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The Post-Arab Spring Geopolitical Instability And Its Effects On Middle East And North Africa

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THE POST-ARAB SPRING GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY
AND ITS EFFECTS ON MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA

being

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays State University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Liberal Studies

by

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The Master of Liberal Studies

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ABSTRACT

Founded on SMTs (Social Movement Theories), the current study aimed at analyzing the impact of Arab Spring uprisings on the geopolitical system of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. With an overview on the political and socioeconomic background of Arab Uprisings, the qualitative study focused on: a) determining the economic, political, and social consequences of the uprisings, especially aftermaths that have given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and b) investigating the possible factors that will spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region. Given the comprehensiveness and magnitude, the case of the popular uprisings in the MENA region is assessed using qualitative analysis.

The study indicates that, Arab Spring failed to bring optimistic changes, empowered political Islamism, spread religious radicalism, reduced state secularism, and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. It negatively affected public freedoms, minorities, rights of women, and democratization. The uprisings resulted in riots, civil wars, social militarization and neighborhood interference, empowered Iranian hegemony, anarchized petrodollar, created proxy wars, led to the revival of terrorist cells, and affected economies.

The Arab Uprisings which sprung with dissatisfaction/deprivation among the masses against their respective regimes, and created conflicts across the MENA region channeled a mass movement on the basis of collective identities and informal networks. The study ultimately concluded that social movements have the potential to escalate to a

full-fledged revolution if not tackled in an appropriate manner. This study proves that Arab Uprisings collectively and negatively impacted the political, social, security, interregional, economic, and financial systems of the MENA region.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although I had gone through tiring days and nights to bring this thesis to light, it would not be appropriate to take assume full credit without expressing my heartfelt gratitude to numerous supporters. These wonderful supporters with their brightness and presence have ensured the materialization of this effort called thesis on the popular Arab Spring. The sad and bloody state that the great MENA region reduced itself to triggered the need for conducting a research study in this arena.

However, the complexity involved in the research topic prompted me to take a backseat, which was duly reversed by sheer willpower and support from my dear advisor Dr. Chapman Rackaway. A person whose patience spans the wide oceans, having Dr. Chapman Rackaway as my graduate advisor is a blessing by all means. I will always remember and be profoundly grateful and thankful to his positive attitude, never-ending patience and compassion towards my efforts. His insight towards the subject, incessant feedback, approvals, and encouragement enabled me to move forward. I shall always remember his help whenever I faced numerous roadblocks to finish deadlines caused by incessant circumstances discomforts. Dr. Chapman Rackaway will always be remembered for his time, effort, and intelligence.

While my advisor offered generous and professional inputs related to the topic, I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Josephine Squires, and Dr. Jian Sun for their support and help. Your expertise and feedback really helped me realize the true reality of academic writing and the need to ensure strategic planning to achieve my set objectives.

I am forever thankful to my family, friends, staff, and faculty of the Department of Political Science at FHSU. I shall always remember your unconditional help and encouragement.

PREFACE

I have done my thesis in six chapters, and each chapter, subchapter, and subsection will be outlined in its dedicated division respectively as shown in the table of contents and Thesis Structure explained in Chapter One, to ensure the fulfillment of all academic aspects for M.L.S scientific research and requirements of Graduate Studies of the Department of Political Science at Fort Hays State University.

In accordance with scientific study requirements, and in full commitment with the academic instructions of FHSU Graduate School's Guidelines for Thesis and Field Study Handbook (Fall, 2012), and as the most compatible with the guidelines of social and humanities sciences, wherefore APA style was adopted by me for all in-text and cited literatures (References) of this thesis.

I have based, showcased, and developed my thesis' suppositions, arguments, and discussions on the original thesis statement proposed, submitted, and approved by my venerable and distinguished Graduate Committee, and Major Professor, and as stipulated in problem statement –The Arab Spring was negatively affected the regions of Middle East and North Africa, and will lead inevitably to instable geopolitical situation results because of violent socio-economic and political devastating transformations, and long-term domestic and interregional conflicts.”

Thesis Search Key words: Arab Spring; uprisings; geopolitical instability; Middle East; North Africa.

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CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS OF ARAB SPRING'S UPRISINGS, AND STUDY OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The radical upheavals that overwhelmed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are still immature and incomprehensible to be considered a quantum leap in political, economic, and social destiny of the peoples of this region, and therefore the term by which that reactionary phenomenon has known mistakenly in political literature as ‘Arab Spring’ is thus proven to be merely an overhasty misnomer (Totten, 2012, p. 23). Contrarily, Arab Uprisings would be an apt term to describe the mayhem that crept across the MENA region.

While the term ‘Arab Spring’ was introduced as expression of optimism, with a noble intention of shifting the MENA region’s political despotism from totalitarianism and autocracy towards democracy and modernity, its aftermaths have illuminated fatal civil wars. Violent representations by extremist and radical regimes are present on one side, and disturbances and insecurity that plagued the Arab States on the other. These two factors have subsequently turned the two regions across the MENA region towards high volatility and antagonistic environments. Consequently, the movement cannot be described as ‘Arab Spring’, since it failed to divulge any positive aspects such as logic

and realism, which are used while describing a 'spring'. Adding further, the outcomes of the popular rebellions have been confiscated by most extreme religious spectrum and descended to be "Islamic Nahda" which mean "Islamic awakening", invariably aims to overthrow secular regimes, whether military or hereditary, and restore the empire of Islamic caliphate which poses ideological hostile to western civilization and its values (May, 2012, p. A4).

The history of mankind reflects a continuum reverberations in the political, social, economic, and security aspects of the civil society. Built on fundamental values of peace and harmony, every society since time immemorial has reflected volatility, unrest, and outbursts against injustice and exploitation. An inherent want for just and right society accompanied with freedom of expression propels every individual to bring forth a struggle, the end-result of which makes or breaks numerous stratum of the society. While some struggles effectuate profound changes in the political authority and social system, others bring forth plausible changes in the political authority and some change in the social system. While few others effectuate moderate changes, other struggles virtually fail to bring any change to the political or social system of the society (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967). Nevertheless, these struggles otherwise termed as revolutions, have played a crucial role in the evolution of civil societies. In simplistic sense, revolution is synonymous for change. However, larger definition of revolution, when applied to the civic society reflects Marx's idea of defining revolution as —moments in the history of class struggle during which a radical, violent change occurs in the class basis of the political structure” (Finley, 1986, p.47). Thus, every revolution is characterized by two

normative aspects, change that affects the fundamental written or non-written laws and change is considered to be illegal by the law that it attempts to abolish (Friedrich, 2009).

While the 1700s showcased the essence of revolution through the great French and American revolutions, modern times since the 1950s have reflected high level of revolution through deaths and time-frame. Revolutions such as the 1959 Cuban revolution, 1958 Iraqi revolution, 1957 Columbian revolution, 1955 Argentinian revolution, and so on highlight the series of discomfort in the human society towards their respective political and socio-economic aspects (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967). An insight to these and recent revolutions highlights many common characteristics: limited scope which magnifies incrementally through peoples' mind and led without the involvement of any government, spiritual or political organization or any singular representation, without any targeted end-point or action plan and highly rewarding to those people that further the coin of revolution (Quinn, 2014).

These attributes are visibly present in the great mayhem that erupted in the Middle Eastern and Northern Africa (MENA) region in December 2010. Variedly termed as Arab Spring, Arab Revolution, Islamist Spring, and Jasmine Revolution and so on, the revolution and revolts that began in Tunisia assumed a mammoth shape in early 2011 and spread across the MENA region consuming the political and socio-economic stability of the region. A watershed event that took the world by storm, given its perpetual magnitude and expansion, the Arab revolution percolated itself into the history of mankind as the great Arab awakening channeled by numerous uprisings across the MENA region. Akin to any revolution, the Arab Uprisings were a result of series of suppressed political and

socio-economic factors, an insight to which shall elucidate the background of its origin and rise in the MENA region.

STUDY BACKGROUNDS

An unpredicted event that took the global community by surprise, Arab Uprisings can be defined as a powerful and landmark event that has permanently transformed the global political setting as well as caused to a seismic change in the socio-political and economic contracts, governing the relationship between elite ruling groups of the MENA region (military jaunts, monarchies, single-party authoritarian regimes) and their respective nations. An insight to the political and socio-economic background of the uprisings is essential to discern the need for conducting a study on Arab Uprisings. The following sections ensure the fulfillment of this aspect.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Regimes in the MENA region have reflected authoritarian and totalitarian characteristics for decades (The Economist, 1997). Authoritarian regimes can either exhibit communist principles, or can function on one-party leadership. They can also be militaristic or dynastic or theocratic in nature and most authoritarian regimes portray characteristics such as constitutional restraints, subordination of individual rights, forceful obedience of citizens, excessive authority by single person or party, absence of free elections, elected assembly, independent judiciary and careful censure or control of media (The Staff, 2000). On similar lines, totalitarian regimes exhibit essential characteristics or pattern which can be classified into political and socio-economic constructs. Politically, they function on a central ideology and are led by a single person

or party. Socially, the law or police functions on terror and such regimes exhibit militaristic behavior. Media, communication channels and public freedom are curtailed, and in totalitarian regimes, the economy is centrally directed by the head of the State (Fredrich and Brzezinski, 1956).

The political causes or background of the popular Arab Uprisings can be attributed to the weakened civil society and political opposition in the MENA region well before the origin of Arab Uprisings in 2011 (Yom, 2005). The historical timeline of the MENA region and political crisis from an overall perspective and regional perspective since the 1980s reflects the above assertion (Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate Arab World polity score and Arab World Median and Average polity compared to world regions). The political background of the Arab Uprisings can be connected with the outcomes of World Wars and the Cold War. The outcomes of World Wars and the Cold War led to the genesis of complex and varied differences across the social and societal fabric across the MENA region. The power of autonomous ruling successfully constrained the society with dynastical or familial, military, national parties, and tribes (Gross, 2011).

While the States functioned under monarchies or as republics (Gross, 2011), the central pillars of the MENA region enriched the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes with complex military security and state-controlled economy (Gause, 2011). The regional perspective of the MENA region's political regimes reflects this aspect. For instance in Syria (Paul, 2012) Morocco (Arellano, and Bover, 1995) and Saudi Arabia (Klapper, 2010), totalitarian rule allowed the President or King to function as the Head of the State. The ultimate decisive power vested in the hands of the Head of the State, who: a)

appointed the ministers and controlled the legislatures and judiciary powers, b) declared war and controlled the executive and judiciary aspects apart from the legislative aspects of the State, c) The mastermind of the country in all of political, economic and social fields, d) Father of the nation and the commander of the army and biggest philanthropist to people, and e) generally rules based on certain religious or political doctrines, revolutionary claimed principles, achievements of the coup, royal hereditary right, sole charismatic leader of nation, Caliph of Muslims, theocracy or the Sharia law (Klapper, 2010).

The results of such political rule eventually reflected bad governance or lack of governance. For instance, Libya under Gaddafi exhibited the most repressive and corrupt regime politically and economically in North Africa where failed and isolated state, nepotism and complete absence of diversity in political rule with the rule of Gaddafi for over four decades. Countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia, Syria and Algeria functioned under Presidents in power for more than 20 years (OECD, 2011). Additionally, citizens under such regimes had dormant rights and are exposed to political corruption (Table 1.1 elucidates Corruption score and ranking of MENA countries 2008). For instance, the rule of Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya, and Ben Ali in Tunisia for decades based on intelligence agencies, private security, secret police, ascendancy of the ruling party, state of emergency, martial law, arbitrary arrests and mock trials, and forced Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian economic sectors inclusive of tourism, banking and many more to be functioned under the ruling family or its

associated members. Thus, oligarchy was vividly present which bred epitomic political and economic corruption (Paul, 2012).

From a political perspective, the States belonging to the MENA region exhibited excessive authority by single person or party through concentration of power, nepotism and lack of political pluralism. The constriction of the States by the monarchial or military dynasties and monopolistic power-hold on the civil statures of the society, eventually forced the Arab populations to demand for a holistic and strong political systems which mirror the Arab Congress's 1913 Paris agenda of establishing a greater rule across the Ottoman Empire and MENA region (Gross, 2011). Additionally, curtailment of individual rights and lack of freedom (media, civilians, and economy) elaborated in the following section, eventually led to the outbreak of a phenomenal phenomenon based on collective social action called as Arab Spring.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

While the political background of the Arab Uprisings can be traced back to the central characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the socio-economic background of the Arab Uprisings can also be elaborated based on the central characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes along with its dynamic effects on the social and economic aspects of the MENA region. The following sections collectively elaborate the socio-economic background of the Arab Uprisings.

Impact of the Great Recession or Global Economic Crisis

The 2008 economic crisis or the global recession worsened the economic situation of the MENA region (–European Commission”, 2011). Despite the adaption and

application of several economic models by the respective regimes, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), practices and policies, several States belonging to the MENA region failed to secure sustainable and effective economies (Fawaz, 2012). High dependence on oil production and exportation of most countries across the MENA region undoubtedly secured surplus funds (Abed, 2011); however, absence of globalized private sector affected the employment status across the region, given the volatility in the oil market.

While the nations that engaged in production and exportation of hydrocarbons largely benefited, the non-dependent nations suffered tremendously (Rosenberg, 2011). The cases of Tunisia and Egypt can be recounted in this regard. The nations forecasted and attempted to reach the various macro-economic targets laid by the international financial institutions. However, they failed to focus on the social aspects of their respective societies (Davis, 2010), resulting in escalated fuel prices accompanied with shortage of food supply (The Staff Team, 2010). Thus, the international crisis coupled with weakened internal financial system, economic deficit, national debt, political impotence, demographic explosion against the poor services and infrastructure, lack of jobs, failure of development plans and oil-price volatility affected both the oil-producing and non-oil producing countries of the MENA region.

Inflation, Especially in Food Prices

Inflation or rise in prices of commodities plays a crucial role in effecting the semblance of political structures of the States (Walton and Seddon, 1994) (Figure 1.7 elucidates food prices in Arab countries January 2004 – May 2011). Economies of the

Arab Spring countries sagged in deficit, and the economic performance in the majority of these countries reduced at rates of over 5% per year to perform in negative indicators. The budgets suffered a record deficit, and GDP declined sharply (Table 1.2. shows real GDP percentages to inflation rate in sample of Arab Spring countries 2020-2013). The trade markets devoured by the flames of price rises, while Inflation rates have increased in some countries of uprisings by 100% within few years, and public debt increased to unprecedented record, and aid from partners, friends, and allies in halting the deterioration of these economies did not succeed. Poverty resulting from escalating food prices is considered as a major cause for chaos, civil disobedience, riots, and even revolutions in many countries (Headey and Fan, 2008).

While unrest and riots for food is not new to MENA region (Sadiki, 2000), countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco did experience protests between 2007 and 2008, given the rapid rise in food prices. Given the general effect of the global economic crisis coupled with bad economic governance across the MENA region, worsened the economic situation. The general mood of the affected citizens gradually shifted from bad to worse and a collective outbreak was visible which can be attributed to collective economic discontent across the MENA population. Unstable business cycles, faltering labor markets, and escalating prices eventually functioned as a paradox of the so-called rich and efficient MENA region.

Demographic Change in the Society

Demographic change in the MENA region functions as crucial cause for the eruption of the volcano called the Arab Uprisings. Between 1970 and 2010, the MENA

region, especially the Arab World experienced humongous change in its population levels (Hegasy, 2011) (Figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 demonstrate the population explosion in Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries). It was estimated that about 30 percent of the population that dwelled were about 20-35 years of age, which clearly indicated the presence of high percentage of young population (Perthes, 2011).

A youth bulge is visible in the MENA region and it is also estimated that “over the coming decade, approximately 65% of the population of the region will be less than 24 years old” (NATO, 2011). This projection has relevant social, political, and economic implications not only across the MENA region, but also across the globe, given the ability of the youth bulge to create geo-strategic effects (Figure 1.6 indicates percentage of youth bulge in MENA between ages 0-14 years). Although a concrete relationship between young population, chaos, and violence does not exist, socio-economic factors such as employment, equality, education, and healthcare facilities, and governments’ inclination towards ensuring these amenities to its civilians impacts the semblance of the youth. When the educated youth fail to secure employment, when the cost of living increases and the rulers fail to provide social and economic security to their civilians, aberrations in the society bound to surface (Perthes, 2011).

Lack of Employment

Unemployment history in the MENA region, especially for countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco narrates the cause for the outbreak of Arab Uprisings. Reduced production rates in the States of the MENA region resulted in the increase of unemployment rates and youth unemployment eventually led to discontentment across

the juvenile population (IMF, 2011; Sika, 2012). The presence of large number of youths across the MENA region clearly symbolizes the effect of unemployment on juvenile population. Lack of age divide and demographic change in the MENA region created a youth bulge and in 2011 “one in every three people in MENA was between the ages of 10 and 24” (NATO, 2011). Research conducted by CQ Global Researcher (2011) and Huffington Post Business (2013) show the correlation between percentage of youth population in each MENA country and the level of disruptions. Rather than extracting humungous benefits from the youth power, the governments in the MENA region failed to create jobs or match the skills of the competent MENA youth (NATO, 2011). Eventually political instability and nepotism propelled the young labor force to rebel against the growing poverty and scaling inequalities in the societies.

Poverty and Scaling Inequalities in the Society

Failure of economic models and global recession escalated the already failing economic conditions of the MENA region to new levels and fundamental deep-rooted issues such as increased unemployment rates, nepotism, political corruption and greater divide between the rich and the poor deprived the society of its basic structure. These aspects further increased the divide between the States and its respective citizens, given the lack of ability of the States and its rulers to meet the expectations of common man (Noland and Pack, 2007; International Bank, 2007). For instance, pivotal point for Tunisia, where the genesis of Arab Uprisings took place, failed to create jobs for its people, especially its local youth, despite its robust economy. Unemployment accompanied with escalating food prices created regional inequalities apart from poverty.

Tunisian unemployment rate in 2011 recorded a new high of 16 percent while Ben Ali and his family enjoyed luxurious lifestyle highlighting the ever-present nepotism and economic divide between the ruler and his family, and common Tunisian citizens, who failed to meet the basic needs of food and shelter, given the rise in inflation (‘Economist’, 2011).

Influence of Young People and Education

The inclusion of young people and education as a cause for the Arab Uprisings can be explained from two prospects: a) with the help of modernization theory which includes the population that receives formal education and b) youth population which fails to receive formal education. Modernization broadens human choices and encompasses socio-economic resources to enhance the capabilities of people to ensure the prevalence of humanistic society (Welzel, 2002). Theorists such as Lerner (1958) and Inkeles (1983) highlighted the role of modernization in the process of education and developing cognitive ability. Studies conducted in this arena by (UNESCO, 2000) shows Illiteracy rate in Arab States is second highest compared to other world regions and elucidated the influential role of education and established the relationship between formal education and rationality of individuals. Firstly, with the inclusion of formal education into the social structure, ‘the presence of secular-rational values and self-expression values increases’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p. 37). Secondly, it creates the need for social and economic stability within the minds of the individuals and breeds values of independence, choice and self-expression which clearly reflect modern democratic views. When applied to the youth population that received formal education

in MENA region, it is clearly visible that education played a crucial role in implanting seeds of democratization in the minds of the individuals.

Focusing on the second prospect, the prospect relating to individuals who have failed to receive education can be clearly established that, lack of education or lower educational levels produce less or non-productive workforce which impedes the economic development of a nation. When reflected from the MENA regions' perspective, as per AFP (AFP, 2008), it is evident that, "three-quarters of the 100 million people unable to read or write in the Arab countries are aged between 15 and 45" (NATO, 2011). Thus, educated youth face discontent given the lack of freedom of choice and employment despite their skills, and non-educated are equally discontent given the lack of employment and necessary skillset. Education along with modernized connectivity access through mediums such as social media reverberated the call for dignity among the MENA population.

Influence of Social Media and Call for Dignity and Social Justice

Social media and other forms of media have played a crucial role in the spread of Arab Uprisings. Live reports of protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Al-Sharekh, 2011), and excessive use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and use of technologically advanced devices such as Smartphones and internet to attach the live updates and influence the population to act against the oppressive forces and injustice meted to the civilians in the hands of the governments across regional and international spaces (Figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 meant to represent the impact of social media on

protests wave), facilitated the effectual growth in the number of protestors ensuring collective action and initiating social movement called Arab Spring (Axford, 2011).

Social values, human dignity and social justice are fundamental pillars of any society. Every individual connects his/her internal micro-cosmic values with the macro-cosmic values of the society. The Head of the State or the government is a canvas and reflective representation of the treatment it provides to its citizens. Degradation of human dignity and social injustice often erupts as a volcano and destroys the semblance of the social edifice. The rise of uprisings across the MENA region can be connected to this (Asseburg, 2011). Lack of human security and governments' failures to meet pivotal social aspects related to education, healthcare, and security pushed the MENA region towards adverse outcomes. Neither did the governments invest in State security, nor did they spare any attention towards human security, despite consistent call of the citizens for empowerment and human security. The MENA population, especially the Arab youth expressed perpetual reference towards human security and dignity across various forums such as IMF youth dialogue and the 2009 Arab Human Development Report validates the need for security (United Nations", 2009).

The increasing public grievances and lack of attention from the respective rulers and persistent tyrannies imposed by the autocratic regimes, eventually bred violence in the hearts of the general public. A general need for democracy became the outcry of thousands of people across the MENA region.

In Tunisia, the land that propelled its population to the popular revolt, chanting from protestors –we can live on bread and water alone but not with the RCD -

Constitutional Democratic Rally” (AFP, 2011), could be vividly heard. Popular Islamist figure, Sadok Chourou who was imprisoned for 20 years under Ben Ali’s rule, exclaimed, “the new government does not represent the people and has to fall” (AFP, 2011). Injustice meted to the public and lack of empathy towards the citizens, is another popular cause for the uprisings. In Bahrain, the Shia Muslims revolted against what they called ‘repressive regime’, which humiliated and failed to give them equal treatment from its Sunni rulers. On similar lines, the gathering of thousands of Egyptian civilians in Tahrir Square, Cairo, with a demand for human dignity (Human Rights Watch, 2012) and refuting the oppression, nepotism, and corruption (West, 2011) symbolize the need for restoration of human dignity, justice, and values among the general public across the MENA region as another social cause for the Arab Uprisings.

Crucial Movement towards Democracy

The political governance across the MENA region reflects totalitarian and authoritarian characteristics, which have forced democracy to take a backseat in the political scenario of the MENA region. While democracy is highly held across other regions of the world, the Arab and North African nations have remained within the strong-holds of autocracy and nepotism (Stepan and Robertson, 2003). The MENA region has failed to integrate Western policies and governance whose fundamentals lie in democracy (Anderson, 2006) and the Arab Uprisings can also be considered as a collective movement and call for democratization. While democratization can be regarded as a social cause for the uprisings, the trajectory of the Arab Uprisings in each

of the affected States will clearly emphasize whether the States transit towards democracy or progress further into chaos and hypocrisy.

AIM & OBJECTIVES

The aim of the research is to observe the political and socioeconomic background of Arab Spring and identify the consequences of these factors. To obtain aim of this research, the following research objectives are outlined:

- ❖ To determine the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab Uprisings, especially aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that has given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and:
- ❖ To ascertain the possible factors that will spread geopolitical instability across the Arab countries in the MENA region.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

[1] What are the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab Spring (both positive and negative implications) especially aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that have given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region?

[2] What are possible factors that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA?

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The history of mankind is a witness of numerous movements accompanied by mass resource mobilization and transformation which invariably represent, –collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998, p.4). While several social and political movements engage in collective action and focus on creating change in existing

systems, the outcomes of such movements generally reflect two possible outcomes: the acceptance and emergence of the challenging group as the voice of the society and transfer of new advantages to the challenging group and its beneficiaries (Gamson, 1990). Apparent changes in the social values (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993) can also be considered as relevant outcome of movements and movements are thus accompanied by direct or indirect internal and/or external changes (Gurr, 1980). –The outcomes of social and political movements, which originates below from the required to comprehend present events in State, for instance disobedience practices in urban areas, than from the inclination to make up the shortfall in the social movement literature” (Giugni, 1998, p.387-388). While social movements are generally non-conducive to the peace and stability of the society (Hazen, 2009) and are essential for successful social transformations (Offe, 1987), social movements are known to lose their intended goal and progress in non-tangible trajectory with discursive and unintended outcomes (Amenta and Young, 1999). While the outcry for reformation cross the MENA region has been glorified as a great Arab Awakening, great need exists in identifying the consequences of the popular uprisings, apart from just acquiring the political accomplishments of the Arab Uprisings.

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

The phenomena of political and social movements across different societies and eras reflect prominent political and social transformation and in most cases, reflect societal and compound psychological dysfunction and anomies across varied social constituencies (Durkheim, 1933). Representing loss of identities, movements are

collective phenomenon (Le Bon, 1977) induced by continual grievances (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) non-addressed or wrapped under the political and socio-economic policies of the State. Thus, with the help of range of resources, resource mobilization (Jenkins, 1983) is achieved which collectively act on the single agenda based on the cultural, emotional and normative fundamentals of the addressed phenomenon. The outcomes of prominent social movements ensure alternating power and effectuating social transformations by the empowered citizens (Tilly, 1999). Though, a retroactive study to make comparison among numerous social movements will “elucidate over the causative components contribute in processes of social and political transformation” (Giugni, 1998, p.389), the current study is limited to uprisings in the MENA region, given the eruptions of widespread revolt across numerous regions of the world.

RESEARCH STRUCTURE

This research follows the common research structure and pursues the APA citation style.

Chapter One introduces the topic, provides the study background, and outlines the aim and objectives, and research questions of the study. It defines the problem statement, scope of the research, and outlines the research structure.

Chapter Two assesses the literature pertinent to the topic. It provides an overview of the social and political background of the Arab Spring, and its immediate, and plausible implications in the MENA region.

Chapter Three elaborates the political, social, security, and interregional effects of the Arab Spring. It analyzes the implications of geopolitical instability using relevant literatures.

Chapter Four defines the methodology applied to this research. It outlines the research methodology and approach, data collection methods and tools, and data analyses procedures used in the study. It touches upon the reliability and validity constructs of the study.

Chapter Five highlights the outcomes from the purposed data collection, analyses, and discusses the research findings.

Chapter Six ultimately concludes the research with relevant interpretations and provides perspectives, and prognostications for further researches.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Literature review is “an extensive reference to related research and theory” (Ridley, 2012, p.3). It is a “selection of available documents (both published and unpublished) on the topic, which contain information, ideas, data, and evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfill certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic” (Hart, 1998, p.14). Literature review provides substantial theoretical background to the research study. It enables the researcher to begin the research article.

A good literature review identifies the relevant literatures, structures the reviews, uses appropriate tense and tone, identifies critical knowledge gaps in the research subject, evaluates the idealism of the research topic, and creates discussions and relevant conclusions (Webster & Watson, 2002). Relevant literature identification involves diverse review of secondary resources to accumulate relative and complete census available literature. In the current study concept-centric approach is applied. Concepts related to fundamentals of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, and the political and socioeconomic backgrounds of the uprisings are intricately studied. This along with structuring will enable in developing appropriate theoretical knowledge on the research subject.

AIM OF LITERATURE REVIEW

The essence of any literature review lies in its ability to provide efficient substratum or knowledge base to conduct intricate analysis on a subject. Current literature review aims to structure an article/literature, such that, it contributes to the total understanding of the research subject, establish relation between one or more literary works, authentic and original work admits the numerous theories. Accordingly, this literature review contains three-fold objective.

Firstly, it attempts to understand the fundamentals of the Arab Spring phenomenon. Secondly, it identifies the political and socioeconomic background of the spring. To accomplish this, the political and social movement theory is studied from a general perspective. The definition, the characteristics and the phases of the theory are subjected to analysis. The purport of the generalized theory is applied to the spring.

Post this, the literature review progresses into the deeper aspect of the spring. The review aims to ascertain the origin, progression and the spread of the spring. The spark of the fire at Tunisia and Libya, peak uprisings in Egypt and Yemen, expansion of the disorders in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Sudan, and fire fuse of all-out war in Middle East given the complications in Syria are studied. The history of the spring, its actors, agencies and the change process are analyzed from a regional perspective. Numerous research articles are used, details of which are mentioned in the references section of the paper.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY OF ARAB SPRING

Weber (1969) categorizes social actions in four ways: instrumental rationality, value rationality, affectual and traditional (pp.24-25). In instrumental rationality, behavior of objects in the environment and other human beings determines the social action. Expectations are developed which are used as conditions to achieve actor's own rationality. In value rationality, individual actor's conscious belief shaped by ethical, aesthetic, religious, and/or other forms of behavior, irrespective of its success determines the social action. Social action is also determined by social actor's emotional state- affectual or by ingrained habituation- traditional (Weber, 1969, pp.24-25).

Social movement theories (SMT) have been used by numerous researchers and academicians to discern the social actions and comprehend the sociology of social movements. SMTs investigate the transformative nature of various social movements that act as key elements for initiating, propagating and permeating change within the societies. Additionally, the theories discern the intricacies involved in the movements. They enable the researcher to understand the dynamics- origin, development, successes, and failures in a simplistic sense across the "broader political structures of our society" (Crossley, 2002, pp.8-9)

Numerous social scientists and researchers have attempted to define social movements from diverse viewpoints. In order to understand the essence of social movements, the definitions of Blumer (1969), Frank and Fuentes (1987) and Della Porta and Diani (2006) have been studied and applied in the current paper. Collating the definitions of these experts, a working definition for social movements can be outlined.

Social movements can be defined as a collective synthesis of identities and actions. The movements are cyclic and inevitable entity of the social process, consisting of informal networks of stratified classes, emerging from social/cultural and/or political conflictual situations. They exhibit diversity, are independent from outside advice and aim at achieving severance from State power, transit towards socialism and bring out transformative change.

Social movements comprise of four distinct stages, which can be termed as ‘typical lifecycle of social movement’. Blumer (1951) coins the first stage as the social ferment, which exhibits unorganized and unfocused agitation, a movement generally based on agitators’ propaganda. The second stage termed as ‘popular excitement,’ exhibits the fundamental causes of general dissatisfaction and the movement is trending towards an organized and objective based operation. The third stage called ‘formalization,’ promenades the movement towards a formal organization channeled by disciplined participation and strategic coordination to achieve its well-defined objectives. In the last stage, ‘institutionalization’ the movement permeated and embeds itself as an inevitable part of the society and gains a concrete structure (p.203). Currently, individual state affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ across the MENA region is either under the formalized stage or trending towards the last stage of institutionalization.

The ‘Arab Spring’ across the MENA region provides substantial base and opportunity for sociological imagination and application of the SMT. It is a paraphernalia and expression of socio-cultural and political conflict. It symbolizes the interplay between social and economic conflicts, and addresses the opulence of suppressed

contextual conflicts in the MENA region. The ‘spring’ characterized by mobilization of rights, Islamic movements and labor struggles (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.19-20) addresses “the relationship between structural change and transformations in patterns of social conflict” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5).

The underlying social problems in the MENA region instigated the essence of collective action. The social actors and agitators identified with the ‘collective we’ and moved towards shared causes and beliefs. Moved by the intense event in Tunisia, regions across the ‘Arab World’ have channelized core values such as “desire for respect, trust, dignity, human and political rights, and economic fairness” (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 2012, p.7) into the conflict. A common human commune of cultural representations reflected across the ‘spring’. The ‘spring’ highlights “the role of cultural representations in social conflict” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5).

Since 1980s demands for human rights and human cause actively propagated in the MENA region. Framework of human rights, constituting mainly from international organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, subsumed professionals with necessary skills and financial security. Their active participation in amalgamation with local rights activists periodically petitioned and pleaded for varied human rights cases (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.83-84). The periodic demand for changes in the social and political stratum of the society, in addition to the harsh and humiliating treatment towards the humane causes, laid the seed of agitation towards a common cause of dignity, human and political rights. Human rights activists in Turkey, particularly those working on issues in the heavily Kurdish areas, have been the targets of

official harassment and deadly assaults by shadowy vigilante elements having possible links to the state” (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.84).

In addition to human rights activists, Islamists movements also introduced major methodological insight and acted as normal social actors. Equipped with resources, strategies, and practices, the Islamic movements aimed to rehabilitate political Islamism (Behr and Aaltola, 2011, p.9). For instance, Egypt’s Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Lebanon’s Islamist group Hezbollah, acted as social actors in promoting moral and pious cause of human and political radicalism (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, p.161). They exhibited a symphony of collectivism and behavior. Apart from socio-cultural conflicts, economic causes such as fiscal consolidations with frequent budget cuts, inflation and shortage of jobs, resulted in labor struggles and “well-educated population all coalesced to produce an atmosphere of humiliation and injustice” (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 2012, p.6). Thus, an “economic deficit”, a “freedom deficit” and a “dignity deficit”” (Behr and Aaltola, 2011, p.4) created core values and provided the necessary conflictual foundation to the edifice called Arab Spring.

The spring generally consisted of urban lower middle-class youth and contained distinct socio-economic and political grievances. The development of informal social networks enhanced the strength of the collective values. It embedded individual participation and cultural orientation with the general ideology of the movement and perpetually developed a web of social interactions (Diani and Mcadam, 2003, p.23). Additionally, they built necessary symbols, rituals and/or narratives that solidified the identities and shaped the actors. A collective symposium towards the networks was

established. The spring propelled the youth to take the streets, and the huge masses of people engulfed the streets from Morocco to Bahrain. The general public utilized revolutionary trajectories of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) networks and turned into the collective causes of the protest. ~~It~~ is argued, ICTs served as these tools of connection, providing a means by which protest was organized and resistance was mobilized” (Lawson, 2012, p. 15). A collective action ensued. The spring demonstrates ~~the~~ process through which values, interests, and ideas get turned into collective action” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5).

While social conflicts provided substantial ground for the development of a movement, the crux of the spring rested in political radicalism of the power-holders. The autocratic regimes across the MENA region, the political corruption and kleptocracy of the rulers, instigated a generalized protest and propelled the peaceful masses towards violent measures. The military entourage directed under the State rulers eventually enhanced the fissures between the State power and the protestors, ~~eventual~~ ousting of the incumbent leadership by the armed forces” (Behr and Aaltola, 2011, p.4). Given the growing violence across the MENA region, the intrusion of militia groups exposes the region and the world to terrorism and geopolitical instability. The spring illustrates ~~how~~ a certain social, political, and/or cultural context affects social movements’ chances of success and the forms they take” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.6).

By addressing the four core questions of social movement analysis, Arab Spring is a definitive case for SMT analysis. Arab Spring exhibits collective behavior and action, represents relative dissatisfaction/deprivation and conflicts. Mobilizations are

channeled by collective identities and informal networks. A regional analysis of the same shall identify the crux of the extent and intensity of socio-political and economic predicaments that expedited the reposed yet concocting causes of the ‘spring’.

SPARK OF FIRE: TUNISIA AND LIBYA

The Arab Uprisings sparked across the MENA region with the self-immolation of Tunisian citizen Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the city of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010 (Beaumont, 2011). Following his death, the Tunisian population comprising of “the local government office, students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, and opposition politicians” (Alexander, 2011), captured the streets and violent demonstrations produced social and political unrest across Tunisia. The Tunisian police and security forces’ attempt to control the protestors intensified the objective demonstrations, which targeted the ousting of the then Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Borger, 2010; Alexander, 2011). “Police in Tunis opened fire and shot tear gas in the air as stone-throwing youths breached a curfew and surrounded government buildings” (Spencer, 2011). However, the protests dramatically grew in number, owing to government intervention.

The protests eventually forced Ben Ali to resign from his 23 year reign, and he was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia (BBC, 2011; Takver, 2011). Ben Ali dissolved his government and parliament, and the Tunisia’s political structure was indefinitely shaken. The state of emergency was declared across the nation, which banned the gatherings of three or more people and enforced night-time curfew (BBC, 2011). Following the exile of Ben Ali, the then Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi took over the reins of governing

the nation. The political governance was divided amongst Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and ministers belonging to Ben Ali's opposition parties. However, the coalition failed due to continued protests and Ghannouchi, tried to stabilize the government by adding and subtracting members from the RCD (Tong, 2011). On February 6th, the ruling party was suspended and it was subsequently dissolved on March 9th (Bouazza 2011).

Rigorous public protests eventually led to the resignation of Ghannouchi on February 27 and Beji Caid el Sebsi succeeded as the Prime Minister (Dobbie, 2011). Sebsi's interim regime ended in December 2011, when the elected Islamist party Ennahda won 37 percent of the votes, and President Moncef Marzouki appointed Hamadi Jebali as the Prime Minister (Mzioudet, 2011). Since 2013, Ali Laarayedh succeeded as the Prime Minister of Tunisia (Byrne, 2013). However, the government is constantly threatened by extremist Salafists and other terror groups. While the common Tunisian population participated in the revolution during its initial stages, the extremist Salafists gradually influenced the revolution, which is an obvious concern (Wright, 2012).

—In Tunisia, Salafis started the Reform Front Party in May and led protests, including in Sidi Bouzid. They've repeatedly attacked symbols of the new freedom of speech, ransacking an art gallery and blocking Sufi musicians and political comedians from performing" (Wright, 2012).

Tunisia also faces internal security threats from groups such as the Salafis, which leave no room for peace and harmony. Since Ghannouchi's dismissal, Tunisia's political

system witnessed dual Prime Minister, replacements. The Tunisian revolution which sparked the Arab Uprisings connoted political, economic, and social instability characterized by continuous distress and chaos.

The social movement in Tunisia was an expression of conflicts raging in the minds of Tunisian population. The violent protests were an expression of bottled frustration at the sublime level of the Tunisian population. It was an expression of three decades of political, economic, and social oppression by the ruler (Alexander, 2011). Characterized by authoritarian regime, soaring unemployment rates of 30 percent for population ageing between 15 and 29 years, inflation in food prices and corruption (Alexander, 2011; Borger, 2011) Tunisia's conflict demanded structural change in the political, social, and economic system.

Death of Bouazizi, who burned himself due to unbearable harassment by the hands of Tunisian authorities (Beaumont, 2011) created a 'collective we' in the minds and hearts of Tunisian population. Bouazizi became a symbol of Tunisian protest and protests that captivated a generation that actively followed online networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook (Thorne, 2011). Protesters sang nationalist songs and held up signs with "RCD Out!", referring to Ben Ali's former ruling party, as they rallied on central Avenue Bourguiba" (Boston, 2011). The values for the protests originated from the symbolic corruption and the regime's unresponsiveness to popular grievances of the general public (Borger, 2010). Despite the violent efforts by the police and security forces, and threats issued by Ben Ali, the protestors actively participated in the movement, causing an uprising, well remembered as the 'Arab Spring'.

Tunisian revolution is a symbolic evidence of the success of social movements, with the power of ‘collective we’, which have indefinite potential to overthrow corrupt political regimes and create chaos and disrupt across the society.

While the 2011 Tunisian revolution showcased the active synthesis of common Tunisian population to overthrow a corrupt regime, chaos and disrupt is still present across Tunisia even today. Popular political parties which hold position in Tunisia is constantly threatened by the radical Salafists and other terrorist groups, and the Tunisian ministry is criticized “for failing to rein in political violence by hardline Salafists and other groups” (Levinson, 2013). The political, social, and economic arena has yet to receive stability. Another poverty-stricken man set himself on fire in 2013. Leftist opposition leader, Chokri Belaid was assassinated in broad day-light on February 6th (The Telegraph, 2013), and instances of violence across Tunisia are still evident. “Hardline Islamists threw stones and bottles at young women in a student hostel in Tunis to stop them staging a performance of dance and music” (Amara, 2013). Social and political difficulties still rage the nation. Political and social chaos is evident. The chaos and disrupt which triggered the nation, eventually spread across the neighboring countries, and Libya and Egypt were invariably affected by the uprisings. The Tunisian revolution caused geopolitical instability across the MENA region.

On similar lines, Libya witnessed anti-government protests on February 15th, 2011 in Benghazi. Termed as Libyan revolution, it was fueled with severe armed clashes between the political ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi’s elite and militant troops, and Libyan rebels who demanded a democratic regime and sought to overthrow his power (The

Guardian, 2011). The security forces open-fired on the crowd in Benghazi and about 400 to 110 people were killed, and the city of Bayda to the east, where 59 to 64 were killed” (Cockburn, 2011).

Despite the number of mounting deaths, the number of protests against Gaddafi’s regime grew rapidly and by February 20th, protests progressed into the capital Tripoli (Black, 2011). Gaddafi’s bloody lockdown with automatic gunfire on unarmed protestors killed nearly 230 people and attracted international attention and condemnation from human rights forums from across the world (Black, 2011). The continuous unrest and chaos disrupted civilian lives, where reports of women being raped mercilessly surfaced during media observations (Cockburn, 2011).

Eventually, the United Nations intervention through the Security Council Resolution 1973 established a no-flying zone over Libya and necessary measures were adopted to protect the civilian life (Security Council, 2011). A three-nation coalition force (France, United Kingdom, and United States) troops bombed against the Gaddafi troops, and another coalition of 27 European, and Middle Eastern troops intervened in Libya (Ria Novosti, 2011). Soon the nation entered into a civil war, where the fight between Brega, government controlled troops, and Ajdabiya, rebel controlled group, mercilessly continued to fight to oust one another (Chulov, 2011).

Although Gaddafi tried to regain his power from the conquering rebels and declared Sirte as the new capital of Libya (Robertson et al, 2011), he was brutally shot near his head and heart by the rebels in October 2011. The 69-year-old Qaddafi is the

first leader to be killed in the ‘Arab Spring’ wave of popular uprisings that swept the MENA, demanding the end of autocratic rulers and greater democracy” (CBS, 2011).

PEAK OF UPRISINGS: EGYPT AND YEMEN

The Tunisian revolution which sparked the Arab Uprisings rapidly peaked in Egypt and Yemen. In Egypt protestors got down to the streets on January 25th, 2011 (Fahim, 2011), and thousands in number marched to Cairo’s Tahrir Square on February 8th, 2011. The crowds were dispersed by firing rubber bullets, tear gas, and concussion grenades, and the police finally drove groups of demonstrators from the square, as the sit-in was transformed into a spreading battle involving thousands of people and little restraint” (Fahim, 2011). They revolted against the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian and corrupt 30-years regime. With an intention to curb the growing protests, Mubarak ordered security forces against the protestors and killed nearly 846 people, and injured nearly 6400 civilians participating in the protest (BBC, 2011b).

This sparked further protests and more people from different social and political background joined the revolution. Cairo became the war zone and protestors seldom cared for the government imposed curfew and military troops were appointed by Mubarak to restrain the crowds. Egypt saw demonstrations across the country, which continued despite a 13-hour military curfew which began at 6 p.m. local time. It initially covered the cities of Cairo, Suez and Alexandria, but was later extended to cover all cities” (NBCNews, 2011). Instability and chaos marred the peaceful nation, and geopolitical instability spread across neighboring countries.

Efforts by Mubarak and various political leaders such as Vice President Omar Suleiman, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, and Essam Sharaf became ineffective (Cutler, 2012), and an Islamic group named Muslim Brotherhood eventually rose to power in Egypt (Johnson, 2012). While the revolution started with an intention of pacifying the social, political, and economic issues, it became an opportunity for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to utilize the chaos for their personal gain. Muslim Brotherhood is accused of having ties with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (Johnson, 2012).

The control of Egypt's political relations by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood not only threatens Egypt's internal security, but also international security. It imposes as a greater threat to nations that have bilateral and multi-lateral ties with Egypt. Another greater threat that Egypt faces is the possibility of a rule under the strict Sharia law, which proclaims Jihad and is accused of condemning the basis human rights and rights of women. Muslim Brotherhood is a strong campaigner for the Sharia law and Jihad, and vesting the political power of Egypt in the hands of such an organization will affect Egypt's public safety and international security (Hessler, 2012).

The revolution in Egypt was the direct result of legal and political grievances. Oppression, loss of freedom of expression, unemployment, inflation in food prices (Zayan, 2011; The New Age, 2011), collectively propelled the Egyptian civilians to embark on an anti-Mubarak campaign. Although the forces tried to oppress the civilians, it became highly impossible to restore the political and social semblance of the society, despite the numerous political modifications and measures. While triggering international

intervention, the Egyptian revolution, risked the international security, where possibility of Mubarak's forces joining hands with other tyrant regimes was high.

Revolution in Yemen was simultaneous with the Egyptian revolution. Social and economic factors such as unemployment, corruption and inflation (BBC, 2011c; Reuters, 2011), forced the people to demonstrate against the rule of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Demonstrations with large number of people (nearly 16,000) occurred in Yemen's capital on January 27th, 2011 (Yemen, 2013). Series of protests was widely present across Yemen since then, and a distinction between pro-government forces and anti-government forces was widely present.

Government forces fired against the protestors, killing nearly 52 people and mutiny against the government intensified. Constant demands for the resignation of the President were held, and the rebels resorted to violent activities. While the President was still debating his resignation, bombing on the President's compound, forced Saleh to fly to Saudi Arabia for treatment (Jamjoom and Almasmari, 2011). Post this, the Saleh government was overthrown and Yemen witnessed democratic elections (Mounassar, 2012). While the revolution ended the President 33-years regime, it created chaos and disrupt across Yemen and other neighboring countries. It attracted terrorist organizations such as the Al-Qaeda, who intervened and bombed against Yemeni soldiers to express their support towards the rebels. General unrest was widely present across Northern Western of Yemen when sectarian violence known as "Houthi rebellion" broke out in four Yemeni governorates (Amran, Hajjah, Al Jawf and Sa'dah) with predominantly Shiite population backed by Iran and Hezbollah (Hammond, 2012).

Yemen never achieved a general calm. Sectarian conflict and military clashes still persist; general apprehension of the rebirth of revolution is still evident. The present government maintains vigil to prevent interference from terror and militant groups, and maintain peace across the nation. Thus, the Arab Uprisings which began in Tunisia eventually reached its peak with Egypt and Yemen, and attracted international attention and intervention.

EXPANSION OF DISORDER: SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JORDAN, AND SUDAN

The protests eventually impacted the neighboring regions and the disorder eventually expanded to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Sudan. Escalated scales of protests were visible across the MENA region. Saudi Arabian protests began with the self-immolation in Samtah (Jizan Province) in January 2011 (BBC, 2011d). The rebels demanded equal rights for men, women, and the Shia Muslims, women suffrage (Abu-Nasr, 2011), and similar to other revolts they revolted against corruption. Not too long, upheavals embarked in Eastern Region which contains most of the oil reserves and populated by Shiites majority influenced by Iran. Protests were suppressed with an iron fist; many Shiite mullahs were detained and tortured, and many activists were thrown in prison for treason and spying for Iran after mock trials. An ongoing revolution, the revolt in Saudi, has brought about changes in the political regime; however it is characterized by killings and death of protestors. Repression and other activities were carried out by the government, and have caused political and social instability across the nation (Erlich, 2013).

On similar lines, situation in Bahrain intensified and is an on-going revolution alike Saudi Arabia. While the protests started in 2011 (Coll, 2011), government and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) intervention allowed the government to curb the protests with a three-month state emergency. Thousands of arrests and deaths of dozens of protestors were visible during the early days. Even today, Bahrain witnesses protests and violent activities, owing to extended support it receives from the opposition parties.

The Kuwaiti uprising which began in February 2011, witnessed the dismissal and dissolution of the Parliament. And when freedom of voting allowed for people, the candidates of Shiite minority won their biggest tally ever in any legislature elections, 17 of the 50 parliamentary seats of "Majlis Al-Umma" the National Assembly of Kuwait. Protests in Jordan are on-going. The civilian protestors are seldom happy with the political regime and the King Abdullah III appointed three Prime Ministers in a period of two years. Demonstrations raged because of the abolition of government subsidies for fuel and rising food prices four doubles. This is mainly caused by that Jordan is a country with extreme poverty and its economy is heavily dependent on aid from the Gulf oil states based on political loyalty and sectarian ties (Spindle, 2012). Revolution in Sudan is on-going and the rebels' demands for political and social changes are heard by the government. But despite of the public dissatisfaction on Sudanese President monopolizing of power, the secession of South Sudan after a general referendum of January 2011 gave Al-Bashir more public sympathy and agitated national emotion in favor of him as he presented himself as the guarantor of the independence and integrity of the rest of the Sudan. While the revolution has not seen deaths of civilians alike the

Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan revolutions, its intensity and action symbolized the potential of social movement influence and geopolitical instability triggered and spread by movements across nations such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi, and Bahrain (Tadros, 2012).

The revolution in these nations is on-going. The governments in these regions are taking precautionary measures to curb the rapidly moving social movements. Demands from the general public have been heard by the respective governments; however, political and social instability is widely visible. The chances of these regions influencing their counter and neighboring nations are relatively high. Geopolitical instability is encompassing the MENA region and the world at the wake of each day.

SYRIA'S COMPLICATIONS: FIRE FUSE OF ALL-OUT WAR IN MIDDLE EAST

Arab Uprising fused out across Syria, owing to the arrest and torture of 15 teenagers in Daraa, who wrote slogans against the Baathist regime in March 2011 (Fahim, 2011). While the Arab Uprisings affected Syria and protests were visible in January 2011, this event necessitated the birth and growth of collective consciousness. Syrian protestors collectively gathered across various regions and the government security forces resorted to violence to curb the growth and spread of the revolution.

Series of events marred the nation and Syria became a stage for widespread revolt and protest. Syrian army tanks killed people in July, August, and November, and a full-scale civil war between the government forces and anti-government forces broke out an

all-out war in the MENA region. The death toll in Syria reached more than 100,000, and the political and social arena of Syria is a playground for power-hunger organizations, which seek to gain control over the civilians (Fantz, 2013). –The violent crackdown by Al-Assad's security forces against the opposition has garnered worldwide condemnation from the European Union, the Arab League, and Turkey in addition to the United States” (CNN Wire Staff, 2011). –Tens of thousands of people have been killed, hundreds of thousands have fled the country, and the idea of the nation itself is disappearing amid cycles of sectarian bloodshed” (Fahim, 2013). As chaotic as it can be, Syrian uprising is an on-going conflict, and the life of civilians is characterized by violence and disruption.

The conflict in Syria turned into a sectarian conflict between Sunni militant groups and Shiite dominated authority threatens to disintegration of country into sectarian and ethnic states. The armed groups are mostly Jihadist and affiliated with Al-Qaeda, the most violent is "Jabhat al-Nusra" founded in late 2011, and designated terrorist organization by United States and European Union earlier in Dec, 2012 (Hof, 2013).

Syrian crisis escalated into more complexity when regional interferences exacerbated to a proxy war, fueled with support of Iran for Al-Assad while in return Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Gulf States arming and funding Sunni Arab fighters and Jihadists, a situation threatens to turn Syrian civil war to regional Sunni-Shiite all-out wide-ranging war could destabilize the region countries, including fragile Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Gulf States (Sharp Jeremy and Christopher Blanchard, 2013, p 10), with high probability to widen the sectarian fight into interregional wars as in case if conflict exported to Caucasus, Central Asia, and Sub-Sahara as we witnessed in Mali

when U.N. warned that weapons from Libya spread at an alarming rate, fuel the war in Mali, Syria, and other countries and promote the arsenals of the extremists in the region (United Nations Security Council, March, 2013, p. 15)

SUMMARY

The Arab Uprisings or what euphemistically and euphorically known as ‘Arab Spring’ across the MENA region began with the Tunisian revolution, which spread across Libya. It reached its zenith across Egypt and Yemen. The uprisings expanded across Gulf region. Ultimately, the ‘spring’ broke out with Syria’s complications. Political and social movement theory can be applied to the events that shaped the Arab Uprisings. It can be invariably deduced that Arab Uprisings was an expression of political and social oppression, and corrupt practices by the respective governments of the countries. Rulers who ruled with autocratic regimes failed to respond to the public grievances, and events such as self-immolation of citizens and assault by police officers, triggered the nations to rise against decades of oppression. A ‘collective we’ was evident among the protestors, who during the initial stages were characterized by common population and youth, and symbolized the power of technology (social networking sites).

While the protestors were successful in over-throwing or bringing about changes in the political regimes, with the objective of stability, nations affected by the Arab Uprisings are yet to witness peace and harmony. Militant groups with the intention of establishing radical State threaten the presence of democracy, and political and social security of the nations is at stake. Chaos and disrupt is still evidently present across the MENA region.

CHAPTER THREE

CAUSATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARAB UPRISINGS

INTRODUCTION

From the literature review, the causes and crucial reasons that led to the rise of Arab Uprisings can be collectively indicated. Ultimately, it can be comprehended that the uprisings have invariably caused geopolitical instability in the MENA region. The causatives and implications of geopolitical instability are categorized into political effects, social effects, security effects and interregional effects. To obtain a collective insight on the causatives and implications of the uprisings, a systematic approach is followed to analyze the current literature. The simplistic definition of each factor under the categories is provided. The characteristics of each factor and its negative implications follow the definition. Post this, factual data associated with the uprisings is provided and inter-connected to the generic implications outlined for each factor. Each of these categories is discussed in the following sections.

POLITICAL EFFECT

Arab Uprising's political effects can be segregated into four categories. The impact of the uprisings on empowerment of political Islamism, spread of religious radicalism, fade of State secularism and emergence of semi-theocratic regimes clarifies its impact on the States' political systems. These effects will be outlined in this dedicated section respectively

Empowerment of Political Islamism

The Arab Uprisings have empowered political Islamism. Political Islamism as construed by policy makers, academicians, researchers, and media personals is synonymous to “Islamic regeneration, Islamic conservatism, neo-Islamism, and Islamic revivalism” (Mansouri and Akbarzadeh, 2006, p.3). From an analytical perspective, Denoeux’s definition can be included in this section. Denoeux (2002) defines Islamism as an indicative “instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition” (p.61).

While political Islamism is a typical ideology of sectorial divisionism between followers of political Islamism and non-followers (Political Islamism, 2014), the activities of the hardline radicals in the recent decades, has gravitated fundamentalist religious factions as a perpetuator of instability, conflicts, and violence across the globe (Mansouri and Akbarzadeh, 2006). Political Islamism can be distinctly validated by the groups’ affinity towards rigidity in Islamic doctrines and Islamist parties can be categorized into two groups, the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ groups. While the right group are the modern Islamists or moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and the left are the Salafists who are rigid in their affinity towards Islamic doctrines. While the Islamic regime from Brotherhood can be tolerated to a certain extent, history indicates that the Brotherhood’s flexible political views are forged into alliance with the Salafists principles (Sader, 2012).

The claim that Arab Uprisings has empowered political Islamism is validated by numerous authors (Haqqani, 2013; Sader, 2012) and can be invariably measured by the rise of religious political parties in the MENA region and the amount or extent of instability, conflicts, and violence caused by the political parties. Several Islamist formations across the MENA region reaped the benefits of the uprisings and entered into their respective region's political structure. The political aspirations of these groups coupled with their fundamental religious beliefs have empowered Islamism hereby creating a new wave of political Islamism across the MENA region (Mneimneh, 2011). Apart from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist parties adorned the role of political players across Tunisia and Libya, Syria and Yemen, and won electoral votes in Kuwait and Morocco (Lynch, 2012). The Ennhada Movement in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Turkey's AKP serve as classic examples for the same.

The elections results post the protests in the MENA region, led to emergence of Islamist parties, who were forced to interact with other crucial players of the State. The Ennhada Movement rose to power in Tunisia after the 2011 elections. The rise of the movement can be critically viewed as the resurgence of religious politics crafted the idea of Islamic Constitution; however, the movement was forced to enter into an alliance with the Congress of Republic (CPR) party. This alliance and public demonstrations against an Islamic Constitution, eventually forced Ennhada to take a back seat from creating a radical theocratic State in Tunisia. On similar lines, Islamist party PJD must govern within the monarchic system of Morocco, the Muslim Brotherhood is forced to co-exist with the military forces of Egypt and Libya's NTC is a co-existence between Islamists

and Secularists (Sader, 2012). While the forges and alliances were meant to strengthen the State and establish stability, they have spread of religious radicalism, killed State secularism and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes, and caused instability across the States.

Spread of Religious Radicalism

Max Weber defined radicalism as a phenomenon “differing in one crucial aspect from the socially sanctioned outlook of common sense” (Bittner, 1963, p.928).

Radicalism is often viewed as a phenomenon with characteristic negative and positive implications, and its application is popularly associated with the context under which it is applied. For instance, radicalism is negatively associated as a synonym to extremism, revolution, and utopianism. Radicalism-extremism is a repulsive phenomenon, where a particular ideal assumes an extremist form and induces violence and terror in the society. Revolutionary-radicalism is an injunctive embellishment of an ideal, which in most cases is accompanied with extremism and revolutionary changes. Utopian-radicalism is the amalgamation of fantastic and illusionary ideals, which result in extremism and revolution. While the negative radical implications are inter-connected with extremism and changes, depending on the context and application, revolutionary- radicalism is associated with positive attributes such as progress, adequacy and innovation (McLaughlin, 2012). Radicalism is directly associated with societal change; however, given its repulsiveness and ability to create distorts and chaos across the society, negative attributes of radicalism are considered in this study.

Religious radicalism is popularly defined as “extreme violent acts in the name of religion” (Zaben, 2012). Religious radicalism arises with an idea or ideology and with the injection of three crucial constituencies, the messengers, the message content and the context in which it is presented; the idea manifests itself from its subtle form to gross reality (Gladwell, 2002). Theories of violence in the human history highlight imbalances in social structure as causes for social unrest. However, ambiguity arises when the messengers manipulate the dissonance present in the structural imbalance. Political entrepreneurs (Gupta, 2008) can be defined as shapers of any social movement. They act as connectors and communicate their message to large number of people or as mavens and lead the followers towards a particular idea or as salesmen and persuade the idea into the followers systems (Gladwell, 2002).

The political entrepreneurs artistically manipulate the offended groups' emotions and present the message content in a compelling storyline (Heath and Heath, 2002). An action plan is outlined and the idea assumes a radical activism form. The Arab Uprisings symbolized these characteristic features and it can be evidently proved that Arab Uprisings have spread religious radicalism. The rise of extremist and hardline political groups across the MENA region can justify this assumption. While the groups' express moderate values and pragmatic political principles towards power and responsibility, their fundamental and ideological commitment towards fundamental principles remains (Rynhold, 2011). This assertion can be validated by understanding the activities of extremist groups that have risen from the Arab Uprisings.

With the Arab Uprisings, the extremists groups have exploited the sectarian and social divisions (supporters of the regime and anti-regime supporters), and power vacuums, and created civil wars to expand their power and prominence not only in the affected regions, but also across the globe (Philips, 2012). These organizations with their undemocratic intentions focus on religious symbols and achieving totalitarian radical goals and have killed thousands of civilians in their wake. The rise of Islamist political parties with radical agendas indicates the spread of religious radicalism across the MENA region. While the political parties exhibit democratic agendas, they divulge their duties with the intention of subduing democracy and encouraging the hardline Sharia Law (Philips, 2012). This theocratic or strict Sharia Law has killed secularism, the details of which are discussed in the following section. The uprisings have thus exhibit negative implications of radicalism and popularize extremism, revolution, and utopianism.

Fade of State Secularism

Secularism is an intractable paradox (Agrama, 2012) and functions as a constructive element. It is an important constituent of national identity. The definition of secularism has been synchronized across different subjects related to social sciences and politics. Nevertheless, secularism in its simplistic sense is defined in relation to religion. While Charles Taylor attributed secularism to modernism, Jawaharlal Nehru defined secularism as a pillar of modernity. Nehru described secularism through two ideal concepts: tolerant social attitudes and “ideas undergirding the state’s laws and egalitarian political processes that were untainted with preferences for one group over another” (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and VanAntwerpen, 2011, p.7). Sociologists and theorists

belonging to International Relations recognize secularism as a compelling force (Casanova, 2009 and Kuru, 2007) since it functions as form of power by not only influencing the masses directly, but also the politics of the state and government.

When a state fails to oblige secular principles, religious dominance is vastly present. A basic conflict between religious entities and the constituents of secularism “to promote the domination of religion and law” (Berkes, 1964, p.6) is evident. The religious entities that emphasize on dominance have their roots in religious traditions (Berkes, 1964), and with the rise of Islamist parties and extremist factions across the MENA region, the Arab Uprisings have killed State secularism. The roots of the Islamist parties and radical groups are deeply embedded in their historical traditions, which even camouflaged with democratic principles will fade secularism. “Islamists have a strong sense of history; their political behavior cannot be easily comprehended or predicted without taking history into account” (Haqqani, 2013, p.7), and the history of hardline Islamists reflects strong affliction towards traditional radical ideas, which fail to recognize secularism as an essentiality of human identity (Agrama, 2012).

The traditions of religious parties emphasize on Islamism, and with Islamism the Sharia Law has come into force or is waiting for its full-fledged revival across the MENA region. Sharia law can be comprehended as "Islamic code of laws, drawn up by Muslim scholars and Jurists to provide Muslims with a practical guide to daily life" (Stallings, 2011). It consists of the Quran and Hadith, and the law acts as the code of guidance for all people at all times. It sets the foundation for the theocratic law (Krawietz and Reifeld, 2008). While the law acts as a practical guide for the followers of the Islamic faith, many

writers believe it consists of numerous controversial codes on human rights, rights of women, and personal freedom (Philips, 2012; Warner, 2010; Arlandson, 2005). By imposing wrong form of Sharia, it can be concluded that the political and radical groups will lead a State towards divisions and sectarianism, and uproot the principles of secularism and democracy from the MENA region (Jadallah, 2013).

Evidences of these assertions are already visible in subtle manners across the MENA region dominated by Islamist parties. The Arab Uprisings which began with a call for secularism and global freedom for religious practice has emerged as a delusion. For instance, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia proposed a bill to prohibit its people from blasphemy which included insults, derogatory defaming, and profanity. Blasphemy laws are upheld by Islamist scholars and most often they are used to persecute the liberal elites in the region. Such anti- blasphemy laws provide “huge amounts of power to the religious authorities and with a depressing inevitability, very soon a full-blown theocracy follows” (Sanderson, 2012). In Turkey the Islamist Justice and Development Party, while propagating democratic views silently imposed Islamic theocratic principles on its citizens. Headscarves and all-enveloping Burka were visible across Istanbul and Ankara in greater numbers compared to the other regimes. Thus, Turkey visibly represented the assertion that Turkey handed over to undercover hardline Islamists and “will soon seek to reinforce their power by gently, bit-by-bit” (Sanderson, 2012).

Emergence of Semi-Theocratic Regimes

Theocracy is a situation where government entities of a State, including “leadership, are held by members adhering to a particular theology” (Douglas, 2009,

p.181). It is a governing function grounded in religious ideologies and in its purest form; theocracy's governing guidelines are run by religious organization and a government by God (Douglas, 2009). Thus, theocracy can be comprehended as "exercise of political power by the clergy of a particular religion, usually (although not necessarily) claiming to be acting primarily on behalf of a divinity and governing according to its principles and requirements" (Megoran, 2009).

Post-modern intellectuals consider theocracy as an opposing concept of democracy and the term 'theocracy' is in adjunction with 'fundamental' ideologies and "finger points with moral indignation at countries manifesting forms of theocratic rule" (Ward, 2009, p.296). Islamic rule idolizes on an Islamic State, and the activities of the government are concentrated towards achieving an Islamic city, parallel to the ideal Medina or commonly known as 'city'. Professor Sidek Baba, a Malaysian scholar and professor at the International Islamic University-Malaysia, divulges into the subject of Medina and regards it as a city that reckons religious communities and religious values. Additionally, he claims that, Medina is not just any city; it "symbolizes a city that is exemplar to other communities and societies in the Arabian Peninsula" (Ad'ha Aljunied 2011). An Islamic state is governed in accordance to the principal elements of Medina. The elements that govern an Islamic state are social justice (adalah) and Islamic Law (sharia). Social justice is achieved by forgiveness (ihsan) and forbearance/tolerance (hilm), which embodies the highest level of faith (iman). These elements are ensured by a leader (amir) or king (sultan) (Ad'ha Aljunied 2011).

According to the religious testimony, the Muslims are governed by their rules and principles under the Sharia, derived from the Quran and the Sunnah. The Sharia deals with religious precepts related to civil, family, inheritance, customary, educational matters, and penal codes. In order to ensure the prevalence of security and legitimacy, the early caliphs introduced the rule of law (Ad'ha Aljunied 2011). However, with changing times, the ideologies of that law were applied for personal privileges and controversies based on Sharia can be evidently found across the world. The misunderstanding of ensuring the provenance of Sharia has spread religious radicalism across the globe. Fiqh and the Sharia law are extremely interpreted and radical activists used religion doctrines and texts as weapons to dissipate their movements. The call for holy war (jihad), blind obedience, and extremism are prevalent at a global level. The idea of fighting un-Islamic conditions has given rise to Jihadi organizations such as, Al-Jihad, Al-Qaeda (Afghanistan), Hamas (Palestine), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Kashmir), and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Kashmir) (Venkataraman 2007). Theocracy under religious orthodoxies thus exhibits totalitarian theologies and ideologies.

While the Arab Uprisings opposed their respective theocratic regimes, uprisings have led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. The Arab Uprisings have been corrupted with radical theocracy (Cline, 2013). Governed by the Sharia law, the political parties that exercise the Islamic law overpowers the lifestyle of Caliphs era and their early followers, and commands the "individual's life of righteous successors from times of dawah, from their diet to the number of times a day they must demonstrate fealty to Allah, to how they may lawfully treat their wives and children" (Cline, 2013).

While the religious and spiritual tendencies of the individual are governed by the sharia law, the law also governs the social and economic life of the individual. Thus, obsessed with power, the political Islamist parties that come into power will forge alliance with other parties or popular forces of the State and establish semi-theocratic regimes. As discussed in the first section, the alliances between the Ennahda Movement and CPR in Tunisia, Islamist party PJD and the monarchic system of Morocco, Muslim Brotherhood and military forces of Egypt, and Libya's NTC and Islamists and Secularists (Sader, 2012) serves as a classic example for the same. While the political parties upheld democratic views and outcry against theocracy, their respective alliances with Islamist factions is a definitive indication of political Islamism, which on a gradual basis will emerge as semi-theocratic regimes and ultimately turn as theocratic regimes. A battleground between the Islamic factions will increase and the rebellions, and the social effects of such a rule will gnaw into the minds of common man, until he submits into the culture or religious faith –only with different faces, mobs, slogans, and weapons” (Cline, 2013).

SOCIAL EFFECT

Arab Uprising's social effects can be segregated into four categories. The decline of public freedoms, persecution of minorities, adverse impact on women and their rights, and farewell to MENA democratization myth, clarifies its impact on the States' social systems.

Decline of Public Freedoms

Public freedoms can be comprehended as fundamental human rights of the general public and according to the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) freedom encompasses multiple dimensions of human life. Accordingly, each individual has: a) the freedom of movement and residence within the borders of his/her respective State, b) freedom of thought, religion, and conscience and –freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his/her religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance” (UDHR, 2014), c) freedom of expression and opinion, and d) freedom to peacefully assemble and associate themselves. Thus, public freedom guarantees religious freedom, freedom to express individual views and peaceful assembly or association to voice the opinions or propagate individual/group notions.

Religious freedom ensures every individual to live in accordance with his/her own conscience or belief (Hassan, 2005). It ensures dignity, stabilizes inherent reason and upholds individuality of the general public. Moreover, religion as a concept is relational and true freedom protects the right of individuals from political authorities or communal aspiration (Novak, 2009). Religious freedom thus ensures resurgence of faith across the globe (Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011) and places peace as the epitome of human civilization. However, radical ideology followed by some Islamist political parties does not guarantee religious freedom (Keshavjee, 2013). Thus as totalitarian ideologies, radical religious powers fails to value an individual, and –minorities are not tolerated.

Expressing one's opinion or changing one's religion, the act of apostasy, is punishable by death" (Warraq, 2005, p.13).

Freedom of speech and expression in relation to the 21st century can be defined as freedom towards ideas of individuals expressed through word, plays, films, videos, photographs, cartoons, paintings and so on" (Warburton, 2009, p.5). Freedom to assemble peacefully is an important human right and functions as an extension of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression and freedom to assemble on moral grounds are crucial since it ensures effective pursuit of knowledge, effective participation, prudent decision making, life-shaping choices and maintenance of valued relationships (Macleod, 2010). Right to assemble peacefully and peaceful protest allows exchange of ideas and knowledge to make effective decisions about the respective governance (Potter, 2010). In this study, media freedom is considered synonymous with freedom of speech and expression. As per Denis McQuail's normative theory paradigms, Islamic media model can be understood using McQuail's five mass media models, liberal-pluralist, social responsibility, administrative, critical negotiated and cultural negotiated models (McQuail, 2005). The Islamic media model is highly compatible with McQuail's critical model since the media are seen as "hegemonic and repressive tools of those in power, usually political power" (Rane, 2010, p.161).

The Arab Uprisings have resulted in the decline of public freedoms. A survey by the United Nations for the past years, ranked the Middle East at the bottom of an international score card of media freedom" (Morris, 2013). In Syria, around 110 reporters and 153 citizen journalists have been killed since 2011, and Syrian rebel groups, Al

Nusra Front, an extension of the Al- Qaeda, and other radical rebel groups are considered as predators of media freedom. They are accused of singling out members that went against the Muslim Brotherhood and “for harassing and physically attacking independent media and journalists critical of the party” (Morris, 2013).

Apart from media freedom, religious freedom did not increase during the Arab Uprisings. A contrary effect was observed. A survey by the Pew Research Centre in 2011 noted that when the Arab Uprisings were beginning in few areas and was at its peak in 2011, there was an increase in religious social hostilities since the government restriction on religion is relatively high. Egypt placed most restrictions on religion in 2011. Religious freedom is crucial to achieve economic prosperity within secure confinements (Brown, 2013). Additionally, the revival of radical religious parties and extremist factions will ensure political or radical religious wave and negate the fundamental human aspects such as religious freedom, media freedom, and freedom to assemble given their affinity towards conditional and traditional radical roots.

Apart from media freedom and religious freedom, the United Nations urged UAE to respect human rights of its citizens, since it observed serious trends of human rights violation by UAE. The nation imprisoned peaceful demonstrators across several areas and aimed towards persecuting human rights defenders and people expressing their opinions peacefully, including online activists. Thus, UN called UAE not to violate fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom to assemble (“Cairo Institute”, 2013). In Qatar, a country that financed rebels in Libya and Syria to overthrow their regimes, a poet was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2012 for criticizing Emir of

Qatar in his poetry (Alpert, 2012). In Kuwait, many political and social activists jailed for insulting Emir in their tweets and posts on their personal blogs (BBC, 2013). Considering this, the Arab Uprisings have hindered the public freedom by affecting the media, freedom to assemble and religious freedom of the affected countries.

Persecution of Minorities

The term minority is comprehensive in nature and lacks universal definition (Capotorti, 1991), given its inherent vagueness and impreciseness (Rehman, 2000). Resultantly, multiple factors and/or criteria can be considered while implying any particular group as minority. Factors such as numerical inferiority, non-dominant position, nationality, distinguishing ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, and collective will (Khan and Rahman, 2012), are used to identify minorities in any region or constituency. Minorities in any region or constituency experience self-identification crisis, and two distinct types of minorities can be visibly identified: minorities by will and minorities by force (Laponce, 1960). Minorities by will are group of individuals who voluntarily disassociate themselves from the general population to maintain their identity and transmit their special essence to future generations and minorities by force are groups of individuals that are created for negative purposes. Their disassociation is involuntary in nature and such groups on usual basis are subjected to persecution by the majority (Whitley, 2002; Pecker, 1999).

An Islamic State distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims, and among the four Islamic schools of jurisprudence, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi'i, and Hanifi, non-Muslims are equally given special status based on the Islamic principles derived from the

Quran, Hadith, Al-Sirah, teachings of Sahabah, and Ahl Al-Bayt. Additionally, non-Muslims are classified as: the people of the dhimma (Dhimma) in Arabic literally means people who are obligated to pay taxes because they are non-Muslims living under Islamic rule), and these are Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslim people those who live in any state conquered by Muslims and are taxed (jizyah) for their stay even if they were the original people of conquered land, those who live in Muslim State and are taxed (jizyah) for their stay, and people of (hudna) those who signed peace treaty with Muslims when they are defeated in a war, and Mustamin (protected) those who approach or visit Islamic State to learn about Islam (Shahid, 2005). The presence of jizyah, legal restrictions, and punishable codes for the dhimmis clearly indicate that Islamic States is questioned on its methods of dealing with non-Muslims in their provinces, because minorities are thus treated unfairly on various grounds. The egregious evidences of this was most recently when terrorist group of Jabhat Al-Nusra after controlling Deir ez-Zor (governorate located East of Syria) ordered the Christians to pay tax to Al-Mujahedeen (fighters for Allah), also when the terrorist group of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS besieged Al-Raqqa city Northern Syria and gave Christians three choices: convert to radicalism and submit, death by sword, or pay Gold tax (jizyah) (Spencer, 2014, Gilbert, 2014, Al Monitor, 2014).

The Arab Uprisings have mercilessly persecuted the minorities across the MENA region. In Syria Shia/Alwaites, Assyrians, Kurds, and Palestinians are continuously targeted. In Yemen, Zaydi Shia, Akdam, and Southerners are persecuted and continuous targets against black Libyans, sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, and Berbers is increased in

Libya (“Minority Rights”, 2013). The casualties of Christians (minorities in the Middle East), demonstrates the above assertion. Christians in Egypt, are always treated as minorities and their dependency on the government for protection is relatively high (Fisk, 2011). In Egypt, the declaration of majority’s voice or rule in the country, questions the position of minorities. The minorities that live in majority dominated Muslim nations, live in unprecedented fear and exodus given the number of attacks on the churches and clergymen.

—In Syria, over 300,000 Christians have already fled in fear as foreign Jihadists intimidated the 'infidels' in pursuit of a Salafist State” (Wakim, 2013). —In Iraq, Christian minorities have existed in the region for two millennia. Yet, the violence gripping the country means that they face a terrible choice of either leaving the country or getting killed. Another stark choice is to convert to radical ideologies” (Cilia, 2012). In Turkey, the governing party, which upholds democratic principles, turned a blind eye towards Christian persecution and the uprisings have resulted in democratic degeneration across the MENA region (Cilia, 2012). Christians are disappearing in the Middle Eastern countries Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan due to persecutions, displacing, threatening, and bombing Churches. Systematic persecution by extremist militias against Christians in Middle East had escalated after Arab Uprisings (Malnick, 2012). Iraqi and Syrian Christians are on danger of potential extinction (Newman, 2013). Research by Daniel Pipes Center shows the decline of Christian population in Middle Eastern countries during last decades (Pipes, 2001, DanielPipes.org).

The Prince of Wales, Charles Philip, condemned the "organized persecution" of Christians in Middle East by fundamentalists which will lead that Christianity will disappear in its original birthplace (Bingham, 2013).

But one of the most recent and biggest ethnic cleansing against Christians of Middle East had taken place in Northern Iraqi city of Mosul after it was seized by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on Jun 10th, 2014. The terrorist group declared caliphate and Islamic Sharia law, and soon Assyrian Christians forced to choose either to convert to radical ideology or leave the city no later than Saturday July 5th, 2014 at 12 p.m. and by then the city has emptied from its indigenous Assyrian Christians population, ending over than 6,000 years of their existence in Nineveh, the imperial city of their Assyrian ancestors (Dahl, 2014). As a result, the rise of Islamist political parties and radicalism has a crucial impact on the secularism of the State and the minority persecution is an unquestionable effect.

Women and Their Rights on the Stake

Women's rights is a serious issue at a global level and women from different regions of the world, and depending on the political and cultural climatic changes, women all over the world have demanded for fundamental rights, termed as women's rights. From a political and legal perspective, women's right encompasses suffrage, civil rights and property ownership and inheritance rights and access to education. From social, employment, and economic rights statutes, women's right encompasses rights towards equality in wages and opposes gender discrimination, sexual harassment, child care, independent credit, and enrollment in the military. From family health and sexuality

perspective, women's rights can be defined as fundamental human rights, access to medical care, self-determined reproductive rights and access to contraceptives, surrogate motherhood, abortion rights, and opposition to female genital mutilation. Rights of women against, violence women in any form, physical or verbal are also considered as a crucial right (Thomsen, 2007; Emerton, Adams, Brynes and Connors, 2005). Concepts of gender discrimination across various social, political, and economic perspectives are visible across the world and women have been treated as minority in certain religious theologies.

While the Arab Spring showcased women marching and protesting for their rights on the streets of their respective autocratic nations, Arab Spring has not been effective in upholding the rights of women. Contrarily, it has taken a detrimental stance. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, radical Islamists have been flexing their political muscles and fighting against women's rights (CBC News, 2013). While the Arab Spring allowed the women to express their voice and opinions, the uprisings proposed challenges to female revolutionaries, journalists, and protestors attracted brutal elements from the society. The women faced rape, sexual assault, verbal, and physical attacks not only from the regimes, but also from their co-protestors and supporters. People who reported demonstrations were sexually and physically attacked, and states such as Egypt and Tunisia abused the rights of women on a massive scale (Arshad, 2013).

Considering the rise in the number of abuses on women, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) claims that instances of early marriage are reported considering the lack of security in the society. With a belief

that the women will be protected from rape and other physical abuses, practices such as early marriages, abandonment by family due to pregnancies by rape, and prostitution of rape victims have returned to the societies affected by the Arab Spring (OHCHR, 2014).

Farewell to MENA Democratization Myth

The principle concepts of democracy can be attributed to the eighteenth-century philosophy of democracy, which defines democracy as “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1950). Most countries across the globe have realized the need for democracy. Democracy reduces the risk of conflict across regions that embrace it (Russett and Oneal, 2001) and ensures peace and development, unlike authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. However, the MENA region has lagged behind embracing democracy and call for democracy across the MENA region was one of the primary causes for the emergence of the Arab Spring.

However, the countries in the MENA region have meted with great challenges towards democratization. The Arab Spring has forced democracy to take a backseat given the rise in the Islamist political parties and the failure of people to embrace democracy. Democracy from this perspective can be viewed as a competition for political leadership. For electoral gains the parties verbally attach themselves to democratic principles of public welfare and create brands to sell their respective agendas. However, this takes a dangerous turn when all the party members or party successor fail to adapt/adopt to the democratic principles outlined in the party agenda and instead gun towards gaining

political power (Schumpeter, 1950). On similar lines, rather than encouraging democracy, the Arab Spring has created disorder and chaos in the society. The rise of religious parties has encouraged religious radicalism, killed secularism, and created semi-theocratic regimes. At a transitory phase, the religious parties with different tastes of power may encourage groups that believe that “democracy leads nowhere, and that only through violence can the theocratic utopia be achieved” (Hardy, 2013).

A rise in sectarianisms and intolerance among the groups within the society, groups that support the regimes and group that rebel against the current regimes prove that the Arab Spring uprisings are incapable of creating a democratic situation across the MENA region. Countries such as Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, bloodshed and mass killings have questioned the essence of the uprising itself. “In societies long suppressed, democratic movements - tolerant, pluralistic, committed to human rights - were never likely to emerge, fully formed, overnight” (Hardy, 2013). These aspects clearly indicate that the democratic outcome of the Arab Uprisings, if any, will fall under defective democracy paradigm, since it will fail to meet the four essentialities of embedded democracy- political rights, civil rights, division of powers, and horizontal accountability (Merkel, 2004). Thus, countries affected by the uprisings will either fall under exclusive democracy (if one or more groups are excluded from voting), or domain democracy (military or elite group removes the exiting governing body from its position), or illiberal democracy (lack of constitutional norms or principles), or delegative democracy (ruling power is vested in the hands of military or elite group). Still in chaotic state, lack of fixed pattern in the Arab Spring, poses as an issue, hence there is no appropriate outcome for

the uprising itself. Whether uprooting of the current dictatorship/ regime or installing democracy is not clear among the participants of the uprising, which has created a myth around democracy in the MENA region (Hardy, 2013).

SECURITY EFFECT

Arab Uprising's security effects can be segregated into four categories. The continuous unrests, riots, and lawlessness, rise of civil wars, internal conflicts catastrophe, rule of military juntas, and society militarization, and neighboring interference by paramilitary, guerrillas, and cross-borders violence, clarify its impact on the States' political systems.

Continuous Unrests, Riots, and Lawlessness

Global history since the 16th century pinpoints social revolutions in States and societies. The French revolution in late 1700s, the Russian revolution from 1917 till the 1930s, and Chinese revolution from 1911 till the 1960s reflect "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structure, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below" (Skocpol, 1994, p.4). Revolts in this manner, while questioning the socio-political and economic order of the society, have characteristically induced chaos accompanied by disorder termed as civil disorder (Hunsicker, 2011; Mace, 2012). Chaos in simplistic sense is "absence of order" (Smith, 1998, p.1) and occurs when aberrations arise in the initial conditions of any given state within the confinement of certain outlined boundaries. Exhibiting high sensitivity, any miniscule alteration in the initial conditions, induces disturbance through various trajectories and can assume a mammoth form across indefinite locations (Smith, 1998).

When applied to the State and its societies, chaos creates public disturbance or civil disorder or civil unrest, which can be defined as “one or more forms of disturbance caused by a group of people” (Hunsicker, 2011, p. 39). Civil unrest arises for a numerous reasons commonly revolving on ethnic differences, economic and social injustice, and religious motivated factional disorder. They exhibit certain characteristic features such as, three or more people (number of people), common purpose, intent of exhibition, and use of force which can assume an unlawful form. The logic of group dynamics can be applied to understand the intricacies of civil unrest. A group with common purpose assembles itself and breaches the civic order of the State, termed as public disorder. The disturbance can either culminate at this point or proceed to cause turmoil, where the group begins to chant, yell or portray this collective opinion on top of the disruption. This is termed as public disturbance. Ultimately, the disturbance and turmoil can turn violent not only to other individuals but also to State property and create extreme volatile environment. Lawlessness is vividly present and the unlawful assembly of people otherwise termed as riots occur, which tumultuously disturb the peace and harmony of the State (Hunsicker, 2011).

Causing disruptions to political and social stability, civil unrest exposes the society to social trauma and affects the psychological semblance of political, economic, and social mix of the State. While exhibiting collective action, civil unrest promotes public fear and intimidate, lasting individual and social traumas. These disruptions affect the stability and normal functionalities of the society, and generally reach the stage of

riots when inconsistent communication between the crowds and concerned parties is low. Civil unrest and disorder thus assumes the shape of riots and lawlessness (Mace, 2012).

The Arab Uprisings began with a call for democratic regimes and the need for peace and harmony in the State. This created a "civil unrest in the Arab world, which has come to be known as Arab Spring" (Shields, 2012). While the Arab Spring highlighted the need for socio-political and economic reforms, Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Alexei Pushkov claims that, "the recent events in Egypt prove that the "Arab Spring" did lead not to a democratic renewal, but to chaos" (Voice of Russia, 2013). A survey done on the Arab Youth in 2012 asserts that the Arab Spring civil unrest and lack of democracy are biggest obstacles facing the region (ASDA 'A', 2014).

Continuous riots disrupt the security and balance of the State. An overview of each State affected by the Arab Spring validates the assertion. The revolt against Ben Ali, the then ruler of Tunisia, killed around 300 people and since July 2013, the assassination of two leftist politicians created stand-off between the Ennhada political movement and its rivals. Other violent activities by the Salafists in the region have created civil unrest in the region. In Egypt, popular revolts against Hosni Mubarak killed around 846 people during the uprising led to the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood as the ruling party. However, the party was dethroned by the military forces and led to a stand-off between supporters of Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of military forces. Political stand-off resulted in the State of Libya between forces of Muammar Gadhafi and rebel forces, which killed thousands of people and led to the emergence of 300 revolutionary militias. General lawlessness and instability is highly prevalent across these

regions. On similar lines, clashes between security forces of Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh and rebel forces killed around 2,000 people. While the President stepped down and allowed elections in 2012, the southern sections of Yemen are plagued with insurgents led by al-Qaeda and northern sections by Zaidi Shia rebels (BBC, 2013).

Oman witnessed protests against Sultan Qaboos bin Said in February 2011; however, the security forces' crackdown on the demonstrations quieted the revolutionary spirit and created instability in the State. In 2011, Kuwaitis demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed Al Sabah through State-wide protests. Despite the replacement of Prime Minister and the rise of Islamist-led opposition party, state of unrest and instability still rests in Kuwait (BBC, 2013).

In Syria, the protest against President Bashar-al-Assad's took a violent turn and "evolved into a brutal and increasingly sectarian armed conflict" (BBC, 2013) killing 100,000 people in its wake. An ongoing strife, continuous unrests, riots, and lawlessness is prevalent in Syria. Since 2011, unrests in Bahrain against King Hamad al-Khalifa's discriminatory regime against the Shia Muslim community, led to the arrest of around 3,000 people. Lack of any breakthrough has forced the Shia youth to resort to violent activities and have killed around 45 people in the ongoing clashes. On similar lines, protests against the ruling Sunni community headed by King Abdullah Al Saud have been quieted through monetary compensations and forces. Security personnel have been asked to detain and obstruct the activities of the demonstrators and general disturbance is still present in the State (BBC, 2013). A general rise in the number of riots and physical abuses are observed and this has decapitated the stability of the States. The call for

democracy has resulted in violent activities and divided the States into segments, creating disharmony and civil wars.

Civil Wars and Internal Conflicts Catastrophe

Civil wars can be defined as “armed conflict between two or more parties within the boundaries of a single state” (Kastfelt, 2005, p.2). They represent an unusual level of violence involving more than 200 battle-related deaths every year (Regan, 2000). The causes of civil war are multitudinous. Demographic factors such as population and population density, ethnic dominance and ethnic heterogeneity, geographical factors such as large area and mountains, neighbor at war, resource concentration, diamonds and oil exports, environmental factors such as drought and soil degradation, history and presence of insecurity factors such as new state, refugees and rivalry and interstate war, and regime instability give rise to civil wars (Dixon, 2009). While the duration for civil wars are unpredictable and depend on the extent of intervention and mitigation measures (Walter, 2002), civil wars exhibit two primary characteristics: violence and death of citizens, and people involved in the war. Chaos and instability is highly prevalent in the regions affected by the civil wars.

The Arab Spring has invoked severe unrest and unlawfulness across the MENA region. In countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the uprising has already resulted as, is resulting in or is on the verge of a full-throttle civil war between the pro-supporters of a government/leader and anti-supporters of a government/leader. For instance, in Egypt, pro-and anti-Morsi demonstrators are leaving the nation at the potential risk of a civil war. Despite democratic elections and the win of Muslim Brotherhood’s elected leader

Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt, the Egyptian civilians recently clammed in Tahrir Square with anti- Morsi slogans. This resulted in the army's measure of overthrowing the President, and has paved way for the inevitable civil-war in Egypt. On July 6, fresh violence between Brotherhood supporters and anti- Morsi supporters were reported, killing four people. The security of Egypt falls under a sensitive zone (BBC, 2013).

On similar lines, Libya's six-month civil war in 2011 killed at least 30,000 people and wounded around 50,000 (Laub, 2011) causing wide-spread violence across the State. Libya's civil war was the clash between pro-Gadhafi fighters and anti-Gadhafi rebels. Libya's then ruler, Muammar Gadhafi employed army to curb the rising protests, which killed around 9,000 troops and killed thousands of civilians in the process. Civil war in Libya channeled mass-violence on the civilians, protestors and the national army, injuring thousands and killing the others. Libya's State security was invariably affected.

The case of Syria is similar to that of Libya. The mounting tension in the region has attracted criticisms from world organizations and governments, given its incessant reports on violence. Syria's civil war has turned into a holy crusade, where Sunni Muslim supporters are fighting against the regime of the President Bashar al-Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah in the region. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian theologian, the world's most influential Sunni cleric, has called Sunni Muslims from the world to fight against Assad and Hezbollah's regime in Syria the allies of Shiite regime in Iran. It is reported that about 3,000 Sunni fighters from more than 60 different countries have joined the civil war (Hegghammer and Zelin, 2013), reducing the uprising in Syria into a sectarian

conflict, which has hampered and will indefinitely hamper the security of the State.

Thus, civil wars in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are characterized by rise in the number of wars over a period of time and consistent killings among the groups or mass genocide.

Civil wars have a catastrophic effect on a State's security. It represents, "large-scale violence between two or more groups holding sovereignty within a recognized state" (Licklider, 1995, 9). Civil war is thus, a war of conquest, where one group tries to hold supreme sovereignty of the other, with violence as the instrument of reality. Civil war is the meeting point of local and supra-local motives and "leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual" (Kalyvas, 2006, 387). With an insurgency of violence across the individual and national actors of the State, the security of the State is adversely affected.

Rule of Military Juntas and Society Militarization

Military juntas are "boards or committees that assume power and rule by decree following the removal of a regime by force" (Johnson, 1964, p. 114). Ideologically, the juntas represent heightened and unified efforts of various branches of the military forces and are in civilian favor. However, they lay down the terms for successor government, and symbolize the decline of individuality and represent esprit de corps or group identification (Johnson, 1964) as the characteristic feature of State governance. Military juntas are trained to restore and maintain peace through force rather than democratic means. In most circumstances, governance under the military juntas result in violation of human rights and use coup as a strategy to overthrow their respective regimes, and society militarization is a usual companion of military juntas (Smeulers and Grünfeld,

2011). Society militarization can be comprehended as the percolation of military values and idiosyncrasies on the cognitive synchronization of the society's socio-political, economic and external affairs (Vledder, 2005, 10). Violence is one of the by-products of militarization. It affects the State's internal security and adversely affects the external and international relations of countries associated with the State; given the exhibition of military behavior from the civic-end of the nation.

The Arab World lacked democratic rulers and consisted of rulers either through monarchy or through military juntas who forcefully assumed power, –whose only ambition in life was to rule and to count the subjects as dust” (Israeli, 2013). While the Arab Spring demanded democracy, the revival of rule by military juntas and spread of society militarization, assert the progression of the uprising in a negative trajectory. For instance, in Egypt, the military junta dissolved the elected parliament and unilaterally amended the constitution to prevent the new President from exercising powers and run the State (Husain, 2012). Such events in the Arab Spring, symbolize the revival of tyranny and death of democracy in the MENA region.

Since the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down and the situation in Egypt has slanted toward instability and disorder. The may-June 2012 election has brought the Muslims Brotherhood to the power and these begun to adopt a religious hard-line approach to convert the country to theocracy. By July 3, 2013 the elected President Muhammad Morsi had been overthrown by junta which was explicitly supported by tens of millions of Egyptians seculars both Muslims and Christian Copts. Pressured by violence fled up by Muslim Brotherhood, the junta announced a road map

to restore law including a set of legal measures targeted to tightening stranglehold on Brotherhood's activities included anti-protest law, shut down official newspaper, freeze assets, close headquarters, and then Brotherhood was banned by Egyptian Supreme Court and designated terrorist organization. Those developments retrieved the notorious emergency status which was imposed along 30-years of Mubarak presidency.

Nevertheless and despite the fact that these events were all in favor of restoration of the civil state rather than the theocratic regime that was Muslim Brotherhood proving its foundations by violating the personal freedoms and rights, but on the other hand it brings to light the fact that protests and bloodshed of Arab Spring witnessed by many MENA countries have ended up with military rule that was seen by peoples to be the only guarantee of civil and free State (Shafick, 2014, Ashour, 2013, El-Hasan 2014).

Recent events in Egypt and Libya also demonstrate society militarization, and highlight the mounting use of weaponry not only by certain sectarian groups, but also by common civilians that are either pro-supporters or anti-supporters (Michael, El Deeb and Keath, 2013). —More than two years after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, the proliferation of weapons and a spate of vigilante killings, violence and sexual attacks are eclipsing the hope born from the revolt” (El-Tablawy, Fam amd El Wardany, 2013). In 2011, the number of explosive violence across Libya created a devastating impact. It resulted in severe civilian casualties and was a result of both shelling and aerial bombing by both Libyan and rebel forces. It was observed that civilians or rebels obtained access to —explosive weapons including mortars, surface-to-air missiles, artillery and RPGs” (Action on Armed Violence, 2011, 1) and used it against the government forces. The

armed-weapon conflict in Syria has shown no signs of abating (Sharp and Blanchard, 2013, 3), and the demand for weapon in Syria has invariably increased. Thus, society militarization in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are characterized by the rise in number of rebellious groups or groups that cause social-unrest, increased use of armed-weapons across the civilian population, and increased access and use of advanced weapon technology across the State's civilian population.

Neighboring Interference by Paramilitary, Guerrillas, and Cross-Borders Violence

External interference is a salient aspect in conflicts that have escalated to international levels. While neighboring countries and countries associated with the states in conflict, intend to prevent conflict and aim to establish peace, external intervention can escalate conflict. External interference on common basis, aid one of the conflict parties to exercise their presence or escalate their locus of control and can upgrade the level of conflict by supplying weapons to instigating paramilitary and guerrilla forces in the vicinity (Rubin, 2004). With respect to the Arab Spring, external interference can be attributed to neighboring interference and interference of Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC) in particular led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Cafiero, 2012; Colombo, 2012).

With an interest to expand their geopolitical interests, two petro-monarchies of the GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken the opportunity through Arab Spring uprisings to influence political transformations across the MENA region. Harboring rivalry between the two nations accompanied with bolstering need to drive Islamism, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have interfered in the uprisings across Tunisia and Egypt (Cafiero, 2012), Syria (Ghabra, 2012), and Libya (Ragab, 2012). The Saudi regime led by King

Abdullah offered to bankroll Mubarak's regime in Egypt, Qatari regime championed the revolution against Mubarak. While the Saudi monarchy opposed the activities of Muslim Brotherhood, Qatari regime has "fostered a congenial alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood" (Cafiero, 2012). While Qatar supported the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and infused its petro-dollars, Saudi Arabia offered political asylum to Bin Ali, the then dictator of Tunisia. A general divide between the two nations pertinent to their interventions is clearly visible (Cafiero, 2012). However, the GCC on a general level have sided with the Syrian and Libyan rebellions (Ghabra, 2012; Ragab, 2012). Whether the interference of GCC lies only in the political arena or whether the GCC have instigated armed rebellions in the affected countries is yet to be openly confirmed.

In relation to international law, cross-border violence occurs when the "international law of armed conflict (ILAC), international human rights law (IHRL), international criminal law (ICL), the law relating to the protection of internally and internationally displaced persons" (Gilbert and Sandoval, 2011, 20) face violations. While many authors outline various cross-border issues such as human-rights, criminal law, and law for displaced persons, my study will focus on armed-conflict and cross-border violation. Armed-conflict violation involves cross-border armed attacks, breach of ceasefire line, and cross-border violent intrusion, on a rough scale. Characterized by bombings, killings, and use of weaponry, cross-border violations affect the security of the State.

An Egypt-brokered truce-deal between Israel and Palestine has been violated with the outbreak of cross-border violence. With Egypt pre-occupied with its internal affairs,

reports indicate that cross-border violation issues between Israel and Palestine is expected to increase. Israel resorted to an air-strike and killed a Palestinian militant in the Gaza strip. Two rockets were fired in central Gaza, which on a fortunate basis did not result in civilian casualties (Fisher-Ilan, 2012). However, it has resulted in creating security imbalance across the sensitive Israel, Palestine, and Gaza strip.

Libya's rocket attacks across Tunisian borders, with efforts to control its rebels, resulted in cross-border intrusion and breached the Libyan-Tunisian cross-border norms. While the Libyan rebels rely on border-crossing to refuel their food and medical amenities, cross-border intrusion invariably affected Tunisian securities. In this case, Libya proved as a threat to Tunisia's security. "Tunisia threatened to report Libya to the U.N. Security Council if it fired into Tunisian border areas again, and a hospital doctor in rebel-held Misrata said seven people died in fighting there" (Amara and Logan, 2011).

On June 10, 2014 fighters and Jihadists of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), known as most prominent group conducting insurgency and terrorist activities against Syrian Army and Al-Assad regime and known for their loyalty to Al-Qaeda, succeeded to cross the Syrians borders and seize Iraqi Nineveh governorate and its administrative capital the city of Mosul, the second largest Iraqi city (Figure 3.1 illustrates geographically ISIS controlling areas across borders in Iraq and Syria, and route to Mosul seizure). The governorate was captured without shooting or resistance by three brigades of Iraqi army who composed from 85,000 soldiers, soon Sharia and Islamic Law was imposed, and local authorities removed. In fact, the seizure of Mosul proved that Jihadist and extremist groups are intend, and capable to, extend their influence cross-border not

merely for smuggling weapons and fighters but controlling on ground, and defeating armies and achieve strategic gains by controlling this bordering province and use it as an open corridor to support other Jihadi and terrorist groups and radical rebels in Syria, taking into consideration that (ISIS) has established and been active in Syria but originally grown on the ruins of "Al-Qaeda" in Iraq ideologically and administratively (Lewis and Ali, 2014).

Syrian grounds have become a place for incessant bombings and armed-conflict. Four rockets hit village near the Syrian border badly wounded a woman who was sitting under an olive tree in her house yard and such incidents usually occur (Barnard and Mourtada, 2013). While the Syrian rebels are invariably held responsible for the source of the attacks, the residents consider Aرسال, a Lebanese town as the source since Lebanese borders considered to be fragile and volatile access points opened for crossing weapons and fighter to supports both Syrian rebels (by Sunni Lebanese and other Gulf States), and to Bashar Al Assad regime (by Hezbollah and Iran), which led the Syrian army carried out many aerial bombardments on Lebanese border town were suspected to be a loophole for fighters to get into Syria lands. Similarly, Turkey was always accused of smuggling the Jihadists and weapons into the neighboring Syria in an attempt to weakening the Syrian regime the ally of Iran, Turkey's regional competitor. On the same extent, Iraq was accused of sending recruited members of Mahdi Army (Shiite militia belongs to Shiite religious leader Muqtada Al-Sadr) to fight beside Bashar Al-Assad and protect the Shiite Shrines in Damascus, while Jordan was seen to facilitate the passage of Salafist fighter to back Syrians rebels and global radical groups (Barnard and Mourtada, 2013,

Higgins, and Kaszera, 2014). Thus, Arab Spring in the name of revolution, has affected the cross-border norms of the States involved and also the neighboring States. It can also be comprehended that, cross-border armed attacks, breach of ceasefire line, and cross-border violent intrusion, affect the security of the States involved in the conflict.

INTERREGIONAL EFFECT

Arab Spring's interregional effects can be segregated into two categories. The rise of Muslim Brotherhood as De Facto Power, and anarchy of petrodollar and the geopolitical sectarian balance, while geostrategic effects are Saudi-Turkish-Iranian proxy wars, and Iranian hegemony and security of Israel and Gulf region. War against terrorism effects are: dormant terrorist cells revival and rising activities of Al-Qaeda, and fighters for paradise: suicide-bombers, mercenaries, and jihadists. Each of these attributes is discussed in the following sections.

Muslim Brotherhood as De Facto Power

In order to understand the definition of de facto power in reference to political authority, understanding the definition of de jure government is essential. A distinction between the two terms, de jure and de facto will highlight the meaning and characteristics involved in de facto political power. The legal and legitimate government of the State which is recognized by other governments and States is considered as de jure government. Contrarily, a de facto government —“in actual possession of authority and control of the State” (USLegal, 2014), and has risen to power due to upsurge or a revolutionary government.

Accordingly, the characteristics of de facto political government can be outlined using the de facto doctrine. A de facto doctrine justifies the authority of governments: a) that have come to force by usurping the sovereign authority of the State, b) though illegally established protects the State from collateral attacks and exercise law and authority as regularly created bodies, and c) entrusts power to officers with adequate power to exercise lawful duties in the State. While de facto power guarantees supremacy of law, peace, and harmony in the State, it culminates in anarchy. Any insubordination to the authority or challenge to the existing authority would promote disorders of the worst kind (Constantineau, 1910).

The Arab Uprisings have led to the emergence of political Islamism and has encouraged the activities of Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist revolutionary organization to assume the garb of political leadership. An insight to Muslim Brotherhood's origin, ideology, presence and activities will clarify how Muslim Brotherhood will emerge as de facto power' through the Arab Spring. Hassan Al-Banna, an Islamic preacher and a school teacher established a Muslim society called Jama'iyah Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun in the year 1928 on the west banks of the Suez Canal, in the colonial town of Ismailia, Egypt. Popularly referred as Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan (Scott, 2011), the historical essence of Brotherhood lies in its rebelling outlook. A social and religious movement, in its inceptive days, the movement opposed the British occupation of Egypt. The British colonial rule was regarded as a symbol of Egypt's humiliation, the leader Banna upheld the essence of reawakening the Muslim World. He considered and lamented over the Muslim World's declining and weakening cause. Banna called the Muslim population

and its leaders to reintroduce the Islamic Law against the westernization of the colonial Egypt –emphasizing that Islam was a "complete system" applicable for economics and law, and not just for personal spirituality” (Scott, 2011, p.1). A system and movement that upheld the Islamic principles called Muslim Brotherhood was thus born and brought into being.

Mohammad Mahdi Akef and Mohammad Habib presumed the role of key leaders (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2005), and the Brotherhood is primarily based in Egypt. Nevertheless, their activities and alliances have spread across the regional quarters of the Muslim World across the MENA region, and also across the Muslim fraternities in the West, including Europe and the U.S. The activities and functionalities of the Brotherhood is believed to be invariably funded by the oil rich Arab nations, especially Qatar and Saudi Wahhabis (ISCTRC, 2005), and the organization claims to have branches across 80 countries (Barsky, 2011). While the Brotherhood refrains from acknowledging any direct and conspicuous connection with terrorist organizations, evidences showcase otherwise.

–Ayman Al-Zawahiri started out as a Brotherhood activist and then created the terrorist organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad” (Barsky, 2011). Brotherhood has impudent connection with organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad Hamas, Islamic Action Front, AKP, and Islamic Party. Connections with these organizations showcase Brotherhood’s apparent presence in the socio-political activities across the Arab nations. –Hamas, for example, is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Tunisia’s Al- Ennahda Movement, led by Rashid Al-Ghanushi, is the Muslim Brotherhood branch

in that country. Turkey's AKP originated in the Muslim Brotherhood, and similarly, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and the Iraqi Islamic Party are branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in their respective countries" (ISCTRC, 2005).

A known fundamentalist, Brotherhood's very slogan aims at creating an Islamic State. Its fundamental philosophies thus lie in the Islamic Sharia law (ISCTRC, 2005).

The slogan of Muslim Brotherhood claims:

–Allah is our objective;

The Prophet is our leader;

Quran is our law;

Jihad is our way;

Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope" (Barsky, 2011).

The activities and influences of the Brotherhood across the MENA region and the world clearly indicate a paradigm shift alike other political organizations. The organization's inceptive ideologies defied the Western rule and revolved around extremist forms of religion to eliminate Western moral and cultural influences across Egypt. Prominent government officials and other elite Egyptian social members were accused by Al-Banna, the founder, for abandoning the fundamental principles of Islam and embracing western culture. He accused them of their corrosive behavior and upheld their behavior as perpetual malaise to the Egyptian society. The founder thus insisted and strongly prompted for reviving Muslim States and Islam to its original military, history

and cultural glory. –He pointed to the Caliphate, the historic Islamic empire and the most celebrated period of Islamic history, as the template for his vision of an Islamic State” (ISCTRC, 2005). Study by (Schwartz, 2014) comprising maps and figures show Islamic Caliphate State claimed by Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS and its flag.

In this manner, Al-Banna’s principles laid the substratum for the edifice called Muslim Brotherhood with his eternally politicized and idiosyncratic ideology. He emphasized the need and essence of an organization called Muslim Brotherhood and claimed that the Brotherhood was not a benevolent society or political party/organization with limited ambitions. He established its eternal idealism towards religion and claimed:

–We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice” (ISCTRC, 2005).

Alike any radical religious organization, the Brotherhood entered into a prejudiced realm towards religion and worship and considered all non-Muslims as idol worshippers and exhibited its indefinite possessiveness towards Islamic principles. It forced Muslims across the world to unite and fight against enemies or non-worshippers of Islam. It would be apt to claim that the founding principles of Jihad originated from the Brotherhood’s fixation towards the extreme religious dogmatic principles. The religious doctrines of the Brotherhood thus revolved around safeguarding the Muslims Islamic principles, idolize on the mission of safeguarding Islam, and implementing the supreme of truth and justice of Islamism across mankind. The very symbol of Brotherhood symbolizes its affinity towards spreading Islam and negating other religions or practices. A circular green

background signifying Islam exists, which is superimposed by the holy book, Quran, which represents the eternal teachings of Islam. Two swords are crossed below it, denoting Jihad, which is followed by the Arabic word ‘wa‘aduwa,’ meaning ‘make ready’ or ‘prepare yourselves’ (ISCTRC, 2005).

While the ideals of Brotherhood can be ignored as a personal attribute or affliction, its adoption of philosophy of defensive Jihad (offering violent resistance only to protect its ideologies), has created a wave of tension across the world. The Brotherhood still advocates Jihad against foreign occupiers (Scott, 2011), and its belief of considering ‘Islam as the solution’ and spreading this belief has perpetually turned into subtle yet self-obsessed actions. Along with driving away foreign influences Brotherhood’s initial teachings emphasized on integrating Islamic religious teachings with the civil government. Currently, this ideology is the central theme of numerous contemporary religious political parties and organizations.

The want to propagate Islamic religious teachings across the world has transposed Brotherhood’s activities in the course of time. To comprehend the comprehensiveness of the activities, the Brotherhood’s propositions under Al-Banna, the Egyptian regimes, and its activities in the recent years require intricate analysis. An overview of the same is provided in the following sections. Under the founder’s direction, Brotherhood’s priority lied in grosser Jihad and finer Jihad. While the grosser Jihad emphasized on spiritual and moral struggle for Muslims and urged them to become better Muslims, finer Jihad consisted of armed struggle against foreign occupiers. In order to achieve the mission of finer Jihad, Al-Banna created a paramilitary wing called ‘Special Apparatus’. The special

force carried out attacks on the British in the late 1940s, and the foreigners were subjugated to a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations (Scott, 2011; Barsky, 2011).

Attack on the British gradually shifted towards the Egyptian Jews in the later years. Regular and violent attacks on Egyptian Jews which incited violence against the community and the Brotherhood upheld violence to maintain the radical stance in Egypt. The torching of Alexandria (Eliyahu Hanavi) synagogue emphasizes the above assertion. –On the international level, Al-Banna supported Haj Amin Al- Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem who worked for the Nazis to recruit international Arab support for Germany” (Barsky 2011). While the activity of the Brotherhood symbolized its extremist nature, it also emphasized the dependence of the organization on foreign funding. The Nazis provided subsidies to the Brotherhood, which enabled them to purchase armed weapons from a portion of the funds.

Apart from supporting Germany, Brotherhood engaged itself in the 1948 Israeli war. The organization is also accused of assassinating Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Al-Nuqrashi. This action of the Brotherhood received worldwide condemnation. Brotherhood tested the patience of peace and harmony, and its consistent violent activities reached a threshold. Brotherhood received ‘illegal’ status across Egypt and international community (Barsky, 2011). The Brotherhood received strong hostile from certain regimes in Egypt such as Anwar El Sadat’s rule. El Sadat’s rule never entrusted the Brotherhood waged war against their privileges to engage in Jihadi activities, then El Sadat himself was assassinated by Brotherhood on October 1981.

However, Hosni Mubarak tightened the reign of Brotherhood. “Mubarak's regime intermittently tried to make it more difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the political process, claiming it was connected to militant groups” (Scott, 2011, p.2).

Mubarak enforced the Emergency Law in 1981 and arrested about 14,000 Brotherhood activists. The President forced the Brotherhood to give up its radical Islamist totalitarian beliefs and accept either secular or pro-western or doctorial regime. Given Mubarak's non-supportive nature, the Brotherhood has consistently tried to overthrow Mubarak's regime to regain its hold over Egyptian social and political affairs. The latest revolution in Egypt symbolizes this. Ahmad Moussali, a professor of Islamic and Western Political Thought, claims that Egypt is “witnessing uprisings, not revolutions; a change in the balance of power, but nothing new in terms of ideologies or ideas” (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 2012). As an active measure to engage in the civil government of the States, the Brotherhood adopted tactile means to engage in the Egyptian affairs. The extremist organization camouflaged its radical views and participated in the Egyptian politics. In the 2005 Egyptian elections Brotherhood rose to its popularity. It secured 88 seats out of 454 and gained 20 percent of the total votes against the popular bloc (Scott, 2011).

With the Arab Spring, Egypt is under chaos and riots since 2011. While the uprising with the successful intervention of Muslim Brotherhood ousted Hosni Mubarak's regime, it emerged as a powerhouse in Egypt's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. Muslim Brotherhood gained strong dominion over Egypt's politics. Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi won a majority in Egypt (Laub, 2014). With

Brotherhood's strong political power, religion oriented parties extracted the power of ballot over bullet. Al-Banna's principles are in the process of restoration. Muhammad Badie, the General guide of Brotherhood in his 2010 sermon upheld Quran's prominence as the constitution of the State and Muslim's duty to enact Islamic law. Muslims from across the world were called to rise against U.S. and Israel, and start the process of liberating Arab occupied lands such as Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Barsky, 2011).

Only few months in power, the Brotherhood led by Morsi declared itself as the Shura council (Egyptian upper house of parliament) and constituent assembly from a judicial perspective. "Morsi argued that the judiciary and much of the bureaucracy were dominated by fellows or remnants of the Mubarak regime eager to impede the revolution's goals" (Laub, 2014). However, forces opposing Morsi asserted this move as an invariable showcase of political power, and created ripples of disharmony across the already chaotic Egyptian politics. With a new lease on political climate, the Brotherhood's addendum towards Salafist principles and Jihadi motivations emerged as a cause for deep concern, not only for Egyptians, but also for nations and global observers connected with Egypt (Barsky, 2011). "Opponents were concerned about the role of religion as the basis of law, feared insufficient protections for women's rights, freedoms of speech and worship, and distrusted the broad power accorded to the presidency" (Laub, 2014). Considering the Brotherhood's fundamental ideology rooted in the radical law, opposing forces feared the restoration of radical theocracy across Egypt.

With military as de facto power in Egypt, on July 3, 2013 the party was suspended by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and this military backed interim government

termed the so called political party as a terrorist group. On account of general distrust among the masses and deadly suicide bombings which targeted police headquarters in Nile delta cities and killed nearly 16 people and injured more than 100, Muslim Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist group. All its activities were criminalized and banned (Associated Press, 2013), and the organization functions as an outlaw countering the government forces (Fahim, 2014). While the Brotherhood tried to wield its political power across Egypt, its failure has incited civil crisis. A general demarcation between Morsi supporters and anti-Brotherhood is visible across Egypt. A similar picture that encompassed Egypt during the inception stages of the Arab Spring, where the Egyptian society was divided between pro-Mubarak regime and anti-Mubarak regime is present.

Muslim Brotherhood now functions as a silent movement waiting to wield its power again. Irrespective of its failure in Egypt's politics, the permeation of the Brotherhood into the politics of the States and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt stands as a classic example for the rise of Muslim Brotherhood as the De Facto power in the MENA region. –Although leaders of the group say they remain committed to protests to express their activism, some members said that many of its sympathizers were increasingly talking of violence” (Fahim, 2014). The party sometimes uses the ballot or bullet to exercise its power. Al-Banna's principles are strongly embedded in Muslim Brotherhood and the organization waits to rise into power, either as a political party or as an extremist group.

Muslim Brotherhood's influence on the socio-political stratum of the State can be viewed from dual angles. Firstly, violent Jihadi organizations such as the Al-Qaeda, in

the name of Sharia law will have the potential to inject their violent Jihadist principles to the Muslim Brotherhood. The elements of interaction, mind, individual, and societal perceptions will be overtly influenced by the strict Islamic ideology. A psychological sync between violent Jihadi organizations' psyche and Brotherhood's principles will be established. The influence of dominant beliefs and large number of Jihadi activists and constant communication could result as a fatal combination towards Brotherhood's political regime across the States. Brotherhood will solely function as a legitimate campaigner for Jihad and Jihadist principles.

Secondly, the rise of Brotherhood and its associates as political parties in the MENA region will necessarily guarantee legitimate power of State in its hands. Brotherhood under the influence of Islamism will actively promote the Islamic law, irrespective to the degenerative principles possessed by radicalism. Brotherhood's dominant beliefs and principles, its role as the political power of States, its communication access to the large number of masses, increases the chances of greater and faster impact on the population in and around the MENA region. Muslim Brotherhood's activities since 1948 are mentioned in figure 3.2 Data from ISCTRC (ISCTRC, 2005) and Jewish Virtual Library (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013) is used to identify the activities of Brotherhood since 1948.

Anarchy of Petrodollar and the Geopolitical Sectarian Balance

In simplistic sense petrodollar can be defined as "money earned from the sale of oil" (Investopedia, 2014). In order to understand the anarchy of petrodollar an overview of MENA region's oil sector is important. The MENA region is rich with natural energy

resources. In 2012, earnings from oil and gas constituted about 73% of the total exports and 78% of the budget revenues across the MENA oil exporting countries, the six GCC (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), and net oil importing countries (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia). 70% of the world's oil reserves and 50% of gas reserves lie in the MENA region and the countries constituting the MENA region play a crucial role in controlling the world energy market (Institute of International Finance (IIF), 2014). Therefore, understanding the anarchy of petrodollar and the geopolitical sectarian imbalance it creates is crucial. This aspect can be comprehended through intrinsic analysis: a) the diversion of petrodollar to create geopolitical imbalance, b) the emergence of oil war vulnerability, and c) petrodollar hegemony on global economy. Each of these aspects is discussed below.

The diversion of petrodollar to create geopolitical imbalance can be comprehended by understanding the role of oil-rich MENA region nations' support towards promoting radical religious ideologies. In this context, social and economic aspects of the States are intertwined. Countries belonging to the MENA region exhibit radical ideologies, in a direct and/or indirect manner. Their underlying principles reside in the radical law. On an imbalanced level, radical ideologies or extreme inclination towards radical principles creates/promotes religious terrorism. –Radical groups commands offensive, and aggressive and unjust Jihad,” (Arlandson, 2005) and acts as a substratum for terrorist activities in the name of Jihad.

Religious finance, generally followed by religious organization, provides charity for supporters, with no-charity towards any non-follower of specific ideologies is biased

and strengthens strict ideologies conversions and bureaucracy. It also supports Al-Qaeda and other Jihadists, and “includes money to the families of “suicide bombers” or any other Jihadists who are killed” (Warner, 2010, p.39). With intense aggressiveness Jihad which is propagated through financial support or sponsorship is coercive and excessive. Jihadi activities include, “forgery of documents, document fraud, burglary and robbery and – to a lesser degree – drugs trafficking and production, and credit card fraud” (De Poot, Sonnenschein, Soudijn, Bijen and Verkuylen, 2011, p.126), support the extremist groups with their incessant funds, and free movement of persons and goods across borders.

For instance, the 2011 Arab Spring led to the rise of Salafism across the MENA region. While the oil rich nations upheld Salafism, Saudi Arabia in particular is accused of funding extremist groups. Before divulging into the subject of petrodollar anarchy through diversion of petrodollar in encouraging Jihadi activities, defining and understanding Salafism is crucial. Salafism is a puritanical branch of Islam and advocates strict adherence towards Islamic doctrines and “return to the practices of the “Salaf” (the predecessors), as the Caliphs and their righteous disciples are known” (Daou, 2012). Considering that Saudi Arabians view themselves as guardians of Islamic doctrine, they have utilized the Arab Spring uprisings and have encouraged Salafism across the MENA region. While not all Salafists accept or indulge in violent behavior, the Arab Spring has attracted violent clusters of Salafists (Daou, 2012; Lavizzari, 2013).

An export version of Wahhabism, “a conservative branch of Sunni Islam actively promoted and practiced by Saudi Arabia’s ruling family” (Lavizzari, 2013), Salafism

anchored by petrodollar is on the rise. Additionally, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ~~have~~ provided a combined \$9 billion of financial aid to Egypt since its revolution in early 2011” (Torchia, 2013). Whether the money created economic development or supported the ruler to suppress the uprisings remains as a question. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s funding has triggered violent Salafism across the MENA region and has created petrodollar anarchy.

The emergence of oil war vulnerability can be comprehended by understanding the historical implications of petrodollar warfare across the globe. The rise in world oil consumption in the past century, especially since the 1980s, has provoked several countries to establish strong hold on the oil-rich countries and exercise their incessant and direct control on the oil reserves. This need for direct control and the diminishing oil reserves has created petrodollar warfare and several rationales have been used by such countries to validate their use of physical force to gain access to the oil reserves from the oil-rich nations (Clark, 2005). The activities of Western countries can be recounted in this regard.

Western influence has always placated the socio-political and economic activities of the MENA region. Since 1945 the currency for global oil transactions is U.S. Dollar. As a de facto international reserve President Nixon’s 1971 proclamation ensured U.S. dollar’s monopolistic and immense monetary power over other currencies across the globe. Secret agreements between U.S. and Saudi Arabia ensured U.S. Dollars of its rightful position as the de facto power and petrodollar recycling finances U.S. trade deficits. Elaborating further, all oil transactions across the globe were carried and still in

most cases are accomplished through U.S. dollars, which are then recycled through OPEC back into the U.S. through Treasury Bills or other Dollar-dominated assets. This in turn creates capital-accounts surplus for the U.S. economy which finances the U.S. trade deficit” (Wong, 2012). Thus, the U.S. has been successful in maintaining its monopolistic control over the oil reserves through monetary or economic interventions.

Other form of interventions such as use of military force by Western countries can be highlighted in this scenario. For instance, when Saddam Hussein, the then Iraqi regime-head, with the approval from the UN, changed the Iraqi oil-transactions from U.S. dollars to Euro currency in 2000, U.S. Dollar depreciated steadily against the Euro. However, the U.S. intervened and attacked Iraq in the pretext of humanitarian intervention captured the oil reserves and in 2003, all Iraqi oil transactions were changed to U.S. Dollars instead of Euro currency. On similar lines, France’s interest in Libya, and China’s interest in Iran project possibilities of interventions to control and maintain consistent oil production and supply to their respective nations (Wong, 2012). Such interventions and interests have led to new form of politics called pipeline politics which is discussed in the following section.

Pipeline politics can be defined as subtle and cold warfare between countries garnering for oil production and consistent oil supply from oil rich nations. The case of Syria can be taken into account. Syria functions as a key transit route to Europe, which makes it lucrative to numerous countries that seek to dominate the oil market. Additionally, the discovery of gas fields in the city of Homs in 2011, adds to its lucrative value and Syria is proposed as a site for constructing massive underground pipeline

connecting Iran's South Pars field and Europe. A joint alliance between Iran and Iraq, the materialization of such a pipeline (Islamic pipeline), would undercut U.S. allies Qatar and Turkey's significance in the oil market, and benefit Russia and Iran. "Russia has reportedly built up its naval presence along the major Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus" (Klein, 2013). Thus, Russia's non-interference in Syrian internal conflict and Turkey's hidden interference in supplying arms to the rebellions forces against Assad's rule (Klein, 2013) indicates the presence and violence of petrodollar in the form of pipeline politics. Petrodollar warfare can be synchronized and comprehended as dominance established by certain countries in three ways: monetary interventions, military interventions, and pipeline politics.

Petrodollar hegemony on global economy can be elaborated by outlining the dependence of modern economy on oil and natural gas supply. The Middle East is the main supplier of oil resources to the global market. The world is thus highly dependent on Saudi Arabia to fill the supply gap. Considering the already existing instability in the oil market, given the global economic crisis, the tenuous political situation created by the Arab Spring in the MENA region, created a much more volatile situation in the global oil market. This in addition to the fear that terrorism accompanied by the Arab Spring could block international water channels led to the rise of 'fear premium'. "Fear premium is basically a rise in the price of a commodity, such as oil, that is based on the expectation that a certain event will happen that would significantly impact the market in a negative way" (Halime, 2013).

Fear premium creates uncertainty which not only affects the international price of oil, but also gives artificial hike to oil prices and commodity markets inter-connected with the oil prices. The anarchy of petrodollar is thus clearly visible. This bestows power to certain sections or States to control the oil production and supply, thereby impacting the markets that are directly or indirectly connected to it. A volatile market is clearly evident (Halime, 2013). While the Arab Spring did not create significant impact on the fundamentals of the oil market as projected, fear premium accompanied with anxiety –injected significant risk-related volatility into the international oil market” (Dargin, 2012). Great reverberations regarding volatility in the oil production and export created structural increase in demand from emerging markets (Asia-Pacific region). Thus, risks of military conflicts in the MENA region created fluctuations in the global energy price and still acts as a driver for creating market disruptions in energy sector (Dargin, 2012).

GEOSTARTEGIC EFFECT

Saudi-Turkish-Iranian Proxy Wars

Proxy wars can be comprehended as unannounced and indirect engagement and intervention by local agents (Khan, 2010; Mumford, 2013). From the definition, the characteristic features of proxy wars require elaboration. Proxy wars are characterized by indirect intervention as opposed to direct intervention. In this regard, understanding the difference between the two intervention types is essential. Direct intervention or interference can be defined as third-party interference, in which, the State that functions as third-part interference and is ready to engage its troops in harm’s way. Contrastingly,

in a proxy war, “a surrogate force on behalf of a non-intervening conduit” (Mumford, 2013) is evidently present.

Avoidance of nuclear warfare, yet an indefinite need to achieve the strategic aim in a cost-effective and minimal risk setting are two important theoretical aspects of proxy wars. With these intentions, the benefactor can either supply manpower, material, financial aid, and non-military assistance to the proxy groups engaged in proxy wars. While manpower plays a crucial role, the benefactor can provide weapons, ammunitions, and financial aid to the insurgent group/s that fight the proxy wars. This, indirect intervention can also be conducted covertly and the dynamicity of proxy wars is essentially high (Mumford, 2013).

The groups involved in proxy wars either seize the opportunity on request for their personal gains rather than achieving mutual strategic aim (Mumford, 2013). My enemy’s enemy (Hughes, 2012) principle holds true in proxy wars, and proxy wars have the ability to turn into fully-blown war. Another crucial dynamicity of proxy wars is its fluid nature. Given that, proxy wars are based on the relationship between the benefactor and the proxy group/s, change in strategic plans of the benefactor or slight variation in the strategic aim and scope of intervention can convert proxy wars into a large-scale conflict (Mumford, 2013). Thus, the cause and effect of proxy war lie in this dynamicity. Personal gain for proxy group, which connect to the concept of my enemy’s enemy and strategic aim for the benefactor that wield indirect or covert interference, along with political instability (Klare, 2001) can be considered as causes for proxy wars and fully-blown war can be considered as the ultimate effect of proxy wars.

The Arab Spring has recalibrated the regional system by ushering in a tri-axial Middle East composed of: a Turkey-Kurdish-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) axis, an Iran-Shiite axis, and a Saudi Arabia-pro-Sunnis and pro-status quo monarchies axis” (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). The borders of this region will thus be transcended by these axis creating disruption and conflicts. Iran’s supporting forces that enunciate foreign policy alignment with the West and Middle Eastern countries and Shiite powers loyal to Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists and Ayatollah Supreme Leader of Iran) which is the theocratic Shiite Islamic regime ruling Iran and this theory holds that Islam entrusted Al-faqih the custodianship and rule over all Muslims, Turkey’s pro-Muslim Brotherhood alignment whose longing to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and Saudi’s inclination to maintain its monarchial and religious stance over Sunnis in the MENA region, will relatively create sectarianism imbalance in the name of achieving realist intentions (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013).

The proxy wars that result out of this will not only create conflicts and tensions across the three axes, but also spread as geopolitical instability across the MENA region. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia oppose each other in shifting alliances, vying to set a new regional order (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). The three nations strategic interest in Syria can be elaborated to emphasize the above assertion. Shiite interests span from Western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. The Syrian Awaite (one of Shiite branches and the religious affiliation of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and his family), and pro-Iran regime serves as a bridge between Tehran and the Shiite interests. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the deadly Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF),

stressed the importance of interfering in Syria's political affairs and opposing the U.S. led Israeli resistance towards Syria. Iran hints at adverse support towards the Syrian rebels and highlights the importance of supporting Syrian regime against the Sunni Arab States, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, with a central aim to prevent the emergence of 'Shiite Crescent', in the MENA region (Alfoneh, 2013). Iran holds the transfer of Shiite militiamen from Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries such as Lebanon to Iranian military bases for urban and Guerrilla warfare training and receive guidance from the clergy in Iran before sending them to Syria to support Al-Assad army to suppress the Sunni rebellion supported by Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, and Turkey. "As the challenges to Al-Assad regime have mounted, Iran has also mobilized the Lebanese Hezbollah, a proxy funded and trained by Iran, along with organized Iraqi Shiite volunteers, and even IRGC Ground Forces when deemed necessary" (Alfoneh, 2013).

Saudi Arabia has resorted to escalating Syria's turmoil by arming and funding Syria's rebels against the regime. "In late 2012, the Saudi government financed a major transfer of infantry weapons from Croatia to the rebels" (Alfoneh, 2013). These weapons are invariably used by Jihadi groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and other militant Islamists. Saudi Arabia considers itself as the regional Islamic power and a benefactor of Sunni Muslims. It aims to weaken Iranian power in the MENA region and in the recent years, Saudi has gained large support from dominated Sunni regions in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Saudi Arabia also sent troops to Bahrain to support against the demonstrators, who represent the country's Shiite majority, which seeks to topple the Sunni ruling royal family. Saudi Arabia urged the U.S. to

demolish Iran's nuclear program, based on which the U.S. began to interfere into the weaponry division of Iran. The nation aims to weaken Al-Assad's influence in Syria, Muslim Brotherhood's influence in the MENA region and ultimately Iran's rising power in the Middle East (Weinberg, 2013).

Turkey aims to function as an effective broker between the West and MENA region. Considering this, its foreign policies aim at maintaining zero problems with its neighbors. But PM Erdogan announced the change in Turkish foreign policy in a his speech before the Turkish Parliament at the beginning of February 2011, in what was considered a qualitative shift in Turkish policy toward direct intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, indirectly linked to the national security of Turkey. This approach was precedent in relations among the major powers in the region. It aimed to establish the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Syria and Egypt, and provide international respect and status for the Brotherhood. However, Brotherhood's failure in Egypt, forced Turkey to interfere in Syria's armed conflict. "By the spring of 2012, the Turkish government began providing support for the armed struggle in Syria and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the Syrian rebels as the government of Syria" (Alfoneh, 2013). While Turkey's support has failed to tinker Al-Assad's regime in Syria, Turkey is at an observational stand-point right now. If the autonomous Kurdish zones emerge post Syria's break-up, then Turkey's political, social, and economic gaining stability will sink into a state of misery. While Turkey opposes Al-Assad's regime and supports the militant rebels, it invariably acts as a competitor or benefactor in channeling rebellious groups and creating proxy wars against Syria's regime.

In this manner, engaging in proxy wars due to its low cost and low risk features has made it a lucrative weapon for nations to indirectly and covertly use their alliances to achieve their respective strategic aims. The paradox of using proxy warfare as a logical weapon can be clearly demonstrated by the Middle East's key nations Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran. The political interplay of these nations in the Arab Spring uprisings and their ploy to gain strategic significance has created a new Middle East, which will instigate ethnic, civil, religious, and social conflicts and unrest across the MENA region.

Iranian Hegemony and Security of Israel and Gulf Region

With the Arab Spring the balance of power in the MENA region is witnessing a general shift. The U.S. led security policy in the MENA region is witnessing a slow decline and the Iranian hegemony is on the rise. A dramatic shift of power away from the U.S. is observed, and Iran and its allies question the security of Israel and the Gulf region. The U.S. dominance in the region protected Israel; however, Iranian hegemony in the MENA region has lifted the general co-existing peaceful stance between the Arabs and Israel (Leverett, 2014).

Iran's want for hegemony dates back to its historic times. A nation once referred as Persia, Iran witnessed the rules of Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, Seleucids, Parthians, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Sassanid. However, in the 16th century, Iran was captured by the Muslims of Safavid dynasty that belonged to the Shiite branch of Islam, and since then the nation is ruled by the Shiite Muslims. With a sincere want gain world power, Iran's strategic agenda is akin with any world power seeking nation: strength of the economy and army, and nuclear weaponry. While the first two is achieved on the central

strength of a nation, the last agenda, nuclear weaponry creates outcry from international communities and neighboring countries, given its potency to destroy the entire Gulf region (IranIntelligence, 2014).

With the nuclear bombs Iran aims to protect itself from any attacks and ensure the spread of Shiite Islam across the MENA region and ultimately the world. Resultantly, Iran's blatant agenda poses as a threat to its immediate neighbors and its long-time rivals. An observation on the recent events validates this aspect. Iran has interfered in the affairs of Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Most Bahrainis are of Iranian origin, and Shiite religious groups are exercising control over the schools in Qom (Iran's most holiest city), Mashhad and Tehran regions. On similar lines the Shiite religious groups are on the rise across Kuwait, and Iran has extended its support to the rebellious "Houthis in the North and Al-Harak in the South" of Yemen (Mokhtar, 2013) (For more maps on distribution of Sunnis and Shiites in Middle East countries see (NSBC International, 2013). In Syria, Iran supports Al-Assad's regime and as a meddling relative "Iran has been Lebanon kingmaker through Syria". Syria is a cornerstone of Iranian influence in the Middle East and the Arab world. Iran considers Syria its outlet to the Mediterranean and then to Europe. For Iranian strategists and politicians, Syria in fact is not merely a state governed by a regime belongs religiously to Shiites, but is a dominating state in the Middle East region and the state enjoys a unique location close to Western Europe and only a few miles from its neighbor Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea, as same as it is close to Iran's competitor for control in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the closeness of Syria and Israel allowing Iran a chance of free movement

in Tel Aviv and its neighbors Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Egypt (Mokhtar, 2013). This not only threatens Israel's security, but also threatens the security of the MENA region in particular oil States in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and other moderate regimes in the region like Jordan and Egypt that have strategic location as crossroad between Asia and Africa.

While the fight between the Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shiite-led Iran is an obvious fact, Iran's strong influence in the oil production and supply and possession of nuclear power can create fear in Kuwait, Bahrain, and UAE. This fear-creation has forced U.S. and its allies to assume the path of peace-talks and has prompted the Gulf States, especially Saudis to think about possessing a nuclear weapon of its own. While Saudi Arabia has denied any outright claims due to fear from international condemnation, it has called for international attack on Iran in this regard (IranIntelligence, 2014).

Additionally, Iran has supported proxy warfare by positing its militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon through, by supplying incessant weaponry. Iran leads an alliance or bloc includes all the countries, groups, militias, and powers that are politically outside the U.S. hegemony or who do not wish to be under the imposed domination of the United States. The goal is to dominate Iraq, Syria, and Gulf States and create attacks on Israel and maintain a base in Southern Lebanon, Gaza, and Bahrain, and possess all those countries as its own sphere of influence and backyards (IranIntelligence, 2014).

The basic principles that form the geopolitical and geostrategic theory of Iran and its role in the world are three: Iran as a unified society by identity and culture, Shia Islam

strength, and Persia as a source of national and historical pride. Iranian leaders of all tendencies, whether Islamists conservatives or Persian nationalists, and regardless of the differing attitudes and political visions, however, brought together by a common vision of the nature of the security threats that threaten Iran and the actions to be taken to protect the interests of the Iranian nation. Iran's hegemony is thus based on fear creation and geostatic interference and its target is centered on Israel. Time and again various leaders associated with Iran's political power, have emphasized the elimination of Israel. Iran's former presidents such as Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Khatami, Former President and Head of the Expediency Council Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, General Yahya Rahim Safavi, and General Mohammad-Ali Jafari are few such leaders that have expressed intent of eliminating Israel (Teitelbaum and Segall, 2012). Statements of these leaders can be directly quoted in this regard. Adopted from Teitelbaum and Segall's (2012) collection, these statements reflect death and elimination of Israel as a Jewish and Hebrew State:

–“Jerusalem occupying region (Israel), must be erased from the face of earth” –

Ahmadinejad in ‘World without Zionism’ conference held in Tehran in 2005.

–“Elimination of Israel from the region”, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in ‘International Conference for Support of the Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) held in 2001.

–“Confront and kill the Zionist regime and its fabricated entity named Israel, and all coward countries in the region who signed peace treaties with them”

Mohammad Khatami in 2000.

–Wiping Israel off the face of the earth is neither unreasonable nor impossible but possible with faith in Allah and Mujahedeen” Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 2000.

–Death for the occupying Zionist regimen”, General Yahya Rahim Safavi in 2008.

–Israel is cancerous microbe in Islamic nations”, General Mohammad-Ali Jafari in 2008.

These periodic outright intentions validate the intensified and historic aversion Iran possesses towards Israel. Additionally, in an international anti-drug conference held at Tehran, Iran’s then vice-president, Mohammad-Reza Rahimi attributed Talmud, central text of Judaism as the main cause for spreading illegal drugs across the world. Negating the existence of Israel, the vice-president called for the world population to oppose the Jews or Zionists since their central text asserts them to destroy anyone who opposes their religion. Mr. Rahimi further asserted that, lack of Zionist drugs users indicates their implicit involvement in drug trade. The vice-president criticized the Zionists for killing black babies and starting the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (Erdbrink, 2012). While the vice-president’s views shocked the forum, it clearly indicated Iran’s historic aversion towards Israel and Jews in Israel and worldwide. Thus, the antagonistic views of Iranian leaders towards Israel, invariably threatens Israel’s stand as a nation in the MENA region.

Iran’s aversion towards Israel, its interest in possessing nuclear power has attracted wide condemnation from several global bodies including UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Reuters, 2012) and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey (The Tower, 2013). World powers, especially the U.S. and its allies

imposed sanctions on Iran, for its alleged nuclear programs (Clawson and Khalaji, 2013). Iran has intensified its claim of using nuclear power for peaceful purposes (Charbonneau, 2014). Contrarily, Iran threatened the world by claiming that, ~~the~~ countries that impose sanctions on Iran will not find the Iranian nation's response ~~pleasant~~" (Pourmohammadi, 2012), and Iran would be forced to achieve its ultimate goals. Iran has never staked claim to have any nuclear ambitions. Thus, such sanctions would only be considered as non-justifiable and Iran has gained good will from international community and northern American public. Thus, the U.S. and its other powerful nations and their allies cannot conduct any strike on Iran. Secondly, Iran's exerts a greater control over world's oil and gas supply, which controls the American and global economy. Any unthoughtful strike or careless strike on Iran, will eventually result in the downturn of the American and global economy. Lastly, Iran's potential military power consists of 80 million-people, who are against any form of imperialism (Cunningham, 2013).

~~Any~~ strike from the U.S. or its allies would result in a region-wide war that would pull down the very pillars of Western geopolitical architecture, including the collapse of the Israeli state and the overthrow of the House of Saud and the other the Persian Gulf oil dictatorships" (Cunningham, 2013).

Iran's ballistic missile strength is exceptional and many U.S. intelligence reports highlighted Iran's current and potential ballistic missiles and their estimated range that capable to reach any regional enemy of Iran in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia and U.S. military bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and U.A.E) or perhaps even Turkey and Israel (for maps and illustrative figures on Iran's current and potential ballistic missiles and

their estimated range refer to (Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 2008). These aspects signify the military, political, spiritual, nuclear, and geostrategic powerful stance of Iran as an essential regional player in the MENA region, and as Arab Spring resulted to weak, disjointed and fragile countries socially and politically therefore the Arab Spring outcomes have provided the power-hungry nation with a wide berth to wield its powerful sword against the democratic views of secularism and world-peace.

Despite persistent pressure by numerous foreign bodies to secure a nuclear deal from Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed to have entered a very difficult zone to reach a common accord with the “P5+1 world powers, the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany” (Charbonneau, 2014). In a recent interview, Iranian Naval Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, a member of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed to be prepared for any clash with the U.S. exercising their faith in martyrdom and unique speedboats, Iran appears to be prepared to keep the West, especially the U.S. in bay (Kredo, 2014).

Iran’s intentions to achieve hegemony, domination under sectarian pretext (Velayat-e faqi of Ayatollah Supreme Leader of Iran) and anti-Western propaganda (Axis of resistance made up all Shiites in Middle East, Iran’s allied regimes and militant groups like Iraq, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah), and its possessiveness towards nuclear power possession have forced it to interfere in the affairs of its neighboring countries and fueling religious conflicts. It has indefinitely provided it with relevant means to achieve hegemony and threaten the security of Israel and the Gulf region (Eman, 2014).

WAR AGAINST TERRORISM EFFECT

Dormant Terrorist Cells Revival and Rising Activities of Al-Qaeda

A 'cell organization' can be defined as an integral division or component of a greater organization. The greater organization divides itself into multi-person groups and supplies necessary information to each cell, with an intention of survival, if any one of its component is compromised (Explainer, 2001). Accordingly, a terrorist cell can be comprehended as an integral division of a greater organization, whose main purpose is to spread terror across their targeted regions. The history of cell organization can be dated back to the 1880s, when anarchists and revolutionaries across Russia, France, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland formed cells against their respective regimes. On similar lines, in 19th century, communist movement formed cells to overthrow the existing governments, given their non-penetrable ability (Explainer, 2001).

From the above paragraph, it is a clear indication that each and every cell organization contains a central goal or motivation which propels itself as a group motivation. Accordingly, terrorist cells idolize on the rational belief of spreading terrorism and terrorism can be defined as, —premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience” (Poland, 1988, p.11). Thus, the goals of terrorists are centered on causing disruption to one or multiple aspects related to social, political, security, and economic semblance of the social stratum.

From social and security perspectives, the goal of the terrorists can be attributed to causing injuries and fatalities, and damaging the critical infrastructure of the targeted

region or nation. On a political level, the goal of terrorism can be connected with creating weakness or embarrassing the government. From an economic perspective, the goal can be attributed to disruption of the economy and discouraging tourism while spreading chaos, fear, and insecurity across the targeted regions (Bennett, 2007). Thus, the goal or intention of terrorism is diverse and alike cancer, terrorism has established its roots across the world through various organizations. While the following organizations are well known for their terrorist activities, certain other organizations function on small scale or are less known in the history of terrorism.

Among the various well-known terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda has secured itself as a radical group with its lethal objectives. Established in 1998, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda is not merely a terrorist organization, but an ideology that supports several radicals across the globe. Derived from the Arabic language, Qaeda refers to “base of operation or foundation, or alternatively as a precept or method” (Burke, 2004, p.18).

Osama bin Laden undoubtedly established the terrorist group and idolized the thought-process behind Al-Qaeda. However, the seed for such a movement was planted by Abdullah Azzam in 1987, who called for Al-Qaeda Al sulbah (firm foundation), which can be simply translated as vanguard of the strong base. The main purpose of such a call was to set an example for all extremist followers across the globe to fight against its oppressors. While the call envisaged the hardliners and radicals to set up and propel such a vanguard, it targeted the umma (global followers of Islam) to establish the caliphate (single Islamic State) (Burke, 2004).

In lieu with the above mentioned objective Al-Qaeda has established its provincial base and presence primarily in Afghanistan and progressed towards the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Islamic Maghreb. Its activities across these regions highlight the lethal activities and its ability to create wars and terror across the MENA region. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacked foreigners in Yemen and attempted to assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif in August 2009. Their 3000 land mines across the towns of Zinjibar and Jaar killed 72 residents and suicide car bombings killed 26 Yemeni soldiers. Another suicide bombing by AQAP killed 96 people in Sana'a, whose actual target was Yemeni military brass (US Department of State, 2014).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) opposed Israel's position in the global map and Western powers since its foundation on December 17, 2004. However, since 2011, its targets and activities have shifted towards the Syrian conflict. Its alias Al-Nusrah Front portrayed itself as legitimate Syrian opposition and has taken responsibility for nearly 600 attacks across cities such as Damascus, Hama, Daraa, Homs, Aleppo, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zor. Apart from small arms, suicide attacks are the favored tool used by the terrorist group for causing mayhem. The group conducted series of attacks in March, July, August, and November on pilgrims, civilians, and policemen across Iraq killing hundreds of people (US Department of State, 2014).

Following the Jihadi principles, Al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted series of bombings on UN headquarters in Algiers and Algerian government building killing nearly 60 people in 2007. In 2011 and 2012, the group used the rising unrest in northern African regions and conducted series of attacks. It targeted Mauritanian

President Muhammad Abdel Aziz and conducted series of suicide bombings against the military, police, and civilians. Affiliates with the group also killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. Continuous attacks on tourists, civilians, and military, and kidnapping people for ransoms, apart from suicide bombings have enabled the group to establish firm base in northeastern Algeria, northern Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (US Department of State, 2014).

In this manner, Al-Qaeda under bin Laden was very effective in creating fear and terror in the hearts and minds of the people across the MENA region. Bin Laden's organization comprising of various cells were ad hoc in function. Planning or support cells, sleeper or submarine cells, execution cells and operation commanders were the divisions or cells of the organization called Al-Qaeda. The planning cell comprised of 10 members, usually of radical origin and residents. The main functionality of these members was to supply materials such as driver's licenses, boarding and lodging, and cash or credit cards. While fund-raising was the main agenda of the planning cell, it was responsible for the maintenance of the execution cells (Explainer, 2001).

While planning and execution cells were activity oriented, unique type of cells called sleeper or submarine cells lived in the target region or country without any activity, until requested otherwise. The members of the sleeper cells live in the target country for many years and on a usual basis lack any prior police or FBI record. However, when bin Laden decided to strike any region or induce his terrorist activity, the execution cells and operation commanders played a crucial role. Utilizing the resources supplied by other cells, the members of the execution cells were brought in during the

final stages of the attack. The operation commanders came in only during the last moment of the attack and were the bridge between the local cells and the greater organization that shielded the activities of the cells. In some cases they came into the forefront, while in most cases they escaped the regions and countries under attack, post the terrorist activities (Explainer, 2001).

With the death of bin Laden on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan in the hands of U.S. forces, Al-Qaeda's influence in South Asia has degraded to a great extent. However, Al-Qaeda still functions as a source of inspiration for numerous affiliated and non-affiliated groups with its impeccable ideologies (US Department of State, 2014). Al-Qaeda's ideologies revolve around its main objectives which can be outlined as: a) revolting against the West and its aggressive ideas which began during the Crusades and colonial period, and protecting Islam against the humiliation and denigration from the aggressive West and b) establish a single Islamic State, which in the current world would comprise of the "Middle East, the Maghreb (North Africa bordering the Mediterranean), Andalusia in southern Spain, Central Asia, parts of the Balkans, and possibly some Islamic territories in the Far East" (Burke, 2004, p.19). With these objectives, Al-Qaeda's central strategy focuses on striking the Western sponsors of Arab regimes to improve the local conditions and create a perfect society in accord with the Islamic holy texts (Burke, 2004).

With its potential to empower political theocratic powers and spread religious radicalism, Arab Spring has paved way for numerous radical militants to revive themselves by either affiliating themselves with the Al-Qaeda or functional

independently. Although redundant during the initial phases of the Arab Spring, Al-Qaeda has reshaped itself to extract maximum opportunities from the Arab Spring through its various affiliates.

–Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab– and other extremist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, and the Haqqani Network also have ties to Al-Qaida” (US Department of State, 2014).

Investigators claim that, “political transitions and unrest in the region have provided opportunities for terrorists to mount attacks” (Goodenough, 2013). The fall of Al-Qaeda’s prominent rival Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the flow of foreign insurgents to Syria with Jihadi agenda have strengthened Al-Qaeda’s position in the mainstream terror activities (Lynch, 2013). Apart from Yemen and Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is closely associated with Libyan International Fighting Group (LIFG). LIFG played a crucial role in escalating the conflict against the Libyan government (For rejected tidal wave of Libyan Islamic fighting group in the MENA region (Cartalucci, 2012). While the NATO supplied arms and funds to fight against the government, the uprooting of Muammar Qaddafi changed the vision of this terrorist organization towards personal agenda to spreading Jihad and terror across the MENA region. LIFG is now emerged as a predicament for Libya, given its consistent agenda to invade different parts and create racial conflict across the region, rather than political and democratic stability (Cartalucci, 2014).

The Al-Qaeda leadership and affiliates continue to issue communiqués to the Arab publics and try to present strategic guidelines to reconstruct the affected regions, to pursue their terrorist operations (Holbrook, 2012, 17). The Arab Uprisings invariably led to the rise of prisoner releases, dawa opportunities and resurgence of Jihadi charity networks (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014). These aspects coupled with political and security disruption across the MENA region has led to the emergence of religious, social, and security chaos.

Fighters for Paradise: Suicide-Bombers, Mercenaries, and Jihadists

Democratic vacuum has been filled by the sheikhs and mullahs. In Saudi Arabia there are the senior scientists, a religious authority that compensates Parliament. There is correlation between economic and political interests, and the religious discourse, for instance, Qatar has entered the political and religious rivalry with Saudi Arabia, and war of fatwas broke out clearly between Qatari-supported sheikhs and Saudi-supported sheikhs on fighting in Syria or Iraq and sexual Jihad (Gabeau, 2011).

A wave of fighters for paradise in varied forms, suicide bombers, mercenaries, and Jihadists, has emerged as the grim side of Arab Spring, (Cartalucci, 2012) explained many routes taken by fighters from country of origin to Iraq via Syria. While a very thin line exists between these varied forms of fighters, the underlying causes of their motivations range from personal to communal objectives or aspirations. The central objective of the fighters of paradise can be connected with the founding principle of Jihad, whose meaning and principle lies in the roots of Islam (Gerges, 2010; Phares, 2007). Based on Koranic interpretations, Jihad is viewed as a defensive religious war,

which calls for fighting actions against Muslim apostates and foreign infidels (Boussamoui, 2007). As an important religious duty, Jihad is not only an individual responsibility, but also a collective function by entities forged within a State/s to spread religious ideologies in a combat manner.

The ultimate goal of Jihadists is to recreate the enlightened regime of Islamic Caliphate and its successors, and urges the Islamic followers to emotively and spiritually envision Hakimiya (God's sovereignty) on Earth. The Medina Surahs urge for unabated confrontations and strengthen the theoretical foundation, and impulse for valor into Islam followers' formative grounding (Karsh, 2006). Thus, Jihadists follow decrees or fatwas that effectuate religious fighting not only against apostates or non-believers or enemies of specific ideology but in some cases also across ideology followers with non-radical ideals. Chaos of fatwas and misusing of religious doctrines have led to collective takfir (anathematize and declaring others unbelievers), and brutal activities to slaughter innocents civilians and elites. As an extension of the fighting tactics, Mujahidin incept and encourage in martyrdom activities or suicide missions, giving rise to suicide bombings, mercenaries, killing civilians, and targets alike (Hafez, 2010).

Mercenaries can either be viewed as individual volunteers that move across the globe with an intention to achieve Jihad or collective primary military companies which the States use to achieve their militant purposes (Rzayev, 2005). While a central definition to understand mercenaries is difficult to obtain, a mercenary believes in the principle of "a devotion to war for its own sake" (Mockler, 1985) and can be better defined by their activities rather than the reason behind these activities. Irrespective of the

definition, mercenaries are composed of militant ideals alike the suicide bombers. Individuals engaged in suicide bombings aim to achieving multiple purposes from satisfying individual missions such as revenge, altruism and humiliation to communal obligations and responsibilities (Hassan, 2009).

The Arab Spring has intensified the core ideals of the fighters of paradise. It has opened the lid of foreign insurgents belonging to various militant factions into the destabilized civic society. —The borders that had been enforced by powerful governments became more porous, there was greater freedom for various groups — whether rebels, Jihadists or criminals — to join up and make common cause” (Worth, 2013). For instance, Libya’s deteriorating and instable conditions have added value to the Jihadist cause, for various camps that prepare militants for suicide missions have been put into operation (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014). On similar lines, Syria’s internal conflict triggered due to the Arab Uprisings have progressed into crucial in-flow of foreign fighters into the nation (Table 3.1 intended work of foreign fighter in Iraq by nationality).

—The International Center for the Study of Radicalization estimates the total number (including returnees and fatalities) as 8,500-11,000 (some 10 percent of the total number of opposition fighters). They originate from 74 different countries – 70% from the Middle East and 18% from Western Europe, presumably children of radical immigrants. The largest number (over 2,000) came from neighboring Jordan, followed by Saudi Arabia (over 1,000), Tunisia (970), Lebanon (890), and Libya (556)” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2014).

In this manner, fueled by adherent and violent radical principles, fighters of paradise have emerged as crucial elements that have unsettled the socio-political and economic semblance of the nations affected by the Arab Spring. The invariable impact of Arab Spring on the economy and financial aspects of the States are outlined in the following section.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EFFECT

Arab Spring's economic and financial effects can be comprehended from short and medium term outlook, and by analyzing the paradigm change in the proper political, economic and social (PES) mix. Each of these categories is discussed in the following sections.

Short and Medium Term Outlook

Socio-political uprisings create economic risk across the nation. An overview of the MENA region's economic and financial status validates this assertion. Accordingly, this section assesses a) the short-term history of MENA region's economic activity. In this regard, selected macroeconomic indicators are used to assess the historical economic data between 2009 and 2011, b) recent economic history of the MENA region; various reports are used to identify the economic risks in the MENA region between 2012 and 2013, c) short-term economic outlook using 2014 reports and d) medium term outlook using the economic projection for 2015 onwards.

Economic data between 2009 and 2011 highlight crucial information regarding the MENA region. While the global economic crisis in 2010 affected various developed

and developing countries, regional economic status across the MENA region exhibited volatility. For instance, the year on year (YOY) percentage change of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflows for Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen for 2010 in comparison with 2009 was -39%, -5%, 20%, -13%, -32%, -59%, -11%, 30%, 17%, -37%, -24%, -43%, -20%, 10%, -43%, -13%, 37%, -49%, and -172%. However, in 2011 the FDI net inflows for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen respectively dipped by 108%, 11%, 18%, 100%, 38%, 31%, 102%, 44%, 57%, 100%, 68%, and 664% in comparison with the year 2010. The following figure emphasizes the same data (refer to Figure 3.3 FDI net inflows (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009).

FDI net inflows (Balance of Payments BOP, current US\$) can be defined as, “the inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments” (The World Bank, 2009, p.366).

Higher the net inflows, indicates greater ease of doing business in the regions and greater economic progress for the nation. Given that, the Arab Spring began and escalated in these regions, it clearly indicates that socio-political uprisings create economic risk across the nation. What the economic crisis across the world could not achieve, the Arab Spring’s uprisings in the MENA region achieved!

Other crucial factors that can be used to validate this are Gross domestic savings (YOY Percentage Change), total reserves (YOY Percentage Change), and net migration (YOY Percentage Change). Gross domestic savings percentage of GDP can be defined as, $\frac{\text{gross domestic product} - \text{total consumption}}{\text{gross domestic product}}$, etc. (or gross domestic investment plus the resource balance)” (CIESIN, 2014).

Total reserves minus gold can be defined as $\frac{\text{total reserves} - \text{gold}}{\text{total reserves}}$ comprise special drawing rights, reserves of International Monetary Fund IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. Gold holdings are excluded. Data are in current U.S. dollars” (Nation Master, 2014).

World bank data indicates that, the year on year (YOY) percentage change of gross domestic savings (percentage of GDP) for Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian, Tunisia, and Yemen for 2010 in comparison with 2009 respectively was -35%, 6%, 7%, -20%, 30%, -4%, 2%, 44%, 19%, 42%, -40%, -4%, and 133%. However, in 2011 Gross domestic savings for Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia dipped by 3%, 14%, 21%, 9%, and 22% in comparison with the year 2010. World Bank data also indicates that, (YOY) percentage change of total reserves for United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen was respectively 26%, 32%, 6%, 14%, 12%, 8%, 14%, 25%, 2%, 0%, 0%, 7%, 66%, 9%, -5%, 13%, -14%, and -15%. However, in 2011 (YOY) percentage change of total reserves for Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Malta, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen respectively dipped by 10%, 50%, 11%, 13%, 5%, 46%,

81%, 20%, and 24%. Higher Gross savings and total reserves indicate high economic stability and growth of nation. Contrary is true otherwise. Following figures graphically represent the two parameters (Figure 1.4 Total Reserves (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison with 2010) and (Figure 3.5 Gross Savings Percentage of GDP (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison with 2010).

Net migration can be defined as “the total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates” (The World Bank, 2009, p.367). World Bank data also indicates that, (YOY) percentage change of net migration for UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and West Bank and Gaza for 2012 in comparison with 2007 was -87%, -92%, -38%, -11%, -33%, 173%, -28%, -33%, 3063%, -42%, 91%, 60%, -231%, and -51% respectively.

Positive figures indicate the percentage of people entering the nation and negative figures percentage of people leaving the nation. Thus, it can be deduced that, citizens and non-citizens from UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Malta, Qatar, Syria, and West Bank and Gaza left these nations and higher percentage of people entered Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Higher migratory number indicates high social and political instability in the region. The following figure represents the YOY percentage change in net migration in the MENA region for 2012 in comparison with

2007 (refer to Figure 3.6 YOY percentage change in net migration in the MENA region for 2012 in comparison with 2007).

Arab Spring caused negative effects so far, above all, in all the countries of the Arab Spring economic growth has stop. The unrests broke down some of the sectors that have sold its products in the local markets in particular." This is due to a decline in purchasing power and consumption in these countries. The concerns about the development of future and developments play a major role in this. This concern also intimidates foreign investors, and moreover, there is only a weak ability to compete. Wages in many cases slightly exceeding the poverty level, the rising costs of loans and lifting of subsidized prices to a large extent on energy and food, labor productivity in these countries is significantly lower than in most countries of East Asia, many workers did not receive adequate education, acceptable working conditions and training (Becker and Zigulo, 2012).

Focusing on the recent economic history of the MENA region; various reports are used to identify the economic risks in the MENA region between 2012 and 2013. From a short term perspective, the Arab Spring created serious economic instability across the MENA region. Macroeconomic instability was seriously witnessed, and medium-term challenges in areas related to economic diversification, job creation and growth perspective was observed. Oil-exporting companies created petrodollar instability across the globe and the nation's tourism, FDI inflows, outflows, and GDP was invariably affected. -Downside risks, arising from slower global growth, domestic political

uncertainties, and geopolitical risks in the region, continue to weigh” (REO Update, 2013) across the MENA region as short-term challenges.

Regional GDP in the MENA region remained flat in 2013. FDI flows have declined during the 2011-2013 period. Weaker revenues, slow growth and increasing public expenditure spending on wages, food, and fuel due to the Arab Spring’s uprisings, have increased debt servicing charges and created deficits from banking sectors and grants from GCC countries (See Table 3.3. International capital flows to developing countries). Apart from financial deficits, Arab Spring has created banking sector risks given the rise in domestic credit quality and government financing needs. Thus, instable political conditions in Egypt, escalating civil war crisis in Syria and its spillover effects to Lebanon and Jordan, security setbacks, infrastructure problems, and negative international relations of Iran have adversely affected the oil exporting countries in the MENA region (World Bank, 2013).

Next focus can be laid on the short-term economic outlook using 2014 Doing Business Report and Global Economic Prospects Reports. Doing Business Report 2014 and Global Economic Prospects 2014 indicates that economies of the MENA region still remain in turmoil and nascent recovery projects have faltered, given the periodic social and political tensions. Industrial activity in the MENA region is weak, given the unsettled political conditions among oil importers and production setbacks across oil exporters and importers in the region. While exports are beginning to reach a state of stability in certain regions, tourism activities are still low. The baseline forecast for social and political tensions in this region are assumed to persist along with their detrimental economic

consequences. Regional GDP is estimated to be flat in 2013 and is projected to rise by 2.8% in 2014, and 3.6% in 2016 given the rate of social and political tensions in the region. Accordingly, growth in the MENA region is expected to remain weak. Aggregate growth in oil importers is estimated to be weak and below potential and the economic recovery in the MENA will remain challenging since it exhibits downside internal risks (The World Bank, 2014).

From a business perspective, Doing Business Report 2014 indicates that Libya is the least suitable region for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, and protecting investors. Additionally, countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Tunisia have made it difficult to start business in their respective countries by increasing the registration fees or minimum capital investment. Iran is the least suitable region for getting electricity to do any business, and Algeria is least suitable for paying taxes. Iraq is least suitable for trading across borders, and Syria is least suitable for enforcing contracts (World Bank, 2013).

Medium term outlook using the economic projection for 2015 onwards indicate that, challenges threaten the economic development of the MENA region. Unemployment, low and uncertain growth with unfavorable business environments, high regional trade barriers, and inappropriate regulatory framework pose as medium-term challenges (REO Update, 2013). This affects the recovery of the nations affected by the Arab Spring's uprisings. A sharp drop in the economic growth, increasing external deficits and diminishing FX reserves (Foreign Exchange reserves), large fiscal deficits and rising public deficits mainly due to political instability and stock market crashes can

be considered as the medium/long term economic effects of the Arab Spring uprisings (Masetti, Körner, Forster, and Friedman, 2013).

Additionally, the regional GDP is expected to increase by 2.8% in 2014 and 3.6% in 2016 depending on the political and social stability of the regions affected by the Arab Spring unrests. Low rate of international capital flows to MENA region is forecasted for 2014, 2015, and 2016, and the capital flows for 2013 is estimated at 1.5% of GDP (The World Bank, 2014). The following table highlights the international capital flows to MENA region in comparison with other developing countries. The World Bank Databank forecasts the GDP at market prices (2010) and current account balances/ GDP percentage for countries in MENA region. The following tables indicate the same data (See Table 3.2. GDP at market prices (2010) and current account balances/ GDP percentage for countries in MENA region).

GDP for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen is projected to show minimal increase till 2016. While the GDP for Iran, Libya, and Syria is estimated at -1.5%, -6%, and -22.5% respectively, slight increase is projected till 2016. Current account balances for Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen showcase fluctuating and/or decreasing trend. While the value fluctuates for Iraq and Libya, it projects a possibility of slight increase from 2014. Unfortunately, the value does not reflect great growth in the MENA region.

The Paradigm Change: The Proper Political, Economic, and Social (PES) Mix

A paradigm change in the MENA region is observed. A different PES mix is observed in regions affected by the uprisings. In order to understand the PES mix in the MENA region, general and regional perspective. From a general perspective, regions in which the Arab Spring has culminated, regions in which the uprising reached its zenith and regions in which the Arab Spring is still progressing, can be analyzed. In regions where the Arab Spring has culminated, the PES mix reflects uncertainty, and in regions where the Arab Spring is progressing or reached its zenith, chaos and unrest is reflected (Perry, 2013).

While the political aspects of the Arab Spring tend towards uprooting corrupt regimes, the participants of the Arab Spring still aim for achieving democracy. Given the rise of religious parties and civil wars, the chaos and unrest created during the Arab Spring is yet to reach stability across most States in the MENA region (Perry, 2013). The countries face delayed economic recovery. "Political turmoil was hurting much needed private investments" (Reuters, 2013), and the budget deficit in Egypt was expected to rise by 10-12 percent of GDP in 2013 (Reuters, 2013). A general slowdown in the economy affected by the political and social instability is visible in the States post the Arab Spring. The regions in which the uprisings are still progressing or are just in their beginning stages, a commotion and general chaos is visible. Mass movements of people and rise in number of refugee population, slowdown in tourism rates, call for international assistance, civil wars, riots, and rise in geopolitical instability is evident across the MENA region (Chatham House, 2011). High instability is evident in these States. A

comparison of the three statuses unduly reflects the paradigm change/trend calloused by the chaotic condition.

The PES mix in the MENA region can also be analyzed from a regional perspective. The cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria can be analyzed given their ability to create chaotic revolutions since the inception of the revolutionized contort called Arab Spring. In Tunisia, new constitution has won place and three-year state of emergency has been reflected. Women rights have been upheld in the constitution to attain gender equality. However, radical militants threaten Tunisia, and unemployment and high cost of living threaten the socio-economic balance of the State. Tourism has declined considerably and the economy is still under a volatility and instability. In Egypt, military rule is prevalent and Muslim Brotherhood is declared as a terrorist organization. The economic situation is highly unstable, given the presence of high unemployment and low tourism. Use of excessive security forces has killed thousands of people and the social security of the State is under high scrutiny. Women's rights have lacked administration and women continue to suffer physical and mental abuse by security forces. Yemen's PES mix also reflects poverty, civil wars, water shortage, society militarization, and illiteracy. Severe sectarian, regional and economic problems are present in the State. Bahrain's dependency on finance has led to severe economic problems, given the rise of unrests. Bahrain's status as financial hub is affected and pressure on State budget is increasing drastically. Sectarianism is emerging as a barrier to women's rights in Bahrain. Libya and Syria reflect serious PES demise. Armed protestors have seized oil ports in Libya and political infighting has created severe civil

unrest in the State. Tribal rivalry projects unprecedented violence and gender inequality is still prevalent in the region. In Syria about 100,000 people have been estimated to be dead in the violent strife called Arab Spring. Chaos is widespread; women and girls have been violated and exploited in Syria questioning the security establishment of the State. Poverty and unemployment are on the rise, and Syria's economy is expressing a downward trend (BBC, 2013; AAron, 2011).

Additionally, the future of the PES mix in the MENA region lies in its ability to receive and accept the numerous developmental activities lined by prestigious organizations not only from their respective home countries but also from several countries of the world. For instance, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has actively synthesized and synchronized primary objectives for the holistic development of the MENA region. With promoting job growth as its first priority, AFD has claimed to stimulate sector budget support for recovery support plan (PAR) in Tunisia and boost competitive spirit of small private companies in Palestinian territories. In order to strengthen social and territorial cohesion, AFD aims to outline programs to support the Green Morocco Plan, cultural heritage, and urban development program in Lebanon. As its third objective, AFD intends to improve the quality of life for communities in Egypt and Turkey by respectively promoting a flagship project: Line 3 of the Cairo metro and implement the first sovereign loan for forests and climatic change, and also ensure constant supply of drinking water in Jordan through its Disi drinking water supply project (Agence Française de Développement (AFD), 2012).

In a nutshell, countries of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya came under a lot of economic problems, declining living standards, decrease in industrial production and exports, increase dependency on foreign aid, high inflation, deterioration of services, and decline in tourism sectors during the transitional stage when political theocrats jumped to power, and likely to require years to overcome devastating effects (Khan, 2013).

SUMMARY

The negative implications of Arab Spring are outlined in the third chapter. Using primary societal indicators such as political, social, security, and interregional effects, the possible causatives and the implications of the Arab Spring is detailed in this chapter. The chapter clarifies that the Arab Spring uprisings have negatively impacted the political system of the States. It has empowered political Islamism, spread religious radicalism, reduced state secularism, and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. It has adversely impacted the States’ social system by reducing the public freedom, persecuting minorities, reducing the rights of women, and killing the democratization vision of the MENA region. The uprisings have negatively impacted the security system of the States. They have resulted in riots, lawlessness, civil wars, internal conflicts, social militarization, and neighborhood interference apart from affecting the economic growth, FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations. While the second chapter outlined the causes that invoked the Arab Spring indicating its potential importance and need for such uprisings, the third chapter outlines the negative implications of the Arab

Spring uprisings. Therefore, need exists in identifying the impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system and the potentiality of its spillover to cause geopolitical instability.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

The fourth chapter of the study clarified the research methodology. The paper focuses on the adverse effects of Arab Spring across the MENA region and aims to elucidate the adverse effect of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system across the MENA region.

INTRODUCTION

Research can be defined as —a method of study that, through careful investigation of all evidences bearing on a definable problem, arrives at a solution” (Vyhmeister, 2009). From the definition, it is evident that research is a scientific process that consists of: a well-defined problem, collection and analysis of evidences pertinent to the problem, and verification or extraction of solutions related to the defined problem. Thus, encompassed within an apparent scope, research study is guided by a philosophy or general principle termed as research methodology (Dawson, 2002).

Research methodology can be comprehended as systematic approach that supplies the logic for the research methods to resolve a problem or issue. It indicates the reason behind choosing a particular method or technique to conduct the research study (Kothari, 2004). Research methodology determines the underlying principle of various techniques, and characteristic aspects such as research philosophy, approach, purpose, strategy, data collection techniques and methods, and analysis generally constitute as constituents of

research methodology. Research methodology needs to be reliable, valid, and within the ethical bounds of the research study. Considering this, each research aspect is studied in the following sections.

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

Research philosophy can be defined as the general assumptions and beliefs of the researcher, and the researcher's view of the world. It outlines the research approach, the research strategy, data collection method, analysis, and the standards for judging the quality of the research. Taken together, these assumptions and beliefs are termed as research paradigms or philosophies (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Research philosophies are thus influenced by positivist or naturalistic assumptions, and researchers can be broadly segregated into positivists or naturalists categories (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

A basic distinction can be observed between positivists and naturalists. Positivists emphasize on quantitative design, and use techniques that measure and count. Contrarily, naturalists emphasize on qualitative design and observation, and questioning and description are commonly used in a naturalistic study (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). In naturalistic philosophy, reality is subjective and is interpreted from the researcher's understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, meanings and understanding are plural, and the goal is to obtain in-depth understanding of particular event, process or culture from the participants and researcher's perspective. The researcher is respectful listener or observer and is less authoritative, and is subjected to overlapping views. Thus, the findings may be

basis of proposed action and relevant understanding to the research phenomenon is extracted from the findings (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

The aim of the study is to identify the adverse impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system across the MENA region. The negative impact of Arab Spring on the political, social, security, economic, and financial stratum of the society is gauged. There exists a single uniform reality, the negative impact of Arab Spring, which the researcher aims to measure in an in-depth manner. Considering this, the current study aims to identify and elucidate the negative impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system. Data collection and the implications of findings move toward clarifying the negative impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system across the MENA region. Qualitative measures and naturalistic philosophy are adopted to establish this relationship (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

RESEARCH APPROACH

Research approach can be viewed in multiple ways. It is comprehensive in nature and can be either dependent on the general plan of the research or on the focus of the research or can be viewed as the strategy to achieve the research objectives. An insight to each of these approaches will enable the researcher to accomplish the study in a structural manner.

Focus of the research decides the research approach and research approach can either be inductive or deductive in nature (Cooper and Schindler, 2008; Saunders et al, 2009). The deductive approach is based on deductive logic, where the researcher has an

established theory, derives hypothesis, collects observations to test the hypothesis (Rubin and Babbie, 2009). Relevant hypothesis is extracted, and quantitative data is collected to validate the research questions. As a highly structured process, deductive approach is free from subjectivism and validates the theory with factual data. Thus, a general shift from theoretical assumptions to factual validation is observed in deductive approach. In deductive approach ideas are tested against hard data (Neuman, 2007).

The inductive approach contradicts the deductive approach and inductive logic is applied, where the researcher “begins with observations, seeks patterns in those observations, and generates tentative conclusions from those patterns” (Rubin and Babbie, 2009, p.39). Data in the inductive approach is qualitative in nature and the need to generalize is minimal or absent. Inductive approach demands the researcher to possess close understanding of the research context and the researcher is allowed to change the research elements as the study progresses. It guarantees flexibility to the researcher (Saunders et al, 2009). Inductive approach thus relies on researcher’s perception and understanding of the research study and is generally subjective in nature.

Given the naturalistic philosophy of the current study, inductive logic is apt and inductive approach is applied. Since the aim of the current study is to assess the negative impact of the Arab Uprisings a close understanding of the phenomenon is achieved by analyzing the political, social, security, economic, and financial orders of the society. The phenomenon of Arab Uprisings is observed from these perspectives and SMT is applied to obtain the pattern and spread of Arab Uprisings across the MENA region. Relevant

conclusions are drawn and the consequences and impact of Arab Uprisings on the geopolitical stability is relatively assessed (Saunders et al, 2009).

RESEARCH PURPOSE

Most often, research purpose is classified into three categories, exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. While the research purpose can either be exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, or can be a combination of descriptive and explanatory. A research study can thus have multiple purposes. The current study is a combination of descriptive and explanatory purposes, otherwise termed as descripto-explanatory studies. An exploratory study aims at understanding the nature of the problem which is uncertain and the focus is generally broad. Contrarily, in descripto-explanatory studies, the descriptive and explanatory purposes are combined to describe a clear picture of the phenomenon, provides sufficient means to extract conclusions and to explain the relationship between the parameters involved in the study (Saunders et al, 2009).

The explanatory phase follows the descriptive phase and in the current study the general picture of the phenomenon of Arab Uprisings is present, and is subjected to detailed inquiry (descriptive purpose), post which, the political, social, security, economic, and financial aspects of the MENA region is outlined and their relationship with geopolitical stability is assessed under the guidelines of naturalistic philosophy (explanatory) (Saunders et al, 2009).

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Research strategy is an important element that is used to collect data and test the hypothesis in the study. Apart from data collection and hypothesis testing, research strategy answers particular research questions and meets the objectives. Existing knowledge, amount of time, and other resources and philosophical underpinnings determine the research strategy. Seven basic research strategies are usually applied in the research studies: experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, ethnography, and archival research (Saunders et al, 2009).

While experiment strategy owes to natural sciences, case study divulges into the subject, even, person or setting in hand. Action research focuses on the resolutions of the issues and evaluating the resolutions, and grounded theory builds theory to predict and explain behavior of the research subject. Ethnography describes and explains the social world, and is very time consuming, and archival research is secondary in nature and makes use of the administrative records and documents to validate the research questions (Saunders et al, 2009).

In a case study, a particular individual, program, or event is studied in depth for a defined period of time. Sometimes researchers focus on a single case, perhaps because its unique or exceptional qualities can promote understanding or inform practice for similar situations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 135). Considering that the study tries to extract information from different countries involved in the Arab Spring, it considers more than one case at a single point in time. It extracts relevant literary data, which can be observed and developed into general patterns of association using which conclusions

can be extracted and research questions can be validated (Bryman and Bell, 2007).

Additionally, the why, what and how aspects of the Arab Uprisings are assessed in the current study, which is another important characteristic of case study strategy (Saunders et al, 2009). Aspects such as, ‘Why’ the Arab Uprisings occurred, ‘what’ are the consequences of the uprisings and ‘how’ the uprisings can create geopolitical instability are assessed in the current study. Comprehending this, case study strategy is apt for this study.

DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE AND METHODS

Data collection is a crucial stage of the research study and it validates the outcomes of the research questions/objectives. Data collection techniques can either be quantitative or qualitative in nature. In quantitative data collection technique, data for the research is gathered from a large practicable sample. This design follows a linear research model. A theoretical position is established using the available theories and literatures. Post this, hypothesis is extracted and research design steps are indicated, concepts are measured, site for carrying out research and sample is selected and relevant instrument is administered. On a common basis, survey or questionnaire is used as instrument to carry out the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2003). Data analysis is conducted, and relevant findings and conclusions are extracted. The research validity is verified based on the findings’ applicability to the study’s research questions (Easterby-Smith et al, 2003).

In qualitative technique, the research structure is rarely rigid. The framework may evolve as the research progresses and multiple methods to collect data can be employed. The research framework is flexible in qualitative design and usually encompasses

longitudinal approaches which are rarely concerned about consistency. The research framework does not focus on numbers and counts, and the observation or research area and candidates in qualitative design is limited and smaller in number (Cooper and Schindler, 2008). Additionally, the research is conducted in its natural settings and researcher's role in interpreting the phenomena is relatively high (Denzin and Webb, 1994). Given that the current study aims to assess the phenomenon of Arab Uprisings in its naturalistic setting and observes the events across the limited countries affected by it, qualitative technique and relevant data collection methods are applied.

Data collection methods can either be primary in nature or secondary. Primary data is "collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in character" (Kothari, 2005, p.95). Collecting primary data can be time consuming and expensive. Thus, secondary data can be used in situations which do not require first-hand data. Data which is already collected to meet some other purpose's requirements is termed as secondary data. Documentary data, government publications, books, journals, industry, statistical reports, continuous and regular surveys and ad hoc surveys, newspapers, interview transcripts, and many more constitute as secondary data. Since the current study recounts the nature of the Arab Uprisings in its naturalistic setting, secondary data such as documentary data, especially written materials and multiple sources, both area-based, and time-series based is used in this study (Saunders et al, 2009).

DATA ANALYSIS

Secondary data in the current study is subjected to iterative analysis. Data collected in the study is thematically analyzed using threefold analysis in lieu with the study's objectives. While the background information provides substratum to comprehend the causes of Arab Uprisings, the political, social, security, economic, and financial consequences of the Arab Uprisings is assessed using relevant secondary data. Arab Spring's impact on political Islamism, religious radicalism, state secularism, and semi-theocratic regimes (political), public freedom, minorities' rights, rights of women, and democratization (social), riots and lawlessness, civil wars and internal conflicts, social militarization and neighborhood interference (security effects), and economic growth, FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations, is invariably gauged.

The impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system and its extent to cause geopolitical instability is gauged through iterative secondary analysis. Factors in the political, social, security, economic, and financial sectors that are crucial drivers of geopolitical instability are assessed in this regard, and the possible factors that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region are invariably assessed through secondary data analysis procedure.

RELIABILITY

According to Joppe ~~the~~ the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research

instrument is considered to be reliable” (Bashir et al, 2008, p.36). The measurements chosen to identify the geopolitical instability across the political, social, security, interregional, and economic aspects are extracted from credible literary sources. Despite the qualitative nature of the study, use of numerous literary resources till saturation is achieved for each aspect of the study, highlights that at any given point of time, these resources can be referred and validated to reproduce or multiply the content of the study.

VALIDITY

Research validity refers to “the extent to which a concept is actually represented by the indicators of such concepts” (Mills, 2010: 959). Content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity are the criteria used to test the validity of the research study. In order to validate the content of the study, the study’s analysis is divided into sections: political, social, security, interregional, and economic aspects to identify the impact of Arab Spring on the geo-political system of the MENA region. Criterion-related validity can be defined as “ability to predict some outcomes” (Kothari, 2004, p.74). The current study aims to validate the negative impact of Arab Spring on the geo-political system of the MENA region. The study eventually establishes that the Arab Uprisings have caused geopolitical instability across the MENA region. Construct validity can be defined as, “degree to which scores on a test can be accounted for by the explanatory constructs of a sound theory” (Kothari, 2004, p.74). As mentioned in previous section, the measurements chosen to identify the geopolitical instability across the political, social, security, interregional, and economic aspects are extracted from credible literary sources, which can be traced from the reference section.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

Research ethics are moral decisions pertinent to values such as “duty, honor, integrity, virtue, justice, the good life, and so on” (Shamoo and Resnik, 2003, p.10). An important area in the research study, ethical considerations in research mainly revolve around four crucial ethical parameters: honesty, objectivity, integrity, and confidentiality (Shamoo and Resnik, 2003).

Honesty as a value and principle is applied in this research study across all crucial stages: data collection, analysis, presentation of results, and while extracting conclusions. Each and every secondary resource used in this study is cited in the references section to give due credit to the researchers or authors and to avoid plagiarism disputes. The researcher maintains objectivity, despite the subjective analysis procedure not only while deciding the methodology for the study but also while analyzing the results of the study.

Confidentiality and integrity of the research study is maintained by following the research ethics. As “a set of principles that embody or exemplify what is good or what is right, or allow us to identify what is bad or wrong” (Hammersley and Traianou, 2012, p.16), research ethics is an integral part of the research process.

SUMMARY

In the fourth chapter, research methodology is introduced. The basic distinction between research and research methodology and its various endeavors are identified. The current study focuses on the Arab Spring uprisings across the MENA region and aims to

elucidate the geo-political effects of the uprisings. Accordingly, naturalistic philosophy and inductive approach is applied. The research purpose is descripto-explanatory in nature and case study research strategy is employed. Qualitative data collection technique is apt and data is collected through secondary resources via literary articles, newspapers, credible journals and websites. E-search method is used to obtain secondary data. The collected data is analyzed using basic yet reliable and valid qualitative analysis method. The entire study is confined to boundaries of research ethics.


CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

While the research objectives laid the foundation for the current study, an intricate analysis of the literature review paved way for identifying its impact of Arab Uprisings on the geopolitical system of the MENA region. An overview of the background of the Arab Uprisings provided basic information on the political and socioeconomic background of Arab Spring through valid resources. The literature review elucidated the Arab Uprisings using the SMT and narrated the Arab Uprisings from regional perspective. The third chapter reflected the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab Uprisings.

An integration of the three chapters (Study background section, chapter two and chapter three) aimed to ascertain aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that has given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and the possible factors that will spread geopolitical instability across the Arab countries in the MENA region.

With descripto-explanatory purpose, the discussion section aims at fulfilling the research objectives by analyzing the secondary sources used in the study. The following figure highlights the flow of the current chapter to fulfill the objectives of the study.



DETERMINING THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, SECURITY, INTERREGIONAL, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS

The political consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be narrowed to emergence of religious political parties with radical agendas, followed by rise in the activities of the political radicalism along with the iron-fist rule of the popular caliph's rule. This will invariably spread religious radicalism across the MENA region, create instability, conflicts, and violence across the globe and plunge the MENA region to semi-theocratic and eventually theocratic regimes, where essentialities of human identity will be lost to political Islamism and religious radicalism, followed by the death of concept called secularism.

The social consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be summated as loss of public freedom, decline of rights of women and minorities, and death of hope for democracy. Loss of public freedom will prohibit the citizens from enjoying the benefits of expressing their views and opinions either through media or via assemblies. Additionally, Islamist parties and factions force their citizens to adhere to their Islamic rules and traditions, which prevent the individuals from enjoying the religious freedom. A close minded society is prevalent which hampers the essence of human rights and human identity and dignity.

The dominance of certain religious decrees will eventually force the minorities to take a backseat and even exploit them and force them to either convert to radicalism or be killed by Jihadist groups or pay tax to the dominating groups.

The rights of minorities are further plunged into dungeons. The plight of women is no different than that of the minorities, for minorities are seldom respected or viewed as object of respect unlike many cultures.

This cultural dilemma will eventually lead to the dominance of selected groups and male members of the society, which can eventually turn the civilized social society into medieval barbarian world. With the rise of sectarians and radicals, the hope for any democratic society will remain as a myth and political rights, civil rights, division of powers, and horizontal accountability (Merkel, 2004) long anticipated by the MENA region will be subjected to totalitarian regimes camouflaged as political parties.

The security consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be recounted as continuous unrest and chaos, utter lawlessness, civil wars and rule of military juntas and society militarization, and neighborhood interference. Continuous unrests and disruptions in any society can induce the society to severe trauma and affect the psychological semblance of political, economic, and social mix of the State. It escalates the risk levels of the affected States, hamper the tourist, and FDI inflow and outflow of the State. It can empower the negative and violent elements of the State and create sectarian divide across the civil society, thereby laying the seeds for civil wars. The Arab Spring uprisings are sadly reduced to mere civil wars across the MENA region and this chaos has taken the lives of thousands of civilians apart from the involved parties. Violence is used a weapon by the involved parties and the general spread of violence across geographical boundaries signifies the plausible impact of violence and chaos across geographical borders.

Society is thus militarized as people are forced to take sides and neighboring interferences with personal agendas in the form of financial or resource aid escalates the violence and the aftermaths of the popular protests across various regions in the Arab and African World is a classic example for the same.

Apart from countries several radical political parties step up to assume power to exercise their personal interests and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood symbolizes this. Funded to create and spread radical hegemony, parties such as the Brotherhood cloak their personal Islamic agendas with democracy and in reality function as semi-theocratic or theocratic regime. Founded on the radical Law, a decree degenerative principle that curtail the fundamental rights of human beings, the rise of such factions in the society eventually affect the regional and international relations of the affected Arab States.

On similar lines, the Arab Spring uprisings has opened opportunities for countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran exercise their hegemonic ideas on the affected regions. The power-politics of these countries have invariably and erroneously supported unwanted elements in the MENA region. Iran's hegemonic ideas to control the political and economic stratum of the MENA region and the world have rendered it as a global threat. Not only has there been regional power-politics in the MENA region, but also politics in petrodollar hegemony.

Arab Spring uprisings have led to increasing anarchy of petrodollar a portion of which is diverted towards the spread of radical Jihadi ideas. The nations involved in such activities supply either money or goods and ensure the maintenance of the household of the people involved in spreading radical religious ideas.

Apart from this aspect, anarchy of petrodollar also exposes the globe to oil war vulnerability and ensure petrodollar hegemony across the global economy. Oil war vulnerability results in the use of physical forces to control the oil supplies, enhanced violent activities, and global wars with petroleum and its products as the cause.

Along with gaining hegemony on global currency, the dependency of modern economy on oil and natural gas pushes the global economy control in the hands of nation that produce and export oil and its apparent resources. This invariably exposes the globe to creating fear for increase in petroleum prices and exposes the MENA and the world to global inflation.

Not only have the Arab Spring uprisings impacted the political and social aspects of the MENA region, uprisings have also induced severe economic and financial consequences for the MENA region. While the GDP fails to show any growth, FDI inflows and tourism have been severely impacted. Developmental activities have ceased to exist in the affected regions and unemployment is on the rise. Poverty has taken a new form and income gap between the rich and the poor is increased in the MENA region. The entire MENA region reflects high political and socio-economic risk.

IDENTIFYING WHETHER ARAB SPRING HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE NOTION OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE MENA REGION

The findings of the study clearly indicate the decline of the Arab Spring uprisings across the political, social, security, interregional and financial frontiers of the States involved in the Arab Spring's wave. A clear dissatisfaction with the Arab Spring uprisings can be highlighted, given that Arab Spring has affected the political, social, economic, and interregional stability for the worse and has failed to bring about optimistic changes. The Arab Spring uprisings have empowered political Islamism and the rise in the number of Islamist parties across the MENA region symbolizes this. This has invariably led to the rise of religious radicalism and backed by radical parties Jihadi

extremists have created serious conflicts by using the political channels of the State. The State secularism is thus on the decline, given the slow rise of the Islamist parties and the imposition of the religious law not only from the religious parties, but also from Jihadi and radical extremists. Lack of appropriate direction to the Arab Spring uprisings and lack of conviction or call for democracy among the participants has led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes.

While the call for democracy was one of the primary causes for the uprisings of Arab Spring, the States across the MENA region did not witness any rise in media or religious freedom. The Christian minorities were mercilessly persecuted and the women were subjected to physical and verbal assaults, and guidelines that consider women inferior (Arlandson, 2005) rose during the Arab Spring uprisings. The Salafists, radical extremists and parties invariably questioned the need for freedom and equality rights for women, since the Islamic ideologies and rules of procedure of the Islamist parties and their electoral platform never mentioned such an aspect. The dream of a democratic region thus remained as a myth, despite the mass uprisings across the MENA region.

The regional expanse of the Arab Spring uprisings can be attributed to the popular characteristic of SMTs: “the process through which values, interests, and ideas get turned into collective action” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5) and mass mobilization.

Symbols, rituals, and/or narratives that solidified the identities of the masses and the use of informal social networks enhanced the strength of the collective values and political and social movement ensued across the MENA region. Given the impeccable role of social media in escalating the Arab Spring uprisings across the MENA region and the

world, the use of social media, exemplars a) its ability to reflect the personal and crucial opinions of young citizens (freedom of expression) and b) its role and ability to create and channel social movements (collective social action).

The Arab Spring uprisings have thus collectively and negatively impacted the political, social, security, interregional, economic and financial systems of the MENA region. From the political front, Arab Spring has empowered political Islamism, spread religious radicalism, reduced state secularism, and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. From a social front, it has reduced the public freedom, persecuted minorities, reduced the rights of women, and killed the democratization vision of the MENA region. From a security perspective, the uprisings have resulted in riots and lawlessness, civil wars and internal conflicts, social militarization and neighborhood interference.

From an interregional perspective, the uprisings have empowered Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian hegemony, anarchized petrodollar, created proxy wars, and have led to the revival of popular terrorist cells such as Al-Qaeda and fighters of paradise, apart from affecting the economic and financial perspectives of the States by effecting economic growth, FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations in an adverse manner. Thus, it is clear that the Arab Spring uprisings have negatively impacted the geopolitical stability of the MENA region.

HIGHLIGHTING THE POSSIBLE FACTORS THAT WOULD SPREAD GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY ACROSS THE MENA REGION

The political, social, security, interregional, economic, and financial consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be synonymously viewed as the possible factors that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region. The factors outlined below could invariably spread wide and far if the States fail to curtail the instability across the MENA region. Islam plays a fairly large role in the political life across the MENA region, and political and legal life of the MENA region still follows the values and principles of Islam.

Thus, with the rise of Islamist parties and Islamist factions, Arab Spring uprisings have empowered political Islamism and reduced State secularism. This is one of the primary factors (political) that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region.

Freedom of people is still at stake and the respective governments still curtail media, religious, internet, elective freedom along with freedom of expression. Women fail to enjoy same rights as men, and minorities are mercilessly persecuted. Severe progress is not being made to protect the rights of women and minorities. Curtailed by chaos and religious fanaticism human dignity and freedom is still at stake in the MENA region. This acts as another important factor (social) that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region.

Extremist organizations have received openness, and avenues and civil wars have assumed a gruesome form in the MENA region. Increasing cross-border violence and revival and rise of radical extremism through violent and terror spreading organizations have created waves of concern, and increased the vulnerability, and exposed the affected nations to external threats.

Rise of extremist activities in the MENA region coupled with chaotic personal agendas functions as another primary factor (security and interregional) that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region.

Bad state of the affected States' economy, rising gap between the rich and the poor and decrease in FDI inflows/outflows, exports, and tourism have negatively affected the economic equilibrium of the MENA region. Fear of worsening economic situations and the spread of this fear, coupled with petrodollar monopoly have created adversities across the global economy and affected the geopolitical stability of MENA region.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The popular uprisings of Arab Spring that shook the foundations of the MENA region revived the concept of political and social movements in the 21st century advanced world. Social movements have tirelessly impacted the political and socioeconomic aspects of the human society, and the Arab Spring proved as a definitive case for SMT analysis. The study highlighted the political and socioeconomic background of the Arab Spring uprisings, and highlighted the need for conducting a study on the movement called Arab Spring, by identifying the impact of Arab Spring uprisings on the geopolitical stability of the MENA region. While the background of the uprisings along with the literature review identified political and socioeconomic background of Arab Spring, need existed in determining the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings, recognizing the effect of Arab Spring founded on the strengths and challenges of the MENA region and ascertaining the possible factors that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region to understand: the collective behavior and action that represented relative dissatisfaction/deprivation and conflicts across the MENA region and channeled a mass movement through elucidating the concept of collective identities and informal networks.

With the use of interpretivism as the philosophy, inductive research approach, descripto-explanatory as the research purpose, the case of Arab Uprisings in the MENA region were studied using qualitative methods and research design. Valid literary articles, newspapers, credible journals, and websites exclusively clarified that, extremist radical political powers took advantage of people's uprisings for freedom and justices. While people protested for freedom and dignity, radical extremists abused the empowered youth and converted the uprisings from 'peoples' revolutions' to Islamic awakening in order to establish Islamic regimes. The Arab Spring uprisings thus turned from a socio-political revolution to personalized radical mission.

The Arab Spring uprisings further replaced autocratic secular regime with theocratic Islamic regimes. While the Arab Spring uprisings started with a call for democratic and free rule, it resulted as a nightmare of religious and sectarian violence in the name of fighting for freedom and democracy, and then to establish Islamic semi-theocratic and theocratic regimes. This aspect opens door to global fear, given its potential to recreate closed and isolated societies across the MENA region that fail to discern the idea of politics or governing given the presence of long repressive and totalitarian rule across the MENA region. Thus, with minimal or absence of political awareness, citizens of the MENA region fail to participate in the politics or governing of the State, since theocratic regimes breed people to believe that, the business of running the State vests in the hand of God's people or leaders. Just like Muslim Brotherhood's action of convincing Egyptians with their slogan 'Islam is the solution', people under

such religious radicals, are bound to view freedom and justice from the eyes of political Islamism. This eventually results in domination of extreme religious mentality.

Radical religious agendas considered personal freedoms and liberties as their most dangerous enemy and the sources of society corruption; therefore, whenever hardline Islamist party won elections, people used to see off their rights and personal liberties. Arab Spring uprisings failed to provide freedom to the society. They plied on the high illiteracy rates of the MENA region (nearly two-third of MENA population are uneducated and have no ability to read and write) who failed to discern the concepts of freedom, democracy, or rights, and pushed the MENA region further into low levels of poverty.

The Arab Spring uprisings resulted in declining economies and bad living standards, and pushed people to thinking religion and religious ideologies as solutions to the prevalent economic and social problems. Thus, many countries across the MENA region turned as subordinates to foreign political agendas at the expense of their independence and sovereignty, given their dependency on foreign aids.

Sectarian and religious tensions backed by Iran and Saudi Arabia became a timed fuse to full-scale war in MENA. Chaos and violence is evident in the MEAN region. Emergence of powerful and influencing radical organizations of regional and international nature (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood) that have military wings and even affiliated to global terrorist groups exemplifies this. Many countries in MENA have become practically failed states with dysfunctional governments and scanty sovereignty

where government cannot extend its authority and rule of law over all its lands. The governance of terrorist groups has become true and more realistic where terrorist groups dominate territories cross borders of many countries and impose strict form of religious radical laws, rule of radicalism, and extremism, the current situation where northeastern of Syria and entire northwestern of Iraq are under the radical rule of ISIS.

With the rise of political and military radicalism, Christianity and other ethno-religious indigenous minorities are more endangered and on the way of extinction due to discrimination, blackmailing, intimidation, forcible displacement, violence, ethnic cleansing, and mass murder, the case of Mosul proved this situation extremely when Christians were forced to common exodus.

Islamists came to power just to avenge their secular opponents with no economic or social development plans or future insight for economy or society. Social conflict is highly prevalent between seculars and religious regarding the governance of the State. While people had no way to get rid of religious parties who seized power in the name of God, the only help they found was the army, something made people to prefer governance of juntas and military council over theocracy. In this manner, the Arab Spring uprisings have collectively and negatively impacted the political, social, security, interregional, economic, and financial systems of the MENA region. Thus, it is clearly visible that, the Arab Spring has negatively impacted the geo-political stability of the MENA region.

APPENDIX

CITED FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1.1 Arab World polity score compared to other regions 1960-2000 (Elbedawi and Makdisi, 2010)




Figure 1.2 Arab World Median and Average polity compared to world 1980-2002 (Elbedawi and Makdisi, 2010)




Table 1.1 Corruption score and ranking of MENA countries 2008 (Transparency International, 2008)

Country	Score	Ranking	Country	Score	Ranking
Qatar	6.50	28	Lebanon	3.00	102
UAE	5.90	35	Egypt	2.80	115
Bahrain	5.40	43	Mauritania	2.80	115
Oman	5.50	41	Comoros	2.50	134
Jordan	5.10	47	Libya	2.60	126
Kuwait	4.30	65	Yemen	2.30	141
Tunisia	4.40	62	Syria	2.10	147
Morocco	3.50	80	Sudan	1.60	173
Saudi Arabia	3.50	80	Iraq	1.30	178
Algeria	3.20	92	Somalia	1.00	180

Table 1.2 Real GDP percentages to inflation rate in sample of Arab Spring countries 2010-2013 (Khan, 2014)

	Real GDP (percentage change)				Inflation (percent)			
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2011	2012	2013
Egypt	5.1	1.8	2.2	1.8	11.4	10.0	7.8	8.6
Jordan	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.5	5.0	4.4	4.8	6.0
Libya	5.0	-62.1	104.5	-5.0	2.5	16.0	6.1	4.0
Morocco	3.6	5.0	2.7	5.0	1.0	0.9	1.3	2.3
Tunisia	2.9	-1.9	3.6	3.3	4.4	3.5	5.6	6.0
Yemen	7.7	-12.7	2.4	6.0	11.2	19.5	9.9	12.0

Figure 1.3 Population Explosion in North Africa 1950-2010 and expectations till 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d. and Cordesman, 2011)




Figure 1.4 Population Explosion in Middle East 1950-2010 and expectations till 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d. and Cordesman, 2011)




Figure 1.5 Population Explosion in Gulf region 1950-2010 and expectations till 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d. and Cordesman, 2011)




Figure 1.6 Percentage of youth bulge in MENA between ages 0-14 years (CIA World Factbook, 2011 and Cordesman, 2011)




Figure 1.7 Food prices in Arab countries January 2004 – May 2011 (Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam, 2011)




Figure 1.8 Percentage of Tunisian posts based on six keywords November 2010 - May 2011 (Howard et al, 2011)




Figure 1.9 Escalating numbers of tweets on Mubarak resign January – March 2011
(Howard et al, 2011)




Figure 1.10 Increasing tweets on events in neighboring countries January - April 2011
(Howard et al, 2011)




Figure 3.1 ISIS controlling areas across borders in Iraq and Syria, and route to Mosul seizure (DEBKAFfile, 2014)




Table 3.1 Intended work of foreign fighters in Iraq by nationality (Combating Terrorism Center, 2012)

Country	Suicide Bombers	Fighters	Other
Saudi Arabia	47.6 % (70)	50.3 % (74)	2.0 %
Libya	85.0 % (51)	13.3 % (8)	1.6 %
Morocco	91.6 % (22)	8.3 % (2)	0
Syria	65.5 % (19)	31.0 % (9)	3.1 %
Algeria	10.7 % (5)	82.3 % (28)	2.9 %
Yemen	45.9 % (17)	54.1 % (20)	0
Tunisia	41.7 % (10)	58.3 % (14)	0

Figure 3.2 Muslim Brotherhood's activities since 1948 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013)




Figure 3.3 FDI net inflows (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison with 2010 (The World Bank Group, 2014)




Figure 2.4 Total Reserves (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison with 2010 (The World Bank Group, 2014)




Figure 3.5 Gross Savings Percentage of GDP (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison with 2010 (The World Bank Group, 2014)




Figure 3.6 YOY Percentage change in net migration in the MENA region for 2012 in comparison with 2007 (The World Bank Group, 2014).




Table 3.2 GDP at market prices (2010) and current account balances/ GDP percentage for countries in MENA region (World Bank, 2014)

Algeria								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	3.6	3.6	2.6	3.3	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.6
Current account bal/GDP (%)	22.4	7.5	9.7	6.4	1.4	0.7	-1.7	-3.4
Djibouti								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	3.5	3.5	4.5	4.8	5.0	6.0	6.5	6.5
Current account bal/GDP (%)	..	-5.4	-14.1	-12.3	-13.1	-15.2	-13.0	-12.8
Egypt, Arab Rep.								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	4.4	3.5	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.1	3.2
<i>Fiscal Year Basis</i>	4.3	5.1	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.2
Current account bal/GDP (%)	1.1	-2.0	-2.6	-3.4	-1.9	-0.9	-1.5	-2.0
Iran, Islamic Rep.								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	4.6	5.9	2.7	-5.6	-1.7	1.5	2.0	2.3
Current account bal/GDP (%)	6.3	6.5	10.3	4.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0
Iraq								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	-1.0	5.9	10.2	10.3	4.2	5.9	6.7	8.2
Current account bal/GDP (%)	..	3.0	12.0	6.7	0.0	1.0	1.2	1.4
Jordan								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	6.1	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.5	4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%)	-4.4	-7.1	-12.0	-18.4	-15.8	-13.7	-12.4	-11.3
Lebanon								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	4.4	7.0	3.0	1.4	0.9	1.5	2.5	3.0
Current account bal/GDP (%)	-16.6	-20.3	-12.1	-3.9	-6.3	-6.8	-7.0	-7.2
Libya								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	3.8	5.0	-62.1	104.5	-9.4	-9.7	28.8	9.0
Current account bal/GDP (%)	..	22.5	9.2	29.1	-5.5	-28.0	-19.4	-18.0
Morocco								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	4.6	3.6	5.0	2.7	4.4	3.0	4.4	4.5
Current account bal/GDP (%)	-0.1	-4.3	-8.1	-9.9	-8.7	-7.9	-6.8	-5.8
Syrian Arab Republic								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _{b,c}	4.6	3.2	-3.4	-21.8	-22.5	-8.6	-6.2	1.7
Current account bal/GDP (%)	2.8	-0.6	-16.0	-18.7	-22.0	-16.8	-12.5	-8.6
Tunisia								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	4.2	3.0	-2.0	3.6	2.6	2.7	3.5	4.0
Current account bal/GDP (%)	-2.7	-4.7	-7.3	-8.1	-8.4	-7.5	-7.1	-6.3
Yemen, Rep.								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	3.5	7.7	-12.6	2.4	4.0	5.9	4.2	3.8
Current account bal/GDP (%)	1.1	-3.7	-4.2	-0.9	-3.0	-3.4	-3.7	-4.2
West Bank and Gaza								
GDP at market prices (% annual growth) _b	2.4	9.2	12.2	5.9	1.5	2.5	2.7	2.9
Current account bal/GDP (%)	..	-24.3	-32.0	-36.4	-29.5	-30.4	-29.6	-29.4

Table 3.3 International capital flows to developing countries (World Bank, 2014)

International capital flows to developing countries (% of GDP) 5					
	5.2	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.1
Developing countries	4.8	6.1	5.9	5.4	5.0
Net capital inflows	7.3	6.9	8.0	8.4	8.0
East Asia and Pacific	5.4	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.5
Europe and Central Asia	2.3	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8
Latin America and Caribbean	5.6	3.9	4.5	4.5	4.4
Middle East and North Africa	6.4	5.8	5.2	5.3	5.4
South Asia					
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.4	2.8	3.4	3.5

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