the Commission sent by the Governor to assess the losses of the settlers. The Commission's Report is complete and this report was the basis of the state's demand for compensation from the federal government. The newspaper articles in this volume are not very representative, most of them being from The Champion of Atchison, Kansas, whose editor later became secretary of the Historical Society.

The state documents relating to the establishment of the Kansas Commission, its purposes, places of meeting, membership, etc., were published in the Second Biennial Report, 1879-1880, of the Kansas
Adjutant General. The statute establishing the commission appears in *Laws of Kansas, 1879*. Also in the latter volume is the governor's message of January 16, 1879, a considerable portion of which is devoted to the Indian Raid. Again the bitterness of frontier attitudes is expressed, but also the voice of a politician currying the favor of western Kansans. The *Senate Journal, 1879*, for the state senate contains some of the same material and also a collection of letters from the frontier to the governor.

In dealing specifically with the details of the raid as it concerned the United States Army, there are three accounts which are invaluable. One account is by an unknown dragoon who participated in the march through Kansas. Written December 21, 1878, from Fort Reno, Indian Territory, probably upon his return from Nebraska, the account has been edited by the late Judge George Nellans, of Oberlin, Kansas. The source of this account is unknown but it is exact in detail of occurrences during the northern trek. Corresponding with this account is the testimony of Lieutenant W. V. Wilder and Captain Sebastian Gunther before the Senate Committee established to investigate the removal of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory. These cross-examinations by the senators are excellent in depicting the army's role in the whole affair. Also included in *Senate Report No. 708*, is the testimony of Thomas Donald, a scout, on Clark, scout and interpreter, Major J. F. Mizner, commander at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, and General Nelson A. Miles, commanding in the Wyoming area, all describing the army's role in the disastrous affair.

Of the numerous documents of the federal government which
pertains to the Indian Raid of 1878, the important ones are included as extracts in the appendix of Senate Report No. 708, the investigation of the Cheyenne removal, which has been previously mentioned. The documents include the correspondence between Agent John D. Miles and the Indian Bureau, between the commander at Fort Reno and the Headquarters at Fort Sill, Indian Territory, and the War Department. There are also letters from the Aid-de-Camp at Fort Robinson to General Crook, remarks of Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz, and correspondence of the Indian Office. This Senate report is invaluable not only in the compilation of reports, letters, treaties, etc., dealing with the raid, but also in the uncovering of the basic motives of the persons involved, through the cross-examination contained in the first two hundred pages of the report. The true dilemma of the Indian problem is cogently expressed in the government's concern to civilize the Indians, and to remove them from the areas desired by the whites in their exploitation of the country's resources.

Equally useful concerning the military activity in subduing the Indians are the Official Records of the War Department, and their compilation in the Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians. Though the latter contains only five pages on the Dull Knife affair, it gives the details of the actual movement of troops during the trek north.

The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 1878, as it relates to the Cheyenne outbreak, is of little value because of the distorted estimates
of the food issued the Indians at Darlington Agency, in Indian Territory. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Ezra Hayt, was later brought before the Senate investigating committee and in Senate Report No. 708, the true picture of the Indians condition at the agency is uncovered.

A full list of the works which treat the Cheyenne outbreak are contained in the bibliography, and the author has only tried in this brief bibliographical sketch, to analyze the major sources available to him. There are other sources which could have been treated but it was the author's judgement that those treated were most essential for the study.
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