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The Role of American Tyranny in Iran's Nuclear Production: The Framework of Public Law 112-158 Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011

Kimberly Jones

Fort Hays State University, kljones9@mail.fhsu.edu

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THE ROLE OF AMERICAN TYRANNY IN IRAN'S NUCLEAR PRODUCTION:
THE FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC LAW 112-158
IRAN THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2011

being

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays State University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Liberal Studies

by

Kimberly Jones
B.S., Troy University

Date _____

Approved _____
Major Professor

Approved _____
Chair, Graduate Council

ABSTRACT

The use of war pretext in foreign policy has been studied for decades. Several theories have established how pretext are used to manage public opinions about war. Arguably, the U.S. government uses pretext to obscure the awkwardness of justifying aggressive or offensive activities to the public. U.S. accusations of Iran's development of nuclear weapons give justification for imposing economic sanctions, but it is an act of war. Public Law 112-158 penalizes states that pay Iran for its oil. Given its current economic weakness, the U.S. government must wield its military power to retain its global preeminence. Oil that is not traded in dollars threatens to collapse the U.S. economic system and the dollar's dominance as the world's currency. This paper contends that Public Law 112-158 is a war pretext to escalate plans to attack Iran. The U.S. government is ultimately fighting for its continued hegemonic existence.

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DEDICATION

For Gregory, Kalil, Malia, DeLaneo, Takoda, Nitika, Iona, and baby J.

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INTRODUCTION

“The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny, and it is useless for the innocent to try by reasoning to get justice, when the oppressor intends to be unjust”
(Aesop's Fables, 1881).

Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are a topic that has been discussed world-wide. Media outlets report that a U.S. war with Iran is looming from years of tense relations. For 33 years, the U.S. has imposed an unprecedented amount of sanctions on Iran’s economy for illicit nuclear activity. The most recent sanctions were signed into law by President Barack Obama on August 12, 2012 under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. Also known as Public Law 112-158, this act aims to compel Iran to “abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities” through the use of rigorous economic sanctions (GovTrack, 2012).

Generally, sanctions are meant as punitive measures to pressure state governments to change their principles or actions. Current sanctions under Public Law 112-158 prohibit trade under the Export Administration Act (EAA)¹ and financing from U.S. Export-Import Bank². U.S. sanctions have caused Iran severe economic struggles,

¹The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) provides the President the legal authority to control U.S. exports for reasons of national security, foreign policy, and/or short supply (<http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/antiboycottcompliance.htm>).

²Export-Import Bank is the official U.S. export credit agency responsible for financing exports of goods and services to international markets.

but remain ineffective in softening political leaders based in Tehran³. To the Western world, Public Law 112-158 sanctions are evidence of White House leaders' latest efforts to counter Iran's nuclear program. This paper argues that Public Law 112-158 is a pretext for war with rising hegemonic challenger Iran to maintain America's hegemony.

This paper argues that sanctions enforced by Public Law 112-158 are debatable, because no nuclear weapons have been found within Iran's borders. Additionally, the country's current defense systems are limited in their weapons range capabilities (see Figure 2). The research of this paper will show that U.S. sanctions implemented against Iran intend to eliminate it as a hegemonic challenger and not as a nuclear threat. The patterns of behavior exhibited by the U.S. government lend credit to the argument of this paper. The U.S. hegemony is rapidly declining, which is cause for increased military incursions in the Middle East (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) to dominate weaker states and increase its political influence.

White House leaders are certain that Iran's nuclear energy program is the base for the development of nuclear weapons. Suspicions about Iran's nuclear intentions present a problem for the national security of the West and its key allies. Israel has threatened to launch its own nuclear attack against Iran - fearing that the U.S. government is not aggressive enough. For U.S. government leaders, the fear is that effect that adverse policies might have on Iran's oil industry. Neither the President nor Congress want to run the risk of increasing oil prices that is sure to cause another economic collapse. Right now, steady oil prices are critical to the U.S. economy rebounding from financial ruin.

³The capital and largest city of Iran, in the north-central part of the country south of the Caspian Sea (www.thefreedictionary.com/Tehran).

By international law, Iran has the legal right to develop nuclear fuel for civilian energy. Unlike Pakistan, India, and Israel – countries that have nuclear weapons - Iran is a NPT signatory. The country's nuclear program began in 1950 under the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi⁴ (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). The shah's nuclear ambitions went dormant after the Revolution in 1979⁵, but scientists had already developed basic nuclear capabilities (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). The program was later resurrected during the 1990s under Shah Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini⁶. Under a new shah, Iran began exploring natural nuclear fuel cycles through uranium mining⁷ (see Figures 3 and 4). To date, Iran has produced over 17,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium to five percent and uranium hexafluoride⁸ to 20 percent since 2010 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). Enrichment levels for uranium in nuclear weapons usually contain levels greater than 85 percent (Arms Control Associations, 2013). The last International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)⁹ report issued on May 22 found Iran culpable for continued enrichment activities. Still, Iran's history of compliance to regular inspections quickly overshadowed the notion that the country was willfully pursuing a nuclear weapons program. IAEA officials even went on record claiming that if Iran were to divert uranium to develop a nuclear weapon, the agency would know within a week's

4Islamic Revolution was the overthrow of Iran's monarchy and establishment of an Islamic Republic (<http://www.chegg.com/homework-help/definitions/islamic-revolution-47>).

5Used formerly as a title for the hereditary monarch of Iran (www.thefreedictionary.com/shah).

6Ruhollah Mostafavi Musavi Khomeini (1902–1989) was leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the country's first Supreme Leader (highest ranking political and religious authority of the nation).

7Uranium mining is the process of extraction of uranium ore from the ground which is commonly used as fuel for nuclear power plants.

8Uranium hexafluoride is a compound used in the uranium enrichment process that produces fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/uranium+hexafluoride>).

9The International Atomic Energy Agency was founded on 29 July 1957 – as an international organization to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and inhibit its use for any military purpose.

time (2013). Analysis of Iran's intentions and U.S. foreign policy is provided in the following review of literature from expert scholars.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This paper argues that Public Law 112-158¹⁰ is best understood as a war pretext to preserve America's global hegemony. As explained by economic analyst Richard DuBoff, a global hegemony exist when “one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing, regulating, and stabilizing the world’s political economy” (2003, para. 1). The U.S. government has assumed that sole responsibility for the past few decades, but is it a real global hegemony?

International Program Studies scholar Yannis Stivachtis argues that America’s global hegemony is a contradiction (in terms of power). For Stivachtis, the U.S. is a unilateral act that pursues its own ideological interests. Pointing to Iran, Stivachtis argues that Western leaders must recognize “the legal equality of all states” and that “norms [are] negotiated, not dictated” (Stivachtis, 2013, para. 16).

Stivachtis claims that U.S. sanctions simply reflect “a dominant state’s brute capacity to lay down the rules” rather than a hegemony whose rule is widely recognized and accepted. Thus, hegemony power is held among the weaker states and not over them, but do other political scholars agree? Is the U.S. a true hegemonic power with legitimate concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions? Or is the U.S. an all-consuming capitalistic empire that makes international order pointless? Maybe, but these questions cannot be answered without first examining other leading expert theories about global

¹⁰Former bill House of Representatives 1905 Iran Threat Reduction Act introduced by Congressional Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Republican - Florida), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, alongside Howard L. Berman (Democrat - California), Committee Ranking member on May 16, 2011 (Govtrack.us, 2011).

hegemony and its effect on foreign policy matters. Scholars Immanuel Wallerstein, George Moldeski, and Abramo Organski each discuss past hegemon through their own empirical observations (see Figure 5). Wallerstein's World System School identified the Netherlands (1618-1648), Great Britain (1792-1815), and the U.S. (1914-1945) as global hegemony powers secured by 30-year long wars (1618-1648, Dutch defeats Hapsburgs; 1792-1815, British defeats French; and 1914-1945, U.S. defeats Germany) (Goldstein, 2006). Wallerstein claimed that each war brought major interstate reforms that created hegemonic stability until decline and another 30-year war.

Similar to Wallerstein's theory, Modelski's Leadership Cycle School observed Portugal (1494-1517), the Netherlands (1579-1609), Great Britain (1688-1713, 1792-1815), and the U.S. (1914-1945) as dominant powers that rose from global wars (Goldstein, 2006). Noticeably, Modelski's and Wallerstein's theories differ, but both scholars' agree that the weak behavior of government leaders were the main cause of the wars. Yet, Organski's Power Transition School also observed that political and economic stability between contending states increased wars (2006). Thus, peace existed when there was an imbalance of national capabilities between nations. Organski explained that even though the weaker states produce aggressors, the dominant state maintains its hegemony through the power and control of resources (Goldstein, 2006).

For the argument of this paper, Organski's theory is best supportive. The research of this paper claims that the U.S. global hegemony is dependent on its control of vital

resources (e.g. oil) in the Middle East. By maintaining control of the Persian Gulf and the oil business, the U.S. government is able to dominate other weaker states.

Scholar Robert Gilpin's hegemonic stability theory supports Organski's theory and the research of this paper. According to Gilpin, the dominant state must enforce rules of behavior among the most critical members of the system to maintain its power (Goldstein, 2006). Gilpin's theory may help explain why the U.S. government has used economic sanctions against Iran. It is far from illuminating why punitive actions were enforced against the production of nuclear weapons that are nonexistent. Gilpin claims that the U.S. government is a collective goods system dogged by free rider nations (2006). Those nations that avoid the cost of shared benefits are the cause of imbalances and uneven growths of power that undermine the dominant state.

Case in point, the U.S., as the dominant state, is threatened not by Iran's nuclear program, but its control of oil resources causing an imbalance of sorts. This in turn, increases hegemonic pretenders (e.g., North Korea, India, and Pakistan) that emerge from the shadows to challenge the U.S. hegemony as an unfair and unequal rival power. Gilpin points out that the attributes of a hegemony rest upon its economic growth and expansion (2006). The U.S. hegemony dominates weaker states through technology, economic businesses, and political influence supported by a strong military presence (Goldstein, 2006).

Many political experts would agree that the U.S. government is the leading power among states, but not to the fact that it was ever or is now a real hegemony or empire. Scholarly debates comparing the U.S. empire to past hegemony countries are one key

factor in determining if the U.S. hegemony exists. Few scholars have studied the existence of past hegemony countries, so early references to the Roman and British empires are poorly contrasted.

According to historian Walter Scheidel, the Rome city-state hegemony (202 to 189 BC) was created through de-facto unifications and direct conquest (148 to 30 BC) (2006). Thus, the size of the republic demanded a conversion to an empire and further division (see Figure 6). In the end, the Western Roman Empire fell in 476 to the Goths and the Byzantine Empire fell in 1453 to the Ottomans (Trueman, 2000).

In comparing the U.S. hegemony to the Roman Empire, the research shows that Rome was conquered. Whereas, the U.S. hegemony ended by internal uprisings and voluntary withdrawals in several wars (e.g., civil and foreign). Other key differences found show that leaders of the Roman Empire inherited their rule under an authoritarian republic. The U.S. government was more liberal and selected its leaders democratically. Last, the continents conquered by Rome spanned only European territories, but the U.S. hegemony conquered lands as far as Asia, Australia, and North America.

The next past hegemony researched is the Mongol Empire. This empire was the largest adjoining domain in past history (see Figure 7) (Rogers & Johnson, 2011). The Mongols achieved advancements in technology and ideology until 1331 when the Black Death rampage and annexation by Russia brought about its decline (Rogers & Johnson,

2011). The only significant likeness that the Mongol Empire has to the U.S. hegemony is its large government and invasion of foreign lands.

Another comparison made to the U.S. hegemony is the Russian Empire. This absolute monarchy was the last of its kind in Europe. The empire covered over 9 million square miles of territory (see Figure 8) (Rogers & Johnson, 2011). In 1917, the Russian Revolution completely destroyed the entire Russian monarchy (Rogers & Johnson, 2011). Again, there are few similarities shared between the U.S. hegemony and past empires except for the fact that they all created large governments and conquered vast territories. The same is true for the Russian Empires comparison to the U.S. hegemony.

The last comparison made to the U.S. hegemony is the British monarchy. This monarchy is known as the largest empire in history. The British monarchy covered over 13 million square miles (see Figure 9) of territories, protected states, and assigned regions (Rogers & Johnson, 2011). Although this great empire took nearly three centuries to establish, its final decline occurred within a matter of years. The financial burdens of World War I, Japan's incursion during World War II, and loss of India in 1947 ended Britain's hegemony (Rogers & Johnson, 2011). By far, the British Empire is most compatible to the current U.S. hegemony, but both powers were greatly influenced by imperial expansion of its territories, and the free trade market in producing and exporting goods. Both of these powers also used military force to maintain their sovereignty over other polities.

All of these comparisons of past empires to the U.S. hegemony show some similar behaviors, but over-stressing their likeness can obscure the important differences

that have paved the way for change. Both the U.S. and British governments took centuries to transform from colonialism to decolonization and national sovereignty. There has also been a trend on a human social and cultural level that has enlightened other past hegemony powers in their challenge to gain power and wealth. In short, hegemony powers are complex institutions of social movement that deserve intense research and study.

The question of whether the U.S. is a true hegemony by comparing it to past empires and hegemony powers remains debatable. For the argument of this paper, if the term hegemony is adequate to describe the U.S. government's rise to power and control, then the argument can also be made about its behavior to maintain that hegemony power. The U.S. is known for its commitment to democracy and the execution of its powers for global good, so it is very easy for scholars quickly identify it as a global hegemony. However, that same influence that U.S. political groups have had on foreign nations for centuries is slowly diminishing. Today's U.S. economy no longer dominates the global market, but like past hegemony powers (e.g. Britain and Russia), it is still a leading nation among other nations.

The U.S. hegemony or empire (Figure 10) began in 1945 following World War II. With its major industrial powers intact, the U.S. economy produced and outsold all other nations to dominate the trade and industry sectors (Wallerstein, 2006). By 1950, the U.S. supplied fifty percent of the world's gross product (see Figure 11). The U.S. military

was also the strongest armed force power in the world. During that time, the U.S. economy was booming and the fruits of prosperity made new cars, suburban houses, and other consumer goods available to more people than ever before.

The U.S. global hegemony current status shows a steep decline from too few shares of the world's trade market. U.S. supremacy in technical fields continues to dwindle. Even the foreign currency market strangles the dollar's standing as the world's reserve tender. Between 1980 and 1985, the dollar's value decreased 40 percent (see Figure 17) making U.S. exports more expensive and foreign imports (U.S. Department of State, 2013).

Distinguished international affairs scholar Christopher Lane contributes these changes to China's economic bloom (The Economist, 2012). China's economy has increased its productivity at a rate of 10 percent a year since the 1990s. By 2005, China had displaced the U.S. workforce in several areas of production and manufacturing (The Economist, 2012). In 2012, the total U.S. trade deficit calculated at 42 billion dollars (see Figure 12) with 1.75 billion in exports and 2.4 billion in imports (see Figure 13) (The Economist, 2012).

This data not only shows that the U.S. economy lacks balance, but also mature growth for a better future. Instead of being driven by exports and investments, the U.S. was led by its own greed and consumption in imports and spending into debt. Even though America exports billions in oil, consumer goods, and automotive products, it imports even more. Therefore, U.S. exports now cause huge deficits in the country's trade balance, because of the rapid consumption of imported foreign goods. As of late,

the U.S. has reduced itself to mainly importing consumer products from China over exports (see Figure 14).

Similarly, U.S. technological advancements have dramatically decreased as manufacturing jobs continue to relocate to China. Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Research, Robert Scott links this industrial employment decline to trade policy shifts within the East Asia nation. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization with a 4.3 percent share of world exports (Scott, 2012). By 2010, China's shares were up 11 percent to make it the world's biggest exporter of trade goods (Scott, 2012) (see Figure 15). At the same time, over 2.7 million U.S. jobs were displaced – 11.5 thousand of them were in manufacturing (Scott, 2012). In 2010, China became the world's largest manufacturing country (see Figure 16) (Scott, 2012).

Following the global recession in 1981, the U.S. dollar depreciated in value as the nation mended itself. Then huge federal budget deficits had created a demand in U.S. foreign capital, and interest rates increased the dollar's market value. Financial expert Andy Singh disclosed that world leaders have called for a new global currency (2009). China is a major pusher behind this reform as they currently hold over 2 trillion dollars of U.S. debt (Singh, 2009).

Since 1990, the inflow of foreign direct investments has slowed (see Figure 18) as the U.S. dollar continues to erode with irregular periods of revival. Although the U.S. no longer dominates the global economy, it is still a leading power much like past

hegemonies (e.g. Britain, Russia). However, China has displaced U.S. in several areas of production and manufacturing over the past several decades. Distinguished scholar Christopher Lane acknowledged that through the mid-1980s and late 1990s, China's economy had bloomed at a rate of 10 percent a year and 8 to 9 percent from the 1990s to 2005. Lane stated that, "if China can continue to sustain near-double digit growth rates in the early decades of this century, it will surpass the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by gross domestic product)" (2008, p. 13). To a great extent, the U.S. government's performance over the next decade depends on the competitive position of this country in the global economy.

The U.S. economy also wanes in the oil industry. From the Natural Resources Defense Council, energy expert Ralph Cavanagh reported that U.S. trade markets were paying 390 million dollars daily for foreign oil (2004). This means that half of every U.S. dollar spent was profited by OPEC, while only a quarter was profited by companies in the Persian Gulf (Cavanagh, 2004). Additionally, those same profits were not reinvested into the U.S. economy, but rather pocketed by member states to control oil prices for increased private profits. The U.S. government was desperate to find alternative fuel sources when oil imports doubled after 1985 (see Figure 19).

While the power of the U.S. hegemony steadily declined, leaders in Washington increased foreign incursions into Middle East territories. This odd behavior was characterized by history scholar Alfred McCoy as normal hegemony conduct. McCoy

attributed the U.S. increased military presence in foreign nations to a phenomenon known as “micro-militarism” (2010). McCoy defined micro-militarism as “psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories” (2010, para. 32).

Arguably, U.S. military invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan were justified to fight terrorism, but the defeat has been slow. Additionally, President Obama has increased the size of troops deployed and extended military obligations to 2014 (see Figure 20). Like this war and many others, the U.S. has justified intervening in foreign countries to defend civilian populations, fight for freedom and democracy, oppose terrorism, and keep the peace since the early 1990s (see Appendix A). However, these so-called interventions have increased defense spending budgets since 2001. In fact, Department of Defense (DoD) records show that the U.S. government spends more on national security and weapons technology than healthcare or Social Security (2012).

Current economic spending trends indicate that over six hundred billion dollars will be spent for defense by 2014 (Department of Defense, 2013). This is good news for recently appointed Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. The new Defense Secretary warned Congress that military cuts were unacceptable (Lardner, R. & Cassata, D., 2013). Hagel’s reasoning against defense cuts resonated with his predecessor’s Leon Panetta’s argument that military spending cuts would reduce troop (Lardner, R. & Cassata, D., 2013). This essentially would put the country’s security at even greater risk.

Not since 1991, at the end of the Cold War with Russia, has the U.S. been challenged with nuclear threats so vital to national security interests. Yet, Department of Defense (DoD) records (Base Structure Report 2005) reveal that the U.S. currently maintains over 770 military bases in 39 countries (not including Afghanistan and Iraq). Supplemental records for active duty military strengths (by regional area and country) showed that over 300,000 soldiers have deployed to 145 countries (Department of Defense, 2005). States powerful enough to challenge the U.S. (e.g., China) lack the motivation to carry out any resistance, because they are accommodated by the current hegemony system.

If there is truly no credible challenger to this exceptionalism, then what pretext does the U.S. have for increased defense spending or economic sanctions against Iran? Is it to sustain America's hegemony through a preeminent military presence? Or is it to maintain control over the Persian Gulf waterways that transport valuable oil for U.S. consumption? Maybe, but all of these and other possible stronger motivations must also be explored.

In the words of British scholar Isaac D'Israeli in *Curiosities of Literature*, "When we mistake the characters of men, we mistake the nature of their actions, and we shall find in the study of secret history, that some of the most important events in modern history were produced from very different motives than their ostensible ones" (Moxon, 1854). If D'Israeli is right, then the strength of this study will help educate the public by exposing the truth of how pretext have been used to marshal support for private wars.

The hoped for outcome is that the U.S. government, whether as a hegemony or empire, works towards creating an efficient global government with other nations. Current U.S. government policies continue to fight a frustrated and skeptic public with pretext for resolving foreign policy issues. As previously stated, a pretext begins with a policy decision, which is followed by a provocation used to validate policy. The pretext obscures unfavorable features of an unpopular policy, so the government is seen reacting to a national security threat. The objective is to manage the public's opinion with determined influence so to gain support for political party programs.

This paper reviews literature that supports the theory that Public Law 112-158 is a war pretext against Iran to maintain the U.S. hegemony. The argument of this paper is that U.S. policy-makers use pretext to justify debatable actions. The U.S. government justified the need for aggressive and costly military wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to fight terrorism and spread democracy. However, war is not a product that is easily sold without a carefully devised strategy or campaign in the form of a pretext.

Identifying himself as an economic determinist, David Gibbs' contends that a pretext allows the government needs "to create a favorable political climate to sell policies of militarization and external expansion to the public" (2004, p. 1). Gibbs claims that the Project for the New American Century (PNAC)¹¹ is best at promoting American foreign policy internationally to maintain global superiority (2004). PNAC's ideological

¹¹ Established in the spring of 1997 and funded largely by the energy and arms industries, the *Project for the New American Century* was founded as the neoconservative think tank whose stated goal was to usher in a "new American century" (http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_PNAC01.htm).

blueprint is a four-fold agenda that capitalizes on military forces and funds to power the U.S. hegemony and corporate privatizations globally (Gibbs, 2004). PNAC Chairman William Kristol's public statements are purposely aimed at rallying support for its principled policy¹² of U.S. international involvement (Project for the New American Century, n.d.). The end result - the public is stimulated with false pretexts and responds with less pragmatism about the use of military force.

International law scholar Ryan Goodman makes a different case for the practical use of pretext involving military force with his constructionist viewpoint. Goodman's theory argues that legalizing the use of military force as a Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention (UHI)¹³ is ethical. The main belief is that this kind of war pretext could eventually stop inter-state violence against citizens. The problem with Goodman's case is that U.N. Security Council approval is not required for UHI execution. This makes many world political leaders doubtful about the use of force disguised as an exercise of humanitarian intervention to facilitate peace (2006).

For Goodman, UHI is a means to achieve a goal, but the manner in which that goal is achieved is not as conservative as politicians would like. In his defense,

12 PNAC statement of principles outlined fourfold agenda includes (1) an increase to military budget at the expense of domestic social programs, (2) toppling of regimes resistant to corporate interests, (3) forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun in regions that have no history of the democratic process, and (4) replacing the UN's role of preserving and extending international order (http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_PNAC01.htm).

13 Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights (<http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf>, 2006).

Goodman argues that “compared to the existing baseline of interstate disputes that might escalate into war between such aggressor and defending states - the net effect on war would be [more] desirable” (2006, p. 110).

Both Gibbs and Goodman’s views are quite diverse, but they agree that war pretexts are tools used to gain public acceptance of the government foreign policy decisions. The majority of Goodman’s research is based on empirical patterns of interstate conflicts and state governments. The causes of war analyzed are based on a small collection of political science studies. Goodman fully examines whether laws that regulate military power might contribute to interstate wars.

However, Goodman’s claims seem uncertain, because he assumes that his position on UHI is the right. The theory that pretexts should be retired if UHI is not legalized (to discourage war) is a one-sided argument. Goodman’s focus is heavily concentrated on the potential abuses of UHI as a law. Therefore, concerns about how this might create new incentives to bypass the UN Security Council reservations are ignored.

Gibbs’ case studies also appear less convincing, because his research is focused on pretext use in North Korea’s invasion of South Korea (1950), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Without the mention of any external theories about war pretext, Gibbs’ study lacks objectivity and detail.

Similar to Gibbs' theory, scholar Michel Chossudovsky¹⁴ claims that every war has a pretext (2012). Chossudovsky cites examples of the U.S. government's war history to demonstrate his point, but his information is limited to a handful of conflicts.

Richard Sanders, founder of the Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade¹⁵, collaborated with Chossudovsky in his research of U.S. war pretext. Both researchers maintained a socialist perspective in studying the repeated historical patterns of war pretext. Sanders and Chossudovsky also shared the belief that America's political leaders falsely justified the use of military force. The war pretexts included in their research spanned timeframe from 1846 to 1989. Conflicts were chosen at random. Brief descriptions proposed the theoretical use of war pretexts for each conflict. In review of their case studies, both Sanders and Chossudovsky appeared increasingly sympathetic to the political left-wing causes.

Similar to the method used by Sander's and Chossudovsky, the research conducted for this paper begins with asking - who stands to benefit from a pretext for war. The intent of this paper is not to promote skepticism in the U.S. government, but to arouse a widespread public interest in the consistent patterns of pretext use prior to military engagement. Since the causes for war are infinite, justification is a necessity. In many world-cultures and religions, the killing of another human is not automatically ruled as self-defense. Rather an explanation or defense is provided. Ideally, Goodman's military intervention against genocide or comparable atrocities is rational. However, the

14 Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal (<http://progressivepress.com/author/michel-chossudovsky>, 2012).

15 COAT began in 1989 with exposing and opposing ARMX, Canada's largest weapons bazaar (<http://coat.ncf.ca/>, 2012).

potential argument is that there is more to pretexts than political leaders marshaling support for wars in foreign countries.

According to scholar Barry Posen's structural realist theory, America's primacy depends heavily on military power to preserve its dominant global position (2003). Posen maintains that the command of the commons (sea, space, and areas that do not belong to any one state) provides the need for hegemony with a strong foreign policy (2003). This is because the resources of Allies are usually fully exploited to intimidate adversaries with the ability to wage war in short order (e.g., 199 Persian Gulf War, 1993 Somalia intervention, 2001 Afghanistan) (Posen, 2003). This provides the U.S. a way out of taxing its own military might.

Adversaries are also weakened by U.S. restrictions placed on their access to economic, military, and political assistance through Ally businesses (e.g., Turkey penalized for financial transactions with Iran). Additionally, short wars waged on other countries were accomplished without maintaining a permanent military presence (e.g., 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan). Allies provide bases that represent crucial stepping stones for U.S. military powers to transit the foreign territories.

Command of the Commons also helps to increase the disparity in economic power between the U.S. and its challengers. The expenditures of the U.S. Department of Defense continue to dwarf the spending of other nation's military budgets. In fact, the Military Balance 2012 reported U.S. defense spending for 2011 at 739 billion dollars. Compared to the combined totals for China at 90 billion dollars and Russia at 53 billion dollars, the U.S. defense budget operates at a level completely independent of its potential adversaries.

Posen contends that great power of the U.S. military makes its hegemony policy practical. However, he also points out that preventive war is not easy to sell to other nations, because it requires a unilateral global offensive capability (Posen, 2003). The requirement for a military of a nation to act alone is offset with the Command of the Commons. The collective goods created by this strategy help the U.S. to manage world trade, travel, global communications and more. All of those things depend on the peace and order maintained in the commons, so other nations realize that they benefit from the U.S. global position of power.

Like Posen, international scholar Robert Gilpin also takes a realist approach in arguing that hegemony is about maintaining economic and political dominance (1981). While the shift in the balance of power weakens an existing government, the power gained by another country allows for greater expansion and increased benefits (Gilpin, 1981). According to Gilpin, the imbalance created can only be resolved through war between the hegemony and challenger (1981).

Gilpin maintains that the world tends toward equilibrium, but distribution of authority and benefits is skewed by military power (2003). However, balance among powers and states are not constant, so the inability to restore balance usually results in war (Gilpin, 2003). Although Gilpin's theory is very broad and less empirical, his points about the distribution of power are helpful to understanding the fundamentals of hegemony power.

Both Posen and Gilpin agree that the U.S. hegemony is based on military and economic powers, but Posen argues that it is not a suitable policy for primacy. Rather, Posen suggest that selective engagement creates conducive conditions to maintain peace and security (2003). Since the protection of the U.S. military is provided to those cooperative states, the Command of the Commons becomes more credible and stronger against potential adversaries.

Unlike Posen and Gilpin's hegemony theories, international relations scholar Peter Gowan claims that the U.S. seeks dominance through capitalism on an international stage. Gowan contends that control of the world's oil (politically) ensures market pricing, payment, and global supremacy of the dollar (2003). So, if oil is central to the U.S. hegemony, then the dollar (acting as the world's currency in oil trade) would keep the demand for its purchase artificially high.

In *The Petrodollar Wars: The Iraq Petrodollar Connection*, Austrian economist Jerry Robinson explains that the increased global demand for oil has led also led to an

increase for U.S. tender (2012). Also known as the petrodollar system¹⁶, this artificially high demand for U.S. currency provides economic benefits for Americans. As such, the Federal Reserve is required to keep an ample supply of U.S. money. The only problem is that this system can only be maintained if the demand for the dollar remains consistently strong. If foreign investors unexpectedly decided to trade goods using other means, then the U.S. would succumb to massive inflationary pressures shocking enough to financially collapse an already fragile economy.

Each of the scholars arguments in this paper contribute significantly to the understanding the connection between America's hegemony and sanctions against Iran's nuclear weapons program. Although there are many disagreements among the expert theories in this paper, all have provided ample research to further educate the American public about the use of pretexts in foreign policy. In this study there is no mistaking that Public Law 112-158 is a pretext for war against Iran to maintain the hegemony of the U.S. government. By asking who benefits from past wars, this study exposes what some might consider as the U.S. government's attempt to disrupt Iran's nuclear weapons program to establish its hegemony in the Middle East states.

In summary, this paper argues that U.S. political leaders have obscured the awkwardness of justifying aggressive military action with information presented in the

¹⁶ The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. The U.S. dollar is the only currency for large scale purchases of oil (<http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jerry-robinson/the-rise-of-the-petrodollar-system-dollars-for-oil>).

form of a pretext. A pretext provides cause for executing a particular course of action in an attempt to conceal the real purpose. The research in this papers shows that U.S. leaders justified the implementation of economic sanctions against Iran's civilian population as necessary. These economic sanctions were enforced not only to deter Iran's nuclear proliferation, but to protect the interest and national security of the U.S. and its allies.

As such, any further aggressive posturing by the U.S. government and military is not interpreted by the American people as acts of war. Rather, the majority of the American public views their government as taking the necessary action to prevent Iran from producing illegal and harmful nuclear weapons. Know that U.S. sanctions work to penalize other states and financial institutions for those conducting business with Iran. While the U.S. appears hostile and intimidating to other nations, Iran's suspicions and mistrust continues to evolve to paranoia levels.

At this point, can the American public blame Iran for its pursuit of a nuclear weapon when Israel has made viable threats to its existence? What about the various sanctions that the U.S. government has put in place to bring about the country's economic ruin for violation of *international* laws set by the U.N. Security Council? The answer is that this kind of approach being made by the U.S. government obstructs any attempt at peaceful negotiations. By appearances, it seems that that the dominance of the U.S. hegemony has been challenged by Iran's nuclear weapons program, which has been cleverly disguised as a civilian nuclear energy program. If this is the case, then President Obama and Congress are not likely to consider a shift in U.S. foreign policy.

This gives way to personal rationalization by the American public that dictates if diplomacy fails, then a military response is *probably* warranted. The dilemma is that a war pretext is needed to justify the use of military force to the public. Justification is also needed for the support of Allies and organizations with an interest in the U.S. government's political decisions. The argument of this paper contends that the pretext used to protect the U.S. hegemony against Iran's nuclear proliferation is Public Law 112-158, Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act.

The research h of this paper makes the case that Public Law 112-158 was not created to daunt Iran's 30-year old nuclear weapons program, but to check its defiance and challenge to the power of the U.S. hegemony. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and other top government officials remain opposed to U.S. global hegemony in the Middle East. Not even ten years has passed since the failed invasion of Iraq as Washington's political leaders' campaign for another war in the Middle East.

The history of how war pretexts have been used to marshal support for ongoing current and past wars may help provide insight into why the U.S. hegemony feels threatened by Iran's pursuit of a civilian nuclear energy program. The following research provides an in-depth analysis of how pretexts have been used to justify past wars.

METHOD

In this empirical inquiry, the focus is on war pretexts and the complex boundaries of events that lead to their occurrence. This thesis uses a descriptive design with multiple-case studies. Conclusions drawn from each case are crossed with other cases for the final deduction. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used.

Yin warns that for case study analysis, reliability and validity are affected when there is too much data (2003). A small group of cases are used in this study to allow the generalization of results to the broad theory of this paper. Yin also advised that the external validity of this type of case study is best achieved through replication and consistency in data collection. The findings in this paper hold up to alternative theories and criticism following Yin's suggested methods.

Further validation of this paper's research methods are achieved through the triangulation method. This concept requires the researcher to (1) use multiple sources of data, (2) create a case study database, and (3) maintain a chain of evidence (Yin, 2003). The rationale for using multiple sources of data in this manner helped to increase the reliability of the data and the integrity of the research process.

The theoretical framework of this study is based on the common characteristics and recurring pattern use of war pretext. Rhetoric used by war organizers that consistently precede combat engagements may include the following:

- (1) high-charged dramatization of an event, (2) reactions exploited by media,
- (3) deliberate provocation of opponents, (4) fabricated or staged adversary violence,

(5) claims of innocent civilians threatened or unjustly harmed, (6) military forces killed during routine activities, and (7) loss of property or equipment to rally public support for war agendas.

For instance, the Revolutionary War (1775-1783) is described by history scholars as a battle between Great Britain and the North American colonists. The pretext provided by the government for the war was the colonists' revolt against taxes. The actual purpose of the colonists fighting was to win their independence from the British government. This purpose qualifies as a rally for public support for the colonists' war agenda. The colonists desired fair and equal treatment by the British government, but war fought was essentially to gain their freedom from British rule.

Research for this study is grounded in peer-reviewed materials in literary form collected from primary and secondary sources. These sources include documents, archival records, physical artifacts, and interviews. Words, posters, and films that have been used throughout history to justify policy and foreign wars are documented in the White House Archives¹⁷ and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)¹⁸ in Washington, D.C.

Excerpts of presidential speeches from the NARA include former President George W. Bush's speech for an aggressive war campaign against Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network (National Archives, 2013). Similarly, a war speech given by President

17 The White House archives information users submit or publish engaging with the White House through official White House pages or accounts (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/privacy/archive>).

18 British ocean liner *RMS Lusitania* primarily ferried people and goods across the Atlantic Ocean between the U.S. and Great Britain (<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/lusitania.htm>).

Roosevelt to Congress of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor (see Appendix B) motivated millions of Americans to enlist (National Archives, 2013). Roosevelt's speech is remembered as a rhetorical masterpiece framing the historical account of an innocent nation's attack by an unprovoked aggressor. Likewise, President Wilson's speech (see Appendix C) advising Congress of Germany's submarine warfare against the British vessel RMS Lusitania¹⁹ encouraged enlistment of young men in the armed forces (National Archives, 2013). The collection of research information was cross-checked with different sources to learn about major war events and main governmental players. Cases chosen for this thesis included events that constituted (1) a major war, (2) involved the U.S. government, and (3) took place between 1775 (Revolutionary War) to 1991 (Persian Gulf War). The 10 case-studies collected revealed support for the theoretical proposition of this paper through logically replicated events.

These war pretext case studies (see Appendix E) were cross-referenced with the war pretext theories from previous scholar research (see Literature Review section). Gibbs' war pretext theory is compatible to 5 of 10 case studies, or 50 percent (see Appendix E, case study 2, 5, 6, 7 and 10). Recall that Gibbs' theory argues a favorable political climate is needed to sell policies of military force and external expansion. The public assumes that the administration has not decided on the need for conflict. At the right time, an event is provided to the public that justifies the necessity of taking military

¹⁹ The National Archives and Records Administration is an independent agency of the United States government charged with preserving and documenting government and historical records and with increasing public access to those documents (<http://www.archives.gov/>).

action. Provided that Gibbs' war pretext theory is correct, then the pretext of the War of 1812, Spanish-American War, WWI, WWII, and the Persian Gulf War were sold to the American public to justify the use of military force. The actual purpose was the preservation of America's hegemony.

Rival war pretext theories like Chossudovsky and Sander's eradication of Communism showed compatibility to 2 of 10, or 20 percent (see Appendix E, case studies 9 and 10). While Gilpin, Goodman, and Posen's war pretext theories applied individually to 1 of 10, or 10 percent (see Appendix E, case studies 1, 3, and 4). Thus, Gibbs' theory is most supportive of this paper's argument about war pretext. Public Law 112-158 is one of many statutes that the U.S. government is using to preserve its global hegemony. The American public believes that there is a danger posed by Iranian's gaining a nuclear weapon.

U.S. laws are tough on blocking nuclear materials trading in the Middle East. However, Iran's civil nuclear energy program does not currently violate the NPT. A quick glance at the to the IAEA's research reactor databases shows that there are 246 operational reactors across 737 countries with enriched uranium above 90 percent ²⁰ (2013). This is not to take away from U.S. suspicions about Iran's nuclear intentions, but rather show the lack of evidence. Iran's sanctioned nuclear program by U.S. political leaders is discussed in the following section.

²⁰ Currently there are 246 operational nuclear reactors across 737 countries that have enriched uranium above 90 percent (National Threat Initiative, 2013). Nuclear weapons experts estimate that 70 tons of HEU is used globally (National Threat Initiative, 2013).

DISCUSSION

The basic analysis of the data supports the argument U.S. government maintains a hegemony advantage over all other nations through a military, political, and economic dominance. Just why has the U.S. government become the most active participant in creating sanctions against Iran? Perhaps encouraging other nations to enact regulations against Iran politically empowers the U.S. government in advancing its hegemonic goals. However, Sanders thoughtfully points out that, “if asked to support a war so a small, wealthy elite could shamelessly profit by ruthlessly exploiting and plundering the natural and human resources in faraway lands, people would just say no” (Sanders, 2012, p. 6).

If the inflammatory assertions about Iran’s nuclear proliferation were aside, what would be the threat? According to the U.S. government, the risk posed by Iran is the trade of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorist. However, the American people should keep in mind that Iran is a midsize country with a population of about 70 million citizens with a per capital income of less than 2,000 dollars a year. Furthermore, Iran has no weapons of mass destruction, and its military forces are far less sophisticated in size and technology than U.S. armed forces.

Perhaps, Iran’s ambitious motivations to build nuclear weapons are generated by their desire for respect, power, and security? This question and others cannot be answered with exact certainty, but the facts should not be overlooked. Sanctions are powerful tools *in* foreign policy, they cannot *create* foreign policy. Rather they provide powerful, but limited means to pressure countries against nuclear proliferation, as part of a broader strategy. This explains why U.S. sanctions implemented as total solutions are

ineffective. So, what other elements of policy are needed to turn sanctions into effective foreign policy? Is it possible that U.S. sanctions at their best could cripple and collapse the economy of Iran? Even if it was possible, would the U.S. really put any country in the position of choosing between a nuclear weapons program and political and economic ruin? These questions cannot be answered with absolute certainty, but it does raise legitimate concerns about both Iran's nuclear intentions and the U.S. government.

The premise that Congress would propose a bill to prevent Iran from proliferating nuclear weapons to terrorists groups for contemptible activities is credible, but the problem is that there is no evidence that Iran has weapons of mass destruction. Rather, they continue to strongly deny allegations of nuclear weaponization and proliferation. The U.S. government plays along with the false intentions of fixing this stalemate, which cannot be resolved with isolation, confrontations, and sanctions until conflict arises.

Apart the numerous resolutions to suspend Iran's nuclear proliferation, the use of oil sanctions and military strikes have proven less than feasible. The U.S. government and other nations must engage wholeheartedly with Iran to talk seriously about the issues at hand. The real hope is that a deal will be agreed upon that will result in Iran's compliance to NPT protocols. For now, a legal trial with an impartial and credible civilian jury may be the only way to bring out the truthfulness of claims made by either side of this nuclear dispute. The outcome that is hoped for regarding the U.S. and Iran situation is discussed in the following section.

CONCLUSIONS


This study analyzed the potential of Public Law 112-158 as a pretext for war. The bulk of the study finds that the U.S. government's war with Iran might be justified by the regime's defiance of Public Law 112-158 economic and financial sanctions. At this time, economic sanctions remain the logical approach for the U.S. government and international community if diplomatic engagements are not successful, but it is too soon to think negatively. Instead, the U.S. government, U.N. Security Council, and other international political entities must continue forward with serious dialogue.

Negotiations between the U.S. and Iran show that diplomatic solutions have not yet been exhausted (see Appendix D). There is no doubt that U.S. officials are aware of that past sanctions have proven unsuccessful in deterring Iran's nuclear ambitions. However, Washington's political elites are convinced that Public Law 112-158 will slow Iran's progression with nuclear technology and eliminate the need for military action.

Specifically, this thesis recommends that (1) U.S. political leaders strengthen and support the U.N. organization goals to mend international relations and trust without nuclear weapons, (2) the U.S. government offer economic incentives for Iranian disarmament of existing nuclear arsenals, and (3) that the U.S. government works tirelessly to provide the political leaders of the Iranian regime with an open platform which to discuss their agenda for nuclear weapons progression. Through credible diplomacy and realistic foreign policies, the U.S. and Iran's widely differing political systems and ideologies can be bridged without the false provocations of war pretexts.

Figure 1


Iran nuclear key sites



Martin, J. (2011)

Figure 2


Estimated ranges of Iranian ballistic missiles



U.S. Department of Defense (2001)

Figure 3


Iran's Nuclear Power Fuel Cycle



1 - Saghand Mine, AEOI; 2 – Esfahan Nuclear Research Center, Fars News Agency/Majid Saeedi; 3 – Natanz Enrichment Facility, Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran; 4 – Esfahan Nuclear Research Center, Fars News Agency/Majid Saeedi; 5 – Bushehr reactor, BBC/AP; A – Electric power lines, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab ; B – Sellafield, UK nuclear waste storage, Getty/AFP, (n.d.)


Figure 4

Nuclear Weapons Fuel Cycle




Manson Benedict, Thomas Pigford and Hans Levi, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, and David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 'Iraq's shop-till-you-drop nuclear program', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 48: 3, and (n.d.)

Figure 5
War/hegemony theory schools




Goldstein, J. (2006)

Figure 6
Roman empire



Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (n.d.)

Figure 7
Mongol empire




Minneapolis Institute of Arts, (n.d.)

Figure 8
Russian empire



Broughton International, 1999


Figure 9
British empire



Beck, R. & Black, L., (2013)

Figure 10


U.S. empire



City of art, (n.d.)

Figure 11

Share of world gross domestic product



Christopher Chase-Dunn, 2002

Figure 12


U.S. international trade in goods and services



Durden, T., (2012)

Figure 13


U.S. trade, imports and exports



U.S. Census Bureau, (n.d.)

Figure 14


U.S. trade with China



Craven, C. (2012)

Figure 15


U.S. exports to China v. rest of world



Perry, M. (2010)

Figure 16

World's largest markets by total manufacturing production



Euro monitor International, (2010)

Figure 17


Trade weighted U.S. dollar index



Board of Governance of the Federal Reserve System, (2012)

Figure 18

Direct investments U.S. and abroad




(in billions of dollars)

U.S. Department of Commerce, (2011)

Figure 19


Net oil imports and price of oil



Stoft, S. (n.d.)

Figure 20

Annualized costs of Iraq and Afghanistan wars



Hellman, C., (2012)

Appendix A

U.S. military interventions

1991	Iraq	Major military operation
1991	Haiti	CIA-backed military coup
1991- 2003	Iraq	Control of Iraqi airspace
1992-1994	Somalia	Special operations forces intervene
1992- 1994	Yugoslavia	Major role in NATO blockade of Serbia and Montenegro
1993-1995	Bosnia	Active military involvement with air and ground forces
1994-1996	Haiti	Troops depose military rulers
1995	Croatia	Krajina Serb airfields attacked
1996-1997	Zaire (Congo)	Marines involved in operations
1997	Liberia	Troops deployed
1998	Afghanistan	Attack on targets in the country
1998	Iraq	Four days of intensive air and missile strikes
1998	Sudan	Air strikes destroy country's major pharmaceutical plant
1999	Yugoslavia	Major involvement in NATO air strikes
2001 – 2013	Afghanistan	Air attacks/ground operations oust Taliban
2001 -	Macedonia	NATO troops shift and partially disarm Albanian rebels
2003 – 2013	Iraq	Invasion ousts government of Saddam Hussein
2004 – 2013	Haiti	CIA-backed forces overthrow President Aristide

Veterans united for truth, (n.d.)

Appendix B

Franklin D. Roosevelt address (excerpts) December 8, 1941

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the **United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.** The **United States was at peace with that nation** and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with the government and its emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese ambassador to the United States and his colleagues delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained **no threat or hint of war or armed attack.** It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the **attack was deliberately planned** many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time, the Japanese government has deliberately sought to **deceive the United States by false statements and expressions** of hope for continued peace. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday, the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Appendix B (cont'd)

Franklin D. Roosevelt address (excerpts) December 8, 1941

Last night, Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last night, the Japanese attacked Wake Island. This morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island. Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.

As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the **American people in their righteous might will win** through to absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but will make very certain that this form of **treachery shall never endanger us again**. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and **our interests are in grave danger**. With confidence in our armed forces - with the unbending determination of our people - we will gain the inevitable triumph - so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the **unprovoked and dastardly attack** by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.

Appendix C

Woodrow Wilson's War Message (excerpts) April 2nd, 1917

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a **moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment** befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away.

When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of February last, I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is **impracticable...** There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now **array** ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

Our object ... is to **vindicate** the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and **autocratic** power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a **concert** of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.

Appendix C (cont'd)

Woodrow Wilson's War Message (excerpts) April 2nd, 1917

We are now about to accept **gage** of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false **pretense** about them...

We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no **indemnities** for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them...

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act **without animus, not in enmity** towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, **the sincere friends of the German people**, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us — however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts...

Appendix D

U.S. - Iran Diplomacy Timeline

- 1980 - U.S. breaks diplomatic ties with Iran
- 1995 - First round of sanctions on Iran
- 2001 - U.S. - Iran cooperate in Afghanistan military operations
- 2002 - U.S. – Iran participate in Bonn Conference in Afghanistan
- 2003 - U.S. rejects Iran bilateral negotiations via Switzerland government
- 2006 - U.S. joins Russia, China, and EU3 (France, Germany, and Great Britain) to offer a Comprehensive proposal to Iran
- 2007 - First talks between U.S. - Iran in 27 years (discussion about Iraq situation)
- 2008 - Revised EU3, Russia, China, and U.S. (also known as P5+1) present the revised June 2006 proposal to Iran in direct meeting
- 2009 - U.S.-Iran fuel swap proposal falls apart
- 2010 - P5 +1 and Iran resume talks in Geneva (December)
- 2011 - P5 +1 and Iran continue talks in Istanbul (January)
- 2012 - P5 +1 and Iran resume talks in Istanbul (April)

Appendix E
Case study matrix

	Event	Background	Actual purpose	Pretext	Supporting theory
1	Revolutionary War (1775-1783)	War between Great Britain and thirteen British colonies of North America	Colonists waged full scale war for independence	Stamp Act 1765, no taxation without representation unconstitutional	Gilpin
2	War of 1812	British impressed American sailors into Royal Navy	Restore American economy and injured prestige	War Hawks call to invade British Canada for political reasons	Gibbs
3	Mexican-American War (1846-1848)	border disputes ensued over Rio Grande Nueces River area	U.S. government expansionism	U.S. belief in God-given right to expand its borders	Posen
4	Civil War (1861-1865)	U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789	firmly redefine the U.S. as a single nation	abolishing the institution of slavery	Goodman
5	Spanish American War (1898-1901)	U.S. intervention to support Cuba and Philippines independence from Spain	new territory promised military bases and foreign influence	<i>USS Maine</i> in Havana harbor in 1898 is bombed by unknown party	Gibbs
6	WWI (1917-1918)	a major European and global conflict	Diplomatic clashes from changes in power	Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare	Gibbs
7	WWII (1941-1946)	Allies and Axis war altered world structure	Diplomatic clashes from changes in power	Japan attack of Pearl Harbor	Gibbs
8	Korean War (1950-1953)	Communist North Korea reunifying with South Korea	To enforce a United Nations end to hostilities	U.S. dedicated to preventing Communism	Chossudovsky, Sanders
9	Vietnam Conflict (1964-1973)	prolonged struggle to unify Vietnam	Modest program of economic and military aid to the French	U.S. dedicated to preventing Communism	Chossudovsky, Sanders
10	Persian Gulf (1990-1991)	Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait	U.S. response to Iraq's invasion/annexation of Kuwait to protect Saudi Arabia oil supplies from similar attack	Persian Gulf vital to world economy and threat to international system	Gibbs

Appendix E

Case study matrix (cont'd)

Supplemental data for war pretext

(1) Revolutionary War (1775-1783)

- “The conflict arose from growing tensions between residents of Great Britain's 13 North American colonies and the colonial government, which represented the British Crown” (2000)²¹.

- “The roots of the Revolutionary War ran deep in the structure of the British empire, an entity transformed, like the British state itself, by the Anglo-French wars of the Eighteenth century” (2000)²².

(2) War of 1812

- “Causes of the war included British attempts to restrict U.S. trade, the Royal Navy’s impressment of American seamen and America’s desire to expand its territory”(2012)²³.

(3) Mexican-American War (1846-1848)

- History scholar Jesús Velasco-Márquez argues that, “The armed conflict between Mexico and the United States from 1846 to 1848 was the product of deliberate aggression

²¹<http://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/page2>

²²http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/American_Revolution.aspx

²³<http://www.history.com/topics/war-of-1812>

Appendix E

Case study matrix (cont'd)

and should therefore be referred to as "The U.S. War against Mexico" (2006)²⁴.

-“The most pressing political issue surrounding war with Mexico had been the potential expansion of slavery. Many pro-war congressional leaders favored battle as a means by which they could increase the influence and lucrative potential of slavery” (2008).

-Henry Clay, 17th century politician and lawyer, asserted that, the Mexican-American war had been waged “to establish or exclude a dynasty; to snatch a crown from the head of one potentate and place it upon the head of another; that it had been often prosecuted to promote alien and other interests than those of the nation whose chief had proclaimed it, as in the case of English wars” (2002).

(1) Civil War (1861-1901)

Pulitzer Prize winning historian Thomas Fleming stated that, “many versions of American History [are] rooted in the very different experiences of each of the ethnic groups and races that make up the American people[...] who believed fervently in the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (2012) .

(2) Spanish-American War

Library of Congress records provide that, “The war heralded the emergence of the United States as a great power, but mostly it reflected the burgeoning national development of

²⁴http://www.pbs.org/keras/mexicanwar/prelude/md_a_mexican_viewpoint.html

Appendix E

Case study matrix (cont'd)

the nineteenth century” and that “neither nation had desired war but both had made preparations as the crisis deepened after the sinking of the Maine” (2011)²⁵.

(4) World War I (1917-1918)

- This war had no sustainable pretext. The war was agreeably listed among various sources as being caused by Germany’s violation of its pledge to suspend unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic.

(5) World War II (1941-1946)

- This war had no sustainable pretext. The war was agreeably listed among various sources as being caused by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

(6) Korean War (1950-1953)

- “American troops had entered the war on South Korea’s behalf. As far as American officials were concerned, it was a war against the forces of international communism itself” (2012)²⁶.

(9) Vietnam Conflict (1964-1973)

- Former Secretary of Defense (of President Richard Nixon), Melvin Laird claimed that, “the infamous pretext for leaping headlong into the Vietnam War was the Gulf of Tonkin incident” (2005)²⁷.

²⁵<http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/trask.html>

²⁶<http://www.history.com/topics/korean-war>

²⁷http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/227/Readings/Laird-%20Iraq_Learning%20the%20Lessons%20of%20Vietnam%20.pdf

Appendix E

Case study matrix (cont'd)

- Global Research scholars, Richard Sanders and Michael Chossudovsky argue that the pretext for this war was that “enemy torpedo boats supposedly attacked a U.S. destroyer, the USS Maddox, in North Vietnam’s Gulf of Tonkin” and that, “this unprovoked attack against a routine patrol threw the U.S. headlong into war” (2002)²⁸.

(7) Persian Gulf (1990-1991)

- Encyclopedia Britannica provided that the war was an “International conflict that was triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990” (2012)²⁹.

Edward J. Marolda, Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center claims that, “U.S. naval forces protected America's interests in the region and helped develop international support for U.S. foreign policy goals” and that “the continuous American military presence in the Persian Gulf demonstrated to potential aggressors that in any confrontation they faced the prospect of war with a superpower” (2012)³⁰.

President Truman’s explained the involvement of the U.S. in the war as required, “to enforce a United Nations resolution calling for an end to hostilities, and to stem the spread of communism in Asia” (2012)³¹.

²⁸greyfalcon.us/restored/How%20to%20Start%20a%20War.htm

²⁹<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/452778/Persian-Gulf-War>

³⁰www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/sword-shield.htm

³¹www.history.com/this-day-in.../truman-orders-us-forces-to-korea

Appendix F

Interview summary

The interviews conducted for this thesis were completed with professionals working at organizations familiar with Iran's nuclear weapons history. Although every effort was made to contact the most experienced and prominent individuals and organizations for input on this thesis topic, only a few positive responses were received. As this study utilized human participants and investigated on real time issues with national security and Iran's activities involving nuclear testing and development, certain issues were considered and addressed. To ensure the privacy as well as the security of the participants, questions were identified in advance. Other issues addressed prior to the interview involved obtaining formal consent from those individuals that volunteered to answer question and the professional use of the information that was provided.

All potential interviewees were appropriate time periods to respond to questions with the option of using the most convenient form of communication for the interview (e.g., phone, electronic mail). Although, there were only two participants who were willing and/or had the chance to share their time and talk about their experiences with U.S. sanctions against Iran's nuclear weapons proliferation, the information obtained was both insightful and comprehensive. In conducting this research, the questions were drafted in a clear and concise manner to prevent any miscommunications among respondents. Participants were provided ample time to respond to questions.

Appendix F

Interview summary (cont'd)

The following questions were proposed and summary answers provided here:

Q1 What is the purpose of Public Law 112-158 (H.R. 1905)? Public Law 112-158 enhances current sanctions against Iran.

Q2 Are its violations of the NPT, UN Security Council resolutions, and ongoing inadequate cooperation with the IAEA sufficient grounds for suspecting that Iran will soon achieve nuclear weapons capability? Explain. Iran's cooperation with agency officials is satisfactory, but it too soon to make a snap analysis of the evidence.

Q3 Given the controversy over our intelligence on Iraq, how are we factoring in and addressing the uncertainty of intelligence on Iran's nuclear program? The intelligence is only as good as the source, so training, vigilance, and integrity are a must.

Q4 What is Iran's role in the Middle East? Like other rising nation states in the Middle East, Iran desires prosperity for its people and country.

Q5 In a Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, CIA Director David Petraeus and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper both said that "enrichment of uranium to a 90 percent level would be a pretty good indicator" that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. Should this be used as an administration red line?

The global powers continue to change hands, so the line is always moving as well.

Appendix F

Interview summary (cont'd)

Q6 President Obama has been mostly positive and not an alarmist or bellicose with the Iranians, but what should members of his cabinet advise. For President Obama to continue the course of diplomacy with the nation's security at the forefront.

Q7 Are the political, military, and human costs manageable enough to allow for military action? Explain. There will never be enough financial funds to cover the cost of political and military feats, and no human life is worth the cost of war.

Q8 In the absence of a comprehensive strategy that could induce Iran to desist in its continuing moves toward nuclear weapons, do the doubts about the definition of red lines and the consequences of their breach undermine both deterrence and reassurance? Explain. Yes, doubts undermine progress to a degree, but communication is critical to strengthening global relations between countries and that cannot be over emphasized.

Q9 Are sanctions working? Yes, very slowly.

Q10 Are its violations of the NPT, UN Security Council resolutions, and ongoing inadequate cooperation with the IAEA sufficient grounds for suspecting that Iran will soon achieve nuclear weapons capability? Explain. *There is no evidence to suggest that Iran will achieve nuclear weapons capability to date.*

Appendix G

Interview analysis

The first interview response was provided by Lawrence Davidson³², graduate of Rutgers University in 1967 and Georgetown University in 1969. His travels throughout the Middle East as a public intellectual, which helps him to explain the realities of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East for American audiences. Davidson has published over 25 articles on the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy, and other topics in academic journals. He also speaks yearly at professional conferences sponsored by the Middle East Studies Association. Davidson's research mainly centers on U.S. historic relations with the Middle East.

In the interview, Davidson first shared his opinion about H.R.1905 (Public Law 112-158), which he contributed to the work of lobbyist. He believed that these parties held too much influence over Congress and other political parties like the AIPAC³³. Davidson suggested that the parties influence caused political legislative decisions to side heavily with the ideological position of lobbyist. Therefore, any evidence put forth by

³²Lawrence Davidson studied in Canada and received his Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Alberta in 1976. Davidson teaches Middle East History and courses in the History of Science and Modern European Intellectual History at West Chester University, West Chester, Pennsylvania. He published several books including *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (University Press of Florida, 2001), *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Greenwood Press, 2003), co-author with Arthur Goldschmidt of the *Concise History of the Middle East*, 8th and 9th editions (Westview Press, 2006 and 2009). Davidson's most recent publication is *Foreign Policy, Inc.: Privatizing American National Interest* (University Press of Kentucky, 2009).

³³The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is a lobbying group that advocates pro-Israel policies to the Congress and Executive Branch of the United States (www.aipac.org/).

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

U.S. intelligence agencies seemed to act as “a dangerous motivator of unnecessary action that risk international violence and economic disruption” (Davidson, 2012). Davidson candidly referred to H.R. 1905’s sponsor, Representative Ros-Lehtinen of Florida as “a notorious advocate for Israel” (2012).

The U.S. government is convinced that Iran’s violations of the NPT, U.N. Security Council resolutions and ongoing inadequate cooperation with the IAEA are sufficient grounds for suspected nuclear proliferation. However, Davidson is not so sure. He asserts that since 2003, Iran had not been reported to the IAEA with any problems of cooperating with inspectors and that any country capable of producing nuclear weapons is not in violation of the NPT (Davidson, 2012). Davidson contends that the lack of credible evidence disputed allegations of Iran’s nuclear weapons production.

Citing reports from the Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing in February 2012, Davidson supported his opinions. The reports included comments by James Clapper, the National Intelligence Director. Clapper remarked about how Iran was unlikely to develop nuclear weapons unless attacked, and that Iran was also unlikely to initiate conflict. U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded otherwise. This led Davidson to question how U.S. politicians could refuse to believe their own security organizations - he surmised that “lobby power trumps the truth” (Davidson, 2012).

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

Since America has not had any diplomatic presence in Iran for the past three decades, much of our knowledge does rely on intelligence, so there is controversy over intelligence provided on Iran, given the past intelligence gaffes about Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)³⁴. Yet, given that America has not had a diplomatic presence in Iran for three decades, and that much of our knowledge relies on intelligence agencies, how does the U.S. government address the uncertainty of intelligence surrounding Iran's nuclear program activities? Davidson believes that the accuracy of American intelligence reports should not be doubted. Rather Congress should determine the value of the intelligence presented with new sources to determine the right course of action. Otherwise, the American people may surrender to the political influence and support of failing sanctions that might lead to war with Iran (2012).

In discussing the effect of current U.S. "draconian", sanctions against Iran, much like those that had been placed on Iraq and Syria, Davidson referred to them as "crimes against humanity" (2012). Davidson referenced Iraq's situation as he described how he felt that U.S. sanctions were responsible for killing millions of innocent civilians over a ten year period during the war. He stated that, "sanctions are designed to destroy

³⁴Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one justification for taking decisive action against Iraq. In the then-classified National Security Directive 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he identified Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against allied forces (Jeffrey Richelson, 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/>).

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

economies and therefore destroy the well-being of entire populations” (Davidson, 2012). Although Davidson was unsure if sanctions against Iran would succeed, but he hoped that they would not.

Recalling America’s second war against Iraq, Davidson discussed how President George Bush was less than truthful with the American people about “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD) in Iraq. U.S. political leaders not only refused to accept intelligence reports of no WMD, but they were also unwilling to acknowledge that Americans had no desire to attack Iran. Davidson believed that this was due to the fear about how a war might change the world’s oil based economy (2012).

Keep in mind that the NPT does not define the specific activities that constitute nuclear proliferation. Nor has the U.S. administration, U.N., or international community explicitly stated a definition. Only the senior officials of the IAEA offer that uranium enrichment at 90 percent is a good indication of nuclear weapons development. Davidson responds by arguing that “although enrichment to such a level enables the construction of nuclear weapons, enrichment to that level does not constitute the construction of a [nuclear] weapon” (2012). Instead, he offered that the reason may be that the U.S. government may have set a threshold for military action at 90 percent or above as clear indication of crossing nuclear proliferation.

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

If that is the case, Davidson warns that the U.S. government would be going beyond NPT and international authority to enforce unilateral rules (2012). He further speculated that Iran might be attempting to create the scientific and engineering capacity to quickly put together a small number of nuclear weapons for when their country is threatened “so, [they] would have all the parts on the shelf, so to speak, but only put them together if necessary” (2012). He referred to this plan as a “rational goal” (Davidson, 2012).

Davidson continued his debate about the actions of President Bush. In particular, he talked about Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Davidson stated that of the three countries mentioned by Bush, only one of them had not been threatened with attack, or actually attacked. Davidson quizzed, “Which one was it? Was it North Korea, the defiant single-party state that continues to conduct nuclear weapons testing violating U.N. sanctions? Or was it Iraq, who is presently surrounded by U.S. military bases? Or is it Iran, the country that has been openly threatened by Israel?” (2012).

Davidson continued, stating that “from an objective point of view, it might be considered irresponsible of [Iran] not to seek a nuclear weapon capability in the sense of having all the parts on the shelf” and that if they were, it is not surprising or unreasonable for Iran to desire a strong military, advanced technology, and weapons (2012).

According to nuclear experts, Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon is still only a possibility. More importantly, President Obama has not yet decided how he would

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

respond should an actual nuclear threat materialize from Iran.

In the absence of a comprehensive strategy in dealing with Iran's nuclear program, doubts about the definitions of red lines for uranium enrichment and the consequences of their breach continue to undermine any diplomatic efforts. However, Davidson is clear in his position that Iran with a nuclear weapon would not be a threat to anyone (including Israel). He explained that, "the principle of mutual mass destruction would prevent them from using such a weapon, unless they were directly attacked, and that having it [nuclear weapons] would also, hopefully, prevent others from attacking Iran" (2012).

In the end, Davidson's advise to Obama was to "reverse course" and to "stop threatening the Iran government, take sanctions off the table, open and expand trade, and to twist the arm of Israel to follow suit" (2012). Davidson admitted that although his advice was good, it might still be politically impossible given the current stand-off and broken communication between the two nations (2012). Davidson ended the interview by pointing out that the cost of military action against Iran was not only unmanageable, but definitely not worth it.

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

The second interview response was provided by Malou Innocent³⁵, Defense and Foreign Policy research analyst in Washington, D.C. Her primary research includes military strategy, counterinsurgency, political philosophy, Middle East security issues, and U.S. foreign policy toward China. Innocent described H.R. 1905 (Public Law 112-158) as “legislation [that] proposes virtually limitless scenarios for which to bring harsher sanctions on Iran” (2012). She did agree that Iran’s violation of several U.N. Security Council resolutions provided sufficient grounds for suspecting that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons capability. However, Innocent made it clear that she supported diplomatic exhaustion before military intervention, and only if America or its Allies were attacked (2012).

As for America’s lack of diplomatic presence in Iran for the past thirty years, Innocent reminds us that not since 1979 has the U.S. government operated an embassy in Iran. She attributes this lack of diplomacy to the rocky relationship between Iran and the U.S., because there are no real communication lines (Innocent, 2012). The importance of the absence of a U.S. embassy in Iran cannot be overstated. It is an office vital to maintaining a visible and open relationship for global peace. Innocent quoted Karim

³⁵ Innocent’s work has been published in the *Chicago Policy Review*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *The Jerusalem Post* and *Rolling Stone* magazine. She studied Mass Communications and Political Science at the University of California in Berkeley; M.A. in International Relations at the University of Chicago.

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

Sadjadpour³⁶, stating that “even European countries [that] have had embassies in Tehran since the Revolution have great difficulty understanding how the Islamic Republic operates” (2012). However, no efforts have been made to reestablish an embassy.

Even with many of the sanctions aimed at denying Iran access to nuclear materials or munitions, Innocent pointed out that, “there seems to be far more doubt in connecting the Iranian regime with particular shipments or specific material...I think it’s fair to say there are major gaps in knowledge” (2012). She also suggested that Iran remained a catalyst for the Middle East evidenced by their political demonstrations and protest against the West. Innocent concluded that Iran continued to change how the U.S. government administered its foreign policy.

As to the question of success or failure of U.S. sanctions against Iran, Innocent stated that, “history suggests sanctions will fail, [because] they have a poor record of persuading authoritarian regimes to sacrifice interests they see as vital. [Therefore], if the regime believes it needs a nuclear program or weapons to survive, it will continue to allow its people to suffer (Innocent, 2012). Yet, Innocent acknowledged that the U.S. might use the U.N.’s failed sanctions on Iran as reason to attack (2012).

³⁶ Iranian expert from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

Innocent strongly believes that U.S. military action is difficult to justify by itself without any ruses. She quotes an article by David Isenberg of *Cato* (2007), stating that, “current military preparations are just another attempt at psychological pressure, or what academics call coercive diplomacy” and that downside is that “once you start mobilizing for war, it becomes harder to stop as time goes by, and conversely, it becomes easier to keep going” (2012).

Steadfast in her opinion, Innocent stated that Iran had not moved to a more advanced program, but rather used its scientific and technological capability to enrich uranium for fuel use and cancer treatment procedures (2012). She contended that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons was still only a possibility, because “there remains much doubt about Iran’s intentions and capability [and] there really isn’t a true understanding of where the nuclear program stands [or if it is] a credible threat” (2012).

Even President Obama has displayed some reservations about Iran’s true intentions. When asked how she would advise Obama as a member of his cabinet, Innocent suggested that she would push to “stop all sanctions against Iran, open up all diplomatic channels, allow trade to freely flow to and from the country, close down a majority of American bases located in countries near Iran, and stop the opening of new bases, coinciding with the movement of more troops in the area” (2012).

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

Additionally, Innocent stated that she would recommend that Obama “move all naval operations away from the Strait of Hormuz, out of the Persian Gulf and Iranian waters toward international waters”, because of the U.S. governments past failures involving North Korea (2012). Innocent believes that Iran should not be isolated and treated as the enemy or a rogue state. She also stated that U.S. preventive nuclear pressures and talks about the use of military action were counterproductive. Innocent is convinced that the U.S. government has responded to Iran with international condemnation most likely dictated by the legal bodies of international agencies (2012).

Innocent argued that between “decommissioning” the Iranian nuclear program and senseless casualties from an unprovoked strike, the U.S. government must “examine the consequences of entering into another conflict in a part of the world where over the past 60 years, U.S. soldiers have fought to exact certain policies erroneously projected to be held as the common perspective” (Innocent, 2012).

Innocent surmised that, “We have beaten the dead horse into a hollow grave. We have done it so much that it would be difficult to impossible to pick up and leave unscathed. We walk the path of failed foreign policy measures, and there is only one place for sure that it will lead to...” and from there Innocent ended with a reminder quoting Winston Churchill, stating that, “Those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it” (1874-1965).

Appendix G

Interview analysis (cont'd)

Both Davidson and Innocent provided important perspectives to give every person something to think about. Political scientist and experts around the world agree that hegemonic power focuses on the control of material goods and production. But no modern state has ever developed enough power to sustain its hegemony long enough to dominate the globe. America's hegemony has benefited the most from the current world order, but it also has the great responsibility for maintaining current hegemonic systems. America's strong military helps to keep peace in other nations, while discouraging rogue states from attacking weaker countries. America's hegemony has driven the economic development of the international community through foreign partnerships and collaborative relations.

However, America's hegemony is declining to rising powers emerging with fresh innovations and new political forums for global prosperity. In a perfect world, sanctions that have been placed on Iran would have compelled its maximum cooperation with the threat of war looming on the horizon. In the real world, economic sanctions will take a long time before any serious impact is realized. The real danger lies not in the wait for these sanctions to take effect, but the risky policies that the U.S. is willing to undertake to prolong and maintain its declining hegemony.

APPENDIX H

Fort Hays State University institutional review board approval letter



**FORT HAYS STATE
UNIVERSITY**

Forward thinking. World ready.

OFFICE OF SCHOLARSHIP AND SPONSORED PROJECTS

DATE: February 6, 2014

TO: Kimberly Jones
FROM: Fort Hays State University IRB

STUDY TITLE: [569881-1] The Role of American Tyranny in Iran's Nuclear Production: The Framework of Public Law 112-158 Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011

IRB REFERENCE #: 14-064
SUBMISSION TYPE: Other

ACTION: DETERMINATION OF NOT RESEARCH
DECISION DATE: February 6, 2014

Thank you for your submission of Other materials for this research study. It is our understanding that the interaction you will have with the individuals in your research involves interviewing scholars about the work they have conducted. As a result, the Fort Hays State University IRB administrator has determined this project does not meet the definition of human subject research under the purview of the IRB according to federal regulations.

We will put a copy of this correspondence on file in our office.

If you have any questions, please contact Leslie Paige at 785-628-4349 or lpaige@fhsu.edu. Please include your study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.

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