The Attitude of Hawthorne Toward Science Compared with the Attitudes of Rousseau, Wordsworth, Goethe, and Poe

Doris Chipman

Fort Hays Kansas State College

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UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH MEXICO, 1910 - 1916

being

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partial fulfillment of the requirements for
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by

Donald E. Chipman, A. B.
Fort Hays Kansas State College

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Approved
Eugene R. Lehman
Major Professor

Ralph A. Loder
Chairman Graduate Council
ABSTRACT

A summary of the revolutions of 1910 and 1913 which respectively removed Porfirio Diaz and Francisco Madero from the presidency of Mexico and the implication of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson comprise the introductory chapter. A detailed analysis was made of the diplomacy of President Woodrow Wilson as it affected the Provisional Presidency of Victoriano Huerta as well as the personalities in Wilson's cabinet, the American State Department, and Mexican officialdom. It is the contention of the writer that a major departure occurred in American traditional policy of recognition, which was formerly based on a nation's ability to maintain law, order, and stability, but under President Wilson shifted to constitutional legitimacy. The motives and circumstances that led to the occupation of Vera Cruz by United States Marines and the mediatory conference at Niagara, Canada, was also given careful study.

Due to the reluctance on the part of Mexican sources of information in disseminating materials pertinent to the topic of this thesis, research was confined to United States documents and sources written in English. Primary sources were: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Congressional Record, The New York Times, and various monographic works. Until the private papers of Ambassador Wilson are released, the writer feels that a complete understanding of American diplomacy can not be obtained by the student of this period.
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The years 1910 to 1916 were eventful for the American people; encompassing the Progressive movement with its accompanying reforms; the pre-World War I years, and a period of history in which the United States further cracked its cocoon of isolationism, a policy adhered to since the presidencies of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. A measure of isolationism as a national policy was lost in the Spanish-American War, in diplomatic relations with Mexico, World War I and World War II, and completely cast aside by the Truman Doctrine of 1947. It is the purpose of this study to set forth and analyze the Mexican phase of the United States emergence as a world power, emphasizing the diplomacy of President Woodrow Wilson and his policy of recognition toward the Provisional Government of Victoriano Huerta. No attempt has been made to present the minutiae of diplomatic events, ranging from border incidents to migratory birds, which occurred between the United States and Mexico from 1910 to 1916. The writer has traced, in a cursory manner, the major political events that highlighted the last years of Porfirio Díaz, the revolution of Francisco Madero, and the coup d'état of Victoriano Huerta. A detailed examination was made of United States diplomatic relations with Mexico during the Provisional Presidency of Huerta. Subsequent to the removal of Huerta from the Mexican scene by the policies of Woodrow Wilson and the military victories of the Constitutionalists, a brief summary of events leading to the
formal recognition of Venustiano Carranza has been presented. It is historically indefensible, until recent documents are released, to assert that contemporary problems of recognition stem from Wilson's departure from traditional American policies of recognition; however, it is important to examine the conditions that shaped that departure and the ramifications of it.

Research was primarily confined to Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Congressional Record, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, monographic works, and The New York Times. To exhaust adequately the material relative to this subject would require work in the Archives of the United States and Mexico, procurement of the State Department Papers, and access to private papers and libraries. It is believed by this writer that a complete understanding of American-Mexican relations of the Madero-Huerta-Carranza-Wilson period can never be attained until the complete papers and machinations of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson are made accessible to the student of the period.

Acknowledgement is made to Professor Eugene R. Craine whose patient proofreading and critical analysis has proved invaluable to the completion of this thesis, and whose dynamic presentation of history in the classroom was instrumental in the writer's decision to pursue that course of study.
Additional acknowledgement is extended to Miss Margaret Van Ackeran whose help in locating documentary material is sincerely appreciated, and to my wife, Doris, who proofread, made helpful suggestions, and typed the initial copies.
CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1910 AND 1913

For thirty years Porfirio Díaz had ruled Mexico with an "iron hand" that crushed opposition to his regime and granted lavish concessions to foreign investors. In 1884 the old Spanish laws which declared mineral wealth to be the property of the state were repealed by a mining code which bestowed sub-surface coal and oil resources to the owner of surface lands, thereby making it easy for Díaz to grant concessions of coal and oil to foreign investors by selling them land. Capital from the United States poured into Mexico and by 1912 American investments in Mexico were in excess of one billion dollars. The total assets of Mexico at that date were approximately two and a half billion dollars; thus, American capital amounted to nearly one half of that amount. It is obvious that Mexican affairs were of vital interest to the United States which not only had huge financial interests in the country, but also about


2 In this study the term American will refer only to the United States.

forty thousand of its citizens living there.

As Díaz approached the end of his thirtieth year as President of Mexico, he was aware of the tremendous power of United States capital in Mexico and tried to counterbalance it by giving lucrative concessions to the British, who already had sizeable investments there, hoping, in this manner, to create hostile competition between the British and Americans and thereby diminish the power of both, especially that of the United States. This action was viewed with hostility by American companies who looked to President William Howard Taft to support their interests. On November 19, 1910, Díaz asked the United States to prevent Mexican revolutionary movements from organizing on American soil; his request was ignored. This is an excellent example of diplomacy of inaction that is, in reality, action, for the refusal on the part of the United States to observe neutrality lent a sanctuary to Mexicans who sought to oust the Old Dictator.

Francisco Madero, an idealist, a reformer, and an outspoken critic of the Díaz policies of granting lavish concessions to foreigners at the expense of the Mexican people was successful in organizing an insurrection. Madero found sympathetic support among

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American companies who were opposed to his idealism, but angry with Díaz because of his preferential treatment of British capital. According to L. S. Rowe, "It was this change in the policy of General Díaz [Díaz], which enabled Francisco Madero to count on the secret support of at least some of the American companies interested in Mexico." With his base of operations north of the Río Grande del Norte, abetted by support of American capital, and the purchase of munitions in the United States, Madero led an amazingly successful revolution. Some Americans felt that the success of the Madero revolt could be attributed to discontent among the oppressed Mexican people, and that the overthrow of Díaz was made possible by popular sentiment against the conditions under which the majority of the Mexican people lived. That these conditions were deplorable there can be little disagreement.

Mexico was predominately an agricultural nation, but in 1910 only three per cent of the people owned land. The average wage for three million agricultural workers was thirty-five cents per day, and conditions on the tobacco and henequen plantations

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6Henry Lane Wilson claimed that while foreign investors had received lucrative profits from Mexican concessions, even greater returns had been reaped by Mexico. See Henry Lane Wilson, "Errors with Reference to Mexico and Events That Have Occurred There," The Annals: International Relations of the United States, LIV (July, 1914), pp. 118-161.
were "not far removed from slavery." Nevertheless, it is questionable that these oppressive conditions were the primary motivating factors behind Madero's support from the Mexican populace. His mild political reforms meant very little to the uneducated masses; although he was hailed with shouts of "¡Viva Madero! ¡Viva la democracia!" as he moved southward toward the Mexican capital.

American correspondent John Reed reported that he overheard one peón ask another what this "democracia" was, and the reply was, "Why, it must be the lady who accompanies him" referring to Madero's wife! Reed asked another peón what he was fighting for, and the reply was, "Why it is good, fighting. You don't have to work in the mines." In reality, the Díaz government collapsed not because it was crushed by a popular revolt, but due to degeneration and corruption.

The old fogies of the Díaz cabinet, grown stiff with age and inaction, were worse than useless. The army was honey-combed with padded muster rosters and petty larceny. More than half the roster were men of straw who were clothed and armed at regular rates, but from whom no bugler, not even Gabriel himself, could bring forth an answering "here."

On May 25, 1911, Porfirio Díaz resigned and was carried into exile by the German freighter, Ypiranga, which was to have a more

7Rippy, Mexico, p. 5.
8As quoted in Gruening, Mexico, pp. 96-97.
9As quoted in Rippy, Mexico, p. 6.
10Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 82.
significant role in the future relations of the United States with Mexico. Francisco de la Barra was appointed Provisional President until an election could be held. He was the choice of Taft and the American "captains of industry" to become the legally constituted President, but they were willing to accept Madero until a more favorable candidate could be found. 11

It is obvious that the United States was implicated in the removal of Díaz from power, and it is equally obvious what the fate of any Mexican President would be who was not endorsed by Washington.

Madero, following his election in October of 1911, was soon beset by serious problems, not the least of which was the incongruity of his frail stature and shrill voice, in a country which venerates the "strong man." Because he lacked the power to dispossess foreign land holders, he was unable to bring about land reform as he had promised, and he also failed to break up the church estates and divide the large haciendas. He was guilty of nepotism in appointing members of his family to positions in his cabinet. While this was not an unusual procedure in Mexico, it nevertheless left Madero vulnerable to harsh criticism.

In spite of many serious problems and biting criticism, Madero might have held office throughout his term if it had not been for interference on the part of United States Ambassador to Mexico,

11 Rippy, Mexico, pp. 11-12.
Henry Lane Wilson. Ambassador Wilson's appointment was due to the influence of his brother, Senator John M. Wilson, who was a close political associate of Richard Ballinger. Ballinger, Taft's first Secretary of the Interior, had "intimate relationship" with the Guggenheim family who controlled the American Smelting and Refining Company and had sizeable investments in Mexico. These investments came into conflict with the smelting and refining interests of the Madero family.\(^{12}\) In January of 1912, only four months after Madero had been elected President of Mexico, Ambassador Wilson reported that Mexico was a hotbed of discontent and warned Americans to leave certain parts of Mexico which he considered unsafe. The areas referred to were so ambiguous that they virtually constituted all of Mexico.\(^{13}\) On August 22, 1912, he wrote to Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox that "... disorders [are] becoming more general; violence of the most barbarous character daily occurring. The Government [is] apparently incompetent to meet the situation ..."\(^{14}\) If violence was as widespread as Ambassador Wilson claimed, it is logical to assume that American diplomatic posts throughout Mexico would have reported somewhat similar circumstances, but this was not the case.

\(^{12}\)Bruening, Mexico, p. 561.

\(^{13}\)Parkes, History of Mexico, p. 330.

Ambassador Wilson's criticism could only be regarded throughout Mexico as proof that the United States did not approve of the Madero government. According to Professor Ernest Gruening, "... the effect on the fortunes of the Maderos was highly unfavorable. It breathed life into every latently hostile group or person. It encouraged banditry. It actively stimulated rebellion." Mexican revolutionaries knew that the revolutions of Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz, and Francisco Madero were organized and launched from American soil, and if the American Ambassador was inimical to Madero - an insurrection might be favorably regarded in the United States.

The first revolt against the Madero government originated in Texas under the leadership of Bernardo Reyes, who had been in Europe at the time of the Madero revolt. Reyes was forced, by United States officials friendly to Madero, to leave the sanctuary of the United States before his plans were fully matured. His revolt was easily crushed due to lack of support and he was imprisoned in Mexico City. A subsequent revolt originated in the Mexican states of Coahuila and Chihuahua under the leadership of Emilo Vásquez Gómez.

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15 The Mexican Herald, an American owned newspaper, circulated the anti-Madero sentiment throughout the country. Rippy, Mexico, pp. 107-109.

16 Gruening, Mexico, p. 562.

and Pascual Orozco.\textsuperscript{18} The Gómez-Orozco revolution is of little significance \textit{per se}, but it summoned to the Mexican scene General Victoriano Huerta who, in a series of brilliant campaigns, stamped out the insurrection and became a military hero. Huerta was a full-blooded Indian who had entered military service in 1872 at the age of twenty. He was thoroughly indoctrinated with Díaz's "principles" of "shoot first and take no prisoners."\textsuperscript{19} He was an ardent admirer of Napoleon, and shared Ulysses Grant's love, if not weakness, for liquor. Huerta furthered his military reputation by crushing an abortive revolution led by Félix Díaz and incarcerating its leader in the capital city.

In most civilized nations, men who lead unsuccessful revolutions are brought to trial and executed. In Mexico, such men were summarily shot by Porfirio Díaz without benefit of legal proceedings; however, Madero foolishly imprisoned Bernardo Reyes and Félix Díaz pending their trials.

On February 9, 1913, disloyal soldiers organized by Rodolfo Reyes, the son of Bernardo, effected the release of Reyes and Díaz from their respective prisons. General Reyes led the insurgents in a siege of the National Palace, defended by General Lauro Villar,


\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
to unseat the Madero government. In the ensuing battle, Bernardo Reyes was killed and General Villar was severely wounded. 20 General García Peña, Secretary of War in the Madero cabinet, persuaded the Mexican President to appoint Huerta as Villar's successor, 21 an appointment Madero hesitated to make because he was disgusted with Huerta's almost perpetual state of drunkenness; however, with General Villar incapacitated, Madero was forced to accept Peña's advice because he had no other generals.

Huerta immediately betrayed Madero and entered into a secret agreement with Félix Díaz whereby they would conduct a sham artillery duel from two batteries located in Mexico City. For ten days, 22 on the pretense of fighting each other, artillery shells fell in profusion throughout the city. "The purpose of this wanton destruction was to create the picture of an irreconcilable civil war, of Madero's inability to end chaos, and to predispose the suffering public, ... toward the solution which the generals would offer." 23 Edward Bell, an American correspondent in Mexico City at the time of the battle, remarked: "Isolated guns were set up by apparently irresponsible


21 Gruening, Mexico, p. 304.

22 In Mexican history, La Decena Trágica.

23 Gruening, Mexico, p. 305.
squads, and fired over and over again in whatever position the pieces happened to assume after the recoil of the previous shot.\footnote{24} Bell added that, "The affair was dishonest, root, branch and twig; dishonest as a squabble started by thieves in a crowd to draw attention from the picking of pockets."\footnote{25} The wily Huerta, with Napoleonic cold-bloodedness, sent loyal federal troops into areas of the city on the pretense of assaulting Díaz, and then systematically slaughtered them with his own artillery.\footnote{26}

Apparently the cannonading was not entirely at random, for during the ten days the National Palace was struck only twice, and the American Embassy was never hit; yet both were often in direct line of fire. Ambassador Wilson, in opposition to his usual policy of reporting incidents of disorder, did not notify Washington that the Embassy or the American colony was in any imminent danger. In fact, official Washington learned of the situation by a press release. In a telegram to Ambassador Wilson, Secretary of State Knox said:

"Associated Press reports that you were notified by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that you should evacuate the Embassy premises; that you positively decline to do so; and that the Minister . . . notified you that the firing must proceed."\footnote{27} Ambassador Wilson replied that

\footnote{24}Bell, \textit{The Political Shame of Mexico}, pp. 263-264.  
\footnote{25}Ibid., p. 281.  
\footnote{27}Knox to Ambassador Wilson, (telegram), February 14, 1913. \textit{FR}, 1913, pp. 708-709.
the press release was correct, and that he had declined to leave the Embassy because he was in charge of United States government records and archives. He added that if the situation had become "intolerable" he would have removed all who wished to leave, but that outside the Embassy there was the threat of "bullets and bandits." The fact that Ambassador Wilson did not notify Washington of this dangerous situation, nor did he indicate why he had declined to do so, suggests that no real danger to himself or the Embassy existed, despite the fact that an estimated four or five thousand Mexicans were killed during the battle.

It seems apparent that collusion existed throughout the ten tragic days between Ambassador Wilson and the forces of Huerta and Félix Díaz. This concord is further supported by the infamous "Compact of the Embassy," drawn up on the night of February 18, 1913, in the American Embassy by Huerta and Félix Díaz with Henry Lane Wilson's full knowledge. Later, that same night, Ambassador Wilson assembled the diplomatic corps of several nations in the United States Embassy and informed them that "Mexico had been saved! . . . I have known about the plans to imprison Madero for three days. It was slated to occur this morning." To the astonishment of the diplomats, he then announced the "exact composition of Huerta's

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28 Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 14, 1913. FR, 1913, pp. 709-710.
29 Gruening, Mexico, p. 568.
When asked about the disposition of Madero and Vice President Pino Suárez, Ambassador Wilson replied that Madero would probably be placed in a "madhouse;" in regard to Suárez he said, "... he is nothing but a scoundrel, so if they kill him it will be no great loss." The Chilean minister protested that every effort should be made to save the life of the Mexican Vice President, but Ambassador Wilson replied, "We must not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico."

He had allowed Huerta and Díaz to use the American Embassy in organizing a revolutionary cabinet to succeed the legally constituted government to which he was accredited as an ambassador, he had fore-knowledge of the positions of that revolutionary cabinet, but to intercede on behalf of Madero and Suárez was "meddling."

On February 17, 1913, Ambassador Wilson wired the American State Department that "Huerta notifies me to expect some action that will remove Madero from power at any moment; plans fully matured, ... I asked his messenger no questions and made no suggestions beyond requesting that no lives be taken except by due

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. A similar account implicating Henry Lane Wilson with both Huerta and Félix Díaz may be found in Priestley, The Mexican Nation, p. 415.
On the following day, Madero and Suárez resigned and became prisoners of Huerta, who was then faced with the problem of what to do with the ex-President and Vice President. At first he was opposed to killing them, not because of moral principles, but because of the consequences it might bring to his leadership. Many Mexicans clamored for the death of Madero, particularly the advocates of business who felt Madero would stir up another revolution if permitted to live. On February 19, Henry Lane Wilson spoke to Huerta about the death of Madero's brother, Gustavo Madero, who had been brutally tortured and murdered by Huerta's soldiers. Huerta claimed that Gustavo was killed without his orders. Their conversation then turned to the disposition of Francisco Madero: "He [Huerta] asked my advice as to whether it was best to send the ex-President out of the country or place him in a lunatic asylum. I replied that he ought to do that which was best for the peace of the country."

It is worthy of mention that no protest was registered by Ambassador Wilson for Gustavo Madero's death, and that Huerta, schooled in Díaz principles of liquidating one's political opponents, could have interpreted the Ambassador's words as license to commit

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32 Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 17, 1913. FR, 1913, p. 718. Italics are mine.

33 Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, p. 295.

34 Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 19, 1913. FR, 1913, p. 724. Italics are mine.
murder. Had Henry Lane Wilson suggested that Huerta spare Madero's life, he probably would have accepted the advice, for he would have hesitated to incur opposition to his revolutionary government. The United States Department of State was apparently disturbed by Ambassador Wilson's telegram, for Secretary Knox replied: "... General Huerta's consulting you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a certain responsibility in the matter."\(^{35}\)

On February 20, Madero's wife went to the American Embassy to plead with Henry Lane Wilson to intercede on behalf of her husband. The Ambassador refused to grant the sanctuary of the American Embassy to the Mexican officials, and said he had received assurances of Madero's safety, but that the fate of Suárez was not certain. Mrs. Madero, in an interview two years after her husband's death, maintained that she gave Ambassador Wilson a message addressed to President Taft begging him to use his influence to save her husband's life.\(^{36}\) There is no evidence that Henry Lane Wilson ever received or sent the message.

On the night of February 22, while Madero and Suárez were being transferred from the National Palace to a penitentiary, they

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\(^{35}\)Knox to Ambassador Wilson, (telegram), February 20, 1913. \textit{FR, 1913}, p. 725.

\(^{36}\)Bell, \textit{The Political Shame of Mexico}, pp. 313-314.
were both shot to death. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the circumstances surrounding their deaths. Although most authorities agree that they were murdered by Huerta, Ambassador Wilson conducted an investigation and stated that he was disposed to accept Huerta's explanation that the prisoners were shot while attempting to escape. In reply to assertions by the American press that Huerta was responsible for the deaths of Madero and Suárez, Ambassador Wilson said:

History will undoubtedly straighten out this tangle, and while the crime was revolting to all people of civilized and humane sentiments it is not evident to me that, ... the death of these two Mexicans, ... should arouse greater expressions of popular disapproval in the United States than the murders, unrequited by justice, of some 75 or 80 Americans in Mexico during the last two years.37

37 Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (letter), March 12, 1913. FR, 1913, p. 772.
"WATCHFUL WAITING" AND WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY

The organization of the Provisional Government of Victoriano Huerta was effected on February 20, 1913. Ambassador Wilson's comments in reference to the deposed regime were: "A wicked despotism has fallen, but what the future contains can not be safely predicted." The words "wicked despotism" are indicative of Henry Lane Wilson's animosity toward the ex-President; for Madero, although too idealistic to be competent, was certain not an autocrat. On the same day the Huerta government was organized, Ambassador Wilson sent the following dispatch to Washington: "The Department should immediately instruct me as to the question of recognition of the Provisional Government, now installed and evidently in secure possession." This request for instructions was the first episode of a diplomatic snarl that was to last for eighteen months.

William Howard Taft, with less than two weeks of tenure remaining as President of the United States, hesitated to take action. According

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2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 725.
to Professor Arthur Link, the refusal to grant immediate recognition to Huerta by the United States Department of State was "not because of any revulsion it felt against the means that Huerta had used to seize power, but because it desired to use recognition as a lever to obtain prompt settlement of a number of disputes outstanding with Mexico." The desire to use recognition as a diplomatic tool, coupled with the shock felt by the American public for the murders of Madero and Suárez, prompted the Taft administration to delay action. 5

Woodrow Wilson's assumption of the office of President of the United States on March 4, 1913, saw a marked departure from the traditional policy of recognition long adhered to by that country. To understand the extent to which this policy of recognition was epochal necessitates a brief presentation of the recognition policy of the United States, Wilson's 6 degree of departure from that policy, and a knowledge of his background that shaped this new departure.

Thomas Jefferson, writing to Thomas Pinckney in 1792, outlined what he considered to be the basic principles regarding recognition:

We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our government is founded, that every nation has a

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6 The name Wilson will refer to President Woodrow Wilson throughout this paper.
right to govern itself internally under what form it
pleases, and to change these forms at its own will;
and externally to transact business with other nations
through whatever organ it chooses, ... The only
thing essential is, the will of the nation.7

The question of recognition was further elucidated by Henry Clay in
1818:

We have ... constantly proceeded on the principle
that the government de facto was that which we could
alone notice. Whatever form of government any society
of people adopt; whoever they acknowledge as their
sovereign, we consider that government or that sovereign
as the one to be acknowledged by us. We have invariably
abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of the
sovereign de jure, and against the sovereign de facto.
That is a question for the nation in which it arises to
determine ... but ... as soon as stability and order
... are maintained, ... we ... ought to consider
the actual as the true government.8

With minor deviations, such as an insistence that a new regime comply
with international obligations and protect the lives of foreigners
residing under its control, the recognition policy of the United
States remained unaltered until 1913. Prior to this date, if the
criteria for recognition as outlined by Jefferson and Clay were
met by a government, recognition was a mere formality, and in no
sense constituted approval or disapproval.9

7Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to Ambassador Thomas
Pinckney, December 30, 1792. Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.), The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington: The Jefferson Memorial

8Annals of the Congress of the United States, 15 Congress,

9Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge:
Cline, United States and Mexico.
Wilson added the principle of "constitutional legitimacy." In other words, the United States would decide if the government of a sovereign nation had complied with its own constitution; and used this as a prerequisite of recognition, which not only amounted to intervention, but involved the concept of "good" and "bad" revolutions. To determine the constitutional legitimacy of governments which are frequently changed by revolutions as they are in Latin America, would be a staggering job in itself. Add to this the fact that each new government is often based on a new constitution, which of course is written in a foreign language, and the task becomes overwhelming. The manifold dangers of injecting moral criterion into a nation's policy of recognition is illustrated by the words of Samuel F. Bemis: "At best the tasks and responsibilities of sitting in judgment on revolutions . . . extend to infinite gradations, degrees, circumstances, difficulties, diplomacies, and inconsistencies. That is why traditional policy has avoided the danger of dogma in dealing with this problem."

Wilson's new criteria for recognition can best be explained by an examination of his background and political thinking. By initiating the standards of constitutional legitimacy and "good" revolutions, Wilson hoped to create stability in Latin-American

10 Ibid., p. 142. "Good" revolutions were supported by the will of the people; "bad" revolutions were a coup d'état or barracks revolt.

nations, particularly those nations which were in a strategic position with reference to the nearly completed Panama Canal. If he granted recognition to Huerta on the basis of a military coup, he felt certain it would trigger a series of bloody revolutions throughout Latin America, and the United States would be obligated to recognize every government that possessed the strength to unseat another. However, the desire for stability only partially explains Wilsonian diplomacy. Wilson was a student of history and political science, but it is significant that his studies and teaching were confined to constitutional origins and representative self-government of Anglo-Saxon and German theory. He had almost ignored "the peoples, politics, languages and cultures of Latin America." In 1902 he became President of Princeton University, a position he thoroughly enjoyed until his bitter fight of 1909 and 1910 with Dean Andrew F. West of the Princeton Graduate School. The controversy was insignificant per se, but the fact that Wilson lost control of the Graduate School apparently warped his personality and thinking. Defeat fostered a "proud and unyielding stubbornness" and an inability


13 Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 168.

14 Ibid.
to work with anyone who opposed him.\textsuperscript{15} He was an idealist who wholeheartedly advocated democracy, but paradoxically was a virtual autocrat if his policies were opposed. Once he arrived at what he considered to be the proper course of action or policy, he seldom changed his mind.\textsuperscript{16} Prior to his departure for Washington to be inaugurated as President he remarked: "It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs, ..."\textsuperscript{17} In his inaugural address he spoke of domestic affairs that had been a part of his platform and did not mention Mexico. The selection of his cabinet is indicative of his preoccupation with internal affairs; for pacifists William Jennings Bryan and Josephus Daniels were respectively chosen Secretary of State and Secretary of Navy, and Secretary of War Lindley Garrison was a Quaker.\textsuperscript{18} Professor Herbert Bell maintains that Bryan knew as little about foreign affairs as any American in public life.\textsuperscript{19} Both Bryan and Wilson were moralists who felt they had a mission to perform in the world and thought of foreign policy in terms of "eternal verities" rather than "the expedient."\textsuperscript{20} Both felt that "they comprehended the peace

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Cline, \textit{United States and Mexico}, p. 139.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} As quoted in Link, \textit{Woodrow Wilson}, p. 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} H. C. F. Bell, \textit{Woodrow Wilson and the People} (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1945), pp. 92-93.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Link, \textit{Woodrow Wilson}, p. 81.
\end{itemize}
and well-being of other countries better than the leaders of those countries themselves."21

It is significant that the United States was emerging from a period of isolationism that had its beginning with the inception of that nation in 1789. Gross ignorance of foreign affairs was not peculiar to Wilson and Bryan, but it was their lot to be confronted with one of the most difficult problems their nation had faced since its Civil War. Their attempts to follow what has been termed "missionary diplomacy" led to intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation on an unprecedented scale; but to have recognized Huerta, would have been entirely inconsistent with their philosophy of right and wrong.

Great Britain had no compunctions regarding the means by which Huerta had seized power, and formal recognition was extended on May 3, 1913, after it became apparent that Huerta was firmly installed as President and was capable of maintaining law, order, and stability.22 By May 17, 1913, Germany, Italy, China, Spain, and Portugal had also extended recognition.23

In spite of obtaining recognition from several major powers the refusal of the United States to recognize Huerta's government

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21Ibid.

22Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 250.

23Ibid.
unquestionably damaged his prestige and isolated him from financial support throughout the world. He could not obtain loans from the United States, and foreign bankers considered him a poor financial risk. This consideration was no doubt predicated on the sound basis that any Mexican President who incurred disfavor in the United States committed ultimate political suicide.\footnote{See page 5, Chapter I, of this paper.} Huerta was not unaware that he would have difficulty in maintaining control of Mexico if he failed to secure approval from the Wilson administration. Petitions, sponsored by the Mexican President, Henry Lane Wilson, and independent businessmen, were circulated and signed by United States citizens in Mexico urging President Wilson to recognize the Huerta government.\footnote{Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New York: McBride, Nast and Company, 1914), p. 342. Hereinafter cited as Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico.} Their solicitations fell on "deaf ears," for while Wilson had not formulated any positive policy with respect to Huerta; he doggedly refused to recognize him, insisting that he must hold free elections. Huerta's unpopularity with the Wilson administration had served as an incentive for revolutionaries to organize and offer resistance to his government; the most powerful of whom was Venustiano Carranza who, with a stroke of genius, named his forces the Constitutionalists. It is difficult to imagine a name more appealing to President Wilson.

Huerta, beset by financial problems, frustrated by a friendly
Ambassador who represented a hostile nation, and faced with an increasing number of revolutionary opponents was not an adversary to be discounted by Wilson. His strength lay in support from Mexican nationals who bitterly objected to the presumptuousness of the United States in telling them who could or could not be their President, concessionaires who hoped for a return of Porfirian treatment of foreign capital, and from alien residents who feared that if a "strong man" were not in control of Mexico, a repetition of the anarchical tragic ten days might occur. As Huerta gained confidence and support, he frequently leveled vituperative outbursts at Wilson. The latter's insistence that Mexico needed a democracy to cure its ills prompted Huerta to remark: "What does Woodrow Wilson know of Mexico, or of what kind of government its people need? Nothing. He does not understand that Mexico is like a snake, with its life in its head." A penetrating comparison of the two Presidents is presented by Edward Bell. "They were ... strong and resourceful men [who] had taken the highest seats in the two countries - strong in different ways, contrasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality."28

26 Francisco "Pancho" Villa in the North and Emiliano Zapata in the South.


28 Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, p. 338.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1913, Ambassador Wilson tried desperately, but ineffectually, to persuade Wilson that he should recognize the Huerta government. Considering Wilson's intolerance for anyone who opposed his policies, it is not unusual that he considered Ambassador Wilson untrustworthy; for the President and his Ambassador were diametrically opposed in regard to Mexico. Despite Wilson's distrust of Henry Lane Wilson and his prerogative of dismissing him, the Ambassador was left at his post until July of 1913; however, little of consequence was conducted through the diplomatic corps in Mexico City. Wilson's method of obtaining information was to appoint personal representatives who were sent to Mexico and reported directly to him. The first of these non-official emissaries, author and journalist John Bayard Hale, was appointed on April 9, 1913.\textsuperscript{29} This secret assignment was prompted by Wilson's increasing distrust of Ambassador Wilson and the need for information. Hale's report reached the American President in July of 1913, and stated that cordial relations existed between Henry Lane Wilson and Huerta, which were divergent with the administration's policy, and that the only way to avert American intervention was by election of a constitutional government.\textsuperscript{30} Hale further added that there was no doubt of Henry Lane Wilson's complicity in the Huerta coup of

\textsuperscript{29}Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 248.

\textsuperscript{30}Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 112.
February 18, 1913. It is not coincidental that Ambassador Wilson as relieved of his post immediately after Hale's final reports was in President Wilson's hands.

In fairness to Henry Lane Wilson, the secret mission of Hale was a clear indication that the American State Department distrusted the reports it received from its Ambassador and regarded any information which was contrary to Hale's as false. It is questionable that Hale who could not speak or read Spanish could have garnered reliable information; for he was compelled by the nature of his mission to use unofficial channels.

The resignation of Henry Lane Wilson on August 4, 1913, left Wilson with a perplexing problem. If he appointed a new ambassador to Mexico it would be tantamount to recognition. If he did not, it would be difficult to bring any official pressure on Huerta or receive information from that country. The conundrum was inadequately approached by relegating diplomatic affairs to Chargé d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy and appointing another personal emissary, John Lind. Lind, like his predecessor, John Hale, "knew nothing of Mexico, Spanish, or diplomacy." He was a personal friend of Wilson, but his only experience in political affairs had been the Governorship of Minnesota. It is typical of Wilson's thinking to place more reliance in an inexperienced friend, than a career diplomat. The ex-Governor was

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32 Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 145.
given specific instructions by Wilson who piously maintained that he sincerely desired to uphold the "sovereignty and independence of Mexico." The incongruity of this statement is exemplified by Lind's instructions which stated that: 1. All hostilities in Mexico should end by a declared armistice, which would be observed by all factions. 2. A guarantee of early, free elections in which all parties would participate. 3. Victoriano Huerta must agree not to be a candidate in the before-mentioned elections. 4. All parties must agree to abide by the results of the elections and pledge their cooperation.

Frederico Gamboa, Foreign Minister of the Huerta Provisional Government, was furiously angry with Wilson's proposals. Gamboa's ire seems justified, for not only had the United States spurned diplomatic protocol by attempting to negotiate with a sovereign nation through an unofficial diplomat, but also demanded guarantees of a government which it refused to recognize. Gamboa at first rejected counsel with Lind, but later capitulated, although his irritation at the emissary's instructions was not diminished. He

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33 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), Vol. XVI, p. 7886.

34 Ibid.
agreed that it was within Huerta's power to declare an armistice, but how could the Mexican President guarantee that the various bandits in Mexico would comply with it? With superb eloquence he added that "Bandits . . . are not admitted to armistice; the first action against them is one of correction, and when this, unfortunately, fails, their lives must be severed for the sake of the biological and fundamental principle that the useful sprouts should grow and fructify."\(^35\) Gamboa pointedly stated that it was not necessary for Huerta to guarantee free and honest elections, because Mexican laws "provide such assurances."\(^36\) With veiled cynicism, he said the request that Huerta not be a candidate ought not be considered, for it might possibly be construed as personal animosity toward the Mexican President.\(^37\) Finally, he insisted that Mexico could not allow the United States to influence affairs in Mexico or it would forego its sovereignty; because "all future elections for president would be submitted to the veto of any President of the United States of America."\(^38\)

After replying to Lind's instructions, Gamboa pleaded for recognition of the Huerta government. When Lind informed him that


\(^{38}\) As quoted in Link, *Woodrow Wilson*, p. 114.
Wilson would never agree, Gamboa asked that the United States abstain from interference in Mexican affairs. Lind answered by delivering a "thinly veiled threat" that if Huerta rejected his proposals Wilson might ask Congress to revoke the Arms Embargo Act, thereby allowing the purchase of arms in the United States by the Constitutionalists. As a final inducement Lind informed Gamboa that Wilson would ask United States banks to float adequate loans to Mexico as soon as the conditions of his instructions were realized. Gamboa was insulted by the offer of a bribe, and refused to consider it; however, his reaction was probably due to the manner in which it was unskillfully presented, rather than a matter of principles, for a bribe is an almost universal diplomatic tool.

In view of the manner in which the Lind mission was conducted, the undiplomatic approach of Lind himself, and Gamboa's reaction to these proposals, it is difficult to understand how it would be construed as successful in Washington, but such was the case. Perhaps Lind misquoted Gamboa in reporting to Wilson or exaggerated his accomplishments out of proportion, but nonetheless it ushered in the so-called "honeymoon" period from August 27, 1913, to October

39 Ibid.

During this period virtually no mention was made of the Mexican problem. Many Americans assumed that Huerta would resign, a new government would be elected in Mexico during October, and that the Mexican situation was one of peace and tranquility. An appraisal of the American public's concern for the Mexican problem was voiced by a British citizen visiting the United States: "As a topic of public discussion, to judge from the columns of the American Press, Mexico holds its own with the Tariff and Currency Bills, and is only eclipsed by the things that really matter - the golf championships, the opening of football season, and so on." On August 27, 1913, Wilson delivered a speech wherein he expressed satisfaction with the state of affairs in Mexico, this was aimed primarily at silencing Congressional criticism of his self-named "watchful waiting" policy.

Congressman Frank W. Mondell of Wyoming was one of many critics of the before-mentioned policy stating that "the new administration [has] adopted an attitude which the President . . . referred to as one of 'watchful waiting'. How watchful it was must remain a matter of opinion - that it was one of waiting cannot be disputed." Mondell added that the primary concern of the United States policy in Mexico

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2. Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 146.
should be to protect the lives and investments of its citizens. This could best be accomplished, he argued, by recognizing the government which controlled most of Mexico\textsuperscript{44} and by using international law rather than pursuing non-recognition, which had actively stimulated revolutionaries and thus jeopardized United States citizens by furthering anarchial conditions.\textsuperscript{45}

From the floor of the United States Senate came the most caustic attacks on Wilson's Mexican policy. Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, whose connections with business interests are well-known, presented himself as spokesman for the states adjacent to Mexico, which were inimical to Huerta. By interviews and speeches he sought to arouse American sentiment to the point of intervention, for most American companies would have preferred Mexico to be occupied by United States forces. In a resolution placed before the Senate, Fall advocated universal protection of American lives and capital:

\textit{Resolved, That the constitutional rights of American citizens should protect them on our borders, and go with them throughout the world, and every American citizen residing or having property in any foreign country is entitled to and must be given the full protection of the United States Government, both for himself and his property.}\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44}At this time, Huerta controlled twenty-two of the twenty-seven political areas of Mexico.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 181-182.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Congressional Record, 63 Congress, 1 Session} (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 2658. Italics, with the exception of \textit{Resolved}, are mine.
When Wilson asked Congress to appropriate one hundred thousand dollars to defray the expenses of Americans who wished to leave Mexico, Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania argued that "Rather than appropriate the pittance of $100,000 to make this wholesale removal I would urge the spending of $25,000,000 to keep them where they belong and protect them in their legal occupations." Following this suggestion, Penrose introduced Senate Resolution #167 which stated that President Wilson should be asked to send "a sufficient number" of constabulary troops to Mexico for the purpose of policing and protecting American lives and property, and that this action should not be regarded as one of "hostility or unfriendliness toward the Mexican nation." Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota protested that intervention in a sovereign state meant war, and that Mexico should be permitted to settle her own internal problems, as the United States had done during its Civil War; but Penrose was unabashed and replied that "We have been for a generation going down to Nicaragua and to other Central and South American Republics and landing marines to protect American lives and American property. So I do not think that I am proposing anything radical." The Penrose Resolution serves to illustrate an erroneous

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47Ibid., p. 3568.
48Ibid.
49Ibid., p. 3569.
conclusion on the part of those who favored intervention that Mexico
would be equated in strength with Cuba, Santo Domingo, or Panama.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, was also critical of
Wilsonian diplomacy, which he maintained had placed the lives and
property of American citizens in jeopardy. He argued that it was
an ignominious situation when United States ministers had to ask
foreign ambassadors in Mexico to protect American citizens, because
the American ministers "were not backed up at home."50 It is
significant that criticism stemmed primarily from Republicans and
advocates of American business interests in Mexico; but Wilsonian
"watchful waiting" was also attacked on a more objective basis by poli-
tical thinkers of that time, one of whom was Professor L. S. Rowe.
Rowe warned that unless the United States adopted and pursued a con-
structive policy toward Mexico, that conditions of anarchy within
that country would increase to a point that would necessitate armed
intervention by the United States, whether it wished to or not.51
He added that the rudiments of a positive policy which had been
invoked were used to prevent European powers from taking action in
Mexico and that this was based on the negative approach of the Monroe

50 Ibid., p. 2598.

51 L. S. Rowe, "The Scope and Limits of Our Obligations Toward
Mexico," The Annals: International Relations of the United States,
Doctrine rather than an admission that Mexico was important to the United States. 52

Rowe maintained that the acquisition of the Panama Canal forced the United States to become a Central American, as well as North American, power.

52 Ibid., pp. 219-2220. Rowe maintained that the acquisition of the Panama Canal forced the United States to become a Central American, as well as North American, power.
CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION

The tranquility of the "honeymoon" period was shattered on October 10, 1913, when Victoriano Huerta imprisoned one-hundred and ten members of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and declared a military dictatorship. This action was in exact coincidence with the appointment of Sir Lionel Carden as British Foreign Minister to Mexico. Carden was "the mouthpiece" of British oil magnate Lord Weetman Cowdray who had huge investments in Mexican oil. Wilson suspected that Cowdray influenced the Mexican policy of the British Foreign Office and that the appointment of Carden had given Huerta assurance that he could count on British support. His suspicions were based on what he thought to be sound premises.

From 1911 to 1913 Carden was British Foreign Minister to Cuba. He was so decidedly anti-American that Secretary of State Knox had brought his behavior to the attention of the British Foreign Office. Great Britain's reaction was characteristic of her support for a public servant who becomes unpopular with a foreign power. Carden was not only permitted to remain in Cuba, but knighted, too! Lord


\[\text{Ibid., p. 116.}\]

Cowdray controlled 1,600,000 acres of Mexican land, half of which he owned and the remainder obtained by thirty-year leases. His largest well, Dos Bocas, flowed 103,000 barrels of oil every twenty-four hours. In 1912 Great Britain had converted her coal-burning ships to oil, and the following year Cowdray signed a contract to supply 7,200,000 barrels of fuel per year. It is significant that at this time Mexico was virtually Great Britain's only source of petroleum and that the appointment of Cardén as Minister to Mexico followed Cowdray's contract with the British government. Huerta's boldness in declaring himself dictator was not based entirely on British support, however, nor was the dismissal of one-hundred and ten members of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies a random action for not one member of the Catholic Party was expelled. If his financial problems became more acute, Huerta shrewdly counted upon support from the Catholic Church and the Hacendados. He knew that Wilson and his cabinet were opposed to armed intervention in Mexico. The disinclination to use force was strengthened by the fact that those who advocated its use were members of the opposition party, and that Wilson had campaigned on a platform protesting the dominance of "Wall Street" in American politics. Furthermore, the demands of the Lind Mission were based on no effective means of enforcing them.

and thus were nothing more than a diplomatic "bluff." Once a nation pursues what it purports to be an adamant diplomatic policy, which it can not carry to its fulfillment, that policy loses its effectiveness, and must be supplanted by one less stringent in its demands, or a more severe approach backed by stronger measures. Since Wilson was determined that "Huerta had to go," it was his task to find these "stronger measures." His approach was two-pronged: first, to alienate Huerta from British support; and second, to use the Constitutionalist forces to implement the demise of Huerta as President of Mexico.

Although there had been disagreements, Anglo-American relations had been cordial from 1894 to 1913. The boundary dispute of 1894-1895 between Venezuela and Great Britain had aroused hostilities between Britain and the United States. Grover Cleveland asserted the right of the United States to arbitrate the matter on the basis of the often referred to, but seldom used, Monroe Doctrine. Fortunately, Britain chose not to enforce her claims, for she saw the inadequacy of her policy of "splendid isolation," and the Kruger telegram pointed out the danger of Germany on her flank. Minor points of contention again occurred in Venezuela and Alaska during President Theodore Roosevelt's

first term, but the revocation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the provisions of the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in November of 1901, had shown that Great Britain was content to recognize the supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean. This new regard was based on the emergence of the United States as a world power and the efforts of Theodore Roosevelt to build an effective navy. Despite increasing regard for the United States, Wilson's Mexican policy prompted a British observer to remark that it was a mass of "puerile inconsistencies" whereby the United States would not intervene; would not allow anyone else to do so; refused to recognize Huerta; disputed his authority, but held him responsible for American lives and property. The Englishman further stated that Wilson depicted Mexico as a nation beset by anarchy and civil war, but advocated a democracy to cure its ills.6

With this mingled background of cordiality and criticism, Wilson began the pursuance of his first objective, which manifested itself in a memorandum intended for circulation among major foreign powers, to the effect that Huerta could not exist without foreign support and recognition, which had been extended by foreign powers on purely economic motives. He added that unless recognition was withdrawn, and the United States allowed a "free hand" in Mexico, he would have to use force to obtain desired objectives in that

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The memorandum was given to Professor John Bassett Moore, who was to re-write it in diplomatic jargon. Moore, however, refused to do so and gave Wilson an unforgettable lesson in international propriety. In substance, he told Wilson that foreign powers did not have to ask the approval of the United States to recognize anyone; that in view of its own record in Mexico the United States had no right to criticize foreign motives; and that the United States had not kept its agreement with Britain by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. Wilson chose not to issue the memorandum, and entered into diplomatic discussions with Sir William Tyrrell of Great Britain.

Tyrrell, a substitute for the ailing Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, was sent to the United States by the British Foreign Office to discuss, unofficially, Anglo-American relations. According to Charles Seymour, "No one understood better than Tyrrell the ins or outs of Continental politics or realized more acutely how great an asset to the British American sympathy might become in case of trouble in Europe." Tyrrell was also an affable person with a sharp

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8 Ibid., p. 150. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty provided that ships of all nations should be treated equally with respect to Panama Canal rates. In 1912 Congress passed an act which eliminated canal tolls on United States coast to coast shipping.

sense of humor, which was displayed when Secretary of State Bryan remarked that oil interests were dictating the Mexican policy of the British Cabinet. Tyrrell replied: "Lord Cowdray hasn't money enough. Through a long experience with corruption the Cabinet has grown so greedy that Cowdray hasn't the money necessary to reach their price." Bryan, always eager to criticize "big business," unwittingly regarded this as an admission of corruption in the British government. The informal conversations between Lord Tyrrell and Wilson were of short duration as it became apparent that once British property and British lives were safeguarded, Wilson could handle Mexico in his own way. Simultaneous with the conversations between Wilson and Lord Tyrrell, American Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter H. Page, was working toward the same goal namely, the withdrawal of support and recognition of Huerta. The negotiations, as reported by Page, between himself and British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, reflect the attitude of Great Britain toward the administration of government.

... They are slow to see what good will come of ousting Huerta unless we know beforehand who will succeed him ... they have a mania for order, sheer order, order for the sake of order. They can't see how anything can

come in any one's [anyone's] thought before order or how anything need come afterward . . . I assure you they don't think beyond order. A nigger lynched in Mississippi offends them more than a tyrant in Mexico.\textsuperscript{11}

Page added that the question of the Panama Canal tolls should be removed as it would incalculably reinforce the bargaining position of the United States.\textsuperscript{12} It is not known what promises Wilson made to Great Britain beyond using his influence to protect their concessions in Mexico; but Lord Grey agreed to withdraw recognition of Huerta, and silenced Sir Lionel Carden by informing him that he was in no way to interfere with Wilson's anti-Huerta policy in Mexico.\textsuperscript{13} British statesmen do not often make bad bargains, and it is inconceivable that Grey believed Wilson, who was still opposed to armed intervention by United States forces, could offer real security to British lives and investments in Mexico; but in the words of Arthur S. Link:

However doubtful Grey might have been about the President's ability to keep these promises, in the then perilous state of European affairs he had no alternative but to co-operate. In the event of a general European war, which seemed in the offing, American friendship would be worth more than Mexican oil.\textsuperscript{14}

Evidence, based on Page's report that Great Britain considered the


\textsuperscript{14}Link, \textit{Woodrow Wilson}, pp. 119-120.
Treaty of 1901 to be violated, suggests that Wilson made a gentleman's agreement to ask Congress to repeal the Canal Toll Exemption Act. Wilson sought repeal for this act in an address delivered to Congress on March 5, 1914. "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." According to Colonel House, "The ... matter of 'greater delicacy' was the elimination of Huerta and the understanding with Great Britain."15

Having alienated Huerta from British support, Wilson now proposed to implement the second phase of his positive policy by supporting Huerta's enemies. Again he called his two personal emissaries, John Lind and John Bayard Hale. Lind informed Wilson that an effective means of ousting Huerta would be to promote civil war in Mexico by throwing the support of the United States behind the Constitutionalists, and blockading Mexican ports with American warships.17 If this did not bring the desired result, armed intervention would be necessary. The extent to which Wilson followed Lind's suggestions is shown by his subsequent actions and a telegram from Secretary of State Bryan to Chargé d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy,

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16 Seymour, Intimate Papers, p. 205.
wherein O'Shaughnessy was told that usurpers such as Huerta could not be tolerated, and that he must be forced out by isolating him from all foreign aid and sympathy; however, if this was not effective "less peaceful means" would be used "to put him out."

John Hale was sent to Nogales, Mexico, in mid-November of 1913 to confer with the Constitutionalist commander, Venustiano Carranza. Wilson's proposal, as presented by Hale, was that in return for United States support of the Constitutionalist forces, Carranza would guarantee free elections in Mexico. Carranza flatly refused to make such a compact and informed Hale that he himself would fight any United States troops on Mexican soil, and that the only thing he desired from the United States was "recognition of their belligerent status, with the accompanying privilege of buying arms and ammunition." Wilson doubtless considered Carranza an ingrate of the highest caliber, for he was willing to throw the force of the United States, short of military troops, behind Carranza, asking only that the Mexican leader guarantee free elections. Carranza's refusal to cooperate was not predicated entirely on stubbornness or the inalienable right of Mexicans to settle their internal affairs,

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19 Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 121.
but was based on the sound precedent that any Mexican President who had known dealings with the "Colossus of the North" found his government tainted with suspicion and beset by revolutionary opposition. 20 Don Roberto V. Pesqueira, a confidential agent of Carranza in the United States, remarked that the United States was more interested in restoring dollar dividends than peace in Mexico. 21 This abject refusal on the part of the Constitutionalists to cooperate gradually moved Wilson's thinking toward an acceptance that civil war in Mexico was essential to meet the unique problems of that state. This approach was advocated by Professor Leslie C. Wells, who maintained that it was inconceivable that a government openly supported by foreigners would be free of a president and congress not slanted toward foreign nationalities. This government would lack the support of the people and the result would be another revolution. 22 Wells added that Americans were completely unqualified to handle the Mexican land problem, for the idea of confiscating land to divide it among the peasants would be an abhorrence to a nation imbued with

20 Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 151.


the concept of the right of private ownership.  

Wilson's changing attitude was possibly influenced by Luis Cabrera, whom Carranza sent to Washington for the express purpose of explaining the agrarian problems of Mexico. Cabrera insisted that the revolutions in Mexico were socio-economic, and that democracy could not exist until the power of the huge land owners was broken.  

Professor L. S. Rowe argued that while tyrannical government is not necessarily good, the Indians and peones suffered more under a weak central government, due to corrupt local officials. Whether Wilson was influenced by Cabrera, the refusal of Carranza to cooperate, or the logical arguments of Professors Wells and Rowe is of minor significance. It is important that by the latter part of January, 1914, he was not only concerned with the removal of Huerta, but also the manner by which it was to be accomplished. This is evident in Secretary of State Bryan's reply to a proposal by Sir Edward Grey which stated that Great Britain and other European governments might agree to draft a request for Huerta's resignation, if Woodrow Wilson could present a plan for the pacification

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23 Ibid., p. 217.

24 Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 154. This meeting of Wilson and Cabrera occurred in early January of 1914.

of Mexico after Huerta's removal. The British Foreign Secretary said that Huerta might accept the request if presented by several powers instead of just the United States; because he could "save his face" and Mexico would not be submitting to another single independent state.26 Bryan replied that the United States had made "several earnest efforts" to effect a change of government in Mexico, which Huerta would not accept; and if Huerta resigned he would be replaced by one of his associates, which would not bring peace to Mexico because it would not satisfy the Constitutionalists in the North. Bryan added: "... the United States has received information which convinces it that there is a more hopeful prospect of peace, ... if Mexico is left to the forces now reckoning with one another there ... Settlement by civil war carried to its bitter conclusion is a terrible thing, but it must come now."27 Bryan informed Ambassador Page that after careful study, President Wilson had decided to abandon a policy of isolation and that he would lift the arms embargo restriction.28

It is interesting to note that Bryan and Wilson felt


28 Ibid., p. 445.
justified in stating what the Constitutionalists would or would not accept, and that the reply to the British proposal was drafted after one day of consideration. During the previously-mentioned Congressional criticism of Wilson's Mexican policy, Senator William Alden Smith from Michigan disclosed that "there is at the present moment in this Capital a thorough, practical, systematic lobby, putting forth their revolutionary propaganda with a serious and a definite object [objective] of affecting the American attitude toward the Government of Mexico, . . ."29 Senator Smith named a Mr. Hopkins and a Mr. Sommerfield as two members of this lobby. The words "revolutionary propaganda" would seem to indicate a Constitutionalist pressure group, and it is doubtful that representatives of Huerta would have been cordially received in Washington. Evidence points toward close contact between the forces of Carranza and the United States, although Carranza did not obligate himself with any agreement as to how he would conduct Mexican affairs if he succeeded Huerta.

On February 3, 1914, Woodrow Wilson revoked the Arms Embargo Proclamation of March 14, 1912, which had been issued due to conditions of "domestic violence" in Mexico. Wilson's justification for lifting the embargo was that conditions which caused the issuance of the 1912 proclamation "have essentially changed," and he wished

to attain a similar position with other nations in respect to exporting arms to Mexico. The extent to which Wilson had departed from a policy of isolation is apparent by comparing his above statements with one issued on August 27, 1913: "I shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war from the United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico . . ." The Constitutionalist reaction to the opportunity of procuring weapons in the United States was instantaneous. Military stocks in El Paso, Texas, were depleted by demands from Juárez, Mexico, United States border guards released captured smugglers and their contraband, and huge shipments of arms and munitions were transported from New Orleans to Matamoros. The Constitutionalists felt that Huerta would easily collapse before their newly acquired weapons; but in reality the repeal of the arms embargo strengthened the Mexican dictator, for the landed aristocracy, the Catholic Church, and business concerns rallied themselves for the first time to his support. In a final effort to bring Huerta to his knees,

Proclamation Revoking the Proclamation of March 14, 1912, Prohibiting the Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War to Mexico, [February 3, 1914] Re, 1914, pp. 447-448.

Congressional Record, p. 3804.

Wilson ordered a naval blockade of Mexican ports. This action precipitated an incident that led to armed intervention by United States forces.

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY INTERVENTION

A special cable dated April 9, 1914, to The New York Times stated that the Mexican port of Tampico was under siege by the Constitutionalist forces and that capture of the city by the rebels was imminent. However, Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commanding officer of the U.S.S. Dolphin, which was anchored outside Tampico harbor, reported that the port city was adequately defended by the Federal gun-boats Vera Cruz and Zaragoza, but that the Aguila Oil Company's refinery (owned by Lord Cowdray) and the Waters-Pierce refinery (an American company) were completely destroyed by shelling. According to The New York Times, the American company made vigorous protests to the United States Department of State. On the same day that Admiral Mayo's communique described the destruction occurring at Tampico, a whale boat from the Dolphin with a United States Paymaster and seven enlisted men aboard docked near Iturbide Bridge in Tampico harbor to purchase gasoline. The gasoline was procured and during the loading of it a Mexican colonel, Ramón H. Hinojosa, arrested the


2 Ibid. Diplomatic correspondence from January 31, 1914, to April 9, 1914, is not contained in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914.
eight Americans, two of whom were in the whale boat which was flying the flag of the United States. Colonel Hinojosa marched the arrested men through the streets of Tampico and reported to the commanding general of the Federal forces, General Ignacio Zaragoza. Zaragoza immediately released the men, arrested Hinojosa, and sent a verbal apology to Admiral Mayo stating that the port was under martial law because of attacking rebels. He added that Colonel Hinojosa had arrested the Americans due to ignorance, but in compliance with the necessities of martial law. To Admiral Mayo, who considered the affair an insult to the American flag, the apology was not sufficient reparation. He delivered a twenty-four hour ultimatum, without authorization from Washington, demanding "formal disavowal" for the arrest, General Zaragoza's assurance that Hinojosa be severely punished, and a twenty-one gun salute to be given to the American flag hoisted on Mexican soil.

The incident was regarded in United States diplomatic circles as resulting from errors in judgment on the part of Colonel Hinojosa in making the arrest and the paymaster's decision to land where he did.

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4 Ibid., pp. 448-449. The salute was to be returned by the Dolphin.
Nelson O'Shaughnessy, American Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico City, reported that Huerta took the incident lightly, "unhesitatingly agreed to reparation," and promised an investigation and punishment of Hinojosa if found guilty. O'Shaughnessy stated that in view of the fact that the whale boat displayed the American flag, an investigation by the United States would also be forthcoming. On April 10, 1914, the context of Admiral Mayo's ultimatum was sent to vacationing President Wilson with a note attached by Secretary of State Bryan stating that he didn't see how "Mayo could have done otherwise." Wilson was in accord with the view of his Secretary of State and decided to support Admiral Mayo's demands; however, Mayo's actions were not condoned by Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels. Daniels maintained that the Admiral could have easily reached Washington by wireless or telegraph, but had declined to do so before issuing his orders. Daniels added that he was almost alone in the State and Navy Departments in feeling that Mayo should have accepted Zaragoza's apology, and that Wilson and the rest of his cabinet felt that Mayo was premature in delivering the ultimatum, but decided to back him because failure to do so would "hearten Huerta."
On April 11, 1914, Bryan informed O'Shaughnessy that the reparations agreed to by Huerta had not included compliance with Admiral Mayo's demand for a salute to the American flag, and that nothing short of this would be accepted by the United States government. 

Because Mexican governmental functions were virtually paralyzed by the observance of Holy Week, compliance with the ultimatum was first extended twenty-four hours and later postponed until April 19. The intervening eight days between April 11 and April 19 were filled with diplomatic correspondence, proposals and counterproposals, accusations and recriminations. The uncompromising attitude of the United States is illustrated by an article in The New York Times. "However mild the course of the administration in handling previous incidents in Mexico . . . it is maintaining a stiff backbone that shows no sign of bending, and it is supporting to the utmost Admiral Mayo's demands." 

The Huerta government was at first equally adamant, maintaining that the men from the Dolphin had landed without permission in a port where martial law was declared, and that their immediate release plus an apology to Admiral Mayo was sufficient reparation. It refused to honor the American admiral's demands for a salute on the basis of

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8 Secretary of State William J. Bryan to Chargé d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy, (telegram), April 11, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 452.

9 NYT, April 13, 1914, p. 1.
international law and because compliance would entail an acceptance of the sovereignty of a foreign state. On what basis of international law the Mexican refusal was predicated was not made clear; but after consulting Professor John Bassett Moore, the United States Department of State declared that the arrest of the two men in the whale boat was a flagrant violation of international law, for public vessels carry the element of extraterritoriality and men abroad them are as immune to arrest as an ambassador within his embassy. It seemingly was a question of whether the exigencies of martial law outweighed the rights of extraterritoriality, but according to Professor Arthur Link, "the affair would have ended with Zaragoza's apology had not the Washington administration been looking for an excuse to provoke a fight." Professor Link's observation seems justified in view of two minor incidents which were exaggerated out of proportion, and which tipped the balance for Congressional approval of military intervention. On April 12, 1914, a message from the American State Department to O'Shaughnessy was detained by a Mexican telegraph operator who was employed as a replacement for the regular operator during Holy Week. Through inexperience and ignorance, as

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10 O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, (telegram), April 12, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 455.

verified by O'Shaughnessy, the replacement thought that the message should be translated before delivering it to the American Chargé.\textsuperscript{12}

The incident was reported in The New York Times as evidence that United States and Mexican relations had been "brought to a head."\textsuperscript{13}

Three days later, a naval orderly from the U.S.S. Minnesota and a Mexican mail orderly attempted to carry on a conversation outside a post office at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Neither was able to speak both English and Spanish and in an attempt to understand each other began shouting. A Mexican policeman, fearing a disturbance, escorted both men to a police station where a judge immediately released the American, while the Mexican was detained and given "proper punishment."

Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commander of the American fleet in Mexican waters, said: "The attitude of the Mexican authorities was correct; there is not cause for complaint against them and the incident is without significance."\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, this was released to the American press under the caption "U. S. Mail Orderly Thrown in Jail!"\textsuperscript{15}

Meanwhile, Huerta had altered his stand on the salute. His proposal, as outlined to O'Shaughnessy, was for the United States to

\textsuperscript{12} O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, (telegram), April 12, 1914. FR, 1914, pp. 453-454.

\textsuperscript{13} NYT, April 13, 1914, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{14} Admiral Frank F. Fletcher to Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels, (telegram), April 16, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 465.

\textsuperscript{15} NYT, April 17, 1914, p. 1.
salute simultaneously the Mexican flag as Mexico saluted the American flag. Bryan curtly stated that "a simultaneous salute would deprive his [Huerta's] action of its significance." After this rebuff, Huerta agreed to a draft protocol drawn up by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, José López Portillo y Rojas, and Chargé O'Shaughnessy, wherein Mexico agreed to deliver a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag asking only that the United States immediately return the salute. O'Shaughnessy, stressing the urgency of settling the matter, sent the text of the protocol to Washington and asked if he should sign it; Bryan replied that Wilson was "out of town" and could not be reached until the next morning; however, Bryan added, "[I] am sure ... that he would not be willing to have you sign the protocol mentioned. The salute should be fired without any agreement as to the return salute." The Secretary said that the United States could be relied upon to fulfill international "custom and courtesy," and continued: "In addition to other reasons, signing of the protocol would be objectionable because it might be construed as recognition of his [Huerta's] Government whereas the President has no intention of recognizing the Huerta Government."

Portilla y Rojas, upon receiving Bryan's answer to the protocol, bitterly remarked that the United States desired to humiliate the

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16 Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, (telegram), April 17, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 466.
17 Ibid., April 19, 1914, p. 471.
18 Ibid.
Provisional Government of Mexico by demanding a salute without a guaranteed return salute, and asked why the United States bothered to demand reparation from a government which it did not recognize as being in existence. After brief consultation with Huerta, Portilla y Rojas announced that Mexico would not unconditionally deliver the salute.

As previously mentioned, in Admiral Mayo's ultimatum to General Zaragoza it was stated that the Mexican salute would be returned by the Dolphin. Huerta was undoubtedly seeking not only a return salute, but also a formal agreement between his government and the United States which would be tantamount to recognition. If intervention by the United States to enforce the salute did occur, the various rebel factions in the country might rally under his leadership to resist an invading foreign power. On the other hand, Wilson was apparently convinced that intervention by the United States forces was a necessity if Huerta was to be forced out of Mexico; therefore, he closed his thinking to compromise or peaceful settlement of an incident that might have been nothing more than an insignificant historical event.

On April 13, 1914, Wilson called John Lind to Washington in order to obtain his views on the Mexican situation. Lind, when called for advice after the end of the "honeymoon period," had

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19 O'Shaughnessy to Bryan (telegram), April 19, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 472.
advocated military intervention if his more peaceful plans for ousting Huerta were unsuccessful. He now announced that "watchful waiting" must be abandoned to remove the Mexican dictator from power. On the following day, the entire Atlantic fleet of the United States was ordered with "least possible delay" to Tampico. By way of justifying this action, Wilson was quoted as saying that "one of the great concerns of this Government has been that the destruction of foreign property in Mexico might cause European nations affected to take measures of their own to protect their interests." As the American fleet neared Tampico, Wilson's stand became increasingly bellicose. In a conference with Congressmen of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Affairs, Wilson said that he had received word that Chargé O'Shaughnessy was conducting himself as a personal friend of Huerta, to the point of riding in Huerta's car. He told the Congressmen that O'Shaughnessy would be recalled if he could think of a way to replace him without recognizing Huerta. Wilson next outlined his plan of action which involved seizure of Vera Cruz and Tampico accompanied by a "peaceful blockade" of both Mexican

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20 NYT, April 14, 1914, p. 1.

21 Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, (telegram), April 14, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 459. The fleet consisted of eight battleships and three smaller vessels, which carried 2,500 fully-equipped expeditionary marine forces capable of assault landings.

22 NYT, April 14, 1914, p. 1.
coasts, occupation of Mexico until Colonel Hinojosa was punished and the salute received, time for compliance by Mexico to be extended until the American fleet arrived, and, although he did not anticipate a declaration of war, he promised that unless conditions warranted immediate action, Congress would be consulted before sending United States forces into action. Wilson received unanimous support from the Committee members who stated that it was possible to overlook the seizure of the men at Tampico, but the arrest of the mail orderly and the attempt to take his dispatches demanded redress beyond a twenty-one gun salute.

President Wilson's belligerent attitude toward Mexico drew interesting comments from the British press. The Chronicle pointed out that Woodrow Wilson's policies were at least changing, as evidenced by not accepting the apology of Huerta's general, which would not have cost the United States any measure of dignity. The Star claimed that mining interests of Great Britain had caused war in South Africa, and that oil magnates in Mexico were creating a comparable situation and were intriguing for intervention. The Daily Telegram supported the

23 Ibid., April 16, 1914, p. 2.
24 Ibid. Admiral Fletcher made no reference to an attempt to seize the mail orderly's dispatches. See pp. 54-55 of this paper.
25 NYT, April 16, 1914, p. 2.
contention that it was totally inconsistent for the United States to
be amiable toward a "predatory" man like "Pancho" Villa and the murders
committed by Carranza, while objecting to Huerta on the same basis.

Furthermore, The Daily Telegram added, "A Government does not demand
apologies and salutes from an official desperado whom it has branded
as a murderous criminal. If it cannot hold a regular national
authority accountable for this desperado's proceedings . . . it either
moves against him and punishes him on its own responsibility or leaves
him alone." 26 The latter point was also grasped by Caranza who had
suggested that if the United States wanted an apology from Mexico, the
Constitutionalists would be happy to offer it, thereby ignoring that
a usurper such as Huerta could officially act for Mexico, and in
turn elevating the prestige of the Constitutionalists.

On April 20, 1914, President Wilson addressed a joint session
of Congress to explain the situation in Mexico. He said that the
Tampico incident was only one of a series of incidents, and if this
were not the case, he would be disposed to forget the matter and
attribute it to "ignorance and arrogance;" but, he continued, an
orderly from the U. S. S. Minnesota was "thrown into jail" and a message
to the American Chargé d'Affaires was detained by the Mexican telegraphic
service. He added: "We do not desire to control in any degree the affairs
of our sister Republic . . . The people of Mexico are entitled to settle

26 Ibid., April 17, 1914, p. 1.
their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely respect their right."\(^{27}\) In conclusion, he asked support of a resolution to use United States troops to obtain recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States from Huerta. The resolution passed the House of Representatives by a margin of 323 to 29, but not before the United States marines occupied Mexican soil.

The landing of Marines at Vera Cruz, Mexico, was precipitated by a telegram from Consul William W. Canada stating that the freighter Ypiranga of the Hamburg-American Line would dock at Vera Cruz on April 21, 1914, with a cargo of two hundred machine guns and 15,000,000 rounds of ammunition.\(^{28}\) Bryan’s reply was "Fletcher has been instructed to take the customhouse immediately and prevent delivery of arms and ammunition."\(^{29}\) On the morning of April 21, 1914, United States marines landed at Vera Cruz seizing the cable office, post office, telegraph office, and customhouse. Josephus Daniels had again opposed the majority of Wilson's cabinet who favored intervention. Daniels later pointed out that the only reasons for the Vera Cruz landing were to enforce a salute to the United States flag and prevent the landing

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\(^{28}\)Consul William W. Canada to Bryan, (telegram), April 20, 1914. \(\text{FR, 1914, p. 477.}\)

\(^{29}\)Bryan to Canada, (telegram), April 21, 1914. \(\text{FR, 1914, p. 477.}\)
of munitions from the German ship. After the United States occupied Vera Cruz, the salute was not demanded, and following a protest by the German Ambassador to Washington that the United States could not seize the German vessel unless at war with his country, the Ypiranga was released. It landed refugees at New Orleans, and then returned to Puerto México and unloaded its cargo, which presumably reached Huerta's forces.30

The occupation of Vera Cruz by American forces nearly accomplished what Huerta desired. Carranza maintained that the United States had invaded Mexico, thus violating its right as a sovereign nation, and threatened to involve the two countries in an unequal war. The First Chief of the Constitutionalist forces insisted that the United States cease military actions and withdraw its forces from Mexican territory. Bryan informed Carranza that if he would make it clear that he was neutral on the occupation of Vera Cruz, the United States could hasten the demise of Huerta "which all parties desire."31

Simultaneous with Carranza's rebuke for the United States, "Pancho" Villa announced that he was opposed to war with the United States because Mexico had enough troubles without fighting its powerful neighbor. In respect to the occupation of Vera Cruz, he said: "I hope the Americans bottle up Vera Cruz so tight they can't even get


31 Bryan to Consul Marion Letcher, (telegram) April 24, 1914, FR, 1914, p. 486.
water into it.\textsuperscript{32} To insure Carranza's neutrality, the United States threatened to invoke another Arms Embargo Act. Special Agent George C. Carothers at Juárez, Mexico, informed Washington that if the proposed embargo did not change Villa's attitude, he had hopes of establishing the neutrality of the Constitutionalists through him. Bryan informed Carothers that "the action of the United States on the part of the border which is controlled on the Mexican side by the Constitutionalists will be governed entirely by the attitude of General Carranza, General Villa and their associates.\textsuperscript{33} On the following day, the United States Department of State was informed by Consul Jesse H. Johnson that in the event of war with Mexico, Carranza would not fight United States troops and under no circumstances would the Constitutionalists join forces with Huerta.\textsuperscript{34}

The prospect of war with Mexico brought a flurry of enlistments in the armed forces throughout the United States, Theodore Roosevelt offered to return from his explorations in South America to lead a cavalry detachment, and military authorities speculated that 200,000 men would be necessary to conquer and control Mexico. Professor

\textsuperscript{32}NYT, April 24, 1914, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{33}Bryan to Special Agent George C. Carothers, (telegram), April 24, 1914. \textit{FR, 1914}, pp. 486-487.

\textsuperscript{34}Consul Jesse H. Johnson to Bryan, (telegram), April 25, 1914. \textit{FR, 1914}, p. 487.
Albert Bushnell Hart questioned that any number of troops would accomplish American objectives there. He pointed out that as a basis for handling the problems of Mexico, the United States could undoubtedly draw on its experience in exterminating her own Indians, and its "enlightened" policy of dealing with Cuba and the Philippines. To illustrate the last point he said, "Sixteen years we have been civilized the Filipinos up to the point where they are unanimous only on one thing, namely, that they want us to leave."35 The press in South American countries was bitterly anti-American, and suspicious of the United States motives in Mexico. The Argentine paper, La Nación, claimed that the independence of Mexico was threatened and caustically compared Wilson's foreign policy with that of Theodore Roosevelt - "The academic rectitude of the one produces the same effect as the big stick of the other."36

On April 25, 1914, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered their good offices to mediate the differences between the United States and Mexico. The United States accepted the offer without hesitation, for it did not desire a war with Mexico, and unless a peaceful settlement could be made, it stood to incur the further

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36NYT, April 25, 1914, p. 3.
enmity and suspicion of the Latin-American nations. On April 27, 1914, under pressure by diplomatic representatives of France, Germany, and Britain, Huerta agreed in principle to mediation with the United States and indicated that he would send delegates to the conference. Thus the preliminary agreement to mediate their differences was agreed upon by the United States and the Provisional Government of Victoriano Huerta, thereby laying the foundation for the Niagara Conference.
CHAPTER V

THE NIAGARA CONFERENCE

The purpose of the Niagará Conference, as set forth by the ministers plenipotentiaries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,\(^1\) was to prevent further bloodshed between the United States and Mexico by effecting a peaceful settlement of the Tampico incident and securing the withdrawal of American forces from Vera Cruz. Contingent upon the acceptance of mediation was the understanding that all "hostilities and military movements by the forces of both parties" be suspended during mediatory action.\(^2\) It is apparent that the topics for discussion did not include the removal of Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico, but Bryan stated that the United States would not accept terms of mediation short of the elimination of Huerta and the establishment of a government in compliance with the National Constitution of Mexico.\(^3\) The inconsistency of negotiating with a government which the United States

\(^1\)Señores Romulo S. Naón of Argentina, Domicio da Gama of Brazil, and Eduardo Suárez Mujica of Chile.


\(^3\)The New York Times, April 26, 1914, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as NYT.
had refused to recognize did not disturb Wilson, "for he never had any intention of submitting to genuine mediation." Furthermore, if the removal of Huerta was an inevitable consequence of mediation, the fact that his government was represented on an equal basis with that of the United States was of no significance and thus precluded any future question of extending recognition. To Woodrow Wilson, the Niagara Conference was an effective "means of eliminating Huerta and establishing a provisional government that would turn Mexico over to the Constitutionalists." On April 29, 1914, Carranza agreed in principle to mediation, but stated that the details of negotiations must be discussed at a "later time." The mediators warned Carranza that as a consequence of accepting their good offices, he must suspend hostilities immediately and continue this policy as long as mediation lasted. The Constitutionalist Chief replied that to cease military operations was "inadvisable for the Constitutionalist cause," and that the civil war in Mexico had nothing to do with the proposed topics of mediation. Because of Carranza's


5 Ibid.

6 Venustiano Carranza to the Mediators, (telegram), April 29, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 517.

7 Ibid., May 3, 1914, p. 518.
refusal to abide by the terms of mediation, the mediators withdrew their invitation to the Constitutionalists to attend the conference.

Wilson selected Justice Joseph Rucker Lamar and Mr. Frederick William Lehmann, who were totally uninformed about Mexico, as United States delegates to the Niagara Conference. No one was sent from the United States Department of State, nor were the American delegates given plenary powers! Any action taken by them was ad referendum, meaning that all suggestions had to be referred to the American State Department before a decision could be made. On the other hand, Huerta's delegates, Señores Emilo Rabasa, Agustin Rodríguez, and Luis Elguero, thoroughly understood the problems to be discussed and were given full plenary powers.

On May 13, 1914, the mediators announced that the objectives of the conference would include the elimination of Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico and the establishment of a Mexican government which both Huerta and the Constitutionalists would accept. It is significant that settlement of the Tampico incident was not mentioned, while the exact objectives of the United States had become the premises of negotiation. The Niagara Conference, scheduled to open on May 18, 1914, was postponed for two days at

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\(^{8}\) *NYT*, May 14, 1914, p. 1.
the request of Huerta's delegates. Ostensibly his delegates claimed they were too weary from their trip to the United States to enter the conference, but they apparently desired to delay mediation until further instructions arrived from Huerta. On May 18, 1914, the Mexican delegates announced that Huerta was willing to resign if it were necessary to attain peaceful settlement of the dispute between the United States and Mexico. Huerta asked that he have a voice in choosing his successor and procurement of an American loan of four hundred million dollars. Perhaps his willingness to resign was based on the military successes of the Constitutionalists who had captured Tampico on May 13, 1914.

The ABC ministers set forth their proposals on May 20, 1914, for the settlement of affairs in Mexico. Huerta was to appoint as his successor a Minister of Foreign Affairs who would be acceptable to the Constitutionalists and the United States; the United States should place an embargo on arms and munitions going to Mexico as soon as Huerta tendered his resignation; and free elections should be held to choose a President and legislative body. It would seem that with Huerta's elimination a certainty, the United

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9Ibid., May 19, 1914, p. 1.

10Pedro Lascurain, Madero's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was suggested by the mediators.

States would have accepted the proposals of the mediators; but Bryan began a series of delays and postponements without which the Niagara Conference might have quickly terminated, by suggesting that a number of names be submitted for consideration as Minister of Foreign Affairs so that their "connections and sympathies" could be checked. Additional evidence that Wilson understood the socio-economic aspects of the Mexican problem and had shifted from a moralistic approach to the realization that civil war must continue in Mexico until land reform was accomplished, was revealed in a conversation with Samuel G. Blythe of The Saturday Evening Post on April 27, 1914. "It [the land problem] is a great and complicated question, but I have every hope that a suitable solution will be found, and that the day will come when the Mexican people will be put in full possession of the land,"

Bryan suggested that since the Constitutionalists had a commanding position in Mexico, the mediators should again extend them an invitation to attend the conference without defining the scope of the discussions or requiring a suspension of hostilities. The mediators refused to do so, stating that the Constitutionalists

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12 Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), May 21, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 502. The mediators submitted as alternate choices Rafael Angeles, Ernesto Madero, and Luis Cabrera.

had expressed a determination not to discuss any domestic reforms with respect to Mexico. Huerta's representatives, claiming that mediation was virtually impossible as long as hostilities continued, proposed an armistice or an embargo, which they maintained would produce the same effect as an armistice, on United States shipments of munitions to Mexico. If the conditions of either the armistice or embargo were fulfilled and a provisional government established to prevent anarchical conditions in the capital, Huerta would resign immediately.¹⁴

Bryan refused to consider the embargo and said that Huerta's representatives apparently wanted the United States to intervene and stop the revolution in Mexico. He added that "it is clear ... that the representatives from Mexico are keenly aware that General Huerta no longer has the force or standing to insist on anything; ..."¹⁵

The conference continued throughout May and June of 1914 with nothing of real significance occurring. This was due to the previously mentioned disinclination of the United States to submit to genuine mediation, the refusal of the Constitutionalists to meet the requirements for representation, and the continued insistence of Carranza that he would not submit to any settlement of Mexico's internal affairs

¹⁴ Commissioners to Bryan, (telegram), May 23, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 505.

¹⁵ Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), May 24, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 505.
by the Niagara Conference. Periodically, Carranza would indicate that under certain circumstances he might send delegates to the conference. After such an indication was made on May 28, 1914, Bryan suggested that "time will be gained by waiting to arrange this and all the processes of the mediation will be facilitated by the admission of representatives of Carranza."\(^\text{16}\) The mediators were not impressed. They pointed out that Carranza's apparent willingness to send delegates was a delaying tactic providing him with more time to crush Huerta's forces, and that unless an armistice was declared Carranza would control all of Mexico thereby casting the Niagara Conference in a ridiculous light.\(^\text{17}\) The fact that the United States delegates were not vested with authority to make decisions did not expedite proceedings, for their correspondence to the American State Department was lengthy, detailed, and burdened with minutiae of questions and proposals.

The proceedings at Niagara were conducted in an air of secrecy and press coverage was not permitted. When asked by Gregory Mason, a reporter from The Outlook magazine, to provide information about what was occurring at the conference, Justice Lamar refused comment

\(^{16}\) Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), May 29, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 512.

\(^{17}\) Commissioners to Bryan, (telegram), May 30, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 514.
saying that it was excellent that no one knew what was going on. Mason remarked that this attitude was not consistent with Wilson's professed faith in an informed public. He added that the policy of the Wilson administration was apparently more concerned with the number of mistresses kept by the Constitutionalists and the amount of liquor consumed by them, rather than their intended reforms. Mason's criticism of moral criteria in government seems justified, but even in a democracy, secrecy is usually mandatory at international conferences, and The Outlook magazine, with Theodore Roosevelt as a contributing editor, was decidedly anti-Wilson in sentiment.

On May 31, 1914, Bryan glibly argued that since the Constitutionalists were not represented at Niagara, the United States would have to be the judge of what would be a "fair" settlement between Huerta and Carranza, without any adequate means of reaching that judgment. Bryan added that the refusal to seat the Constitutionalists at Niagara cast doubt on the impartiality of the mediators, which they could not "successfully explain away." The

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18 Gregory Mason, "Mediation without Information," The Outlook, CVII (June 27, 1914), p. 446.

19 This statement erroneously implies that the United States was not in contact with the Constitutionalists. Luis Cabrera, a representative of Carranza, served as informant to the American State Department, and diplomatic correspondence was carried on between Special Agent George C. Carothers at Torreón, Mexico, and Washington. See pp. 47-50 of this paper, also FR, 1914, pp. 494, 542.

20 Bryan to Commissioners (telegram), May 31, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 520.
mediators steadfastly maintained that while they were anxious that Carranza be represented, an invitation would not be granted until the First Chief of the Constitutionalists agreed to abide by the results of the conference and cease military action against Huerta.

On June 11, 1914, Carranza pointedly remarked that he had accepted the principle of mediation as early as April 29, 1914, and in lieu of this acceptance announced the names of three delegates, although he did not state that he would send them to the Niagara Conference. On July 13, 1914, the United States delegates initiated a proposal that a Constitutionalist be chosen Provisional President of Mexico, for, as Commissioner Lehmann observed, it was illogical to assume that Carranza would accept less from mediation than he could accomplish by armed force. Three days after this proposal the representatives of Carranza met with the United States commissioners at Buffalo, New York, to set forth the views of the Constitutionalists who then occupied nearly all of Mexico. In reply to the Americans' suggestions that they accept the favorable terms, secured by United States efforts on their behalf, that were forthcoming in the Niagara Conference, the Mexicans stated that settlement of Mexican internal affairs in which the United States was a part would not be acceptable.

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21 Señores Luis Cabrera, Iglesias Calderón, and José Vasconcelos.

Carranza's delegates further refused to abide by any decisions of mediation even if it was exactly what they wanted. In the words of the United States commissioners, "They [Carranza's delegates] declined to discuss names or propose names for provisional president, saying that no one would be satisfactory that was appointed by the Mediators, even if it was Carranza himself, because anything that came from the Mediators would not be accepted by their party or by the Mexican people." 23

The Niagara Conference was unquestionably a failure. It did not touch the problems that prompted its inception, nor did it resolve the more broad objectives mediated at the insistence of the United States, for the only Mexican party capable of implementing civil reforms was the non-participating Constitutionalists. The conference adjourned on July 2, 1914, after the United States commissioners and Huerta's delegates had signed a protocol agreeing to the resignation of Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico, which was devoid of significance; for the ousting of Huerta and the ascendancy of Carranza were almost certain without a conference. 24 On July 15, 1914, Huerta resigned and appointed as his successor,


Francisco Carbajal. Shortly thereafter, Huerta left Puerto México for European exile abroad the ship that had carried Díaz to exile and had triggered United States intervention, the Ypiranga.

The question arises as to whether Wilson wanted the Niagara Conference to be a success or a failure. He could have restored the Arms Embargo Act and effected a status quo between the Constitutionalists and the Federal forces, thereby bringing pressure to bear on Carranza and forcing him to accept mediation. Had he done so, he would have aroused the wrath of the Constitutionalists and deprived them of a rallying asset that accompanied military victory. According to José Vasconcelos, Wilson "was not loath to see the Niagara Conference converted into a failure."25 However, as subsequent events indicated, Wilson had no intention of losing a directing hand in Mexico, and it is inconceivable that he intended to allow Carranza unfettered control of Mexico. He therefore insured the military victory of the Constitutionalists by supplying them arms, while demanding concessions at Niagara which seemingly embodied everything that they could desire. He hoped that Carranza would enter the conference at the last minute and accept his proffer of "kindness," and in return, Wilson could strive for the socio-economic reforms he felt were necessary for Mexico by manipulating Carranza.

Wilson's predicament after the Buffalo, New York, meeting is superbly presented by Professor Arthur S. Link:

Carranza's absolute refusal to allow Wilson to use the ABC mediation to settle the civil war . . . was final and complete proof that the Revolution was out of American control. And it was out of control at the very moment when the cumulative effect of American policies were making possible the triumph of the revolutionary forces. In short, Wilson had made possible the success of a movement for which he had assumed responsibility before the British government, yet over which he could exercise no real direction. 26

Almost immediately following Huerta's resignation, an irreparable split occurred between Villa and Carranza. Although the breach between the Constitutionalist leaders was to plunge Mexico into another civil war, it was regarded by Bryan and Wilson as not altogether unfortunate, and "the deposing of Carranza and the enthroning of Villa now became the chief objective of the American government." 27 Wilson's support of Villa was completely inconsistent with his concepts of morality, for Villa "was guilty of . . . wanton killings without number which spared neither sex, age, nor class, . . . Pulling Chinese apart with horses was one of his diversions." 28 This unfortunate error in judgment on Wilson's part was due to Villa's willingness

26 Link, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 127-128.

27 Ibid., p. 129.

to be a tool of Wilsonian diplomacy and his support of the United States occupation of Vera Cruz, as well as American disaffection for the stubbornness of Carranza. As a consequence of this decision, John Lind was dismissed because of his pro-Carranza sentiment and replaced by an able lawyer, Paul Fuller. Fuller was sent to Mexico with a Wilsonian proposal for the establishment of a new provisional government. The Mexican revolutionary leaders met at Aguascalientes, Mexico, on October 12, 1914, to organize a compromise government; however, Villa dominated the conference and chose General Eulalio Guiterrez, a Villista, as President. Carranza withdrew from the conference followed by the most able Mexican generals and the civil war continued with the United States diplomatically supporting the forces of Villa. 29

On June 23, 1915, Robert Lansing became Secretary of State, and through his direction coupled with the disastrous defeat of Villa by Álvaro Obregón, formal recognition was extended to Venustiano Carranza on October 19, 1915. Although the United States did not have control of the situation in Mexico, Wilson knew that the war in Europe would occupy the attention of foreign countries, who, without this diversion, might agitate for intervention in Mexico to protect their investments. Furthermore, in the event of United States involvement in World War I, it would be well to have a friendly nation on its southern border.
CONCLUSIONS

A major departure from the traditional American policy of recognition occurred during the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. To determine the legitimacy of a government on the basis of morality, constitutionality, democratic principles, or any criterion other than its ability to maintain law, order, stability, and its power to meet international obligations, creates a perilous diplomatic situation. If a nation, such as the United States, denies de facto recognition to a government on premises not adhered to by other sovereign states, it places that nation in the untenable position of ultimately altering its own criteria of recognition or enjoining other nations into an acceptance of its own independent policy. Wilson was able to accomplish the latter, not because Great Britain accepted United States principles of recognition, but because the relative economic and military strength of the United States and Mexico made cordial relations with the first feasible, at the risk of incurring enmity of the second. A nation must pursue a policy aimed at the optimum realization of its own objectives, whatever these objectives may be, which accounts for Great Britain's tacit approval for Wilson's policy, although it was wholly inconsistent with its own established policy of recognition.

If Woodrow Wilson was determined to use moral criteria as a base for recognition, which he was, it was illogical to destroy Huerta unless he could be supplanted by someone more moralistic.
"Pancho" Villa or Venustiano Carranza, the leading contenders to succeed Huerta, certainly did not meet this requirement. Wilson's lack of acuity of foreign affairs is to a degree excusable, for he did not profess to be an expert on this subject, and his Presidential platform was oriented toward domestic issues. Although Wilson justifiably distrusted Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, his decision to employ John Lind and John Bayard Hale, emissaries without diplomatic experience and as lacking in sound knowledge of foreign affairs as himself, was an unfortunate error in judgment, for it was his unquestionable prerogative to recall Ambassador Wilson. The fact that Henry Lane Wilson was allowed to remain in Mexico for five months after the establishment of the Provisional Government of Victoriano Huerta attests to the indecisiveness of "watchful waiting" diplomacy, however, it is to Wilson's credit that he resisted for a time the demands of the expansionists and the advocates of direct intervention.

Military intervention was precipitated by ulterior motives on the part of both Woodrow Wilson and Huerta. The arrest of the American sailors in the whale boat at Tampico was undeniably a violation of extraterritorial rights, but a violation that a powerful nation could overlook after an immediate apology was presented by a state torn by civil war. The "arrest" of the United States paymaster and the detention of confidential information to the American Embassy were intentionally released to United States Congressmen and to the American public as inflammatory propaganda to justify
intervention and to insure United States direction of Mexican internal reforms. Huerta's motives for bickering over the terms of the salute were aimed at precipitating American intervention, for with both Mexican coasts blockaded and with the Constitutionalists' right to procure munitions from the United States, Huerta's political demise was inevitable. The invasion of Mexico by the "Colossus of the North" was his only chance of survival, for he hoped it would unite all Mexican factions against a common enemy.

The Niagara Conference was an excellent opportunity for the United States to mollify Latin-American suspicions of its imperialistic designs, but the original purpose of the conference, settlement of the Tampico incident, was circumvented by the United States. The fact that the Constitutionalists were never a party to the mediation reduced the significance of it to farcical proportions and frustrated Woodrow Wilson's desire to insure domestic reforms in Mexico.
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